Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case Number: 23GDCV00818, Date: 2025-01-23 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 23GDCV00818, Date: 2025-01-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23GDCV00818 Hearing Date: January 23, 2025 Dept: E

Case No: 23GDCV00818
Hearing Date: 01/23/2025 – 8:30am

Trial Date: UNSET

Case Name: EDDIE SATRUSTEGUI v. MICHAEL ARTHUR SANDMAN, et al.

[TENTATIVE RULING – MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS]

Moving Party: Defendant, Miles Sandman as Trustee for the Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor’s Trust)

Responding Party: Plaintiff, Eddie Satrustegui

Moving Papers: Notice/Motion; Request for Judicial Notice; Proposed Order

Opposition Papers: Opposition

Reply Papers: Reply

Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300(c)): Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP § 1005(b), CRC 3.1300(a)): Ok
Correct Address: (CCP § 1013, § 1013a, § 1013b): Ok

RELIEF REQUESTED
“MILES SANDMAN AS TRUSTEE FOR THE FRED HAMMOND FAMILY TRUST (SURVIVOR’S TRUST) (erroneously sued as MARGARET HAMMOND TRUST AND HAMMOND TRUST) (“Defendant”) will and hereby does move this Court for an order granting judgment on the Complaint by Plaintiff EDDIE SATRUSTEGUI (“Plaintiff”) as to the (i) first cause of action for Battery, and (ii) second cause of action for Negligence-Premises Liability, against Defendant for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Specifically, that Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action are barred by Probate Code sections 9100, 9103, 9351, 9370, and 19008 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 366.2 and 377.41.

This Motion is based on Code of Civil Procedure section 438, and the Court’s inherent authority to grant judgment on the pleadings as to an entire pleading or any cause of action or defense therein at any time prior to trial or at trial itself. This motion is further based upon this Notice; the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the Declaration of Kirsten A. Brown, filed herewith; the records and files of the Court in this action; and upon such further evidence and argument as may be presented prior to or at the time of the hearing on the Motion.

This Motion will also be based on the Defendant’s corresponding Request for Judicial Notice asking the Court to take judicial notice of the following matters and related documents (or lack thereof):

1. The death of Margaret Hammond on November 21, 2023 and her residence at that time, as confirmed in her Certificate of Death issued by the County of Los Angeles, Department of Public Health (Evidence Code 452(h));

2. The lack of any probate opened for Margaret Hammond in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, which is the appropriate venue given the location of her residence at the time of her death (Evidence Code 452(d)); and

3. The lack of any creditor claim filed by Plaintiff against Margaret Hammond’s estate and/or trust in the Los Angeles County Superior Court on or before November 21, 2024 (Evidence Code 452(d))”

(Def. Notice, p. 2-3.)

PROCEDURAL

Meet and Confer
Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc. § 439(a).)

“A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (CCP §439(a)(4).)

Here, Defendant’s counsel alleged that a meet and confer occurred. (See Brown Decl. ¶¶ 2-5.)

LEGAL STANDARD – MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
If moving party is a defendant, a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made if either of the following conditions exist: (1) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint, or (2) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. (CCP § 438(c)(1)(B).)

“The grounds for motion provided for in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. Where the motion is based on a matter of which the court may take judicial notice pursuant to Section 452 or 453 of the Evidence Code, the matter shall be specified in the notice of motion, or in the supporting points and authorities, except as the court may otherwise permit.” (CCP § 438(d).)

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself. [Citation.]” (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.) “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 (Citations Omitted).) The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).)

TENTATIVE RULING

The Court has grave concerns as to both parties’ arguments. Both parties’ papers are written, in the Court’s view, in a confusing manner that do not assist the Court in evaluating the parties’ arguments.

Plaintiff, Eddie Satrustegui, filed the instant action on 4/24/2023.

The caption of the Complaint lists the Defendants as – (1) Michael Arthur Sandman; (2) Margaret Hammond, an individual; (3) Margaret Hammond Trustee, Margaret Hammond Trust; and (4) Hammond Trust.

However, the body the Complaint lists only Maragaret Hammond (presumably the individual) and Margaret Hammond Trustee for the Margaret Hammond Trust.

That is, to highlight the Court’s point, the body of the Complaint does not list the actual Margaret Hammond Trust; it lists only Margaret Hammond the individual and Margaret Hammond the trustee for the Margaret Hammond Trust.

The Complaint alleges two causes of action – (1) Battery and (2) Negligence – Premises Liability.

Plaintiff alleges he was punched by Defendant Michael Sandman in the face and sustained multiple fractures to his left cheek bone causing his cheek to become permanently concave.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Michael Sandman resided with his grandmother Margaret Hammond. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Michael Sandman was invited to reside at his grandmother’s home by his grandmother, and that she had actual notice of Michael Sandman’s violent propensities and willingly assumed the consequences of Michael Sandman residing upon her premises where the injury occurred.

On 9/30/2024, a doe amendment was filed naming Doe 1 as The Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor’s Trust), and on 10/16/2024, a doe amendment was filed naming Doe 2 as Miles Sandman, as the Trustee for the Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor’s Trust).

On 12/3/2024, counsel for Miles Sandman as Trustee for the Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor’s Trust) and Plaintiff’s counsel filed a stipulation which stated:

1. On April 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this matter.

2. Plaintiff named Margaret Hammond, individually and as Trustee of the Margaret Hammond Trust and Hammond Trust.

3. Margaret Hammond died on November 21, 2023.

4. On August 14, 2024, Miles Sandman filed an Answer as Trustee for the Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor's Trust)

5. Miles Sandman, Trustee confirms that the Margaret Hammond Trust and the Hammond Trust do not exist.

6. On September 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Doe Amendment naming Doe 1 as the Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor's Trust) as a Defendant.

7. On October 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Doe Amendment naming Doe 2 as Miles Sandman, Trustee of the Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor's Trust) as a Defendant.

8. The parties seek to stipulate that the Answer filed on August 14, 2024, by Miles Sandman, Trustee be treated as a timely answer to the Doe Amendment for Doe 2.

9. Upon receipt of a fully executed copy of this Stipulation, Plaintiff agrees to dismiss Defendants Doe 1, Margaret Hammond, Trustee of the Margaret Hammond Trust, and the Hammond Trust from this action.

10. Defendant Miles Sandman, Trustee confirms that at the time of the events that gave rise to the action, Margaret Hammond, Trustee of the Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor's Trust) was the owner of the real property of 639 E. Cypress, Glendale, CA 91205 (the “Cypress House”).

11. Upon Margaret's death, Miles Sandman became Trustee of the Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor's Trust).

12. Defendant Miles Sandman, Trustee confirms that at the time of the events that gave rise to the action, the Margaret Hammond Trust and the Hammond Trust were not owners of the Cypress House and are not now owners since those trusts never existed.

13. This stipulation shall not serve as an implied waiver of any defense or be considered an admission of liability to this action.

IS IT THEREFORE STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between the parties, through their respective counsel, as follows:

1. Based upon the representations made by Miles Sandman and his counsel herein, Plaintiff has filed a Doe Amendment naming Doe 2 as Miles Sandman, Trustee of the Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor's Trust) as Defendant owner of the subject property referred to herein as the Cypress House, and shall file a request to dismiss without prejudice Defendants: (1) the Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor's Trust) (Doe 1), Margaret Hammond, Trustee of the Margaret Hammond Trust, and the Hammond Trust.

2. That Miles Sandman, Trustee's Answer filed on August 14, 2024, shall be considered a timely Answer to the Complaint and Doe Amendment on behalf of Miles Sandman, Trustee of the Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor's Trust), as Doe 2.

3. That the Trustee of the Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor's Trust) is and shall be deemed to be the only owner of the Cypress House for all purposes and all time periods relevant to this action and all causes of action asserted herein, and that therefore all of the following is absolutely and irrevocably agreed among the parties hereto:

a. Miles Sandman, as the current successor trustee of said Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor's Trust) is the proper party defendant to respond to Plaintiff’s claims against the owner of the Cypress House; and

b. Miles Sandman, Trustee of the Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor's Trust), waives the right to assert in this action that any other person or entity has any liability in this action based upon the legal ownership of the Cypress House.

(12/3/2024 Stipulation.)

The Court points this out because the stipulation is not entirely clear as to which Defendants are dismissed. The stipulation makes clear that Doe 1, The Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor’s Trust), is dismissed. It also makes clear that Margaret Hammond, Trustee of the Margaret Hammond Trust, and the Hammond Trust is dismissed.

The stipulation itself does not make clear if Margaret Hammond the individual is dismissed.

However, the Court also notes that the 12/17/2024 order of dismissal noted that Margaret Hammond was dismissed without prejudice. Further, the 12/17/2024 Minute Order stated that Margaret Hammond was dismissed without prejudice.

To the Court’s understanding, the dismissal of Margaret Hammond is referring to the individual and not as to Margaret Hammond, Trustee, nor as to the Hammond Trust because the stipulation already dismissed Margaret Hammond Trustee, and it dismissed the Hammond Trust.

All that being said, on 12/16/2024, Defendant, Miles Sandman as Trustee for the Fred Hammond Family Trust (Survivor’s Trust) filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The Court would like Movant to explain why CCP § 366.2 applies to the instant action.

Movant argues that CCP § 366.2 imposes a strict one-year limitations period for claims against a decedent.

Movant cites to CCP § 366.2:

(a) If a person against whom an action may be brought on a liability of the person, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, and whether accrued or not accrued, dies before the expiration of the applicable limitations period, and the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced within one year after the date of death, and the limitations period that would have been applicable does not apply.

(b) The limitations period provided in this section for commencement of an action shall not be tolled or extended for any reason except as provided in any of the following, where applicable:

(1) Sections 12, 12a, and 12b of this code.

(2) Part 4 (commencing with Section 9000) of Division 7 of the Probate Code (creditor claims in administration of estates of decedents).

(3) Part 8 (commencing with Section 19000) of Division 9 of the Probate Code (payment of claims, debts, and expenses from revocable trust of deceased settlor).

(4) Former Part 3 (commencing with Section 21300) of Division 11 of the Probate Code (no contest clauses), as that part read prior to its repeal by Chapter 174 of the Statutes of 2008.

(CCP § 366.2.)

Movant appears to be arguing that since Decedent passed away on November 21, 2023, this action was not commenced within one year after the date of decedent’s death.

The Court does not understand Movant’s reliance on CCP § 366.2: this action was filed on 4/24/2023, and 4/24/2023 is before November 21, 2023.

Therefore, the Court does not understand how this action was not commenced within one year after the date of death of decedent.

Further, the Court would like Movant to address the fact that Movant’s argument is based on the decedent’s death, but the decedent in question, Margaret Hammond was dismissed from this action.

To add further confusion to Movant’s motion, despite Movant relying on CCP § 366.2 to argue that there is a strict one-year limitations period for claims against a decedent, Movant simultaneously relies on Probate Code § 9370 which states:

(a) An action or proceeding pending against the decedent at the time of death may not be continued against the decedent’s personal representative unless all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) A claim is first filed as provided in this part.

(2) The claim is rejected in whole or in part.

(3) Within three months after the notice of rejection is given, the plaintiff applies to the court in which the action or proceeding is pending for an order to substitute the personal representative in the action or proceeding. This paragraph applies only if the notice of rejection contains a statement that the plaintiff has three months within which to apply for an order for substitution.

(b) No recovery shall be allowed in the action against property in the decedent’s estate unless proof is made of compliance with this section.

(Prob. Code § 9370.)

Movant appears to be citing to Prob. Code § 9370 because Plaintiff did not file a claim under Prob. Code § 9370(a)(1) and because Plaintiff cannot recover under Prob. Code § 9370(b).

What is confusing about Movant’s simultaneous citation to CCP § 366.2 and Probate Code § 9370 is the following. CCP § 366.2 is in Chapter 6 which is titled, “Time of Commencement of Action After Person’s Death.” However, Probate Code § 9370 is in Article 2 titled, “Claim Where Action or Proceeding Pending.” Therefore, the Court is confused how Movant is simultaneously relying on a section that deals with the timeliness of commencing an action after death (CCP § 366.2) and a section that pertains to rules when a claim where action or proceeding is pending (Prob. Code § 9370). This seems to be a contradiction. Perhaps not. The Court will hear from the parties.

Further, while Movant relies on Prob. Code § 9370, 9370 does not mention a timeliness requirement. Probate Code § 9370 does mention claim filing requirements, but none of those requirements appear to mention time limits.

Therefore, the Court would like Movant to address why it is relying on CCP § 366.2 because the Court is confused as to how Movant is relying on this section when Chapter 6 is titled, “Time of Commencement of Action After Person’s Death,” and Plaintiff commenced this action against Decedent before Decedent’s death. And, as already noted, Plaintiff dismissed the decedent.

The Court to hear argument.

Request for Judicial Notice

Movant requests judicial notice of the following:

3. The lack of any creditor claim filed by Plaintiff against Margaret Hammond’s Estate and/or Trust in the Los Angeles County Superior Court on or before November 21, 2024 (Evidence Code section 452(d)).

(Def. RJN, p. 2.)

Under Evidence Code § 452:

Judicial notice may be taken of the following matters to the extent that they are not embraced within Section 451:

(a) The decisional, constitutional, and statutory law of any state of the United States and the resolutions and private acts of the Congress of the United States and of the Legislature of this state.

(b) Regulations and legislative enactments issued by or under the authority of the United States or any public entity in the United States.

(c) Official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States.

(d) Records of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States.

(e) Rules of court of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States.

(f) The law of an organization of nations and of foreign nations and public entities in foreign nations.

(g) Facts and propositions that are of such common knowledge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute.

(h) Facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.

(Evid. Code § 452.)

The Court will hear argument about Movant’s request for judicial notice. The Court is inclined to take judicial notice as requested.