Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case Number: 23GDCV01015, Date: 2024-03-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 23GDCV01015, Date: 2024-03-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23GDCV01015 Hearing Date: March 8, 2024 Dept: E

Hearing Date: 03/08/2024 – 8:30am
Case No.: 23GDCV01015
Trial Date: UNSET
Case Name:

Complaint: Meri Iskandaryan, an individual; v. LA COUNTY METRO TRANS AUTHORITY, a Public Entity; MICHAEL JAY AHN, an individual; and DOES 1-50

Cross-Complaint: LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY v. MERI ISKANDARYAN; and ROES 1-10 inclusive

2 TENTATIVE RULINGS – COMPEL RESPONSES

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Meri Iskandaryan filed a Complaint on 05/16/2023 against Defendants LA County Metro Trans Authority and Michael Jay Ahn.

On 07/20/2023, Cross-Complainant, Los Angeles Country Metropolitan Transportation Authority, filed a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendant, Meri Iskandaryan.

MOTION 1

Moving Party: Cross-Defendant, Meri Iskandaryan

Responding Party: Cross-Complainant, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority

Moving Papers: Motion; Proposed Order

Opposition Papers: Declaration of Joel F. Citron

Reply: No Reply as of 3/7/2024

RELIEF REQUESTED¿

“Cross-Defendant, MERI ISKANDARYAN, will move the Court for an Order compelling Cross-Complainant, LA COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, to serve answers to Form Interrogatories, Set One, which were served on the Cross-Complainant on August 17, 2023, and will further move this Court for an order requiring Cross-Complainant LA COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY and/or its attorneys Joel F. Citron, Esq. and Thomas H. Citron at the CITRON & CITRON Law Firm to pay to Cross-Defendant, MERI ISKANDARYAN his reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in obtaining this order in the amount of $461.65.

The motion will be made on the grounds that Cross-Complainant has not responded to this discovery request, that the information sought by said request is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and is not privileged, and that the failure of Cross-Complainant to respond to this discovery request is without substantial justification. The motion will be based on this notice of motion, on the Declaration of ANNA SARGSYAN served and filed herewith, on the Memorandum of Points and Authorities served and filed herewith, on the papers and records on file herein, and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing of the motion.”

Procedural

16/21 Day Lapse (CCP § 12c and § 1005(b): Ok
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300): Ok
Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a): Yes/No – Moving party, Cross-Defendant, did not serve the moving papers on the email address that is listed on eCourt for Cross-Complainant’s counsel. However, Cross-Complainant submitted an untimely declaration in Opposition that essentially opposed this motion. The Cross-Complainant’s declaration did not argue that the instant motion was not served at the proper email address; the declaration argued why the instant motion should not be granted.

LEGAL STANDARD – COMPEL RESPONSES, INTERROGATORIES

Within 30 days after service of interrogatories, the party to whom the interrogatories are propounded shall serve the original of the response to them on the propounding party, unless on motion of the propounding party the court has shortened the time for response, or unless on motion of the responding party the court has extended the time for response. (CCP § 2030.260(a).)

If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling response to the interrogatories. (CCP § 2030.290(b).)

“The party to whom the interrogatories are directed waives any right to exercise the option to produce writings under Section 2030.230, as well as any objection to the interrogatories, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010). The court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with Sections 2030.210, 2030.220, 2030.230, and 2030.240. (2) The party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” (CCP § 2030.290(a).)

Unlike a motion to compel further responses, a motion to compel responses is not subject to a 45-day time limit, and the propounding party does not have to demonstrate either good cause or that it satisfied a “meet and confer” requirement. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 404 [citing Weil and Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2006) ¶¶8:1137 to 8:1144, pp. 8F-59 to 8F-60, ¶¶ 8:1483 to 8:1489, pp. 8H-29 to hH-30].)

ANALYSIS

Cross-Defendant, Meri Iskandaryan (Movant), argues that initial responses to her Form Interrogatories, Set One, have not been received; therefore, responses should be compelled. Movant does not state which statute she is moving under as her legal authority to compel responses, she simply states that discovery was served, and since no responses have been received, the Court should compel responses. Presumably, Movant is implying that since initial responses were not received within 30 days, Movant is entitled to responses. [To compel initial responses to form interrogatories, the appropriate code section is CCP §2030.290.]

A formal opposition was not submitted by the opposing party (Cross-Complainant, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority), but a declaration was submitted by its counsel, Joel F. Citron. Presumably the opposition intended for the declaration to be its opposition. This opposition was submitted late. This declaration states that initial responses were submitted timely and provides the proofs of service for its initial responses to the form interrogatories,

TENTATIVE RULING

The Court’s inclination is to DENY the motion, but the Court will hear argument.

Sanctions

In the motion to compel responses to form interrogatories, Movant does not cite to the appropriate code section of § 2030.290(c) to request sanctions. Movant simply cites to § 2030.030 in general as its basis for requesting sanctions. Movant does not even state the specific sub-section of § 2030.030 as to what its basis it is requesting sanctions.

Plaintiff should have moved for sanctions under § 2030.290(c). Section 2030.290 states in relevant part:

The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

(CCP § 2030.290(c).)

“The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).)

The Court will hear argument as to Movant’s request for sanctions in the amount of $461.65.

MOTION 2

Moving Party: Cross-Defendant, Meri Iskandaryan

Responding Party: Cross-Complainant, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority

Moving Papers: Motion; Proposed Order

Opposing Papers: Declaration of Joel F. Citron

Reply: No Reply as of 3/7/2024

RELIEF REQUESTED¿

“Cross-Defendant, Meri Iskandaryan, will move the Court for an Order compelling Cross-Complainant, LA COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, to serve answers to Demand For Production And Inspection Of Documents, Set One which were served on the Cross-Complainant on August 17, 2023, and will further move this Court for an order requiring Cross-Complainant LA COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY and/or its attorneys Joel F. Citron, Esq. and Thomas H. Citron at the CITRON & CITRON Law Firm to pay to Cross-Defendant, MERI ISKANDARYAN his reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in obtaining this order in the amount of $461.65.

Procedural

LEGAL STANDARD – COMPEL RESPONSES, INSPECTION DEMANDS

Within 30 days after service of a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the party to whom the demand is directed shall serve the original of the response to it on the party making the demand, and a copy of the response on all other parties who have appeared in the action, unless on motion of the party making the demand, the court has shortened the time for response, or unless on motion of the party to whom the demand has been directed, the court has extended the time for response. (CCP § 2031.260(a).)

If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand. (CCP § 2031.300(b).)

If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the party to whom the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed waives any objection to the demand, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010). (CCP § 2031.300(a).) “The court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with Sections 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230, 2031.240, and 2031.280. (2) The party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” (CCP § 2031.300(a)(1)-(2).)

ANALYSIS
Cross-Defendant, Meri Iskandaryan (Movant), argues that initial responses to Demand for Production And Inspection of Documents, Set One, have not been received; therefore, responses should be compelled. Movant does not state which statute she is moving under as her legal authority to compel responses, she simply states that discovery was served, and since no responses have been received, the Court should compel responses. Presumably, Movant is implying that since initial responses were not received within 30 days, Movant is entitled to responses. [To compel initial responses to inspection demands, the appropriate code section is § 2031.300.]

A formal opposition was not submitted by the opposing party (Cross-Complainant, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority), but a declaration was submitted by its counsel, Joel F. Citron. Presumably the opposition intended for the declaration to be its opposition. This opposition was submitted late. This declaration states that initial responses were submitted timely and provides the proofs of service for its initial responses to the requests for production.

TENTATIVE RULING MOTION 2

The Court inclination is to DENY the motion, but the Court will hear argument.

Sanctions

Movant cites to § 2031.310, without specifying a specific subsection, as its legal authority for requesting sanctions. Confusingly, § 2031.310 pertains to compelling further responses and not initial responses to requests for production, so it is unclear why Movant cites this section as its legal authority for requesting sanctions. Movant should have cited to 2031.300(c).

In relevant part, § 2031.300(c) states as follows:

Except as provided in subdivision (d), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

(CCP § 2031.300(c).)

The Court will hear argument as to Movant’s request for sanctions in the amount of $461.65.