Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 23GDCV01018, Date: 2025-03-21 Tentative Ruling
Hearing Date: 03/20/2025 – 8:30am
Case No. 24NNCV03633
Trial Date: UNSET
Case Name: GUISHENG XU, an individual, v. JIAQI
HAN, an individual; FUZHOU LIU, an individual; YINMING LIU, an individual;
FIRST STOP AUTO LLC, a California limited liability company; and DOES 1 to 10,
inclusive
TENTATIVE RULING ON MOTION TO VACATE AND
SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT
RELIEF
REQUESTED¿¿¿
“Defendant YINMING LIU will and hereby does move this court for an
order vacating and setting aside the default entered on October 11, 2024, and
subsequent default judgment entered on February 4, 2025, on the grounds:
a) the Summons and Complaint purportedly
served on him by substituted service on August 27, 2024, were not properly
served on him and hence the default and default judgment are void;
b) alternatively, on the grounds set forth
in Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5.
A copy of Defendant’s proposed Demurrer is
attached to this Motion as Exhibit “C.”
The relief requested by this Motion is
based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points
and Authorities, the declarations of Defendant Yinming Liu and Eugene R. Long,
all pleadings and documents currently on file with the Court as well as such
other oral or documentary evidence as may be presented at the time of hearing
on this Motion.”
(Def. Mot. p. 2.)
PROCEDURAL
Moving Party: Defendant, Yinming Liu (Defendant
or Movant)
Opposing Party: Plaintiff, Guisheng Xu
Proof of Service
Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300(c)): Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP § 1005(b)): Ok
Proper Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a, § 1013b): Ok
Moving Papers: Notice/Motion [filed 2/10/2025]; Amended
Notice/Motion [filed 2/24/2025];
Opposition Papers: Opposition
Reply Papers: Reply
//
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Guisheng Xu, filed the instant action on 8/19/2024
against Defendants – (1) Jiaqi Han, an individual, (2) Fuzhou Liu, an
individual, (3) Yinming Liu, an individual, (4) First Stop Auto LLC, a California
limited liability company, and (5) Does 1 to 10, inclusive.
Entry of default was entered against all of the non-Doe Defendants
on 10/11/2024.
Does 1 to 10 were dismissed from the Complaint on 10/29/2024.
On 02/04/2025, default judgment was entered against (1)
Jiaqi Han, an individual, (2) Fuzhou Liu, an individual, (3) Yinming Liu, an
individual, and (4) First Stop Auto LLC, a California limited liability company.
For purposes of this hearing, the Court considers Defendant,
Yinming Liu’s, amended notice/motion filed on 2/24/2025 and not the earlier
filed notice/motion that was filed on 2/10/2025.
ANALYSIS
Preliminary Matter
In the instant action, Plaintiff filed four proofs of substituted
service on 8/29/2024 for all of the named Defendants in this action.
Moving Defendant, Yinming Liu, moves for an order to vacate and
set aside the default and default judgments entered against him on the basis
that he was not properly served.
Movant appears to move pursuant to CCP § 473(d), and in the
alternative, § 473.5.
The Court notes that neither party’s papers is a model of clarity.
For example, neither party makes clear why § 473(d) or § 473.5 is or is not the
appropriate statute to move under to vacate the default/default judgment.
Generally speaking, Defendant argues that service upon him was improper, and
Plaintiff argues that service upon Defendant was proper. To the Court, this
motion appears to be akin to a motion to quash service of summons. Either way,
since Defendant’s motion does not make clear why § 473(d) or § 473.5 is the
appropriate statute, and since Plaintiff did not oppose Defendant’s motion on
the grounds that those two statutes are not the proper statutes, the Court will
assume Defendant moved under the proper statute.
Substantive
On 8/29/2024, Plaintiff filed a proof of service of summons that
alleged substituted service on Defendant, Yinming Liu, on 8/27/2024.
Defendant, Yinming Liu, argues that service upon him was not
proper.
Compliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is
essential to establish personal jurisdiction. (American Express Centurion
Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 387.)
As to how Defendant believes that service upon him was improper is
not entirely clear. Many times Defendant asserts arguments without citing legal
authority. Or at times, Defendant will make reference to legal authority, but
in no clear manner does Defendant explain how his argument is tied to the legal
authority that he cited.
For example, Defendant first appears to argue that service upon
him was not valid because Plaintiff did not personally serve him.
The argument that service was improper because Defendant was not
personally served appears to be unavailing for several reasons.
First, Plaintiff’s proof of service lists service upon Defendant
via substituted service; it does not list service upon Defendant via personal
service.
Second, it does not appear that Defendant has to be personally
served, because substituted service is an alternative to personal service.
As explained in American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara:
The
Code of Civil Procedure specifies the various methods by which service may be
made upon defendants who are sued as individuals.
The
method described as “personal service” means service that is accomplished
“by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the
person to be served.” (§ 415.10.) If the complaint and summons were personally
delivered to, i.e., handed to, defendant then he could be said to have been
“personally served.”
A
defendant may also be “personally” served by delivering a copy of the summons
and complaint to an agent authorized to accept service on behalf of that
defendant. (§ 416.90; see Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil
Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2011) ¶¶ 4:128 to 4:132, pp. 4–19
to 4–21; (rev. # 1, 2010) ¶ 4:184, p. 4–27 (rev. # 1, 2004) (hereafter Weil
& Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial).) An authorized agent might include,
for example, an attorney who has been expressly authorized to accept service,
or a sheriff or jailer having custody of a prisoner. (Weil & Brown, Civil
Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 4:128, p. 4–19, ¶¶ 4:130.2,
4:132, pp. 4–20 to 4–21.)
Another
alternative available for serving individual defendants is what is commonly
known as “substitute service.” Substitute service on an individual is
accomplished by “leaving a copy of the summons and complaint **103 at
the person's dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or
usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office
box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person
apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing
address ..., at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents
thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint
by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place
where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.” (§ 415.20, subd. (b).)
However,
an individual may be served by substitute service only after a good faith
effort at personal service has first been made: the burden is on the plaintiff
to show that the summons and complaint “cannot with reasonable diligence be
personally delivered” to the individual defendant. (§ 415.20, subd. (b); Evartt
v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 795, 801, 152 Cal.Rptr.
836.) Two or three attempts to personally serve a defendant at a proper
place ordinarily qualifies as “ ‘reasonable diligence.’ ” (Weil & Brown,
Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 4:196, p. 4–30.)
(American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199
Cal.App.4th 383, 389.)
Thus, Defendant’s argument that service was improper because he
was not personally served is unavailing.
Substituted Service – Usual Place of Business
Further, Plaintiff’s proof of service checks a
box for substituted service via business to “a person at least 18 years of age
apparently in charge at the office or usual place of business of the person to
be served.” The proof of service also indicates that the documents were left
with “Jane Doe – Angela, refused last name (Gender: F Age: 35 Height : 6’0”
Weight: 120 Race: Asian American Hair: Black Other: Hazel Eyes) Manager.”
Under CCP § 415.20(b), substitute service is
effectuated when:
If
a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be
personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section
416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of
the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode,
usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States
Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the
household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of
business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service
post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents
thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint
by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place
where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. Service of a summons in
this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing.
(CCP § 415.20(b).)
Defendant appears to be
arguing that substitute service was not proper under § 415.20(b) because he was
not served at his “usual place of business,” and because service was not left with
“a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or
usual mailing address.”
Attached to the motion,
the declaration of Defendant Yinming Liu is attached.
In relevant part, Liu’s declaration states:
2.
Plaintiff Guisheng Xu, states that service of a Summons and Complaint was
affected [sic] by substitute service on me on August 27, 2024. Plaintiff claims
that substitute service was made by serving on one Jane Doe – “Angela” -- who
refused to provide her last name, who held a position as a “Manager.” I do not
know this individual nor do I have any personal or business relationship with
her.
3.
The address of 314 Garvey Avenue Monterey Park, CA
91755 is a small building with several businesses at that location, and it is
not my place of business. The building does not have any front desk person
or onsite management office. The corporate defendant First Stop Auto LLC is a
dormant entity with no revenue, employees, or operations. It does not have any
manager, employees, or representatives at that address.
4.
I first became aware of this lawsuit on January 2, 2025, upon receipt of a
WeChat message from defendant Fuzhou Liu. A review of the lawsuit revealed that
it concerns a dispute concerning an unpaid loan of $50,000 between two
individuals, Plaintiff and Mr. Fuzhou Liu. It has nothing to do with me as an
individual or the corporate defendant, First Stop Auto LLC.
5.
On February 4, 2025, I appeared at the Court and sought to express my position
to the Court. The Court advised me that it cannot give me any legal advice and
the only advice to me was to retain a lawyer to file a motion for relief.
Accordingly, I have retained the law firm of WHGC, PLC to file this Motion.
(Liu
Decl. ¶¶ 2-5.)
To the extent that
Defendant is arguing that substitute service was not proper under § 415.20(b)
because he was not served at his “usual place of business,” Defendant’s
declaration appears to address this in ¶ 3 of the Liu declaration wherein Liu
states, “The address of 314 Garvey Avenue Monterey Park, CA 91755 is a small
building with several businesses at that location, and it is not my place of
business.” (Liu Decl. ¶ 3.)
In Opposition, Plaintiff
argues that Defendant Yinming Liu was in fact properly substitute served at his
“usual place of business.” Plaintiff argues that Liu is making
misrepresentations to the Court and that the 314 Garvey address is in fact Liu’s
“usual place of business.”
To support this
argument, Plaintiff attaches the declaration of Plaintiff’s attorney (Tom F.Y.
King), along with Exhibits A-E cited in King’s declaration.
King states as follows:
2. In or about August 2024, I searched,
downloaded, and printed a statement of information filed with California
Secretary of State filed by Yinming Liu on behalf First Stop Auto LLC on August
13, 2024. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the
statement of information I obtained from California Secretary of State website.
It shows Yingming Liu as the CEO, member, manager, and agent for service of
process of First Stop Auto LLC, located at 314 E Garvey Ave, Monterey Park, CA
91755.
3. Previously, before Yinming Liu filed the
August 13, 2024 statement, I also searched and download a statement of
information Yinming Liu filed with California Secretary of State the year
before on July 5, 2023, which also shows Yinming Liu as the CEO, member,
manager, and agent for service of process of First Stop Auto LLC located at 314
E Garvey Ave, Monterey Park, CA 91755. A true and correct copy of said
statement is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
4. In January 2025, after the three individual
defendants appeared in court to try to argue their case on January 16, 2025, I
searched, found, and download from California Secretary of State website a
statement of information filed by Yinming Liu on January 3, 2025 moving the
company address to 797 E Arrow Hwy, Azusa, CA 91702, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit C. I also found and downloaded a statement of
information filed on January 16, 2025 by co-defendants Jiaqi Han moving the
company address back to 314 E Garvey Ave, Monterey Park, CA 91755 and removing
Yinming Liu's name from the company. A true and correct copy of said statement
is attached hereto as Exhibit D.
5. As a result of the two successively filed
statement of information First Stop Auto LLC filed with California Secretary of
State in January 2025, all previously filed statement of information were
purged from the public record. I inquired on this matter online and discovered
that it is the policy of California Secretary of State to only keep the two
most recently filed statement of information for an entity for public record.
Attached hereto are search results from Google based on the search terms
"California Secretary of State purging prior statement of
information." The search result shows a general result followed by links
to specific webpage results. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a page from
the general search result and a specific search results from California
Secretary of State website.
(King Decl. ¶¶ 2-5.)
However, even assuming
the truth of King’s declaration and the attached exhibits, Plaintiff’s argument
is not on point and appears to miss the mark.
For example, to the
extent that the California Secretary of State lists Yinming Liu as manager,
member, CEO, and agent for service of process at the 314 E Garvey address, that
information is applicable to First Stop Auto LLC. That information says nothing
about the Defendant as an individual that is filing the instant motion. The
instant proof of service that Defendant is arguing is improper is the proof of
service as to the individual, Yinming Liu. Yinming Liu is arguing that the 314
address is not his usual place of business. At best, the information
attached from the California Secretary of State would maybe seem to indicate
that Yinming Liu could accept service at the 314 E Garvey address for First
Stop Auto LLC since he was listed as agent of service of process for First Stop
Auto LLC. However, to reiterate, that information says nothing about where
Yinming Liu, the individual’s usual place of business is. At best, it may show
where First Stop Auto LLC’s usual place of business is. Ultimately, First Stop
Auto LLC is not moving to vacate default/quash service of summons. Here, moving
Defendant is Yinming Liu the individual.
At best, maybe the
successive filings with the Secretary of State tests Liu’s credibility for
changing the address of First Stop Auto LLC and changing the name of the agent
for service of process. However, again, even assuming there were bad faith, the
Court fails to see how Plaintiff’s arguments addresses the usual place of
business of the moving Defendant, Yinming Liu, the individual.
Despite all this, in Defendant’s
Reply Defendant confusingly argues that even if 314 E Garvey were Liu’s place
of business, service was not proper because the crucial question is whether
service was proper where Plaintiff served an unknown individual at a location
that housed several other businesses where there is no indication that the
individual ever informed Liu of service.
Therefore, the Court
will hear argument from the parties about the “usual place of business” of Defendant.
Substituted Service –
Person Apparently in Charge of his or her office, place of business
The proof of service
pertaining to Defendant, Yinming Liu, states that Defendant was substitute
served at “314 E Garvey Ave Monterey Park, CA 91755.”
Further, Plaintiff’s
proof of service checks a box for substituted service via business to “a person
at least 18 years of age apparently in charge at the office or usual place of
business of the person to be served.” The proof of service also indicates that
the documents were left with “Jane Doe – Angela, refused last name (Gender: F
Age: 35 Height : 6’0” Weight: 120 Race: Asian American Hair: Black Other: Hazel
Eyes) Manager.”
Under CCP § 415.20(b),
substitute service is effectuated when:
If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot
with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served,
as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be
served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling
house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address
other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a
competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or
her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United
States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be
informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the
summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person
to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.
Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after
the mailing.
(CCP § 415.20(b).)
Defendant argues that the
individual who was served on Defendant’s behalf is not an individual with whom
Liu had any personal or business relationship.
Further, in relevant
part, Liu’s declaration states:
2. Plaintiff Guisheng Xu, states that service of
a Summons and Complaint was affected [sic]by substitute service on me on August
27, 2024. Plaintiff claims that substitute service was made by serving on one
Jane Doe – “Angela” -- who refused to provide her last name, who held a
position as a “Manager.” I do not know this individual nor do I have any
personal or business relationship with her.
3. The address of 314 Garvey Avenue Monterey
Park, CA 91755 is a small building with several businesses at that location,
and it is not my place of business. The building does not have any front desk
person or onsite management office. The corporate defendant First Stop Auto LLC
is a dormant entity with no revenue, employees, or operations. It does not have
any manager, employees, or representatives at that address.
4. I first became aware of this lawsuit on
January 2, 2025, upon receipt of a WeChat message from defendant Fuzhou Liu. A
review of the lawsuit revealed that it concerns a dispute concerning an unpaid
loan of $50,000 between two individuals, Plaintiff and Mr. Fuzhou Liu. It has
nothing to do with me as an individual or the corporate defendant, First Stop
Auto LLC.
5. On February 4, 2025, I appeared at the Court
and sought to express my position to the Court. The Court advised me that it
cannot give me any legal advice and the only advice to me was to retain a
lawyer to file a motion for relief. Accordingly, I have retained the law firm
of WHGC, PLC to file this Motion.
(Liu Decl. ¶¶ 2-5.)
Defendant’s argument –
that the individual who was served on Defendant’s behalf is not an individual
with whom Liu had any personal or business relationship – is confusing because
it isn’t entirely clear what portion of § 415.20(b) Defendant is arguing that
Plaintiff did not comply with.
Presumably, Defendant is
trying to argue that “Jane Doe – Angela” was not “a person apparently in charge
of his or her office, place of business,” and thus service was improper. Defendant’s
declaration does not state that Jane Does/Angela was not “a person apparently
in charge of his or her office or place of business” in any explicit terms.
Instead, the Liu declaration states in relevant part, “I do not know this
individual nor do I have any personal or business relationship with her.” (Liu
Decl. ¶ 2.)
In Opposition, Plaintiff
does not address Defendant’s argument regarding the individual that was
allegedly served in any clear manner. Plaintiff’s Opposition seems to mainly
contest that 314 E Garvey was in fact the usual place of business of Defendant.
It seems like Plaintiff attempts to argue that Defendant is not credible based
on the filing with the secretary of state because Defendant would know the
people at the 314 E Garvey address because it is his address.
In Reply, Defendant
argues that the key issue here is that Plaintiff served an unknown individual
that housed several other businesses where there is no indication that the
individual ever informed Liu of the service.
Here, the Court will
hear argument. Defendant appears to be arguing, although not explicitly stated
in Defendant’s motion or Defendant’s declaration, that “Jane Doe – Angela” was
not a person apparently in charge of his or her office, or place of business.
Opposition does not do much to contest this argument. Plaintiff’s Opposition
seems to just be implying that Defendant would in fact know who Angela is
because the 314 Garvey address is Defendant’s business. The Reply reiterates
that Defendant has no idea who Angela is and that there is no evidence to
suggest that she worked with or for Liu.
473.5
Under CCP § 473.5(a):
When service of a summons has not resulted in
actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default
judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve
and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and
for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed
within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of:
(i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180
days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or
default judgment has been entered.
(CCP § 473.5(a).)
Defendant argues that
the Summons and Complaint did not result in actual notice to Liu for Liu to
defend the action.
However, the Court notes
that neither party’s arguments regarding § 473.5 adds any further substance to
their arguments. Plaintiff’s arguments that Defendant did in fact have notice
are based on the same arguments previously discussed, i.e., Plaintiff argues
that Defendant is lying and in fact had notice because Defendant is/was CEO of
First Stop Auto LLC which is located at 314 E Garvey.
Overall
Dill v. Berquist
Construction Co. states:
It has been held that the filing of a proof of
service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper. (M.
Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Superior Court (1978) 80
Cal.App.3d 762, 770 [145 Cal.Rptr. 814], quoting from Judicial
Council Rep., supra, com. to § 417.10, p. 56; but see Johnson
& Johnson v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 243, 255, fn.
7 [211 Cal.Rptr. 517, 695 P.2d 1058], overruling Lowenstein on
a related issue.) However, that presumption arises only if the proof of
service complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.
(Dill v. Berquist
Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441-1442.)
Here,
Defendant appears to have shown how Plaintiff’s proof of service as to moving
Defendant did not comply with the statutory requirements for proof of
substituted service. Defendant appears to have shown this by showing that the
location served was not his usual place of business. Plaintiff’s argument in
Opposition appeared to be unavailing because at best Plaintiff may have shown
that the address served was First Stop Auto LLC’s usual place of business;
however, First Stop Auto LLC is not seeking to vacate the default/default
judgment. Here, moving Defendant is Yinming Liu. Plaintiff did not submit proof
or evidence about Yinming Liu, the individual’s, usual place of business. Even
setting aside the issue of “usual place of business” and focusing on whether or
not a “person apparently in charge of his or her office or place of business” was served, Defendant seems
to argue that he had no idea who the person is that Plaintiff served. In
Opposition, Plaintiff simply seems to argue that Defendant is lying and
Defendant would know who was served because the location served was where
Defendant’s business was located.
Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. states, “In the absence
of a voluntary submission to the authority of the court, compliance with the
statutes governing service of process is essential to establish that court’s
personal jurisdiction over a defendant. When a defendant challenges that jurisdiction
by bringing a motion to quash, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the
existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an
effective service.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 1426, 1439-1440.)
Tentatively,
the Court plans to GRANT, Defendant Yinming Liu’s motion to vacate the default
and default judgment entered against Yinming Liu. The Court notes that this
order does not apply to the other Defendants, as no other Defendants moved to
vacate default/judgment.
Case Number: 23GDCV01018 Hearing Date: March 21, 2025 Dept: E
Hearing Date: 03/21/2025 – 8:30am
Case No. 23GDCV01018
Trial Date: 08/04/2025
Case Name: LEONOR VAZQUEZ v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., a California
Corporation, and DOES 1-10, inclusive
TENTATIVE
RULING – MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RELIEF
REQUESTED¿
“Plaintiff
Leonor Vazquez will move the Court for an order compelling further responses to
Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 24-33,
37-38, and 44, and monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,860.00 against
Defendant AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., and its attorneys of record BOWMAN
AND BROOKE LLP. This motion is made on the grounds that Defendant has refused
to provide Code-compliant responses pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure,
section 2031.310, et seq. The motion will be based upon this notice, the
memorandum in support of the motion, declaration of Timothy Lupinek in support
of motion, Plaintiff’s separate statement of items in dispute, and the records
and files in this action.”
(Pl. Notice, p. 2.)
Preliminary Procedural
Moving
Party: Plaintiff, Leonor Vazquez (Plaintiff or Movant)
Responding Party: Defendant, American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Defendant or AHM)
16/21 Day Lapse (CCP § 12c and § 1005(b)): Ok
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300(c)): Ok
Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a, § 1013b): Plaintiff served the moving
papers via email/electronic transmission; however, Plaintiff did not serve the
email address that is listed on eCourt for defense counsel. That being said,
Defendant submitted opposition, thus Defendant appears to have received the
moving papers.
Moving Papers: Notice; Memorandum; Timothy Lupinek
Declaration; Separate Statement; Proposed Order;
Opposition Papers: Opposition; Separate Statement
Reply Papers: Reply
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff,
Lenor Vazquez, filed the instant action on 05/16/2023 against Defendant,
American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that on October 5, 2019,
Plaintiff purchased a new, 2019 Honda Insight.
Plaintiff alleges causes of action for: (1) Violation
of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty and (2) Fraudulent Inducement
– Concealment.
LEGAL STANDARD – COMPEL FURTHER – REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION
Under
CCP § 2017.010, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action..., if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” The Section specifically provides that
“[d]iscovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery
or of any other party to the action,” and that discovery “may be obtained of
the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable
matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition
and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible
thing, or land or other property.” (Ibid.)
CCP § 2031.310(a) provides that a party demanding a document
inspection may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if
the demanding party deems that:
“(1) A statement of
compliance with the demand is incomplete.
(2) A representation of inability to comply is
inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.
(3) An objection in the response is without
merit or too general.”
(CCP
§ 2031.310(a).)
“In the more specific context of a
demand for production of a tangible thing, the party who asks the trial court
to compel production must show “good cause” for the request—but unless there is
a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is
met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Services
Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)
PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS
45-Day Requirement
Unless
notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified
response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific
later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in
writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to
the demand. (CCP § 2031.310(c).)
Here, Plaintiff’s motion is timely. The parties agreed
that February 4, 2025 would be the filing deadline for this motion, and the
instant motion was filed on February 4, 2025. (Lupinek Decl. ¶ 15.)
Meet and Confer
“The
motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section
2016.040.” (CCP § 2031.310(b)(2).)
Here, the parties met and conferred.
TENTATIVE
RULING
AB
1755, CCP § 871.26
As to all
RFPs at issue in this motion, Defendant argued that a further response is not
warranted based on AB 1755, codified at CCP § 871.26.
Defendant argues
that under CCP § 871.26(h), the legislature specifically laid out what Plaintiff
can discover from Defendant in Song-Beverly cases.
In Reply,
Plaintiff argues that AB 1755 is not retroactive and in no way is applicable to
the instant discovery dispute.
Here, the
Court will hear argument.
First, the
Court will hear argument on Plaintiff’s argument that AB 1755 is not
retroactive. Plaintiff provided no citation for this, so the Court would like
Plaintiff to point the Court to the legal authority that supports Plaintiff’s
argument.
Second, the
Court also fails to see the support for Defendant’s argument that § 871.26(h)
provides what Plaintiff can discover from Defendant in Song-Beverly cases.
In relevant
part of CCP § 871.26:
(a) This
section only applies to a civil action seeking restitution or replacement of a
motor vehicle pursuant to Section 871.20.
(b) Within
60 days after the filing of the answer or other responsive pleading, all
parties shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to all other
parties an initial disclosure and documents pursuant to subdivisions (f), (g),
and (h).
…
(h) The
defendant or manufacturer shall provide the following documents to all other
parties pursuant to the timelines prescribed in subdivision (b):
(1) Copy
of or access to a version of the owner’s manual for a motor vehicle of the same
make, model, and year.
(2) Any
warranties issued in conjunction with the sale of the motor vehicle.
(3) Sample
brochures published for the motor vehicle.
(4) The
motor vehicle’s original invoice, if any, to the selling dealer.
(5) Sales
or lease agreement, if the manufacturer is in possession.
(6) Motor
vehicle information reports, including build documentation, component
information, and delivery details.
(7) Entire
warranty transaction history for the motor vehicle.
(8) Listing
of required field actions applicable to the motor vehicle.
(9) Published
technical service bulletins (”TSBs”) for the same make, model, and year
reasonably related to the nonconformities pertaining to the motor vehicle.
(10) Published
information service bulletins (“ISBs”) for the same make, model, and year
reasonably related to the nonconformities pertaining to the motor vehicle.
(11) Records
relating to communications between the manufacturer or dealership and the owner
or lessee of the motor vehicle, including those related to repair orders or
claims involving the motor vehicle.
(12) Warranty
policies and procedure manuals.
(13) Service
manuals reasonably related to the nonconformities pertaining to the motor
vehicle.
(14) If
a pre-suit restitution or replacement request is made, all call recordings of
pre-suit communications with the consumer available at the time of service of
the complaint.
(15) If
a pre-suit restitution or replacement request is made, the manufacturer’s
written statement of policies and procedures used to evaluate customer requests
for restitution or replacement pursuant to “Lemon Law” claims.
(16) If
a pre-suit restitution or replacement request is made, any nonprivileged,
prelitigation evaluation.
(17) Any
warranty extensions or modifications issued by the manufacturer on the motor
vehicle.
(CCP §
871.26(a)-(b) & (h).)
From the
Court’s reading of § 871.26(h), it appears that those are documents that
Defendant must provide as initial disclosures. However, the Court did not see
anything in § 871.26 that stated that those documents are the only documents
that Plaintiff can discover from Defendant. If Defendant can cite to legal
authority that supports its position, Defendant should plan to come forward
with such authority.
REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO. 24:
All
DOCUMENTS from 2019 to present evidencing YOUR goals to reduce warranty costs,
including all warranty trend reports for this period.
RESPONSE
TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 24:
AHM objects
to this request as vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and as
asking for information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this
litigation and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence, particularly considering the request does not take into consideration
the statutory construct of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Whether
Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is
entirely unrelated to goals related to warranty costs. This case concerns
whether Plaintiff is entitled to a remedy under the facts of this case. See Calcor
Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216. Moreover,
as phrased, the request fails to describe with reasonable particularity the
documents or categories of documents being requested, in violation of Code of
Civil Procedure, section 2031.030(c)(1). AHM further objects to the extent this
request asks AHM to respond on behalf of any other entity.
Tentative
Ruling (TR) RFP 24
Under CCP § 2031.310(b)(1), “The
motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the
discovery sought by the demand.” (Ibid.)
“In the more
specific context of a demand for production of a tangible thing, the party who
asks the trial court to compel production must show “good cause” for the
request—but unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney
work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of
relevance.” (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)
Here, the
Court will hear argument. The Court does not understand Plaintiff’s explanation
on good cause/relevance for the instant RFP. Further, the Court notes that this
RFP is not limited to vehicles of the same make, model, and year of the subject
vehicle, nor is it limited to vehicles within California.
REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO 25:
All
DOCUMENTS from 2019 to present evidencing or discussing YOUR goals to reduce
the number of vehicle repurchases or replacements.
RESPONSE
TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO 25:
AHM objects
to this request as vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and as
asking for information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this
litigation and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence, particularly considering the request does not take into consideration
the statutory construct of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Whether
Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is
entirely unrelated to other vehicle repurchases or replacements. This case
concerns whether Plaintiff is entitled to a remedy under the facts of this
case. See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53
Cal.App.4th 216. Moreover, as phrased, the request fails to describe with
reasonable particularity the documents or categories of documents being
requested, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure, section 2031.030(c)(1). AHM
further objects to the extent this request asks AHM to respond on behalf of any
other entity.
REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO. 26:
All
DOCUMENTS from 2019 to present evidencing or discussing YOUR goals to reduce
the costs associated with repurchases or replacements.
RESPONSE
TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 26:
AHM objects
to this request as vague, ambiguous, overly broad, and as asking for
information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation and
not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,
particularly considering the request does not take into consideration the
statutory construct of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Whether
Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is
entirely unrelated to other vehicle repurchases or replacements. This case
concerns whether Plaintiff is entitled to a remedy under the facts of this
case. See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53
Cal.App.4th 216. Moreover, as phrased, the request fails to describe with
reasonable particularity the documents or categories of documents being
requested, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure, section 2031.030(c)(1). AMH
further objects to the extent this request asks AHM to respond on behalf of any
other entity.
TR
RFP 26
Here, the Court will hear argument.
The Court does not understand Plaintiff’s explanation on good cause/relevance
for the instant RFP. Further, the Court notes that this RFP is not limited to
vehicles of the same make, model, and year of the subject vehicle, nor is it
limited to vehicles within California.
REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO 27:
All
DOCUMENTS evidencing or describing statistics for the number of repurchases and
replacements YOU have made in California in response to consumers’ personal
requests (i.e. a consumer request without an attorney) from 2019 to present.
RESPONSE
TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 27:
AHM objects
to this request as vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and as
asking for information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this
litigation and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence, particularly considering the request does not take into consideration
the statutory construct of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Whether
Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is
entirely unrelated to other vehicle repurchases or replacements. This case
concerns whether Plaintiff is entitled to a remedy under the facts of this
case. See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53
Cal.App.4th 216. Moreover, as phrased, the request fails to describe with
reasonable particularity the documents or categories of documents being
requested, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure, section 2031.030(c)(1). AHM
further objects to the extent this request asks AHM to respond on behalf of any
other entity.
TR
RFP 27
Here, the Court will hear argument.
The Court does not understand Plaintiff’s explanation on good cause/relevance
for the instant RFP. Further, the Court notes that this RFP is not limited to
vehicles of the same make, model, and year of the subject vehicle, nor is it
limited to vehicles within California.
REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO 28:
All
DOCUMENTS evidencing or describing statistics for the number of service
contracts YOU gave consumers in California in response to their personal
requests for a buyback oi replacement from 2019 to present.
RESPONSE
TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO 28:
AHM objects
to this request as vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and as
asking for information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this
litigation and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence, particularly considering the request does not take into consideration
the statutory construct of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Whether
Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is
entirely unrelated to other vehicle repurchases or replacements. This case
concerns whether Plaintiff is entitled to a remedy under the facts of this
case. See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th
216. Moreover, as phrased, the request fails to describe with reasonable
particularity the documents or categories of documents being requested, in
violation of Code of Civil Procedure, section 2031.030(c)(1). AHM further
objects to the extent this request asks AHM to respond on behalf of any other
entity.
TR
RFP 28
Here, the Court will hear argument.
The Court does not understand Plaintiff’s explanation on good cause/relevance
for the instant RFP. Further, the Court notes that this RFP is not limited to
vehicles of the same make, model, and year of the subject vehicle, nor is it
limited to vehicles within California.
REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO 29:
All
DOCUMENTS evidencing, describing, or tracking complaints by owners of 2019
Honda Insights vehicles regarding SENSING DEFECTS.
RESPONSE
TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 29:
AHM objects
to this request as vague, ambiguous, overly broad, harassing, and as asking for
information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation and
not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and
it misrepresents and/or does not take into consideration the statutory construct
[sic] of the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Whether Plaintiff is entitled
to relief under the SongBeverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated to
complaints by other owners of other 2019 Honda Insight vehicles. This case
concerns whether Plaintiff is entitled to a remedy under the facts of this
case. See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th
216. AHM also objects to Plaintiff's definition of the term “SENSING DEFECT” as
vague, ambiguous, and overly broad, as its definition includes at least six
separate types of vaguely defined symptoms, in addition to “other similar
concerns.” Considering Plaintiff's definition of the term “SENSING DEFECT,” and
its subparts, this request is overly broad and fails to describe with
reasonable particularity the documents or categories of documents being
requested, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure, section 2031.030(c)(1). AHM
also objects to those symptoms included in Plaintiff's definition of “SENSING
DEFECT” for which the SUBJECT VEHICLE was never presented or otherwise did not
exhibit. Further, as phrased, the request is argumentative and misleading to
the extent it improperly assumes a defect. Moreover, as phrased, this request
asks for information concerning complaints involving different allegations and
circumstances, different consumers, with different use and repair histories,
and other circumstances that are separate and distinct from the alleged facts
and circumstances of this case. In addition, AHM objects to this request as
calling for information in violation of the right to privacy and/or that is
confidential, commercially sensitive, and proprietary or trade secret. AHM
further objects to the extent this request asks AHM to respond on behalf of any
other entity.
TR
RFP 29
Here, the Court will hear argument. Generally
speaking, this request appears to be discoverable. However, one of Defendant’s
objections argues that Plaintiff’s definition of “sensing defects” includes
defects which are not at issue for the subject vehicle. This could potentially
be a valid objection; however, the Court is also concerned that Defendant’s
objection is boilerplate and Defendant is deliberately attempting to interpret Plaintiff’s
definition of “sensing defects” in an unnecessarily broad manner when the
nature of the information sought is apparent to Defendant. Further, while the
instant request is limited to the same make, model, and year of the subject
vehicle, the instant RFP is not limited to vehicles in California.
REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO 30:
All surveys,
reports, summaries, and other DOCUMENTS in which owners of 2019 Honda Insight
vehicles have reported to YOU any SENSING DEFECTS.
RESPONSE
TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO 30:
AHM objects
to this request as vague, ambiguous, overly broad, harassing, and as asking for
information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation and
not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and
it misrepresents and/or does not take into consideration the statutory
construct of the SongBeverly Consumer Warranty Act. Whether Plaintiff is
entitled to relief under the SongBeverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely
unrelated to complaints by other owners of other 2019 Honda Insight vehicles.
This case concerns whether Plaintiff is entitled to a remedy under the facts of
this case. See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53
Cal.App.4th 216. AHM also objects to Plaintiff's definition of the term
“SENSING DEFECT” as vague, ambiguous, and overly broad, as its definition
includes at least six separate types of vaguely defined symptoms, in addition
to “other similar concerns.” Considering Plaintiff's definition of the term
“SENSING DEFECT,” and its subparts, this request is overly broad and fails to
describe with reasonable particularity the documents or categories of documents
being requested, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure, section
2031.030(c)(1). AHM also objects to those symptoms included in Plaintiff's
definition of “SENSING DEFECT” for which the SUBJECT VEHICLE was never
presented or otherwise did not exhibit. Further, as phrased, the request is
argumentative and misleading to the extent it improperly assumes a defect.
Moreover, as phrased, this request asks for information concerning complaints
involving different allegations and circumstances, different consumers, with
different use and repair histories, and other circumstances that are separate
and distinct from the alleged facts and circumstances of this case. In
addition, AHM objects to this request as calling for information in violation
of the right to privacy and/or that is confidential, commercially sensitive,
and proprietary or trade secret. AHM further objects to the extent this request
asks AHM to respond on behalf of any other entity.
TR
RFP 30
Here, the Court will hear argument.
Generally speaking, this request appears to be discoverable. However, one of
Defendant’s objections argues that Plaintiff’s definition of “sensing defects”
includes defects which are not at issue for the subject vehicle. This could
potentially be a valid objection; however, the Court is also concerned that
Defendant’s objection is boilerplate and Defendant is deliberately attempting
to interpret Plaintiff’s definition of “sensing defects” in an unnecessarily
broad manner when the nature of the information sought is apparent to
Defendant. Further, while the instant request is limited to the same make,
model, and year of the subject vehicle, the instant RFP is not limited to
vehicles in California.
REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO. 31:
All
DOCUMENTS evidencing, describing, or tracking vehicle repurchases made by YOU
of 2019 Honda Insight vehicles allegedly containing SENSING DEFECTS.
RESPONSE
TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 31:
AHM objects
to this request as vague, ambiguous, overly broad, harassing, and as asking for
information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation and
not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and
it misrepresents and/or does not take into consideration the statutory
construct of the SongBeverly Consumer Warranty Act. Whether Plaintiff is
entitled to relief under the SongBeverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely
unrelated to repurchases of other vehicles. This case concerns whether
Plaintiff is entitled to a remedy under the facts of this case. See Calcor
Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216. AHM also
objects to Plaintiff's definition of the term “SENSING DEFECT” as vague, ambiguous,
and overly broad, as its definition includes at least six separate types of
vaguely defined symptoms, in addition to “other similar concerns.” Considering
Plaintiff's definition of the term “SENSING DEFECT,” and its subparts, this
request is overly broad and fails to describe with reasonable particularity the
documents or categories of documents being requested, in violation of Code of
Civil Procedure, section 2031.030(c)(1). AHM also objects to those symptoms
included in Plaintiff's definition of “SENSING DEFECT” for which the SUBJECT
VEHICLE was never presented or otherwise did not exhibit. Further, as phrased,
the request is argumentative and misleading to the extent it improperly assumes
a defect. Moreover, as phrased, this request asks for information concerning
complaints involving different allegations and circumstances, different
consumers, with different use and repair histories, and other circumstances
that are separate and distinct from the alleged facts and circumstances of this
case. In addition, AHM objects to this request as calling for information in
violation of the right to privacy and/or that is confidential, commercially
sensitive, and proprietary or trade secret. AHM further objects to the extent
this request asks AHM to respond on behalf of any other entity.
TR
RFP 31
Here, the Court will hear argument.
Generally speaking, this request appears to be discoverable. However, one of
Defendant’s objections argues that Plaintiff’s definition of “sensing defects”
includes defects which are not at issue for the subject vehicle. This could
potentially be a valid objection; however, the Court is also concerned that
Defendant’s objection is boilerplate and Defendant is deliberately attempting
to interpret Plaintiff’s definition of “sensing defect” in an unnecessarily
broad manner when the nature of the information sought is apparent to
Defendant. Further, while the instant request is limited to the same make,
model, and year of the subject vehicle, the instant RFP is not limited to
vehicles in California.
REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO. 32:
All
DOCUMENTS which evidence or describe the numbers of owners of 2019 Honda
Insight vehicles who have complained of any of the conditions, defects, or
nonconformities for which the SUBJECT VEHICLE was presented.
RESPONSE
TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 32:
AHM objects
to this request as vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome,
harassing, and as asking for information that is not relevant to the subject
matter of this litigation and not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. In addition, the phrase "conditions,
defects, or nonconformities" is not defined, described, or otherwise
explained in this request and, without definition, description, or explanation,
are vague, ambiguous, and the information referred to or sought cannot be
determined, without speculation. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under
the SongBeverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated to alleged defects
in other vehicles. This case concerns whether Plaintiff is entitled to a remedy
under the facts of this case. See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216. Moreover, as phrased, this request asks for
information concerning complaints involving different allegations and
circumstances, different consumers, with different use and repair histories,
and other circumstances that are separate and distinct from the alleged facts and
circumstances of this case. AHM further objects to this request insofar as it
is not limited by category or otherwise to allegations that are relevant to
Plaintiff’s claims in this lawsuit thereby expanding the scope of this request
beyond Plaintiff’s allegations. AHM further objects to the extent this request
asks AHM to respond on behalf of any other entity.
TR
RFP 32
Defendant’s objections are
boilerplate, and Defendant’s objections are overruled. Plaintiff’s motion to
compel a further response to RFP 32 is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to provide
a code-compliant, further response, without objection within 10 days of this
Court’s order. However, the Court notes that this RFP is being limited to
vehicles within California.
REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33:
All
DOCUMENTS evidencing quality problems identified by YOU in the automatic
SENSING SYSTEM used in 2019 Honda Insight vehicles.
RESPONSE
TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33:
AHM objects
to this request as vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome,
harassing, and as asking for information that is not relevant to the subject
matter of this litigation and not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. In addition, the term “quality problems” is
not defined, described, or otherwise explained in this request and, without
definition, description, or explanation, is vague, ambiguous and the
information referred to or sought cannot be determined, without speculation.
AHM objects to Plaintiff’s definition of the term “SENSING SYSTEM” as vague,
ambiguous, and overly broad, as its definition includes two separate vehicle
systems and/or components. Considering Plaintiff’s definition of the term
“SENSING SYSTEM” and its subparts, this request is overly broad and fails to
describe with reasonable particularity the documents or categories of documents
being requested, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure, section
2031.030(c)(1). AHM also objects to the extent the SUBJECT VEHICLE was never
presented for or otherwise did not exhibit symptoms related to the vehicle
system and/or component included in Plaintiff’s definition of “SENSING SYSTEM.”
AHM further objects to this request as calling for information that is
confidential, commercially sensitive, and proprietary or trade secret.
TR
RFP 33
Here, the Court will hear argument.
Generally speaking, this request appears to be discoverable. However, the Court
with hear argument on Defendant’s argument that “quality problems” is not
defined.
Further, one
of Defendant’s objections argues that Plaintiff’s definition of “sensing system”
includes defects which are not at issue for the subject vehicle. This could
potentially be a valid objection; however, the Court is also concerned that
Defendant’s objection is boilerplate and Defendant is deliberately attempting
to interpret Plaintiff’s definition of “sensing system” in an unnecessarily
broad manner when the nature of the information sought is apparent to
Defendant. Further, while the instant request is limited to the same make,
model, and year of the subject vehicle, the instant RFP is not limited to
vehicles in California.
REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37:
All
DOCUMENTS evidencing the agendas and/or minutes of YOUR board of directors or
committee meetings, at which any quality concerns of the SENSING SYSTEM in 2019
Honda Insight vehicles were addressed or discussed.
RESPONSE
TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37:
AHM objects
to this request as vague, ambiguous, overly broad, harassing, and as asking for
information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation and
not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and
it misrepresents and/or does not take into consideration the statutory
construct of the SongBeverly Consumer Warranty Act. AHM also objects to
Plaintiff’s definition of the term “SENSING SYSTEM” as vague, ambiguous, and
overly broad, as its definition includes two separate vehicle systems and/or
components. Considering Plaintiff’s definition of the term “SENSING SYSTEM” and
its subparts, this request is overly broad and fails to describe with
reasonable particularity the documents or categories of documents being
requested, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure, section 2031.030(c)(1). AHM
also objects to the extent the SUBJECT VEHICLE was never presented for or
otherwise did not exhibit symptoms related to the vehicle system and/or
component included in Plaintiff’s definition of “SENSING SYSTEM.” Moreover, the
term "quality concerns” is not defined, described, or otherwise explained
in this request and, without definition, description, or explanation, is vague,
ambiguous and the information referred to or sought cannot be determined,
without speculation. In addition, AHM objects to this request as calling for
information that is confidential, commercially sensitive, and proprietary or
trade secret. AHM further objects to the extent this request asks AHM to
respond on behalf of any other entity.
TR
RFP 37
Here, the Court will hear argument.
Generally speaking, this request appears to be discoverable. However, one of
Defendant’s objections argues that Plaintiff’s definition of “sensing system”
includes defects which are not at issue for the subject vehicle. This could
potentially be a valid objection; however, the Court is also concerned that
Defendant’s objection is boilerplate and Defendant is deliberately attempting
to interpret Plaintiff’s definition of “sensing system” in an unnecessarily
broad manner when the nature of the information sought is apparent to
Defendant. Further, while the instant request is limited to the same make,
model, and year of the subject vehicle, the instant RFP is not limited to
vehicles in California.
REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO. 38:
All
DOCUMENTS evidencing the agendas and/or minutes of YOUR board of directors or
committee meetings, at which YOUR warranty spending or reacquired vehicle
spending pertaining to 2019 Honda Insight vehicles was addressed or discussed.
RESPONSE
TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 38:
AHM objects
to this request as vague, ambiguous, overly broad, harassing, and as asking for
information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation and
not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and
it misrepresents and/or does not take into consideration the statutory
construct of the SongBeverly Consumer Warranty Act. Whether Plaintiff is
entitled to relief under the SongBeverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely
unrelated to warranty spending or reacquired vehicle spending for other 2019
Honda Insight vehicles. This case concerns whether Plaintiff is entitled to a
remedy under the facts of this case. See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216. Moreover, this request is overly
broad and fails to describe with reasonable particularity the documents or
categories of documents being requested in violation of Code of Civil
Procedure, section 2031.030(c)(1). Further, as phrased, the request is
argumentative and misleading to the extent it improperly assumes a defect.
Moreover, as phrased, this request asks for information concerning complaints
involving different allegations and circumstances, different consumers, with
different use and repair histories, and other circumstances that are separate
and distinct from the alleged facts and circumstances of this case. In
addition, AHM objects to this request as calling for information that is
confidential, commercially sensitive, and proprietary or trade secret. AHM
further objects to the extent this request asks AHM to respond on behalf of any
other entity.
TR
RFP 38
Here, the Court will hear argument.
The Court does not understand Plaintiff’s explanation on good cause/relevance
for the instant RFP. Further, while the instant request is limited to vehicles
of the same make, model, and year of the subject vehicle, the Court notes that
this RFP is not limited to vehicles in California.
REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO. 44:
All
DOCUMENTS evidencing complaints by owners of 2019 Honda Insight vehicles
regarding any of the complaints for which the SUBJECT VEHICLE was presented for
repair.
RESPONSE
TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 44:
AHM objects
to this request as vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome,
harassing, and as asking for information that is not relevant and not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and it
misrepresents and/or does not take into consideration the statutory construct
of the SongBeverly Consumer Warranty Act. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to
relief under the SongBeverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated to
alleged complaints by owners of 2019 Honda Insight vehicles. This case concerns
whether Plaintiff is entitled to a remedy under the facts of this case. See
Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216.
Moreover, as phrased, the request fails to describe with reasonable particularity
the documents or categories of documents being requested, in violation of Code
of Civil Procedure, section 2031.030(c)(1). Moreover, as phrased, this request
asks for information concerning complaints involving different allegations and
circumstances, different consumers, with different use and repair histories,
and other circumstances that are separate and distinct from the alleged facts
and circumstances of this case. AHM objects to the extent this request asks for
information that is protected by the right to privacy. In addition, AHM objects
to this request as calling for information that is confidential, commercially
sensitive, and proprietary or trade secret. AHM further objects to the extent
this request asks AHM to respond on behalf of any other entity.
TR
RFP 44
Defendant’s objections are
boilerplate, and Defendant’s objections are overruled. Plaintiff’s motion to
compel a further response to RFP 44 is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to provide
a code-compliant, further response, without objection, within 10 days of this
Court’s order. However, the Court notes that this RFP is being limited to
vehicles within California.
Sanctions
Except as
provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under
Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or
attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further
response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction
acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the
imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP §2031.310(h).)
“The court
may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a
motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed,
or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was
provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
Rule 3.1348(a).)
Plaintiff
requests sanctions in the amount of $2,860.00 against Defendant, American Honda
Motor Co., Inc., and its attorneys of record, Bowman and Brook LLP.
Plaintiff’s
sanctions request is explained as follows:
17.
The total legal fees incurred in preparing the motion and supportive papers
are, and are reasonably expected to be, calculated as follows:
a.
I spent a total of 2.6 hours drafting the instant motion, separate statement,
proposed order, notice of motion, and declaration, at my normal billing rate of
$500.00 per hour, for a total of $1,300.00
b.
It is also reasonably anticipated that I will spend an additional two (2) hours
reviewing Defendant’s opposition and drafting a reply at my normal billing rate
of $500.00, for a total of $1,000.00.
c.
Finally, it is reasonably anticipated that I will spend an additional one (1.0)
hours preparing for and attending the scheduled hearing on this matter at my
normal billing rate of $500.00, for a total of $500.00.
d.
In all, legal fees will total $2,800.00.
18.
Plaintiff’s counsel was forced to spend $60.00 to file the instant motion.
(Lupinek
Decl. ¶¶ 17-18.)
In
Opposition, Defendant seeks sanctions in the amount of $1,460.00 against
Plaintiff, Leonor Vazquez, and her counsel Roger Kirnos and Thach Ttran of The
Knight Law Group, LLC pursuant to CCP § 2023.030.
Defendant
argues that sanctions are appropriate against Plaintiff because Plaintiff’s
discovery requests were excessively broad, and Plaintiff abused the discovery
process.
Defendant’s
counsel explains its sanctions request as follows:
9.
On behalf of AHM, AHM’s counsel have expended 2.0 hours of attorney time to
review the file, prepare the opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to compel, and
prepare the accompanying separate statement. It is anticipated that it will
take an additional 2 hours to review Plaintiff’s reply, prepare for oral
argument, and attend the hearing on Plaintiff’s harassing motion. At a minimum
billing rate of $350.00 per hour, AHM will incur at least $1,400 in attorney
fees. Including the $60.00 filing fee, AHM will incur a total of $1,460 in fees
and costs for having to oppose Plaintiff’s motion. Therefore, AHM respectfully
requests a total of $1,460 in sanctions be awarded to AHM for its reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs against Plaintiff and her counsel.
(Schattl
Decl. ¶ 9.)
In Reply,
Plaintiff argues that Defendant does not take into consideration the relevancy
of the requests at issue.
The Court to
hear argument.