Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 23GDCV01334, Date: 2024-01-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23GDCV01334    Hearing Date: January 26, 2024    Dept: E

 

DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE

                                                   [CCP §430.10 et. seq.; CCP § 436]

                       

Date:                                                                                        1/26/24                      

Case No:                                                                                  23GDCV01334            

Trial Date:                                                                               None Set

Case Name:                                                                             Anna Markosyan v. Gor Enterprises, Inc., D/B/A Paradise Pastry & Cafe

 

Moving Party:               Defendant GOR Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Paradise Pastry & Café

Responding Party:       Plaintiff Anna Markosyan

 

Pleading filed on:                                                        June 23, 2023             

Demurrer filed on:                                                      November 3, 2023

Pleading served on:                                                     Not on file, but OSC re: failure to file POS discharged on 11/30/2023    

Meet and Confer?                                                       Ok

 

RELIEF REQUESTED:   

            Sustain demurrer to the Complaint on the grounds that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

           

CAUSES OF ACTION:    from Complaint

 

1)                  Premises Liability

2)                  General Negligence

 

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

 

            On July 2, 2021, Plaintiff was performing her work duties at Paradise Pastry and Café located at 1825 W. Glenoaks Blvd., Glendale, CA 91201, when she tripped and fell on the stairs on her way to the freight elevator while carrying boxes of dough, resulting in injuries.

 

MEET AND CONFER

 

A party filing a demurrer “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., §430.41, subd. (a).) “The parties shall meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least five days prior to the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why the parties could not meet and confer.” (Code Civ. Proc., §430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Failure to sufficiently meet and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Id., §430.41(a)(4).)

 

Defendants submit the declaration of David N. Lake who states that he spoke with Plaintiff’s counsel, Armen Tashjian on October 18, 2023 via phone call, where he raised the issue of preemption under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Mr. Lake also followed up with email, stated the grounds for demurrer, and requested authority as to why preemption would not apply. He did not receive a response. Theses communications show that the parties were unable to informally resolve the disputes. Therefore, the meet and confer requirement has been met.

 

ANALYSIS:

 

Demurrer

 

Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law ....” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

 

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading ... is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156- 157.)

 

On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to “determine whether or not the ... complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) “Generally it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d.)

 

Claims Are Barred Under Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity

Workers’ compensation exclusivity bars claims against employers or workers’ compensation insurers for injuries that fall within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions. (Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 811.) This summation of worker’s compensation exclusivity is based upon the following statutory provisions: Labor Code sections 3600, subdivision (a), section 3602, subdivision (a), as well as section 5300, subdivision (a). (Lab. Code, §§ 3600, subd. (a); 3602, subd. (a); 5300, subd. (a); Charles J. Vacanti, supra, at 813.) Together, these provisions establish that the liability of employers and insurers for “industrial injury which results in occupational disability or death” is limited to workers' compensation remedies.¿(Charles J. Vacanti, at 813.)  

 

Here, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff incurred injuries “while performing her work duties at her place of employment.” (Complaint, ¶¶ L-1, GN-1.) Specifically, she “tripped/slipped and fell on the stairs on her way to the freight elevator while carrying boxes of dough suffering significant injuries.” (Id.) These allegations, on their face, show that Plaintiff’s claims and complaint are subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act because she incurred injuries within the scope of employment. Plaintiff’s argument that her slip and fall on a staircase while carrying baking supplies lacks the direct connection to employment is belied by her direct assertion that she was “performing her work duties.” The Complaint on its face shows that Plaintiff incurred injuries within the scope of her employment such that her causes of action for premises liability and general negligence are barred.

Thus, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the Complaint WITH 10 days LEAVE TO AMEND.