Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case Number: 23GDCV01994, Date: 2025-02-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 23GDCV01994, Date: 2025-02-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23GDCV01994 Hearing Date: February 26, 2025 Dept: E

Case No: 23GDCV01994
Hearing Date: 2/26/2025-8:30am

Trial Date: UNSET

Case Name: ROBERT TOROSIAN, an individual; MARINA FERMANYAN, an individual; and ALOUST GREGORY TOROSIAN v. EDGAR MADATYAN, an individual; ELVIS MADATYAN; an individual; GLENDALE FRENCH BAKERY, INC., dba PAPILLON INTERNATIONAL BAKERY, a California corporation; LIANA GYOZALYAN, an individual; and DOES 1-100

[TENTATIVE RULINGS - 3 DEMURRERS WITH 2 MOTIONS TO STRIKE]

DEMURRER 1

RELIEF REQUESTED
Defendant, Elvis Madatyan, moves for an order sustaining his demurrer to the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint (4AC) pursuant to CCP § 430.10.

Defendant moves on grounds of failure to state sufficient facts with respect to the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action. Defendant also moves on grounds of uncertainty/ambiguity with respect to the fourth and seventh causes of action.

BACKGROUND
An initial Complaint was filed in this action on 9/19/2023.

There was no demurrer hearing as to the initial Complaint.

The FAC was filed on 2/2/2024.

On May 3, 2024, this Court heard three demurrers to the FAC, and the Minute Order noted that the Court took the matters under submission. On May 6, 2024, the Court ruled on the submitted matters.

On May 22, 2024, the Minute Order for the Case Management Conference indicated that the Court removed misnamed party Liana Yozalyan. Further, the 5-22-2024 Minute Order indicated that “Discovery stay remains in place.”

On 6/4/2024, Plaintiffs filed their SAC.

On 8/9/2024, this Court ruled on Defendant Elvis Madatyan’s demurrer to the fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action to SAC. The Court overruled the demurrer as to the fifth cause of action and sustained with leave to amend as to the sixth and seventh causes of action.

Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint (TAC) on 8/29/2024.

On 11/1/2024, this Court heard Glendale French Bakery, dba Papillon’s, demurrer and motion to strike to the TAC. This Court: (1) sustained the demurrer with leave to amend with respect to the third cause of action for premises liability, (2) sustained the demurrer with leave to amend with respect to the fourth cause of action for assault and battery, (3) sustained the demurrer with leave to amend with respect to the fifth cause of action for loss of consortium, (4) and sustained with leave to amend with respect to the sixth (intentional infliction of emotional distress) and seventh (aiding and abetting assault and battery) causes of action.

Plaintiffs filed the Fourth Amended Complaint (4AC) on 11/26/2024.

The instant action surrounds allegations that several Defendants, and Elda, plotted to physically harm Plaintiff (Robert) because Robert discovered that Elda (not presently sued because Elda is a debtor in bankruptcy) was embezzling money from a business that Robert had substantial interests in.

PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS
Moving Party: Defendant, Elvis Madatyan

Responding Party: Plaintiffs, Robert Torosian, Marina Fermanyan, and Aloust Gregory Torosian

Moving Papers: Notice/Demurrer

Opposition Papers: Opposition; Proof of Service

Reply Papers: No Reply by Defendant Elvis Madatyan

Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300(c)): No
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP § 1005(b)): Uncertain
Proper Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a, § 1013b): Uncertain

Meet and Confer
A party filing a demurrer “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) “The parties shall meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least five days prior to the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why the parties could not meet and confer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).)

Failure to sufficiently meet and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(4).)

Here, Defendant met and conferred. (See Shaghzo Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.)

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRERS
Demurrer – Sufficiency
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda, (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law ….” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading … is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)

On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to “determine whether or not the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) “Generally it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

Demurrer – Uncertainty
A special demurrer for uncertainty, CCP section 430.10(f), is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)

TENTATIVE RULING DEMURRER 1

TENTATIVE RULING SERVICE
Defendant did not file a proof of service with his notice/motion. Therefore, Defendant did not comply with CRC, Rule 3.1300(c). Further, since there is no proof of service, it is unclear if Defendant complied with the timeliness component of CCP § 1005(b).

However, since Plaintiffs submitted an opposition to Defendant’s motion, the Court will hear Defendant’s demurrer on the merits.

Fourth Cause of Action – Assault and Battery
Defendant, Elvis, first argues that the demurrer to the fourth cause of action should be sustained because the caption/label on page 10 of the 4AC does not name Elvis as a Defendant, yet the allegations in ¶ 36 located within the fourth cause of action does name Elvis as a Defendant. Defendant’s argument is that this discrepancy between the caption/label and the allegations makes it uncertain whether Plaintiffs intend to assert the fourth cause of action against Elvis.

The Court does not find Defendant’s argument on uncertainty to be availing.

“It has long been established that in ruling on a demurrer, the trial court is obligated to look past the form of a pleading to its substance. Erroneous or confusing labels attached by the inept pleader are to be ignored if the complaint pleads facts which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” (Saunders v. Cariss (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 905, 908.)

A special demurrer for uncertainty, CCP section 430.10(f), is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)

Elvis also argues that his demurrer should be sustained because the 4AC does not allege that Elvis personally committed any acts constituting assault or battery against Robert.

The Court does not find this argument availing. The fourth cause of action for assault and battery appears to be Plaintiffs’ attempt to hold Elvis vicariously liable for assault and battery under the theory of conspiracy.

As stated in City of Industry:

Civil conspiracy is not an independent tort. Instead, it is “a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or *212 design in its perpetration. [Citation.] By participation in a civil conspiracy, a coconspirator effectively adopts as his or her own the torts of other coconspirators within the ambit of the conspiracy. [Citation.] In this way, a coconspirator incurs tort liability co-equal with the immediate tortfeasors.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 510–511, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 869 P.2d 454.) The elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) the formation of a group of two or more persons who agreed to a common plan or design to commit a tortious act; (2) a wrongful act committed pursuant to the agreement; and (3) resulting damages. (Ibid.) We construe the fifth count for fraud and the tenth count for conspiracy together as a single count for fraud.

(City of Industry v. City of Filmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 211-212.)

Here, Plaintiffs alleged the elements of conspiracy in ¶¶ 35-42 of the 4AC.

To the extent that Defendant argues that conspiracy is not itself a cause of action, the Court notes that City of Industry v. City of Filmore supports Defendant’s argument. However, the Court does not find this as a basis to sustain Defendant’s demurrer.

Plaintiffs’ theory of liability via conspiracy appears to be a basis for Plaintiffs to vicariously hold Elvis liable for Edgar’s assault and battery of Robert based on Plaintiffs’ successful allegations of the elements of civil conspiracy.

TENTATIVE RULING FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Defendant’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action for assault and battery, on grounds of uncertainty and failure to state sufficient facts, is OVERRULED.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION – LOSS OF CONSORTIUM

The elements for loss of consortium are: (1) a valid and lawful marriage between the plaintiff and the person inured at the time of the injury; (2) a tortious injury to the plaintiff’s spouse; (3) loss of consortium suffered by the plaintiff; and (4) the loss was proximately caused by the defendant’s act. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 746, fn. 2.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs allege no facts that Elvis himself proximately caused a tortious injury to Marina’s spouse Robert. Defendant argues that the 4AC alleges that it was Defendant Edgar who shot Robert, not Elvis. Defendant argues that the alleged connection between Elvis and Marina’s loss of consortium is too attenuated to support this cause of action.

The Court does not find Defendant’s argument availing because Plaintiffs alleged Elvis’s involvement in Edgar’s assault and battery of Robert by means of Elvis conspiring with Elda, Edgar, and Liana to have Edgar assault and batter Robert. (See 4AC ¶¶36 &39.) Further, the fifth cause of action for loss of consortium incorporates the conspiracy allegations in the fourth cause of action by means of ¶ 43 in the fifth cause of action.

TENTATIVE RULING FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Defendant’s demurrer to the fifth cause of action for loss of consortium, on grounds of failure to state sufficient facts, is OVERRULED.

Sixth Cause of Action - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to plead any conduct by Elvis that could support a claim for IIED, let alone extreme conduct with the requisite “great specificity.”

As stated in Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford, Inc.:

“ ‘ “[T]o state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “Conduct, to be ‘ “outrageous” ’ must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.” ’ [Citation.] In order to avoid a demurrer, the *161 plaintiff must allege with ‘great[ ] specificity’ the acts which he or she believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. [Citation.]” (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832, 166 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 (Vasquez ).)

(Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 160-61.)

The Court does not find Defendant’s argument availing. Plaintiffs sufficiently pled the elements of an IIED claim in ¶¶ 47- 52 of the 4AC. Further, the Court notes that ¶ 47 of the 4AC incorporated the prior allegations of the 4AC.

TENTATIVE RULING SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Defendant’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action, on grounds of failure to state sufficient facts, is OVERRULED.

Seventh Cause of Action – Aiding and Abetting Assault and Battery

As stated in Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC:

“Liability may also be imposed on one who aids and abets the commission of an intentional tort if the person (a) knows the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other to so act or (b) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and the person's own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person. [Citations.]” (Saunders v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 846, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 438; accord, Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1144, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 401.) “Despite some conceptual similarities, civil liability for aiding and abetting the commission of a tort, which has no overlaid requirement of an independent duty, differs fundamentally from liability based on conspiracy to commit a tort. [Citations.] ‘ “[A]iding-abetting focuses on whether a defendant knowingly gave ‘substantial assistance’ to someone who performed wrongful conduct, not on whether the defendant agreed to join the wrongful conduct.” ’ ” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 823, fn. 10, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 325.)

(Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 303, 324.)

Here, Plaintiffs alleged the elements of aiding and abetting assault and battery in ¶¶ 53-58 of the 4AC. Defendants’ arguments as to failure to state sufficient facts and uncertainty are unavailing.

TENTATIVE RULING SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Defendant’s demurrer to the seventh cause of action for aiding and abetting assault and battery, on grounds of uncertainty and failure to state sufficient facts, is OVERRULED.

DEMURRER 2

RELIEF REQUESTED
“Defendant GLENDALE FRENCH BAKERY, INC. DBA PAPILLON INTERNATIONAL BAKERY (“Papillon” or “Defendant”), will and hereby does, pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10, demur to the Fourth Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs ROBERT TOROSIAN, MARINA FERMANYAN, and ALOUST GREGORY TOROSIAN (collectively “Plaintiffs”).

The demurrer is brought on the grounds that the Premises Liability, Assault and Battery, Loss of Consortium, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Aiding and Abetting (Assault and Battery) causes of action alleged against Defendant fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a causes of action and are uncertain pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10(e) and (f).

This demurrer is based on this Notice of Demurrer and the Demurrer, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, the Declaration of John C. Deagon III, Esq., all pleadings and documents on file in this action, all matters that are judicially noticeable, and such oral and written evidence and argument as may be introduced at, or prior to, the hearing on this demurrer.”

(Def. Mot. p. II.)

PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS
Moving Party: Defendant, Glendale French Bakery dba Papillon

Responding Party: Plaintiffs, Robert Torosian, Marina Fermanyan, and Aloust Gregory Torosian

Moving Papers: Notice/Demurrer

Opposition Papers: Opposition; Proof of Service

Reply Papers: Reply

Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300(c)):Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP § 1005(b)): Ok
Proper Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a, § 1013b): Ok

Failure to sufficiently meet and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(4).)

Here, Defendant’s counsel met and conferred. (Deagon Decl. ¶¶ 13-14.)

TENTATIVE RULING DEMURRER 2

November 1, 2024 Minute Order
On November 1, 2024, this Court heard Papillon’s demurrer to the TAC.

In relevant part of the 11/1/2024 ruling, this Court stated:

Fourth Amended Complaint to be filed and served within 20 days.

Any demurrers currently filed as to Third Amended Complaint are deemed moot.

Any future demurrers as to Fourth Amended Complaint to be filed by 01/06/25.

(11/1/2024 Min. Order, p. 7, emph added.)

Here, the Fourth Amended Complaint (4AC) was filed on 11/26/2024 and served on 11/22/2024.

Defendant argues that the 4AC was untimely filed. [The Court notes that Defendant does not mention whether or not it believes the 4AC was timely served.]

In Opposition, Plaintiffs state that the 11/1/2024 Minute Order did not specify a particular date by which the 4AC was to be filed, whereas the 11/1/2024 Minute Order did in fact specify a particular date in which future demurrers to the 4AC were to be filed (1/6/2025).

Plaintiffs state their counsel calculated the 4AC to be due by 11/26/2024 because they allowed five days service of the Court’s minute order by mail. Plaintiffs argue that if the date was erroneous, they apologize, and that no party could or should have been prejudiced because all defendants were still afforded thirty days’ time to respond.

In Reply, Defendant points out that the 11/1/2024 Minute Order required the 4AC to be filed and served within 20 days. Defendant argues the 11/1/2024 Minute Order was violated because Plaintiffs’ 4AC was filed on 11/26/2024.

Further, Defendant argues:

If Plaintiffs required additional time to file their FAC, they were obligated to seek leave of the Court for a late filing. A court order is not discretionary and Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate good cause for failing to timely file their FAC.

Plaintiffs’ opposition contends that because Papillon was nonetheless afforded thirty (30) days to respond to Plaintiffs’ FAC, Papillon has suffered no prejudice. This is simply not true. Papillon is entitled to rely on the Court’s Order. Prejudice is presumed when a party disregards a court-ordered deadline, as it affects litigation timelines and defense strategy.

(Def. Reply, p. 1-2.)

The Court notes that Defendant did not provide any legal authority for the arguments asserted above that the Court put in block quotes.

Further, Defendant argues in Reply that “pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 581(f)(2), this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC in its entirety, as it was not timely filed as required by the Court’s Minute Order.” (Def. Reply, p. 2.)

The Court notes that Defendant did not cite the language of CCP § 581(f)(2). Therefore, the Court cites it below.

“The court may dismiss the complaint as to that defendant when: Except where Section 597 applies, after a demurrer to the complaint is sustained with leave to amend, the plaintiff fails to amend it within the time allowed by the court and either party moves for dismissal.” (CCP § 581(f)(2).)

Here, the Court will hear argument.

With respect to Defendant citing CCP § 581(f)(2), the Court notes that Defendant did not move for dismissal as required by CCP § 581(f)(2). In fact, the moving Defendant here filed a demurrer and a motion to strike.

Third Cause of Action – Premises Liability

As stated in Kesner v. Superior Court:

The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 637; see Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 309, 911 P.2d 496 [negligence cause of action]; **301 Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 36 P.3d 11 [cause of action for premises liability].) Premises liability “ ‘is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises’ ”; accordingly, “ ‘mere possession with its attendant right to control conditions on the premises is a sufficient basis for the imposition of an affirmative duty to act.’ ” (Preston v. Goldman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 108, 118, 227 Cal.Rptr. 817, 720 P.2d 476, italics omitted, quoting Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1981) 30 Cal.3d 358, 368, 370, 178 Cal.Rptr. 783, 636 P.2d 1121.) But the duty arising from possession and control of property is adherence to the same standard of care that applies in negligence cases. (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 119, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 [“The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land ... is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others....”]; accord, Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 448, 929 P.2d 1239.) In determining whether a premises owner owes a duty to persons on its property, we apply *1159 the Rowland factors. (See, e.g., Thai v. Stang (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1264, 1271, 263 Cal.Rptr. 202 [Rowland analysis applies to premises liability cases].) Indeed, Rowland itself involved premises liability. (Rowland, at p. 110, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561.)

(Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158-59.)

Moving Defendant cites to CACI 1000 which lists the elements of premises liability as: (1) That defendant owned/leased/occupied/controlled the property; (2) That defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property; (3) That plaintiff was harmed; and (4) That defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (CACI 1000.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ 4AC fails to state facts sufficient to support their third cause of action for premises liability because no ownership or control of the incident location has been alleged against Papillion. Defendant argues that the 4AC alleges that Robert and Gregory walked out of the Glenoaks Papillon bakery and were walking on the sidewalk of the parking lot. Defendant argues that the harm that Robert suffered did not occur at the Papillon premises or on property controlled by Papillon.

The Court does not find Defendant’s argument availing.

Defendant’s own moving papers cite Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th1149, 1162 for the proposition that control alone is sufficient.

Plaintiffs alleged, “Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on said basis allege that, that the time of Edgar’s assault on Robert, Papillon exercised control over the property adjacent to the bakery. Papillon was negligent in the use or maintenance of the adjacent. Edgar was harmed as a result and Papillon’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing Robert’s harm.” (4AC ¶ 37.)

Although ¶ 37 is contained in the fourth cause of action for assault and battery, and not located in the third cause of action for premises liability, the Court reads the allegations of the complaint liberally and in context.

“All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading … is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)

Further, to the extent that Defendant argues that the alleged criminal conduct was not foreseeable, Defendant’s argument is unavailing. Plaintiffs alleged foreseeability in ¶32 of the 4AC.

TENTATIVE RULING THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Defendant’s demurrer to the third cause of action, on grounds of uncertainty and failure to state sufficient facts, is OVERRULED.

Fourth Cause of Action – Assault and Battery
Defendant argues that there are no allegations to suggest that Papillion assaulted or battered Robert. Defendant argues that the 4AC alleges that Edgar shot and stabbed Robert.

Defendant’s arguments are unavailing.

First, the Court encourages Defendant to read the tentative ruling with respect to the fourth cause of action in Demurrer 1.

Second, the general rule of respondeat superior is as follows, “an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of the employment.” (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 298.)

Here, the fourth cause of action attempts to hold several defendants liable for assault and battery under the vicarious liability theory of conspiracy.

Plaintiffs alleged conspiracy of assault and battery against Defendant Liana. Further, the Complaint alleges that Liana was employed by Glendale French Bakery, Inc. as a manager of that entity. (4AC ¶ 7.) Further, The 4AC alleges that Liana was “managing agent” of Papillon in that she exercised substantial independent authority and judgment in corporate decision-making such that her decisions could ultimately determine corporate policy. (4AC ¶ 7.) Further, the 4AC alleges that Liana’s actions were undertaken in the course and scope of employment. (4AC ¶ 19.)

Many of Defendant’s arguments are not on point as they attack the sufficiency of the evidence. This hearing is not an evidentiary hearing.

TENTATIVE RULING FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Defendant’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action, on grounds of uncertainty and failure to state sufficient facts, is OVERRULED.

TENTATIVE RULING FIFTH, SIXTH, and SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION
With respect to the fifth cause of action, Defendant argues that the 4AC fails to establish any tortious conduct by Papillion.

With respect to the sixth cause of action, Defendant argues that the 4AC fails to allege specific facts to show Papillion directed any conduct towards Plaintiffs.

With respect to the seventh cause of action, Defendant argues that the 4AC fails to allege that Papillon had knowledge of Edgar’s plan or intended conduct.

The Court does not find any of Defendant’s arguments availing.

The Court encourages Defendant to read the tentative ruling with respect to Demurrer 1, and the Court encourages Defendant to read the analysis of the fourth cause of action in Demurrer 2.

Defendants demurrers to the fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action, on grounds of uncertainty and failure to state sufficient facts, are OVERRULED.

TENTATIVE RULING MOTION TO STRIKE
Defendant, Glendale French Bakery, Inc., moved to strike several portions of the 4AC. Those portions were ¶ 41, ¶ 42, ¶ 58, and any other reference or claim for punitive damages.

Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED.

Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the elements of each cause of action that Defendant demurred to. Further, to the extent that Defendant argued that Plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege punitive damages, Defendant’s arguments are unavailing.

Although Defendant points out that Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion to strike, Defendant’s arguments as to striking the allegations with respect to punitive damages was unavailing.

DEMURRER 3

Tentative Ruling Fourth Cause of Action

Defendant, Liana Gyozalyan, demurs to the fourth cause of action in the 4AC. [The Court notes that Defendant’s notice indicated that Defendant was demurring to the Third Amended Complaint. The Court assumes Defendant made an error with reference to the Third Amended Complaint.]

Defendant argues that the fourth cause of action fails to state sufficient facts and that the fourth cause of action is uncertain.

Defendant’s arguments are similar to the arguments asserted by moving Defendants in Demurrers 1 & 2.

Defendant’s arguments are likewise unavailing as previously explained in the rulings for Demurrer 1 & 2.

Further, the Court notes that the instant demurrer by Liana Gyozalyan was not filed by 1/6/2025 as the 11/1/2024 Minute Order instructed. Liana’s demurrer was filed on 1/7/2025.

Defendant’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action, on grounds of uncertainty and failure to state sufficient facts, is OVERRULED.

Tentative Ruling Motion to Strike

Defendant, Liana Gyozalyan, moves to strike ¶¶ 41, 42, 51, 52, 58, and any other reference or claim for punitive damages.

Although Defendant points out that Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion to strike, Defendant’s arguments as to striking the allegations with respect to punitive damages was unavailing.

Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED