Case Number: 23GDCV02321    Hearing Date: May 14, 2025    Dept: E

Hearing Date: 05/14/2025 – 8:30am
Case No. 23GDCV02321
Trial Date: 06/16/2025
Case Name: OLIVIA MARTINEZ, an individual; v. GLENDALE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER, an unknown entity; DIGNITY COMMUNITY CARE, a Colorado corporation; DOE 1 (Manager); and DOES 2 to 50 inclusive

TENTATIVE RULING ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RELIEF REQUESTED¿

“[D]efendant DIGNITY COMMUNITY CARE dba GLENDALE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER (Erroneously sued and served herein as " GLENDALE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER ") will move this Court, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c, for an order granting summary judgment in defendant's favor and against plaintiff OLIVIA MARTINEZ.

This Motion is made on the grounds that plaintiff's Complaint, as to moving defendant, has no merit, that there exists no triable issue of material fact remaining for trial, and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In addition, this Motion is made as to the following issues:

ISSUE 1 (Affirmative defense): Plaintiff's entire action is barred because defendant DIGNITY COMMUNITY CARE dba GLENDALE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER was not negligent.

ISSUE 2 (Affirmative defense): Plaintiff's entire action is barred because defendant DIGNITY COMMUNITY CARE dba GLENDALE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER's alleged act or omission was not a substantial cause of plaintiff's injury.

ISSUE 3 (Affirmative defense): Plaintiff's entire action is barred because plaintiff has no evidence to back up her claims or elements of her claims.”

(Def. Mot. p. 2.)

PRELIMINARY 

Moving Party: Defendant, Dignity Community Care dba Glendale Memorial Hospital and Health Center (Erroneously sued and served herein as Glendale Memorial Hospital and Health Center)

Responding Party: Plaintiff, Olivia Martinez

Moving Papers: Notice/Motion; Separate Statement; Declaration Evan A. Guzé; Declaration of John Tyson, PE; Declaration of Raed Ali, M.D.; Notice of Lodging of Evidence; Proposed Order; Proposed Judgment; 

Opposing Papers: Memorandum; Separate Statement; Appendix of Evidence; Objections to Defendant’s Evidence;

Reply Papers: Reply; Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence; Proposed Order

PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS
Under CCP § 437c(a)(2):

Notice of the motion and supporting papers shall be served on all other parties to the action at least 81 days before the time appointed for hearing. If the notice is served by mail, the required 81-day period of notice shall be increased by 5 days if the place of address is within the State of California, 10 days if the place of address is outside the State of California but within the United States, and 20 days if the place of address is outside the United States. If the notice is served by facsimile transmission, express mail, or another method of delivery providing for overnight delivery, the required 81-day period of notice shall be increased by two court days.

(CCP § 437c(a)(2).)

Here, Defendant’s motion appears timely; and Plaintiff does not object on the basis that the motion is untimely.

The motion shall be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise. The filing of the motion shall not extend the time within which a party must otherwise file a responsive pleading. (CCP § 437c(a)(3).)

Here, Defendant’s motion appears timely; and Plaintiff does not object on the basis that the motion is untimely.

LEGAL STANDARD – MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) The plaintiff or cross-complainant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

“Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff or cross-complainant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP §437c(p)(2).)

To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of material fact on the merits of the defendant’s showing. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.)

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s Complaint arises from an alleged slip and fall at Defendant’s hospital. Plaintiff alleges that she stepped on an unknown substance on the floor causing her to slip and fall, thereby causing Plaintiff to endure severe injury and pain.

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges two causes of action. The first cause of action is for general negligence, and the second cause of action is for premises liability.

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence. (Jones v. Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1207 citing Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998) Accordingly, the plaintiff must prove a legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. (Jones v. Awad, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at 1207 citing Beacon Residential Community Assn. v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP (2014) 59 Cal.4th 568, 573.)

Preliminary

As a preliminary matter, it appears that Defendant did not comply with CRC, Rule 3.1350(d). Although Plaintiff’s Opposition did not point this issue out to the Court, the Court brings this issue up on its own because Defendant’s separate statement is difficult to decipher.

“The Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in support of a motion must separately identify: (A) Each cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion[.].” (CRC, Rule 3.1350(d)(1)(A).)

First off, Defendant’s separate statement did not separately identify each cause of action. To the Court, this issue is not problematic because the two causes of action in the Complaint are for negligence and premises liability, and those causes of action have the same elements.

However, Defendant’s motion’s notice page identifies three issues, and according to the notice page, each of those three issues are affirmative defenses. However, Defendant’s separate statement did not separately identify each affirmative defense. Defendant’s separate statement lumped all three affirmative defenses into 30 continuous undisputed material facts. Therefore, it is not clear which undisputed material facts (of the 30) support which affirmative defense (of the 3).

As stated in Beltran:

As we mentioned, one of the purposes of the Separate Statement is “to permit the trial court to focus on whether [the material] facts are truly undisputed.” (Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 411.) This can only be accomplished by both parties preparing the Separate Statement according to the statute and Rules of Court and acting in good faith. The moving party must include only material statements of fact, not incidental and background facts. The opposing party must concede facts that are truly undisputed and only add facts that are material. 

…

Trial courts ⁵ should not hesitate to deny summary judgment motions when the moving party fails to draft a compliant separate statement – and an inappropriate separate statement includes an overly long document that includes multiple nonmaterial facts in violation of the Rules of Court. Courts should also not hesitate to disregard attempts to game the system by the opposing party claiming facts are “disputed” when the uncontroverted evidence clearly shows otherwise.

(Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 876, fn. 5 [“In certain instances, particularly before granting summary judgment or adjudication, an opportunity to correct deficiencies in the separate statement may be appropriate. (Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1215-1216, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 411; see Rush v. White Corp. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1100, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 240.).]”)

Issue 1

On the notice page of Defendant’s motion, Defendant indicates as follows:

ISSUE 1 (Affirmative defense): Plaintiff's entire action is barred because defendant DIGNITY COMMUNITY CARE dba GLENDALE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER was not negligent.

(Def. Mot. p. 2.)

Further, in Defendant’s motion, Defendant addresses Issue 1 on page 12 of its motion in a section titled “The Facts Here Demonstrate that the Hospital was Not Negligent.” (Def. Mot. p. 12.)

The Court points this out because it has no idea what element of negligence/premises liability Defendant is attacking in its Issue 1 argument.

Plaintiff must prove a legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. (See Jones v. Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1207.) However, by Defendant arguing that it was not “negligent,” this does not explain how it is satisfying its initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element of a negligence cause of action. Or to phrase it differently, the Court has no idea what element, or elements, Defendant thinks it is negating in Plaintiff’s negligence/premises liability claims.

In attempting to decipher Defendant’s argument, Defendant appears to be relying on its alleged safety expert John Tyson, PE, who allegedly examined the floor and opines that the floor would not have been slippery or otherwise presented a dangerous condition.

To the extent that Defendant is attempting to argue that there was no slippery or wet condition at the premises, Defendant’s own separate statement shows there’s a dispute as to whether or not there was a slippery or wet condition at the premises.

Defendant’s own separate statement at UMF 6 states, “Plaintiff testified at her deposition that the floor was "moist" or "humid." [Deposition of plaintiff OLIVIA MARTINEZ, Exh. "B", 33:1-3].” (Def. Sep. Stmt., UMF 6.)

Therefore, for Defendant’s expert to argue that there was no slippery or wet condition is unavailing.

Further, not only is it unclear what purpose the John Tyson, PE, declaration serves, to the extent that the Tyson declaration is attempting to show that breach of duty cannot be established, that argument is also unavailing.

Breach of duty is usually a fact issue for the jury; if the circumstances permit a reasonable doubt whether the defendant’s conduct violates the standard of due care, the doubt must be resolved by the jury as an issue of fact rather than of law by the court. (Onciano v. Golden Palace Restaurant, Inc. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 385, 394.)

Defendant appears as if it may be attempting to argue that Defendant did not breach its duty/standard of care by attempting to establish that Defendant “conducted the appropriate periodic rounding, sweeping and ongoing visual examinations required for a busy hospital.” (Def. UMF 10.)

However, Defendant did not submit admissible evidence to establish UMF 10.

“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations shall be made by a person on personal knowledge, shall set forth admissible evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavits or declarations. An objection based on the failure to comply with the requirements of this subdivision, if not made at the hearing, shall be deemed waived.” (CCP § 437c(d).)

The Court fails to see how Tyson can testify as to whether or not Defendant conducted the appropriate periodic rounding, sweeping, and ongoing visual examinations. The documents that Tyson claims to rely on are Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, and Plaintiff’s responses to SROGs and RFPs. The Court fails to see how Plaintiff’s own testimony would establish whether or not Defendant conducted the appropriate periodic rounding, sweeping, and ongoing visual examinations.

Further, to the extent that Tyson stated that he inspected the location where Plaintiff alleges that she was injured, the Court still fails to see how Defendant submitted admissible evidence to establish that Defendant conducted the appropriate periodic rounding, sweeping, and ongoing visual examinations. Tyson does not state that he relied on any documents from the Defendant about the frequency of rounding, sweeping, and visual examinations. Further, even if Tyson was at the location on the day of the incident, which it does not appear as if Tyson was there on the day of the incident, Tyson does not state he relied on any specific individual’s testimony, or documentary evidence, that attests to the frequency of rounding, sweeping, and visual examinations.

Whatever issue Tyson is attempting to establish in Issue 1, Tyson did not submit admissible evidence to establish whatever issue he was attempting to establish for the Defendant.

Further, if Tyson is attempting to establish there was no moist or humid condition on the floor, Defendant’s own separate statement indicated that Plaintiff testified at her deposition that the floor was moist or humid. (See Def. Sep. Stmt. UMF 6.)

Further, as explained in Kaney v. Custance:

In Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205–1206 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 36 P.3d 11], the court explained that an owner cannot be liable for a dangerous condition unless she had actual or constructive knowledge of it, or she could have discovered it by the exercise of ordinary care and should have realized that it involved an unreasonable risk to invitees. (Ibid.) “The plaintiff need not show actual knowledge where evidence suggests that the dangerous condition was present for a sufficient period of time to charge the owner with constructive knowledge.” (Id. at p. 1206.) “Whether a dangerous condition has existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to have discovered it is a question of fact for the jury, and the cases do not impose exact time limitations.” (Id. at p. 1207.)

(Kaney v. Custance (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 201, 216.)

//

Issue 2

On the notice page of Defendant’s motion, Defendant indicates as follows:

ISSUE 2 (Affirmative defense): Plaintiff's entire action is barred because defendant DIGNITY COMMUNITY CARE dba GLENDALE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER's alleged act or omission was not a substantial cause of plaintiff's injury.

(Def. Mot. p. 2.)

With respect to Issue 2, Defendant argues that the alleged act/omission is not the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.

As explained in Achay:

“To establish causation, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ in bringing about his or her harm. [Citations.] Stated differently, evidence of causation ‘must rise to the level of a reasonable probability based upon competent testimony. [Citations.] “A possible cause only becomes ‘probable’ when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action.” [Citation.] The defendant's conduct is not the cause in fact of harm “ ‘where the evidence indicates that there is less than a probability, i.e., a 50-50 possibility or a mere chance,’ ” that the harm would have ensued.’ ” (Bowman v. Wyatt (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 286, 312 [111 Cal.Rptr.3d 787].)

“In reviewing evidence of causation, ‘we consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from both kinds of evidence, giving full consideration to the negative and affirmative inferences to be drawn from all of the evidence, including that which has been produced by the defendant.’ ” (Bowman v. Wyatt, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 312.)

“ ‘Whether a defendant's conduct actually caused an injury is a question of fact [citation] that is ordinarily for the jury.’ ” (Raven H. v. Gamette (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1029–1030 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 897].) “ ‘ “The fact of causation is incapable of mathematical proof, since no [person] can say with absolute certainty what would have occurred if the defendant had acted otherwise. If, as a matter of ordinary experience, a particular act or omission might be expected to produce a particular result, and if that result has in fact followed, the conclusion may be justified that the causal relation exists. In drawing that conclusion, the triers of fact are permitted to draw upon ordinary human experience as to the probabilities of the case.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 1029–1030.)

(Achay v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 528, 539-40.)

To support Defendant’s argument – that the alleged act/omission is not the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury – Defendant submits the declaration of orthopedic surgeon Raed Ali, M.D.

In Defendant’s separate statement, UMF 11-30 appear to be what Defendant relies upon to establish that Plaintiff cannot show causation.

However, the Court has doubts as to the presumption that underlies Defendant’s decision to submit alleged expert medical testimony on the issue of causation in an alleged slip and fall accident.

As a preliminary matter, in no clear manner does Defendant state that medical expert testimony is necessary to establish causation in a slip and fall. Therefore, it is unclear if Defendant is assuming that expert medical testimony must be submitted to establish causation.

However, Defendant does cite a portion of Jenning which states in relevant part:

In a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove the defendant's negligence was a cause-in-fact of injury. (Bromme v. Pavitt (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1502, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 608.) “The law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based [on] competent expert testimony. Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case. [Citations.] That there is a distinction between a reasonable medical ‘probability’ and a medical ‘possibility’ needs little discussion. There can be many possible ‘causes,’ indeed, an infinite number of circumstances [that] can produce an injury or disease. A possible cause only becomes ‘probable’ when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action. This is the outer limit of inference upon which an issue may be submitted to the jury. [Citation.]” (Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402–403, 209 Cal.Rptr. 456, italics added; accord, Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 234, 253, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 [although plaintiff need not eliminate any possibility that defendant's conduct was not a cause, he must introduce “ ‘evidence from which reasonable [people] may conclude that it is more probable that the event was caused by the defendant than that it was not’ ”].)

Thus, proffering an expert opinion that there is some theoretical possibility the negligent act could have been a cause-in-fact of a particular injury is insufficient to establish causation. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 775–776, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 23 P.3d 1143 [expert testimony positing a “ ‘mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant ’ ”]; accord, Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 487, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 785.) Instead, the plaintiff must offer an expert opinion that contains a reasoned explanation illuminating why the facts have convinced the expert, and therefore should convince the jury, that it is more probable than not the negligent act was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury.

(Jennings v. Palomar Pomerado Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1118.)

Therefore, based on Jennings, it is possible that at the hearing Defendant argues that in a personal injury action causation must be proven with competent expert testimony.

If this is in fact Defendant’s argument, the Court has doubts as to Defendant’s argument because the Court fails to understand why expert medical testimony is needed here to establish causation in this alleged slip and fall accident.

Jennings pertained to medical malpractice; however, the case here does not deal with medical malpractice. The case here deals with a slip and fall.

In fact, as explained in Jennings:

A person who qualifies as an expert may give testimony in the form of an opinion if the subject matter of that opinion “is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of [the] expert would assist the trier of fact.” (Evid.Code, § 801, subd. (a); People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 614, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713.) It is undisputed that qualified medical experts may, with a proper foundation, testify on matters involving causation when the causal issue is sufficiently beyond the realm of common experience that the expert's opinion will assist the trier of fact to assess the issue of causation.

(Jennings v. Palomar Pomerado Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1116-1117.)

Here, the Court fails to see how determining whether a slip and fall caused Plaintiff’s injuries is sufficiently beyond common experience.

Further, as explained in Kaney, a negligence action by a visitor brought against landlord and tenant after the visitor slipped and fell on stairs to a bathroom in tenant’s residence, the Court of Appeal noted:

“Where the complexity of [a] causation issue is beyond common experience, expert testimony is required to [prove] causation. [Citations.]” (Garbell v. Conejo Hardwoods, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1569 [122 Cal.Rptr.3d 856].) In contrast, if causation presents a question that is within the common knowledge of persons of ordinary education, then expert testimony is not required. (McNeil v. Yellow Cab Co. (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 116, 118 [147 Cal.Rptr. 733].) Here, whether the absence of a handrail, the size of the risers, or a combination of both caused appellant to fall was within common knowledge. 

(Kaney v. Custance (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 201, 217.)

Therefore, if Defendant is assuming that medical expert testimony must be submitted to establish causation in this case, the Court is inclined to find that Defendant did not meet its initial burden in establishing that Plaintiff cannot prove causation because the Court is not convinced that medical expert testimony is necessary here to establish causation, or lack thereof.

If Defendant is not assuming that medical expert testimony is necessary to establish causation here, then Defendant also did not meet its initial burden because Defendant’s own evidence shows there a dispute as to causation in this case.

In Defendant’s own separate statement, Defendant indicated that:

Plaintiff testified at her deposition that the floor was "moist" or "humid." [Deposition of plaintiff OLIVIA MARTINEZ, Exh. "B", 33:1-3].

(Def. Sept. Stmt., UMF 6.)

However, the Court will hear argument on the issue of causation because the Court struggled to understand both parties’ arguments.

The Court struggled with the issue of causation because although causation here does not appear to need medical expert testimony, Plaintiff does not do herself any help because Plaintiff does not argue that medical expert testimony is not needed here to establish causation.

Further, in Defendant’s UMF 22, wherein Defendant’s medical expert opines that the alleged injury was not caused by the alleged incident, to dispute Defendant’s expert Plaintiff simply relies on Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony wherein an alleged doctor allegedly told Plaintiff that her meniscus injury was caused by the fall at the hospital.

Therefore, if Plaintiff is under the assumption that medical expert testimony is necessary to establish causation, Plaintiff’s own alleged evidence – Plaintiff’s own deposition explaining that some doctor told her meniscus injury was caused by the fall – would not be admissible to establish causation.

Further, the Court is confused as to why Plaintiff only focuses on a meniscus injury in her knee, when Defendant’s expert’s mentioned injuries in several areas of the body.

Overall, despite the fact that Plaintiff’s opposition and separate statement are poorly written, and despite the fact that Plaintiff does not address what appears to be the most obvious legal issues that the Court found in attempting to decipher Defendant’s arguments, the Court is inclined to think that Defendant did not meet its initial moving burden. The Court tentatively plans to find that Defendant did not meet its initial burden in demonstrating that Plaintiff cannot prove causation because the Court does not understand why Defendant is under the assumption that medical expert testimony is necessary here to establish causation in an alleged slip and fall.

Based on Defendant’s own separate statement at UMF 6, Defendant appears to show that there is a dispute as to a material fact as to the cause of Plaintiff’s injury. “Plaintiff testified at her deposition that the floor was "moist" or "humid." [Deposition of plaintiff OLIVIA MARTINEZ, Exh. "B", 33:1-3].” (Def. Sep. Stmt., UMF 6.)

The Court to hear argument; however, it is inclined to DENY Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Issue 2.

Issue 3

On the notice page of Defendant’s motion, Defendant indicates as follows:

ISSUE 3 (Affirmative defense): Plaintiff's entire action is barred because plaintiff has no evidence to back up her claims or elements of her claims.

(Def. Mot. p. 2.)

As a preliminary matter, it is not entirely clear what Defendant is arguing here.

Defendant appears to be relying on UMF 27 – 30 in Defendant’s separate statement as to Issue 3.

To the Court, it appears as if Defendant is attacking causation for a second time.

As seen in Defendant’s separate statement with respect to UMF 27 – 30:

27. Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents were propounded to plaintiff, to which plaintiff responded. His responses demonstrate that she has no evidence proving that any action or inaction by defendant Hospital caused her injuries. [Plaintiff OLIVIA MARTINEZ's responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set No. One), Exh. "F", and to Special Interrogatories (Set No. One), Exh. "G", both propounded by DIGNITY COMMUNITY CARE dba GLENDALE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER].

28. Plaintiff failed to identify any person who has advised her that Defendant's alleged negligent conduct caused her injuries. [Plaintiff OLIVIA MARTINEZ's responses to Special Interrogatories (Set No. One), Exh. "G", propounded by DIGNITY COMMUNITY CARE dba GLENDALE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER].

29. Plaintiff has no statement or statements of agents, employees, or servants of this defendant relevant to the subject matter of the incident nor of any witness to any of the events of the incident. [Plaintiff OLIVIA MARTINEZ's responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set No. One), Exh. "F", propounded by DIGNITY COMMUNITY CARE dba GLENDALE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER].

30. Plaintiff also has no written or recorded or videotaped statements, or notes of conversations or interviews, by or from any individual concerning the incident and/or his claimed damage. [Plaintiff OLIVIA MARTINEZ's responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set No. One), Exh. "F", propounded by DIGNITY COMMUNITY CARE dba GLENDALE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER].

(Def. Sep Stmt., UMF 27-30.)

Here, as previously explained, the Court fails to see how Defendant met its burden in establishing that Plaintiff cannot establish causation. Defendant’s own separate statement conceded that “Plaintiff testified at her deposition that the floor was "moist" or "humid." [Deposition of plaintiff OLIVIA MARTINEZ, Exh. "B", 33:1-3].” (Def. Sep. Stmt., UMF 6.)

To the extent that Defendant’s argument appears to be relying on Plaintiff not providing evidence in response to Defendant’s SROGs and RFPs as to the cause of the injury, Defendant  appears to be relying on cases that stand for the proposition that a defendant shows that an element of a cause of action cannot be established by submitting evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence supporting the element. (See Kaney v. Custance (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 201, 212 citing Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.)

However, Defendant’s argument ignores the fact that medical expert testimony does not appear to be necessary hear to establish causation, and Defendant’s own UMF 6 asserts that Plaintiff testified that the floor was moist or humid. Further, Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff has not provided evidence that anyone else witnessed the alleged incident is unavailing.

Stipulation

The Court also notes that after Defendant’s moving papers were submitted, and after Plaintiff’s opposition papers were submitted, but before Defendant submitted its reply, the parties’ counsel filed and signed a stipulation with the Court on 4/24/2025 requesting a trial continuance.

While the trail continuance request does not request for the date of Defendant’s MSJ to be continued, the Court points to the following portion of the stipulation:

4. Pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.1332(c)(1) and (6), additional time is required for the parties to conduct further fact discovery, including obtaining deposition testimony from essential lay witnesses who[] are presently unavailable for their depositions prior to the current trial date. Similarly, defendant has been unable to obtain essential documents, including medical records from plaintiff's subsequent treating providers, despite diligent efforts. It is imperative for both parties to obtain the aforementioned testimony and documents, then have their respective experts review them, prior to expert designation and trial.

(Stip. filed 4/24/2025.)

The Reply does not bring up the fact that this stipulation was filed after the moving and opposing papers were filed.

The Court would like the parties to address this stipulation. If the stipulation is admitting that Defendant has been unable to obtain “essential documents, including medical records from plaintiff’s subsequent treating providers,” and if the stipulation is admitting that “it is imperative for both parties to obtain the aforementioned testimony and documents, then have their respective experts review them, prior to expert designation and trial,” how is Defendant simultaneously arguing in its MSJ that its experts established that the alleged incident did not cause the alleged injuries?

The Court to hear argument.

TENTATIVE RULING
The Court is inclined to DENY Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to all 3 issues. It does not appear that Defendant met its initial burden in establishing affirmative defenses or negating essential elements to a cause of action.

As an initial matter, the Court was not convinced that expert medical opinion is necessary to establish the lack of causation in an alleged slip and fall.

Further, as explained in Kaney, a negligence action by a visitor brought against landlord and tenant after the visitor slipped and fell on stairs to a bathroom in tenant’s residence, the Court of Appeal noted:

“Where the complexity of [a] causation issue is beyond common experience, expert testimony is required to [prove] causation. [Citations.]” (Garbell v. Conejo Hardwoods, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1569 [122 Cal.Rptr.3d 856].) In contrast, if causation presents a question that is within the common knowledge of persons of ordinary education, then expert testimony is not required. (McNeil v. Yellow Cab Co. (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 116, 118 [147 Cal.Rptr. 733].) Here, whether the absence of a handrail, the size of the risers, or a combination of both caused appellant to fall was within common knowledge. 

(Kaney v. Custance (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 201, 217.)

Further, the evidence that Defendant submitted in its own moving papers appears to show that at the very least there is a triable issue of fact as to the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries, as Defendant’s evidence concedes that Plaintiff testified at her deposition that the floor was moist or humid. (See Def. Sep. Stmt. UMF 6.)

Further, it is not entirely clear what Defendant is attempting to argue with respect to Issue 1. Defendant appears to be arguing it wasn’t negligent because it conducted the appropriate periodic rounding, sweeping, and ongoing visual examinations required for a busy hospital, but Defendant does not submit admissible evidence to establish this. The Tyson declaration did not rely on any evidence from Defendant itself with respect to rounding, sweeping, or visual examinations. The Tyson declaration reviewed Plaintiff’s documentary evidence (i.e., the complaint, Plaintiff’s deposition, Plaintiff’s SROG responses, and Plaintiff’s RFP responses); the Court fails to see how Tyson can opine on whether or not Defendant conducted the appropriate periodic rounding, sweeping, and ongoing visual examinations when Tyson does not rely on evidence from Defendant. While Tyson states in paragraph 3 of his declaration that he “inspected the location where plaintiff alleges that she was injured,” Tyson does not explain what evidence he relied on at the location to determine that at the time of the alleged incident Defendant conducted the appropriate periodic rounding, sweeping, and ongoing visual examinations.

Defendant’s arguments as to Issue 3 are also unavailing.

The parties to address the stipulation issue that the Court addressed.

Additionally, Defendant did not comply with CRC, Rule 3.1350(d)(1)(A). This made it difficult for the Court to understand several of Defendant’s arguments.

The Court to hear argument, but it is inclined to DENY Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to all 3 issues.