Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case Number: 23GDCV02381, Date: 2024-06-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 23GDCV02381, Date: 2024-06-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23GDCV02381 Hearing Date: June 28, 2024 Dept: E

Hearing Date: 06/28/2024 – 8:30am
Case No. 23GDCV02381
Trial Date: UNSET
Case Name: EVON HALAKA, an individual; v. FCA US LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, and DOES 1-10 inclusive

4 TENTATIVE RULINGS – COMPEL RESPONSES

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Evon Halaka, filed a Complaint on 11/09/2023 alleging three causes of action for: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2.

MOTION 1 - RELIEF REQUESTED¿
“Plaintiffs, EVON HALAKA (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”), will, and hereby do, move for an order to compel responses, without objections, to Plaintiff’s Form and Special Interrogatories, Set One (“Interrogatories”). Plaintiff’s Interrogatories were initially served and propounded on Defendant by Plaintiff on December 29, 2023.

This Motion is made pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, sections 2033.280, subdivision (a), and 2033.280, subdivision (b), on the grounds that Defendant FCA US LLC (“Defendant”) has failed to provide any responses to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories, which seek information directly relevant to their claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Thus, Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Defendant to produce responses, without objections, within 10 calendar days of the Court’s order.

The Motion is based upon this Notice, the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Gregory Sogoyan, the pleadings, and papers on file herein, and upon any other matters that may be presented to the Court at the hearing.

No separate statement is being submitted in support of the instant Motion, as it is not required pursuant to rule 3.1345(b) of the California Rules of Court.”

(Pl. Mot. p. 2.)

Procedural – Motion 1

Moving Party: Plaintiff, Evon Halaka

Responding Party: Defendant, FCA US LLC

Moving Papers: Notice/Motion filed 3:50pm on 4/29/2024; Sogoyan Declaration; Proposed Order; Notice/Motion filed 3:52pm on 4/29/2024 The Court notes that it is unclear why Plaintiff filed two notices/motions for its motion. Both captions of both motions indicate they are motions to compel responses to FROGs and SROGS. Further, both motions use the same exact reservation ID. It appears that both motions are identical.

Opposition Papers: Oppo to FROGs; Oppo to SROGs

Reply: Reply; Sogoyan Declaration

16/21 Day Lapse (CCP § 12c and § 1005(b): Ok
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300): Ok
Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a): Ok

MOTION 2 – RELIEF REQUESTED
“Plaintiff, EVON HALAKA (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), will, and hereby do, move for an order to compel responses, without objections, to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set One (“RFPs”). Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, was initially served and propounded on Defendant by Plaintiff on December 29, 2023.

This Motion is made pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, sections 2033.280, 2023.010, and 2023.030 on the basis that Plaintiff properly served upon Defendant, Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, and Defendant has failed to serve timely responses. Plaintiff’s RFPs seek information directly relevant and material to their claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Thus, Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Defendant to produce responses, without objections, within 10 calendar days of the Court’s order.

No separate statement is being submitted in support of the instant Motion, as it is not required pursuant to rule 3.1345(b) of the California Rules of Court.”

(Pl. Mot. p.2)

Procedural – Motion 2

Moving Party: Plaintiff, Evon Halaka

Responding Party: Defendant, FCA US LLC

Moving Papers: Notice/Motion; Proposed Order; Sogoyan Declaration

Opposition Papers: Opposition

Reply: Reply; Sogoyan Declaration

16/21 Day Lapse (CCP § 12c and § 1005(b): Ok
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300): Ok
Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a): Ok

MOTION 3 – RELIEF REQUESTED
“Plaintiff, EVON HALAKA (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), will, and hereby do, move for an order deeming the truth of matters admitted in Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions, Set One. Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions were initially served and propounded on Defendant by Plaintiff on December 29, 2023.

This Motion is made pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, sections 2033.280, subdivision (a), and 2033.280, subdivision (b), on the grounds that Defendant FCA US LLC (“Defendant”) has failed to provide verified and timely responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions, which seek information directly relevant and material to their claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Thus, Plaintiff seeks an order deeming the truth of matters admitted, within 10 calendar days of the Court’s order.

The Motion is based upon this Notice, the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Gregory Sogoyan, the pleadings and papers on file herein, and upon any other matters that may be presented to the Court at the hearing.

No separate statement is being submitted in support of the instant Motion, as it is not required pursuant to rule 3.1345(b) of the California Rules of Court.”

(Pl. Mot. p.2.)

Procedural – Motion 3

Moving Party: Plaintiff, Evon Halaka

Responding Party: Defendant, FCA US LLC

Moving Papers: Notice/Motion; Sogoyan Declaration; Proposed Order

Opposition Papers: Opposition

Reply: Reply; Sogoyan Declaration

16/21 Day Lapse (CCP § 12c and § 1005(b)): Ok
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300): Ok
Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a): Ok

LEGAL STANDARD – COMPEL RESPONSES, INTERROGATORIES
Within 30 days after service of interrogatories, the party to whom the interrogatories are propounded shall serve the original of the response to them on the propounding party, unless on motion of the propounding party the court has shortened the time for response, or unless on motion of the responding party the court has extended the time for response. (CCP § 2030.260(a).)

If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling response to the interrogatories. (CCP § 2030.290(b).)

Further, if a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, “The party to whom the interrogatories are directed waives any right to exercise the option to produce writings under Section 2030.230, as well as any objection to the interrogatories, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010). The court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with Sections 2030.210, 2030.220, 2030.230, and 2030.240. (2) The party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” (CCP § 2030.290(a).)

Unlike a motion to compel further responses, a motion to compel responses is not subject to a 45-day time limit, and the propounding party does not have to demonstrate either good cause or that it satisfied a “meet and confer” requirement. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4^th 390, 404 citing Weil and Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2006) ¶¶ 8:1137 to 8:1144, pp. 8F-59 to 8F-60, ¶¶ 8:1483 to 8:1489, pp. 8H-29 to hH-30 (Weil & Brown).)

LEGAL STANDARD – COMPEL RESPONSES, INSPECTION DEMANDS
Within 30 days after service of a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the party to whom the demand is directed shall serve the original of the response to it on the party making the demand, and a copy of the response on all other parties who have appeared in the action, unless on motion of the party making the demand, the court has shortened the time for response, or unless on motion of the party to whom the demand has been directed, the court has extended the time for response. (CCP § 2031.260(a).)

If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand. (CCP § 2031.300(b).)

If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the party to whom the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed waives any objection to the demand, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010). (CCP § 2031.300(a).) “The court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with Sections 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230, 2031.240, and 2031.280. (2) The party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” (CCP § 2031.300(a)(1)-(2).)

LEGAL STANDARD –REQUEST TO DEEM ADMISSIONS ADMITTED
“Within 30 days after service of requests for admission, the party to whom the requests are directed shall serve the original of the response to them on the requesting party, and a copy of the response on all other parties who have appeared, unless on motion of the requesting party the court has shortened the time for response, or unless on motion of the responding party the court has extended the time for response.” (CCP § 2033.250(a).)

If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response, the requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with § 2023.010). (CCP § 2033.280(b).)

Further, “If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response, the following rules apply: (a) The party to whom the requests for admission are directed waives any objection to the requests, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010). The court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with Sections 2033.210, 2033.220, and 2033.230. (2) The party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” (CCP § 2033.280(a).)

“The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” (CCP § 2033.280(c).)

TENTATIVE RULING ALL MOTIONS
Plaintiff lumps what should have been four motions into three motions.

A motion must be brought separately as to each discovery method at issue. The instant three motions should have been filed as four separate motions and four filing fees paid. Plaintiff’s Motion 1 lumped compelling responses to Form and Special Interrogatories, Set One, into one motion when it should have been filed as two separate motions, i.e., one motion for FROGs and one motion for SROGs. “[P]ayment of filing fees is both mandatory and jurisdictional.” (Hu vs. Silgan Containers Corp. (1999) 70 Cal. App. 4^th 1261, 1269.)

If Plaintiff wants these four motions to be heard, they can pay the additional filing fee to the Court before the hearing and show proof of payment of the additional filing fee before the hearing.

Alternatively, Plaintiff is welcome to request the Court to continue the instant hearings to a date that all four motions will be scheduled for; however, Plaintiff is advised that all motions must provide sufficient notice to Defendant. Further, Plaintiff would need to clarify which discovery method Motion 1 will pertain to on the future hearing date, i.e., will Motion 1 pertain to special interrogatories or form interrogatories. Presumably, the additional motion filed will clearly indicate what individual discovery method it pertains to, i.e. FROGs or SROGs.

As to the merits of these motions, on December 29, 2023, Plaintiff served Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, and Requests for Admissions, Set One, on Defendant. (Sogoyan Decl. ¶ 8.)

As of the date of the Sogoyan Declarations [April 29, 2024], Defendant had failed to provide any responses to the discovery served on December 29, 2023. Therefore, Defendant did not provide timely responses, as the responses did not come anywhere close to being served within 30 days of service of the discovery that was propounded.

On June 12, 2024, which would be after the filing of Plaintiff’s motions, Defendant served unverified responses. On June 20, 2024 Defendant served verifications to the responses. Therefore, here, responses were not timely provided, but responses and verifications were ultimately provided before the hearing on the instant motions.

Tentative Ruling Motions 1 and 2

As to the Oppositions to the SROGs/FROGs and RFPs, Defendant argues that it did not waive objections because it served responses that were substantially compliant and its failure to timely respond was due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.

Those arguments as to SROGs/FROGS and RFPs are unavailing. Whether Defendant served substantially compliant responses, or whether the untimely response were due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, is irrelevant for compelling initial responses to interrogatories and RFPs at this hearing. That standard is only relevant if Defendant files a motion to be relieved from waiver of objections. Defendant has not filed a motion to be relieved from waiver of objections, and the Oppositions are not considered motions to be relieved from waiver of objections.

Further, as to SROGs/FROGs and RFPs, Opposition argues that Motions 1 and 2 should be denied as moot.

The Reply argues that Motions 1 and 2 should not be denied as moot.

The Reply supports its argument that Motions 1 and 2 should not be denied as moot by citing to Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants because that case addressed the issue of if the trial court has authority to hear a motion to compel responses to written interrogatories under § 2030.290 when the party on whom the interrogatories were served fails to serve any response within the required time, thereby waiving objections, but after the motion is served, provides an untimely response that the propounding party deems inadequate. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 395-396 (Sinaiko).)

Ultimately, the court in Sinaiko held that the scenario this Court faces today (untimely responses that were served before the hearing) does not divest the trial court authority to hear and grant a motion to compel responses under § 2030.290(b). (Sinaiko, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 396.)

However, Sinaiko also held that whether the trial court should proceed with a motion to compel responses under § 2030.290 when there has been an untimely response is within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Sinaiko, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 396.)

Therefore, while the Reply is correct to note that this Court can rule on Motions 1 and 2 and does not have to deny them as moot, it is not entirely clear what the moving party is seeking with its request to not have the motions be denied as moot. It appears that the Reply has a problem that the responses to SROGs/FROGs and RFPs asserted objections, and it appears that the Reply wants the Court to note that objections to SROGs/FROGs and RFPs were waived, but it is not clear as to what the Reply is arguing it seeks in the Court’s ruling on Motions 1 and 2.

Sinaiko helps shed light on potential ways in which the Court can deal with the instant scenario as describe below:

Under section 2030.290, therefore, once a party has failed to serve timely interrogatory responses, the trial court has the authority to hear a propounding party's motion to compel responses under section 2030.290, subdivision (b), regardless of whether a party serves an untimely response. If a party fails to serve a timely response to interrogatories, then by operation of law, all objections that it could assert to those interrogatories are waived. (§ 2030.290, subd. (a).) Unless that party obtains relief from its waiver, the propounding party is entitled to move under subdivision (b) for an order compelling the response to which the propounding party is entitled—that is, a response without objection, and that substantially complies with the provisions governing the form (§ 2030.210) and completeness (§ 2030.220) of interrogatory responses.

The question we address is the extent of the trial court's authority under section 2030.290, subdivision (b), not whether relief should be granted in a particular case. If a party provides an untimely interrogatory response that does not contain objections and that sets forth legally valid responses to each interrogatory, the untimely response might completely or substantially resolve the issues raised by a motion to compel responses under section 2030.290. Even in such cases, however, the trial court retains the authority to hear the motion. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1030(a) [“The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though ... the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed”].) Whether a particular response does resolve satisfactorily the issues raised by a motion is a matter best determined by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion, based on the circumstances of the case. In many cases involving untimely responses, the propounding party will take the motion off calendar or narrow its scope to the issue of sanctions. If the propounding party proceeds with the motion, however, the trial court has the discretion to rule on the motion. The trial court might compel responses without objection if it finds no legally valid responses have been provided to one or more interrogatories; it might deny the motion to compel responses as essentially unnecessary, in whole or in part, and just impose sanctions; it might treat the motion as one under section 2030.300 and either determine that further answers are required,¹⁴ or order the propounding party to “meet and confer” (§ 2030.300, subd. (b)) and file a separate statement (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1020(a)(2), (c)); or it might take the motion off calendar, thereby requiring the propounding party to file a motion under section 2030.300.

(Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 408-409.)

Therefore, the Court will hear argument as to what Plaintiff precisely seeks with its ruling with respect to Motions 1 and 2. The Court notes that it agrees that objections were waived, and that Defendant has not filed a motion to be relieved from waiver of objections. The Court also notes that while it is clear that Plaintiff has a problem with the fact that Defendant asserted objections in part of its responses, the Court will not be analyzing each response and turning the instant hearings into motions to compel further responses.

Tentative Ruling Motion 3
As to Motion 3, which pertains to RFAs, the same scenario as Motions 1 and 2 arises with respect to the fact that responses were untimely, and verified responses were not provided until after the filing of the motion, but before the hearing on the motion to deem admitted.

The issues that Motion 3 face are slightly more complex than the issues that Motions 1 and 2 face, and neither party helps the Court determine what the proper solution is here. The primary issue that arises here is how the Court should handle the objections in the responses to the RFAs at the instant hearing.

The Opposition argues that the motion should be denied as moot in its entirety because it served responses before the hearing, and Opposition argues that the objections it asserted in its responses were not waived because its responses were served in substantial compliance, and Defendant’s failure to timely respond was due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.

To the extent that Opposition is under the impression that the Opposition is considered a motion to be relieved from waiver of objections, the Court notes that Defendant’s Opposition is not construed as a motion to be relieved from waiver of objection.

The Reply argues that this motion should not be denied as moot, the RFAs should be deemed admitted, and objections should be waived.

Reply cites to Sinaiko to argue that this Court has authority to rule on this motion, despite Defendant providing untimely responses.

However, the Reply’s citation to Sinaiko is unhelpful to the Court. Sinaiko did not deal with RFAs, which are fundamentally different than interrogatories and RFPs.

As stated in St. Mary v. Superior Court:

RFAs are different from other civil discovery tools such as depositions, interrogatories, and requests for documents. “Most of the other discovery procedures are aimed primarily at assisting counsel to prepare for trial. Requests for admissions, on the other hand, are primarily aimed at setting at *775 rest a triable issue so that it will not have to be tried.

…

As has been explained in one treatise: “The admission request differs fundamentally from the other five discovery tools (depositions, interrogatories, inspection demands, medical examinations, and expert witness exchanges). These devices principally seek to obtain proof for use at trial. In marked contrast, admission requests seek to eliminate the need for proof: ‘[T]he purpose of the admissions procedure ... is to limit the triable issues and spare the parties the burden and expense of litigating undisputed issues.’

(St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 774-774.) (St. Mary)

St. Mary appears to be more on point that Sinaiko, but St. Mary does not fully direct this Court as to what it should do in the instant scenario.

In St. Mary, St. Mary served her untimely proposed responses to the RFAs not only before the hearing on the motion, but even before the motion to compel responses was filed. (See St. Mary at 766 & 778.) [This Court notes that here, the responses were served after the motion was filed, but for purposes of analyzing St. Mary and the instant motion, the fact that the untimely responses were served after the motion was filed seems to be a distinction without a difference. St. Mary focuses on how the trial court erred in deeming admitted responses when the responses were untimely. Here, the responses were also untimely, and both St. Mary and 2033.280 don’t make a distinction between untimely responses served after the filing of the motion versus untimely responses served before the filing of the motion. For example, 2033.280(c) only makes a distinction with responses served before the hearing.]

St. Mary helps explain 2033.280 as follows:

Under the RFA procedure postdating the Civil Discovery Act, a propounding party must take affirmative steps—by bringing a formal “deemed admitted” motion—to have RFAs to which timely responses are not received deemed admitted. In the event responses to RFAs are not timely served, the responding party waives any objections thereto (§ 2033.280, subd. (a)), and “[t]he requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction” (id. subd. (b)). Unless the court determines that the responding party “has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220,” it must order the RFAs deemed admitted. (Id. subd. (c).) “[A] deemed admitted order establishes, by judicial fiat, that a nonresponding party has responded to the requests by admitting the truth of all matters contained therein.” (Wilcox, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 979, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 260, 987 P.2d 727.) The court must also impose monetary sanctions upon the party and/or the attorney for the failure to serve a timely response to the RFAs. (§ 2033.280, subd. (c).) But a responding party's service, prior to the hearing on the “deemed admitted” motion, of substantially compliant responses, will defeat a propounding party's attempt under section 2033.280 to have the RFAs deemed admitted. (Tobin v. Oris (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 814, 827, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 736 (Tobin ).) As one court put it: “If the party manages to serve its responses before the hearing, the court has no discretion but to deny the motion. But woe betide the party who fails to serve responses before the hearing. In that instance the court has no discretion but to grant the admission motion, usually with fatal consequences for the defaulting party. One might call it ‘two strikes and you're out’ as applied to civil procedure.” (Demyer v. Costa Mesa Mobile Home Estates (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 393, 395–396, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 260, fns. omitted (Demyer ).)¹⁸

(St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 775-776. Footnote 18 stated, “Both Tobin, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th 814, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 736, and Demyer, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th 393, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 260, were disapproved on other grounds in Wilcox, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 983, fn. 12, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 260, 987 P.2d 727.)

However, where there is a gap in St. Mary and in the instant scenario is how the parties responded to the RFAs.

In St. Mary, the Court of Appeal noted that the responses were in substantial compliance and the RFAs should not have been deemed admitted even though they were untimely and some of the responses contained more in their responses than just the words “Admit” or “Deny.” (See St. Mary at p. 780-781.)

While St. Mary addressed the key issue of whether a proposed response was substantially compliant, the issue here is that none of the responses in St. Mary had objections, whereas some of the responses here had objections.

The Reply argues that because the responses contained both responses and objections, the Defendant’s responses are not in substantial compliance because the objections were waived due to being untimely and that, therefore, the responses should be deemed admitted.

The Court will hear argument because neither party provides case law as to whether asserting both responses and objections in the untimely, verified responses, does or does not constitute substantial compliance.

The Court’s inclination is that Defendant’s responses were in substantial compliance to the degree that the requests should not be deemed admitted.

The Court’s further inclination is that the objections in the responses would be more appropriately dealt with in a different type of motion. For example, if Defendant wanted to seek relief from waiver of objections, Defendant could potentially file a motion for relief from waiver of objections under § 2033.280(a).

Likewise, if Plaintiff doesn’t find the objections appropriate and that the objections were waived, Plaintiff could potentially file a motion to compel further responses.

As stated in St. Mary:

If the propounding party believes that the responses to RFAs are deficient in some respect or that any objections thereto are not well taken, he or she may make a motion to compel further responses under section 2033.290. (See Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 618, 636, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 532; Tobin, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 829, fn. 25, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 736.) Section 2033.290 provides that such a motion to compel further responses may be made within 45 days of service of the responses (§ 2033.290, subd. **529 (c)) if the propounding party asserts that the particular answer or answers are “evasive or incomplete” or the objection or objections are “without merit or too general” (id. subd. (a)).

(St. Mary, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at 776.)

Further:

The RFA device is not intended to provide a windfall to litigants. Nor is the RFA procedure a “gotcha” device in which an overly aggressive propounding party—who rejects facially reasonable requests for a short discovery extension and thereafter files the wrong discovery motion after service of a slightly tardy proposed RFA response that is substantially code-compliant—may obtain a substantive victory in the case by having material issues deemed admitted. RFAs are not to be deemed admitted unless the party to whom RFAs are propounded fails to respond prehearing to RFAs in a manner that is substantially code-compliant (§ 2033.280, subd. (c)), or he or she is recalcitrant and violates a court order compelling further responses that are deficient (§ 2033.290, subd. (e)). Furthermore, the order deeming admitted the 41 RFAs, to the extent that it may substantially impact St. Mary's ability to prove her case, undermines public policy that promotes controversies being resolved through trials on the merits. (See New Albertson's, Inc., supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1420–1421, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 [court's discretion under § 2033.300 to grant party leave to withdraw or amend RFA responses based upon “mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect” must be exercised consistently with “the spirit of the law and in a manner that serves the interests of justice”; policy favoring trial on the merits dictates that any doubts be resolved in favor of party seeking relief].)

(St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 783-784.)

The Court will hear argument as to Motion 3.

Sanctions – Requests for Admission

“It is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion.” (CCP § 2033.280(c).)

Sanctions - Inspection Demands

In relevant part, § 2031.300(c) states as follows:

Except as provided in subdivision (d), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

(CCP § 2031.300(c).)

Sanctions – Interrogatories
CCP § 2030.290 states in relevant part:

The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

(CCP § 2030.290(c).)

Sanctions Ruling
“The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).)

Here, none of the three notices/motions sought sanctions in their moving papers. However, all three of Plaintiff’s replies argue that the Court should impose sanctions against Defendant, or their counsel of record, in an amount the Court deems fit.

The Court notes that the section regarding sanctions for RFAs (§ 2033.280(c)) uses different language in the sense that it says sanctions are “mandatory.”

The Court will hear argument because the Court is concerned about notice issues since Movant did not request sanctions until the Reply.

As stated in CRC, rule 2.30, titled, “Sanctions for rules violations in civil cases”:

(a) Application

This sanctions rule applies to the rules in the California Rules of Court relating to general civil cases, unlawful detainer cases, probate proceedings, civil proceedings in the appellate division of the superior court, and small claims cases.

(b) Sanctions

In addition to any other sanctions permitted by law, the court may order a person, after written notice and an opportunity to be heard, to pay reasonable monetary sanctions to the court or an aggrieved person, or both, for failure without good cause to comply with the applicable rules. For the purposes of this rule, "person" means a party, a party's attorney, a witness, and an insurer or any other individual or entity whose consent is necessary for the disposition of the case. If a failure to comply with an applicable rule is the responsibility of counsel and not of the party, any penalty must be imposed on counsel and must not adversely affect the party's cause of action or defense thereto.

(c) Notice and procedure

Sanctions must not be imposed under this rule except on noticed motion by the party seeking sanctions or on the court's own motion after the court has provided notice and an opportunity to be heard. A party's motion for sanctions must (1) state the applicable rule that has been violated, (2) describe the specific conduct that is alleged to have violated the rule, and (3) identify the attorney, law firm, party, witness, or other person against whom sanctions are sought. The court on its own motion may issue an order to show cause that must (1) state the applicable rule that has been violated, (2) describe the specific conduct that appears to have violated the rule, and (3) direct the attorney, law firm, party, witness, or other person to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed against them for violation of the rule.

(d) Award of expenses

In addition to the sanctions awardable under (b), the court may order the person who has violated an applicable rule to pay to the party aggrieved by the violation that party's reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees and costs, incurred in connection with the motion for sanctions or the order to show cause.

(e) Order

An order imposing sanctions must be in writing and must recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.

(CRC, rule 2.30(a)-(e).)

The Court will hear argument.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay the filing fee for combining the SROG and FROG motion.