Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case Number: 24NNCV00634, Date: 2025-06-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 24NNCV00634, Date: 2025-06-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NNCV00634 Hearing Date: June 12, 2025 Dept: E

Hearing Date: 06/12/2025 – 8:30am
Case No: 24NNCV00634
Trial Date: UNSET
Case Name: BRENDA GARCIA, an individual; v. OPTUMCARE MANAGEMENT LLC, a California limited liability company; OPTUM CARE, INC., a Delaware corporation; OPTUM360 SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive

TENTATIVE RULING ON MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Brenda Garcia, filed the instant action on 3/29/2024 against Defendants – (1) OPTUM CARE, INC., a Delaware corporation; (2) OPTUM360 SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation; and (3) DOES 1 through 50, inclusive.

On 11/18/2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC). The FAC added an additional Defendant not named in the initial Complaint. The FAC lists the Defendants as – (1) OPTUMCARE MANAGEMENT LLC, a California limited liability company; (2) OPTUM CARE, INC., a Delaware corporation; (3) OPTUM360 SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation; and (4) DOES 1 through 50, inclusive.

The causes of action listed in the caption of the FAC are listed as – (1) Disability Discrimination In Violation of FEHA; (2) Failure To Reasonably Accommodate; (3) Failure To Engage In An Interactive Process; (4) Retaliation In Violation of FEHA; (5) Retaliation In Violation Of Labor Code Section 1102.5; (6) Wrongful Termination In Violation Of Public Policy; (7) Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress; (8) Failure To Pay Regular And Overtime Wages; (9) Failure To Reimburse For Necessary Business Expenditures; (10) Failure To Pay Wages Upon Termination; and (11) Unfair Business Practices In Violation Of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, ET. SEQ.

Plaintiff alleges that she was hired by Defendants on or about January 20, 2019, as a medical assistant. (FAC ¶ 22.) Plaintiff’s action arises from her alleged wrongful termination on or about August 1, 2023. (Id.)

Defendants now move for an order compelling arbitration of each and every cause of action asserted against them, as well as a stay of this action, including but not limited to all pleadings and discovery, pending resolution of Plaintiff’s claims in an arbitration proceeding.

PROCEDURAL

Moving Party: Defendants – (1) OPTUMCARE MANAGEMENT, LLC (“OptumCare Management”); (2) OPTUM CARE, INC.; and (3) OPTUM360 SERVICES, INC.

Responding Party: Plaintiff, Brenda Garcia

Moving Papers: Notice/Motion; Declaration Susan Weedman; Declaration Sara Grimm Weeks; Declaration Cindy Pham; Request for Judicial Notice; Proposed Order

Opposing Papers: Opposition

Reply Papers: Request to Strike Late-Filed Opposition; Reply

RELIEF REQUESTED

“Defendants OPTUMCARE MANAGEMENT, LLC (“OptumCare Management”); OPTUM CARE, INC.; and OPTUM360 SERVICES, INC. (collectively “Defendants”) will and hereby do move this Court for an order compelling arbitration of each and every cause of action asserted against Defendants in Plaintiff BRENDA GARCIA’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint, as well as a stay of this action, including but not limited to all pleadings and discovery, pending resolution of Plaintiff’s claims in an arbitration proceeding.

Defendants seek relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281, et. seq., and United States Code, Title 9, Sections 1, et seq., on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff entered into a valid written mutual agreement to arbitrate with, inter alia, Defendants, subsidiaries of UnitedHealth Group (“UHG”), in which she agreed to arbitrate claims arising out of her employment with OptumCare Management, including but not limited to, the claims that are at issue in Plaintiff’s Complaint; (2) the Federal Arbitration Act, which governs the Parties’ agreement, and California’s public policy strongly favor resolution of disputes by arbitration and the enforceability of arbitration agreements; and (3) Plaintiff refused to submit this matter to arbitration pursuant to the terms of the Parties’ agreement, forcing Defendants to file this instant motion.

This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel Arbitration; the Memorandum of Points and Authorities; the Request for Judicial Notice; the Declarations of Susan Weedman, Sara Grim Weeks, and Cindy Pham; the documents and records in the Court’s file; oral argument that may be presented at the hearing on this motion, and any other matter the Court deems appropriate.”

(Def. Notice, p. 2.)

ANALYSIS

Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.2, governing orders to arbitrate controversies, provides in pertinent part:

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:

(a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or

(b) Grounds exist for rescission of the agreement.

(CCP § 1281.2(a)-(b).)

The party seeking arbitration bears the initial burden of demonstrating the existence of an arbitration agreement. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

Once the Court concludes an arbitration agreement exists, it must then consider whether the agreement covers the claims at issue. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery (2004) 118 Cal.App.4^th 966, 960.) Even when the FAA applies, “interpretation of the arbitration agreement is governed by state law principles.” (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. Bridge Banc, LLC (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435.)

Existence of Agreement – Parties

In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the Court must first determine whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute, and general principles of California contract law help guide the court in making this determination. (Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541; Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 734, 835.)

“The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, while a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842 citing Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

In relevant part of Defendants’ moving papers, Defendants submit the declarations of Susan Weedman and Sara Grimm Weeks.

Weedman attests to the following:

2. I am currently employed by UnitedHealth Group Incorporated (“UHG”) as VP, People Team. I have been employed by UHG in this capacity since February 2019. Prior to this, I was employed in various capacities within the UHG Human Capital team. I started my employment with UHG in 2007. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein, or have knowledge of such facts based upon information from the business records of UHG and its affiliates and subsidiaries, including OptumCare Management, LLC (“OptumCare Management”); Optum Care, Inc.; and Optum360 Services, Inc. If called as a witness to testify, I could and would competently testify to each of the facts set forth herein.

3. In my capacity as VP, People Team, as well as in other capacities within UHG’s People Team Department, I have knowledge about UHG’s recruitment and onboarding process. Historically, I have been responsible for, among other things, training employees, and assisting new and existing employees with onboarding and the completion of UHG-required documents. Based upon my job duties, maintenance of employee records, including onboarding records, and my review of UHG’s business records, I have personal knowledge of the length and terms of Plaintiff’s employment of with OptumCare Management and Optum Care, Inc.

4. In my employment with UHG, I also have knowledge about its operations and business structure. UHG provides healthcare related services to individuals in all fifty states of the United States.

5. As part of my job duties, I am familiar with UHG’s new employee onboarding process through New Employee Connect (NEC), and UHG’s requirement that all employees electronically sign UHG’s “Employment Arbitration Policy” (the “Arbitration Agreement”). As a part of the onboarding process through NEC, employees are provided with onboarding paperwork to review and complete. UHG retains all completed new hire packets and related personnel records.

6. For purposes of this declaration, I reviewed certain employment records of Plaintiff regarding the transition of her employment from OptumCare Management to Optum Care, Inc., and her respective pre-boarding and onboarding with Optum Care, Inc.

7. On November 9, 2022, as a result of OptumCare Management’s integration with UHG, Optum Care, Inc. offered Plaintiff a position as Medical Assistant in the Optum Care Delivery division of Optum California. Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of the transition offer letter provided to and signed by Plaintiff on November 10, 2022, and is incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit A.

8. The transition letter issued to Plaintiff advised her that her respective employment offer included an Arbitration Agreement which “is a binding contract between you and UnitedHealth Group to resolve through arbitration all covered employment-related disputes that are based on a legal claim, and mutually waive the right to a trial before a judge or jury in court in favor of final and binding arbitration. By accepting employment with UnitedHealthGroup, you agree to be bound by the terms of the Arbitration Policy.”

9. Thereafter, on November 10, 2022, during the onboarding process through NEC, Plaintiff electronically signed the UHG Arbitration Agreement, which required arbitration of all claims arising from Plaintiff’s employment. Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of the Arbitration Agreement signed by Plaintiff during the NEC process for Plaintiff’s employment. It is incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit B.

10. Plaintiff agreed to transition her employment from OptumCare Management to Optum Care, Inc., accepted employment with Optum Care, Inc. subject to the Arbitration Agreement, was terminated by OptumCare Management on December 17, 2022, and began work for Optum Care, Inc. on December 18, 2022, as a Medical Assistant.

11. UHG has no record of Plaintiff conducting herself in any manner contrary to her express acceptance of the Arbitration Agreement or implied agreement through continued employment.

12. Plaintiff thereafter worked for Optum Care, Inc. from December 18, 2022 until her employment separation on June 21, 2023.

(Weedman Decl. ¶¶ 2-12.)

Attached as Exhibit B to the Weedman Declaration is the Arbitration Agreement that contains Plaintiff’s electronic signature.

In addition to the Weedman Declaration, Defendants submit the Weeks Declaration which states:

1. I am currently employed by United HealthCare Services, Inc. (“UnitedHealth”) as Manager, Talent Acquisition Services Delivery. This declaration is submitted in support of Defendants OPTUMCARE MANAGEMENT, LLC (“OptumCare Management); OPTUM CARE, INC; and OPTUM360 SERVICES, INC.’s (“Optum360”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff BRENDA GARCIA’s (“Plaintiff”) claims. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Declaration, or I have knowledge of such facts based upon information from the business records of UnitedHealth Group Incorporated and its affiliates and subsidiaries, including UnitedHealth, OptumCare Management, Optum Care, Inc., and Optum360 (collectively, “UnitedHealth Group”), of which I have possession, custody, or control due to my current role. I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify.

2. I have been employed with UnitedHealth (or its predecessors in interest) since October 12, 2015. In my role, I am responsible for, among other things, overseeing the pre-boarding and onboarding of new and existing employees of UnitedHealth Group. As a result, I am familiar with UnitedHealth Group’s pre-boarding and onboarding requirements, and its maintenance of employment records throughout this process.

3. In my role, I am also familiar with UnitedHealth Group’s corporate policies, including the recruitment and onboarding processes that were in effect for applicants and employees of UnitedHealth Group during the time period relevant to the Complaint.

4. Further, in my current capacity, I am familiar with UnitedHealth Group’s corporate structure and the general nature of its business operations. OptumCare Management and Optum Care, Inc. are two subsidiaries of UnitedHealth. Prior to December 18, 2022, OptumCare Management operated independently from UnitedHealth Group by, among other things, implementing and overseeing its own human resources, payroll, benefits, and other related administrative functions.

5. I am familiar with UnitedHealth Group's new employee onboarding system through New Employee Connect (“NEC”), and its requirement that all employees electronically sign the “Employment Arbitration Policy” (the “Arbitration Agreement”). As a part of the onboarding process through NEC, new employees, including newly integrated employees, are provided with onboarding paperwork to review and complete.

6. In December 2022, OptumCare Management integrated into UnitedHealth Group, and transitioned its employees to Optum Care, Inc., to harmonize its human resources, payroll, benefits, and other related administrative functions. This integration, among other things, provided benefits for employees such as better paid time off and 401(k) benefits.

7. OptumCare Management provided written notice to its employees of the integration more than a month in advance, and outlined the mandatory steps to be eligible for integration. Among these requirements was compliance with UnitedHealth Group’s onboarding process.

8. Additionally, in November 2022, UnitedHealth Group sent transition offer letters offering OptumCare Management employees their equivalent or similar positions at Optum Care, Inc. to start on or around December 18, 2022 (“Transition Date”). This notification also outlined certain pre-employment screening and onboarding requirements that would need to be satisfied if the OptumCare Management employee wished to accept the offer of employment with Optum Care, Inc. and integrate into UnitedHealth Group, including a background check and additional screenings, if applicable, such as drug tests or tuberculosis tests. Screenings needed to be satisfactorily completed before the Transition Date. If employees did not successfully complete these requirements, they would be ineligible for employment with Optum Care, Inc. and unable to integrate into UnitedHealth Group. All employees were also required to fill out I-9 forms and bring the requisite documentation to verify their eligibility to work in the U.S. as part of their onboarding with Optum Care, Inc.

9. In addition, employees were also required to review and sign certain employment policies before or at the time of integration. For example, as a condition of the employment offer, employees were required to agree to be bound by the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, which applies to UnitedHealth Group and their employees. And by accepting employment with Optum Care, Inc., employees agreed to be bound by the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. This requirement was explicitly stated in the transition offer letters sent to OptumCare Management employees about the integration.

10. UnitedHealth Group simultaneously provided employees other onboarding policies like the Arbitration Agreement electronically on NEC.

11. The transition offer letter explained that by accepting employment with Optum Care, Inc. and integrating into UnitedHealth Group, the employee agreed to all the terms of the transition offer letter and onboarding attachments provided on NEC. Employees had to acknowledge their acceptance of the transition offer letter and its requirements by electronically signing the document.

12. Employees who accepted the offer, satisfied pre-screening requirements, and otherwise complied with onboarding requirements were generally qualified to integrate into UnitedHealth Group and, accordingly, began employment with Optum Care, Inc. on the Transition Date.

13. All OptumCare Management employees, regardless of whether they accepted the transition offer or satisfied the pre-screening and onboarding required to integrate into UnitedHealth Group, were terminated from OptumCare Management on December 17, 2022 prior to the Transition Date.

14. Any OptumCare Management employees who did not accept the transition offer, or otherwise failed to satisfy the pre-screening and onboarding requirements, were ineligible to integrate into UnitedHealth Group as an employee of Optum Care, Inc.

(Weeks Declaration, ¶¶ 1-14.)

Thus, based on the declarations of Weedman and Weeks, and based on Plaintiff’s signature on the arbitration agreement in Exhibit B of the Weedman Declaration, Defendants appear to have met their burden in establishing the existence of the Arbitration Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants.

In an attempt to argue that the arbitration agreement does not exist between the parties, Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement lacks mutual assent.

In Plaintiff’s Opposition, with respect to mutual assent, Plaintiff argues as follows:

1) Lack of Clear Explanation

The Arbitration Agreement was presented to Plaintiff during the onboarding process without a clear explanation of its terms and implications. Plaintiff was not adequately informed of the rights she was waiving, including the right to a judicial forum for resolving disputes. The agreement's complexity and the circumstances of its presentation prevented Plaintiff from fully understanding the nature and consequences of the arbitration clause.

2) Absence of Informed Consent

Informed consent requires that a party be fully aware of the terms and voluntarily agree to them. Here, the agreement was introduced as a standard part of the employment package, with no indication that it was optional or that Plaintiff could seek legal counsel before signing. This lack of transparency and the absence of an opportunity to negotiate or opt out of the agreement indicate that Plaintiff did not provide informed consent to the arbitration terms.

3) Imbalance in Bargaining Power

The imbalance in bargaining power between Plaintiff and the Defendants further undermines mutual assent. As an employee, Plaintiff was in a subordinate position, with limited ability to negotiate the terms of the agreement. The presentation of the arbitration clause as a nonnegotiable condition of employment highlights the lack of a genuine meeting of the minds.

The absence of mutual assent in the formation of the Arbitration Agreement renders it invalid under California law. The lack of a clear explanation, informed consent, and the imbalance in bargaining power all contribute to the conclusion that Plaintiff did not knowingly agree to the arbitration terms. Therefore, the Court should deny the Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration based on the lack of mutual assent.

(Pl. Oppo. p. 10-11.)

Here, Plaintiff did not meet her burden in proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts necessary to the defense that there was no mutual assent.

First, the Court notes that although pages 10-11 of Plaintiff’s opposition argued that there was no mutual assent, Plaintiff does not cite a single source of legal authority, such as case law, as to what the legal standard is with respect to lack of mutual assent. By Plaintiff asserting various arguments about mutual assent, without citing any legal authority to support her arguments about mutual assent, Plaintiff does not provide the Court with any legal authority to determine whether Plaintiff’s arguments are in fact availing. Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument about mutual assent is unavailing in light of Plaintiff failing to cite legal authority to support her argument.

With respect to mutual assent, the Court was able to find the following from Serafin:

“In California, ‘[g]eneral principles of contract law determine whether the parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate.’ [Citations.]” (Pinnacle v. Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 282 P.3d 1217.) “An essential element of any contract is the consent of the parties, or mutual assent. [Citation.]” (Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 261, 270, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 807, 27 P.3d 702 (Donovan ).) Further, the consent of the parties to a contract must be communicated by each party to the other. (Civ. Code, § 1565, subd. 3.) “Mutual assent is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or understandings. [Citation.]”

(Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 173 quoting Alexander v. Codemasters Group Limited (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 129, 141, disapproved on other grounds in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 524.)

Second, Plaintiff’s argument about mutual assent is unavailing because Defendants produced an arbitration agreement, signed by Plaintiff, in Exhibit B of the Weedman Declaration.

In Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff did not argue that she did not sign the arbitration agreement.

Additionally, the Court points out that Plaintiff’s opposition did not contain any declaration by the Plaintiff herself attesting to anything.

Further, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition did not argue that Defendants did not sign the arbitration agreement.

The Court brings this up because technically Defendants did not sign the arbitration agreement.

However, if Plaintiff’s Opposition had brought that up as an argument, that argument appears to be unavailing.

As explained in Serafin:

[T]he writing memorializing an arbitration agreement need not be signed by both parties in order to be upheld as a binding arbitration agreement. In Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 598, the court explained, “it is not the presence or absence of a signature [on an agreement] which is dispositive; it is the presence or absence of evidence of an agreement to arbitrate which matters.” (Id. at p. 361, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 598, original italics.) Evidence confirming the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, despite an unsigned agreement, can be based, for example, on “conduct from which one could imply either ratification or implied acceptance of such a provision.” (Ibid.; see Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416, 420-423, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 [despite absence of a signed writing acknowledging receipt of the memorandum and brochure containing the arbitration provision, the employee's continued employment constituted implied acceptance of the agreement].)

…

Just as with any written agreement signed by one party, an arbitration agreement can be specifically enforced against the signing party regardless of whether the party seeking enforcement has also signed, provided that the party seeking enforcement has performed or offered to do so. (Civ. Code, § 3388.)

(Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 176-77.)

Further, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition did not argue that the arbitration agreement was between Plaintiff and UnitedHealth Group Incorporated and not Plaintiff and Defendants.

The Court points this out because the arbitration agreement states in relevant part that, “This Policy is a binding contract between UnitedHealth Group and its employee.” (Weedman Decl. Ex. B, p. 10.)

However, the Court notes that the Arbitration Agreement further explained that “UnitedHealth Group Incorporated and its subsidiaries and affiliates (referred to as “UnitedHealth Group”)[.]” (Weedman Decl. Ex. B, p. 10.)

Further, the Weedman Declaration explained:

(Weedman Decl. ¶ 2.)

Therefore, even if Plaintiff had attempted to argue that the agreement was between Plaintiff and UnitedHealth Group instead of Defendants, Plaintiff’s argument would be unavailing.

Not to mention, Plaintiff did not argue that: (1) Defendants did not sign the agreement, and (2) The agreement was between Plaintiff and UnitedHealth Group.

Scope
Once the Court concludes an arbitration agreement exists, it must then consider whether the agreement covers the claims at issue. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery (2004) 118 Cal.App.4^th 966, 960.)

Here, the Plaintiff does not argue in any explicit manner that the Arbitration Agreement does not cover the claims at issue in the FAC.

Plaintiff’s opposition argues that the Arbitration Agreement improperly attempts to arbitrate PAGA claims, but Plaintiff does not make this argument with respect to the scope of the agreement. Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement improperly attempts to arbitrate PAGA claims in the opposition’s section pertaining to substantive unconscionability. Therefore, this Court will analyze Plaintiff’s argument on Defendants improperly attempting to arbitrate PAGA claims under the Court’s section on substantive unconscionability, just as Plaintiff addresses it in her opposition.

The body of Plaintiff’s FAC lists Plaintiff’s causes of action as – (1) Disability Discrimination in Violation of FEHA, Government Code Section 12940(a); (2) Failure to Accommodate in Violation of FEHA, Government Code Section 12940(m); (3) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in Violation of FEHA, Government Code Section 12940(n); (4) Retaliation—Violation of Government Code sections 12940 (h), 12940(l)(4) and 12940(m)(2); (5) Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5; (6) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; (7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (8) Failure to Pay Wages in Violation of Labor Code Sections 510 and 1194(a); (9) Failure to Reimburse for Necessary Business Expenditures in Violation of Labor Code Section 2802; (10) Failure to Pay Wages Upon Termination in Violation of Labor Code Sections 201-203; and (11) Unfair Business Practices.

In relevant part of the arbitration agreement:

The Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) shall govern this Policy. All disputes covered by the Policy shall be decided by an arbitrator through arbitration and not by way of court or jury trial.

B. SCOPE OF POLICY

This Policy creates a contract between UnitedHealth Group and employee requiring both parties to resolve employment-related disputes (except the excluded disputes listed below) that are based on a legal claim through final and binding arbitration. Arbitration is the exclusive forum for the resolution of such disputes, and the parties mutually waive their right to a trial before a judge or jury in federal or state court in favor of arbitration under the Policy.

UnitedHealth Group and employee mutually consent to the resolution by arbitration of all claims and controversies, past, present, or future, that employee may have against UnitedHealth Group or UnitedHealth Group may have against employee, which arise out of or relate to employee's employment, application and selection for employment, and/or termination of employment.

Employees are encouraged to exhaust the IDR process before initiating arbitration. If an employment-related dispute is not resolved through the IDR process and the dispute is based on a legal claim not expressly excluded from this Policy, any party to the dispute may initiate the arbitration process. UnitedHealth Group is not required to follow the steps of either the IDR process or the Policy before initiating or implementing any disciplinary action.

Subject to the specific exclusions below, the claims covered by the Policy include, but are not limited to: claims for unfair competition and violation of trade secrets; claims incidental to the employment relationship but arising after that relationship ends (for example, claims arising out of or related to post-termination defamation or job references and claims arising out of or related to post-employment retaliation); claims derived from or that are dependent on the employment relationship; claims that are derivative of or inextricably intertwined with any claims of the employee; claims for wages or other compensation due (including but not limited to, minimum wage, overtime, meal and rest breaks, waiting time penalties, vacation pay and pay on separation); claims for breach of any contract or covenant (express or implied); tort claims; common law claims; equitable claims; claims for discrimination and harassment; retaliation claims; and claims for violation of any federal, state or other governmental law, statute, regulation, or ordinance, except claims excluded below.

¹ Throughout this Policy, the term “employee” includes both current and former employees of UnitedHealth Group.

Covered claims also include any disputes regarding the Policy or any portion of the Policy or its interpretation, enforceability, applicability, unconscionability, arbitrability, waiver, or formation, or whether the Policy or any portion of the Policy is void or voidable, with the exception noted in the Class and Collective Actions Waivers section below.

Claims excluded from mandatory arbitration under the Policy are: (i) claims for workers compensation benefits, state disability insurance and unemployment insurance benefits; however, it applies to discrimination or retaliation claims based upon seeking such benefits; (ii) claims for severance benefits under the UnitedHealth Group Severance Pay Plan; (iii) claims for benefits under UnitedHealth Group's other ERISA benefit plans; (iv) claims for benefits under UnitedHealth Group's Short-Term Disability Plan; (v) claims that may not be the subject of a mandatory arbitration agreement as provided by Section 8116 of the Department of Defense ("DoD") Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Pub. L. 111-118), Section 8102 of the Department of Defense ("DoD") Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Pub. L. 112-10, Division A), and their implementing regulations, or any successor DoD appropriations act addressing the arbitrability of claims; (vi) claims that the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act or other controlling federal law bars from the coverage of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements; and (vii) actions for civil penalties filed under the California Private Attorneys General Act, which may only be maintained in a court of competent jurisdiction.

This Policy does not preclude an employee from filing a claim, charge, or report with any governmental agency, such as the National Labor Relations Board, the Department of Labor, or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In addition, this Policy does not preclude any party from seeking a temporary restraining order or materially identical emergency relief ("temporary restraining order") in a court of law in accordance with applicable law, and any such application shall not be deemed incompatible with or a waiver of this agreement to arbitrate. The court to which such application is made is authorized to consider the merits of the arbitrable controversy to the extent it deems necessary in making its ruling related to the temporary restraining order, but only to the extent permitted by applicable law. The court shall have no jurisdiction over the matter after making its ruling related to the temporary restraining order and all determinations of final relief shall be decided in arbitration.

An issue is subject to arbitration only if it states a claim under applicable federal, state, or local law. Upon a motion by any party, an arbitrator may dismiss, without a hearing on the merits, any matter which does not state a claim under applicable federal, state, or local law.

C. CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVERS

There will be no right or authority for any dispute to be brought, heard, or arbitrated as a class or collective action, or on behalf of any other person. Nor shall the arbitrator have any authority to hear or arbitrate any such dispute. Accordingly, UnitedHealth Group and employee waive any right for any dispute to be brought, heard, decided, or arbitrated as a class and/or collective action and the arbitrator will have no authority to hear or preside over any such claim ("Class Action Waiver"). In the event a final judicial determination is made that the Class Action Waiver is unenforceable and that a class or collective action may proceed notwithstanding the existence of this agreement, the arbitrator is nevertheless without authority to preside over a class or collective action and any class or collective action must be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction, not in arbitration. The arbitrator shall retain the authority to hear or arbitrate any individual claims.

Regardless of anything else in this Policy and/or any rules or procedures that might otherwise be applicable by virtue of this Policy or by virtue of any arbitration organization rules or procedures that now apply or any amendments and/or modifications to those rules, the interpretation, enforceability, applicability, unconscionability or formation of the Class Action Waiver may be determined only by a court and not by an arbitrator.

(Weedman Decl. Ex. B, p. 10-11.)

Thus, the claims in the FAC appear to fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Notably, Plaintiff does not argue that the claims at issue do not fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement.

Unconscionability

Unconscionability generally includes the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms that unreasonably favor the other party. (Carboni v. Arrospide (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 76, 82-83.) Unconscionability has both a “procedural” and a “substantive” element. (A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 473, 486.) An agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable only if both procedural and substantive unconscionability is shown. (Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1533.) Plaintiff has the burden of proving both procedural and substantive unconscionability. (Crippen v. Central Valley RV Outlet. Inc. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165.)

Procedural Unconscionability

“The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability. [Citation.]” (Marenco v. DirectTV LLC (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1416.)

An agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable only if both procedural and substantive unconscionability is shown. (Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1533.) Plaintiff has the burden of proving both procedural and substantive unconscionability. (Crippen v. Central Valley RV Outlet. Inc. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165.)

“ ‘The procedural element focuses on two factors: oppression and surprise. Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice.... Surprise involves the extent to which the terms of the bargain are hidden in a “prolix printed form” drafted by a party in a superior bargaining position.’ ” (Crippen v. Central Valley RV Outlet (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 quoting Olsen v. Breeze, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 608, 621.)

“[T]here is no general rule that a form contract used by a party for many transactions is procedurally unconscionable.” (Crippen v. Central Valley RV Outlet (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165.)

Plaintiff’s opposition only contains two paragraphs arguing that this Arbitration Agreement is procedurally unconscionable. Plaintiff argues as follows:

The agreement was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis via an online portal during a corporate transition. Plaintiff had no bargaining power, no ability to negotiate the terms, and no indication that she could decline or opt out. The document was not separately explained or highlighted. Plaintiff reasonably believed her employment depended on completing the digital forms.

This format reflects classical oppression. California courts have consistently found arbitration agreements procedurally unconscionable when presented as a non-negotiable part of employment onboarding without a meaningful opportunity to review or reject the terms. (See OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111; Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702.)

(Pl. Oppo. p. 8.)

Here, as a preliminary matter, to the extent that Plaintiff argues that she had no bargaining power, no ability to negotiate the terms, and no indication that she could decline or opt out, Plaintiff’s opposition does not contain a declaration by the Plaintiff attesting as such.

To the extent that Defendants’ papers demonstrate that the Arbitration Agreement was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis as a condition of employment, it appears that there is a slight degree of procedural unconscionability.

“Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive…The pertinent question, then, is whether circumstances of the contract’s formation created such oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required.” (Cisneros Alvarez v. Altamed Health Services Corporation (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 572, 590 quoting OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126-27.)

“The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the *591 proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party's review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.” (Cisneros Alvarez v. Altamed Health Services Corporation (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 572, 590-91 quoting OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126-27.)

However, to the extent that the Arbitration Agreement was adhesive, Plaintiff does not establish other circumstances relevant to establishing oppression, as Plaintiff did not submit a declaration establishing such circumstances.

Further, with respect to surprise, Plaintiff does not establish surprise.

The instant Arbitration Agreement is in a separate agreement than the “Employment Transition Letter.” (See Exhibits A & B, Weedman Decl.)

Further, Plaintiff separately signed both the Employment Transition Letter and the Arbitration Agreement.

Additionally, the Arbitration Agreement is in bold titled “Employment Arbitration Policy.” This Employment Arbitration Policy has several sections in bold to indicate the different sections of the policy. Further, Plaintiff signed a separate page that is in bold titled “Arbitration Agreement.”

Therefore, there appears to be a very minor degree of oppression, but there does not appear to be any surprise. Further, any arguments that needed the support of a declaration by Plaintiff are unavailing because Plaintiff did not submit a declaration.

Thus, it appears there is a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability.

Substantive Unconscionability

An agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable only if both procedural and substantive unconscionability is shown. (Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1533.)

Substantive unconscionability focuses on overly harsh or one-sided results. (Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702, 713 citing Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.) Substantively unconscionable terms may “generally be described as unfairly one-sided.” (Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702, 713 citing Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1071.) For example, an agreement may lack a “a modicum of bilaterality” and therefore be unconscionable if the agreement requires “arbitration only for the claims of the weaker party but a choice of forums for the claims of the stronger party.” (Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702, 713 citing Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 119.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable because of: (1) Arbitrarily limited discovery, (2) No requirement and failure to require written reasoned awards, (3) Ambiguity in cost allocation and fee shifting, (4) One-sided Delegation Provisions, and an (5) Improper attempt to arbitrate PAGA claims.

To the Court, it appears that many of Plaintiff’s arguments with respect to substantive unconscionability are addressing the Armendariz requirements.

As explained in Fitz:

In order to ensure that mandatory arbitration agreements are not used to curtail an employee's public rights, the California Supreme Court in Armendariz set forth five minimum requirements (the Armendariz requirements). Arbitration agreements in the employer-employee context must provide for: (1) neutral arbitrators, (2) more than minimal discovery, (3) a written award, (4) all types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) no additional costs for the employee beyond what the employee *713 would incur if he or she were bringing the claim in court.

(Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702, 712-13 citing Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83,102, 110-111.)

Armendariz (2) – More than minimal discovery

Plaintiff argues that there is “arbitrarily limited discovery.”

As a preliminary matter, the Court fails to see where Plaintiff obtains the standard of “arbitrarily limited discovery.”

Fitz refers to the discovery standard as “more than minimal discovery” and Armendariz refers to the discovery standard as “adequate discovery.” (See Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702, 712 and Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 104.)

Plaintiff argues there is “arbitrarily limited discovery” because:

The agreement restricts Plaintiff to two depositions and 25 document requests. These limitations are insufficient for Plaintiff to effectively pursue statutory claims under FEHA and the Labor Code. As the Court in Fitz, supra, held, agreements that significantly limit discovery rights—especially without justification—are substantively unconscionable.

Moreover, the agreement restricts Plaintiff to a single interrogatory limited to identifying witnesses. This drastically undercuts Plaintiff’s ability to gather meaningful evidence. In addition, if Defendants object to any of the 25 document requests, the agreement provides no mechanism for compelling compliance or resolving discovery disputes, effectively nullifying even those minimal rights. These cumulative constraints render the discovery provisions wholly inadequate under OTO and Fitz.

The agreement also authorizes dispositive motions—including motions for summary judgment—under federal standards. Yet it simultaneously imposes highly restrictive discovery limits, effectively depriving Plaintiff of the evidentiary record necessary to oppose such motions. This structure enables premature adjudication and contradicts the principles articulated in Armendariz, which requires that arbitration afford employees “adequate discovery” to vindicate their statutory rights.

(Pl. Oppo. p. 8-9.)

It is unclear how Plaintiff is rooting her arguments in Fitz, OTO, and Armendariz. Plaintiff does not cite to a single page(s) in any of those cases.

Not only is it unclear what legal standard Plaintiff is attempting to root her arguments in, but Plaintiff’s arguments on many occasions are not fully explained.

Plaintiff argues, “The agreement restricts Plaintiff to two depositions and 25 document requests. These limitations are insufficient for Plaintiff to effectively pursue statutory claims under FEHA and the Labor Code.” (Pl. Oppo. p. 8) However, Plaintiff makes no explanation as to how these limitations are insufficient for Plaintiff to effectively pursue statutory claims under FEHA.

The Arbitration Agreement limits discovery as follows:

10. Discovery

a. Interrogatory - Each party shall be entitled to propound and serve upon the other party one interrogatory in a form consistent with Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and which shall be limited to the identification of potential witnesses. "Identification" means that a party must identify each witness's name, current address and telephone number, and a brief description of the subject of testimony.

b. Requests for Production of Documents - Each party shall be entitled to propound and serve upon the other party one set of Requests for the Production of Documents in a form consistent with Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and which shall be limited in number to twenty-five (25) requests (including subparts, which shall be counted separately). Parties reserve the right to make objections to any document request on the grounds that the request is irrelevant, overly broad, vague, or burdensome, or any other good faith objection available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

c. Depositions - Each party shall be entitled to conduct a maximum of two (2) eight-hour days of depositions of witnesses or of the parties in accordance with the procedures set forth in Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, each party shall be entitled to conduct a maximum of one (1) eight-hour day of depositions of expert witnesses designated by the other party.

d. Physical and Mental Examinations - Each party shall be entitled to seek discovery consistent with Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

e. Arbitrator Authority - The arbitrator shall have the authority to resolve all issues concerning discovery that may arise between the parties. Each party can request that the arbitrator allow additional discovery, and additional discovery may be conducted under the parties' mutual stipulation or as ordered by the arbitrator. In addition, the arbitrator shall have the authority to issue subpoenas for the appearance of witnesses or the production of documents pursuant to applicable law.

f. Prehearing Submissions - At least thirty (30) days prior to the hearing, the parties are required to exchange lists of witnesses, including any expert witnesses, who the parties anticipate will be called to testify at the hearing. In addition, the parties are required to exchange copies of all exhibits the parties intend to introduce as evidence at the hearing.

(Weedman Decl. Ex. B.)

Here, the Court fails to see how the discovery limits in the Arbitration Agreement does not provide for adequate discovery. Plaintiff makes no explanation as to how the discovery limits “are insufficient for Plaintiff to effectively pursue statutory claims under FEHA and the Labor Code.”

“Adequate discovery does not mean unfettered discovery.” (Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702, 715 quoting Mercuro v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 167, 184.)

Parties may “agree to something less than the full panoply of discovery provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.05.” ((Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702, 715 quoting Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 105-106.)

Further, as pointed out in the reply, the Arbitration Agreement provides that “[e]ach party can request that the arbitrator allow additional discovery, and additional discovery may be conducted under the parties’ mutual stipulation or as ordered by the arbitrator. In addition, the arbitrator shall have the authority to issue subpoenas for the appearance of witnesses or the production of documents pursuant to applicable law.” (Weedman Decl. Ex. B.)

Plaintiff did not successfully demonstrate how the Arbitration Agreement does not provide for adequate discovery.

Armendariz (3) – A written award

Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement does not guarantee a written, reasoned award. Plaintiff argues that Armendariz mandates this as a minimum safeguard to allow judicial review.

Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing.

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff does not cite to a specific page(s) of Armendariz for the Court to evaluate Plaintiff’s argument.

Upon the Court’s perusal of Armendariz, the Court found the following: “All we hold today is that in order for such judicial review to be successfully accomplished, an arbitrator in an FEHA case must issue a written arbitration decision that will reveal, however briefly, the essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83,107.)

Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing because the Arbitration Agreement provides that “[t]he award shall be in writing and shall set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the arbitrator based the award. All awards shall be executed in the manner required by law.” (Weedman Decl. Ex. B.)

Armendariz (5) – No additional costs for the employee beyond what the employee would incur if he or she were bringing the claim in court

Plaintiff argues that there is “ambiguity in cost allocation and fee shifting.”

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff fails to cite where she gets the standard of “ambiguity in cost allocation and fee shifting.”

Plaintiff then argues:

The agreement does not affirmatively provide that Defendants will bear all arbitration specific costs. While it references the AAA rules, it also permits the arbitrator to allocate costs in accordance with “applicable law,” without guaranteeing that Plaintiff will not be required to bear administrative fees or hearing costs. This ambiguity creates the risk that Plaintiff—an hourly, nonexempt worker—could be saddled with fees she would not incur in court. As recognized in Armendariz, arbitration agreements must clearly provide that employees are not responsible for costs unique to arbitration. The ambiguity here creates a chilling effect that discourages assertion of statutory rights.

(Pl. Oppo. p. 9.)

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff does not cite to a specific page of Armendariz for the Court to evaluate Plaintiff’s argument.

Upon the Court’s perusal of Armendariz, it found the following: “[W]e conclude that when an employer imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment, the arbitration agreement or arbitration process cannot generally require the employee to bear any type of expense that the employee would not be required to bear if he or she were free to *111 bring the action in court.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 110-11.)

Further, Plaintiff does not explain how the instant Arbitration Agreement would require the employee to bear any type of expense that the employee would not be required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in court.

In section D(1)(a) of the Arbitration Agreement in the section titled “Initiation of Arbitration Proceeding – Arbitration Initiated by Employee,” the Arbitration Agreement provides that “UnitedHealth Group shall pay 100 percent in excess of the first twenty-five dollars ($25) of the required AAA administrative fee.”

Plaintiff makes no argument as to how this $25 is a type of expense that the employee would not be required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in court.

Plaintiff’s argument is thus unavailing.

One-Sided Delegation Provisions

Plaintiff’s opposition has a section titled “One-Sided Delegation Provisions.”

As a preliminary matter, it is entirely unclear if Plaintiff is attacking one of the Armendariz requirements.

Plaintiff argues:

The agreement purports to delegate enforceability, arbitrability, and unconscionability issues to the arbitrator, while carving out certain employer-favorable clauses to be determined by a court. This asymmetry is one-sided and unfair. (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237).

(Pl. Oppo. p. 9.)

Plaintiff’s “One-Sided Delegation Provisions” argument is unavailing.

First, Plaintiff does not cite to a specific page(s) of Baltazar; Plaintiff cites to the case generally. Thus, it isn’t entirely clear what Plaintiff’s argument is with respect to Baltazar.

Second, the Court does not understand Plaintiff’s argument. Plaintiff does not cite to a single section of the Arbitration Agreement to demonstrate that the Arbitration Agreement is one-sided. Plaintiff makes no explanation of what the “employer-favorable” clauses are.

Thus, whatever Plaintiff’s argument is here, it is unavailing.

Improper Attempt to Arbitrate PAGA Claims

Plaintiff has a section titled “Improper Attempt to Arbitrate PAGA Claims.”

As a preliminary matter, it is unclear if Plaintiff is attacking one of the Armendariz requirements.

Plaintiff argues:

Although the agreement purports to exclude PAGA claims, Defendants now seek to compel all claims—including those seeking civil penalties under the Labor Code—into arbitration. This is impermissible under Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348.

The combination of procedural and substantive unconscionability renders the Arbitration Agreement unenforceable under California law. The oppressive circumstances of its presentation and the unfair terms it imposes demonstrate a lack of mutuality and fairness, which are essential for a valid arbitration agreement. Therefore, the Court should deny the Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration based on the unconscionability of the agreement.

(Pl. Oppo. p. 9-10.)

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff continues to fail to cite to specific page(s) of the case it cited, here Iskanian, to assess Plaintiff’s argument.

Further, the Court does fully understand Plaintiff’s argument here.

Plaintiff is arguing that the Arbitration Agreement is “improperly attempting to arbitrate PAGA Claims.”

The Court fails to understand how Plaintiff’s argument is applicable here.

Based on the caption of the FAC, the body of the FAC, and the Court’s reading of the FAC, the Court fails to see that the FAC is bringing a PAGA claim.

“A PAGA claim is legally and conceptually different from an employee's own suit for damages and statutory penalties. An employee suing under PAGA “does so as the proxy or agent of the state's labor law enforcement agencies.”” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 81 quoting Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 986.)

Plaintiff’s FAC makes no reference to PAGA.

Further, under Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U.S. 639 (2022) (Viking River Cruises), the Supreme Court held that the FAA allows for division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual (representative) claims through an agreement to arbitrate.

After Viking River Cruises was decided, the Supreme Court of California held in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104 that a plaintiff who files a PAGA action with individual and non-individual claims does not lose standing to litigate the non-individual claims in court simply because the individual claims have been ordered to arbitration.

Plaintiff’s argument with respect to PAGA and Iskanian is unclear to the Court. And more importantly, Plaintiff’s FAC does not appear to bring a PAGA claim.

Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that the Arbitration Agreement improperly attempts to arbitrate PAGA claims is unavailing.

Since the five arguments – (1) Arbitrarily limited discovery, (2) No requirement and failure to require written reasoned awards, (3) Ambiguity in cost allocation and fee shifting, (4) One-sided Delegation Provisions, and an (5) Improper attempt to arbitrate PAGA claims – that Plaintiff brings up with respective to substantive unconscionability is unavailing, Plaintiff did not establish substantive unconscionability.

Since Plaintiff did not establish substantive unconscionability, Plaintiff did not establish that the Arbitration Agreement is unconscionable. An agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable only if both procedural and substantive unconscionability is shown. (Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1533.)

Policy

Plaintiff also argues that public policy considerations prohibit enforcement.

Plaintiff argues:

The agreement frustrates enforcement of essential statutory rights, including FEHA, wage and hour laws, and the Labor Code’s representative enforcement scheme under PAGA. California has a strong public interest in protecting employees’ access to judicial forums and discouraging employers from contractually shielding themselves from accountability.

Enforcing this agreement would insulate Defendants from public review of discrimination and retaliation, violating the policy objectives behind California’s employment and labor statutes.

(Pl. Oppo. p. 11.)

Here, as Plaintiff did on many occasions throughout this motion, Plaintiff continues to assert arguments without providing legal authority for her arguments.

Plaintiff’s public policy argument is thus unavailing because Plaintiff provides no legal authority to support her argument.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and stay this action is GRANTED. Defendants met their burden in establishing the existence and scope of the Arbitration Agreement, and Plaintiff did not meet her burden in establishing a defense to enforcement.

Defendants request judicial notice of the AAA Employment Arbitration Rules (Effective January 1, 2023), attached to the concurrently filed Declaration of Cindy Pham, as Exhibit C.

Plaintiff did not object to Defendants’ request for judicial notice; thus, Defendants’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED. The Court does not admit the truth of the allegations therein in Exhibit C to the Pham Declaration.

In reply, Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s opposition was untimely and that this Court should exercise its discretion under CRC, Rule 3.1300(d) and not consider the late-filed opposition.

The Court notes that it considered the opposition on its merits.

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