Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 24NNCV01021, Date: 2025-01-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24NNCV01021 Hearing Date: January 17, 2025 Dept: E
Hearing Date: 1/17/2025 – 8:30am
Case No: 24NNCV01021
Trial Date: UNSET
Case Name: ANNA KASUMYAN v. GLENDALE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
2
- TENTATIVE RULINGS ON (2) MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff,
Anna Kasumyan, filed a Complaint on 4/17/2024 against Defendant, Glendale
Unified School District (GUSD).
Plaintiff alleges she was a service coordinator that
was partaking in an individualized education plan (IEP) meeting for a special
education student inside a classroom of GUSD school. (Compl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff
alleges that during the meeting, a non-verbal male student with behavioral
issues, that was supposed to be supervised by two teaching aides, entered the
classroom and forcibly struck her in the head, causing serious injuries. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that GUSD failed to provide the needed supervision and/or did
so only with staff that were not competent or properly trained to prevent the
incident. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that GUSD failed to provide a safe
environment for her while inside the classroom. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges one cause of action for
negligence, alleging that GUSD breached its duty to Plaintiff and negligently,
carelessly, and recklessly hired, trained, and supervised their teaching aides,
causing injuries to Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 10.)
On 10/22/2024, GUSD filed a Cross-Complaint against Holding
Hands Pediatric Therapy and Adult Services (Holding Hands or Cross-Defendant)
for (1) express indemnity, (2) implied/equitable indemnity, and (3) declaratory
relief.
In the Cross-Complaint, GUSD alleges that it entered
into a contractual agreement with Holding Hands wherein Holding Hands would
provide the manpower and services to offer behavioral support services and
behavior intervention services for students of the school district.
(Cross-Complaint, ¶ 4.) GUSD alleges that Employees of Holding Hands were to be
assigned to specific students enrolled in special education within GUSD and
were acting as the one on one aides for these students or were assigned as the
behavior intervention support services person for the specific special
education class or classroom. (Id.)
There are two hearings on calendar for 1/17/2025 –
Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to Requests for Production of
Documents, Set One, propounded on GUSD, and Plaintiff’s motion to compel
further responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, propounded on GUSD.
On 12/17/2024, a stipulation to consolidate these two
motions was filed. The stipulation was signed by both Plaintiff’s counsel and
GUSD’s counsel. The parties filed this stipulation because “Defendant’s
objections and Plaintiff’s reasons for demanding further responses are the same
with regards to the Requests for Production of Documents and Special
Interrogatories.” (Stip. filed 12/17/2024.)
The Court will combine the tentative for these two
hearings.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Motion
1: Plaintiff, Anna Kasumyan, moves for an order compelling Defendant, GUSD, to
produce further responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Production
of Documents, Numbers 8 and 19.
Motion
2: Plaintiff, Anna Kasumyan, moves for an order compelling Defendant, GUSD, to
produce further responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set One,
Numbers 2-9 and 30-31.
Preliminary
Procedural
Moving
Party: Plaintiff, Anna Kasumyan
Responding Party: Defendant, GUSD
Moving
Papers Motion 1: Notice/Motion; Separate Statement
Opposition
Papers Motion 1: Opposition; Separate Statement
Reply
Papers Motion 1: Reply
Moving
Papers Motion 2: Notice/Motion; Separate Statement
Opposition
Papers Motion 2: Opposition; Separate Statement
Reply
Papers Motion 2: Reply
Proof
of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300(c)): No – “Proof of service of the
moving papers must be filed no later than five court days before the time
appointed for the hearing.” (CRC, Rule 3.1300(c).) Here, Plaintiff did not file
proofs of service for any of her moving or reply papers. However, both an
opposition and a separate statement was filed for both motions.
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP § 1005(b)): Uncertain – “Unless otherwise ordered or
specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers shall be served
and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing. The moving and supporting
papers served shall be a copy of the papers filed or to be filed with the
court. However, if the notice is served by mail, the required 16-day period of
notice before the hearing shall be increased by five calendar days if the place
of mailing and the place of address are within the State of California, 10
calendar days if either the place of mailing or the place of address is outside
the State of California but within the United States, 12 calendar days if the
place of address is the Secretary of State’s address confidentiality program
(Chapter 3.1 (commencing with Section 6205) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the
Government Code), and 20 calendar days if either the place of mailing or the
place of address is outside the United States, and if the notice is served by
facsimile transmission, express mail, or another method of delivery providing
for overnight delivery, the required 16-day period of notice before the hearing
shall be increased by two calendar days.” (CCP § 1005(b).)
Here,
the moving papers were timely filed. However, it is unclear if the
moving papers were timely served because there were no proofs of service
with any of Plaintiff’s papers. The Court notes that oppositions and opposition
separate statements were filed for both motions.
Proper Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a, § 1013b): Uncertain if the moving papers
were served on the proper address because no proofs of service were filed by
Plaintiff. However, the Court notes that oppositions and opposition separate
statements were filed for both motions.
PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS
45-Day Requirement
Unless
notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified
response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific
later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in
writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to
the demand. (CCP § 2031.310(c).)
“Unless notice of this motion is given within
45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified
response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding
party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party
waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories.” (CCP § 2030.300(c).)
For
both motions, Plaintiff was granted an extension to file these motions until
November 27, 2024. Since these motions were filed on November 26, 2024, both of
these motions are timely.
Meet
and Confer
“A
motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer
declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP §2030.300(b)(1).)
“The
motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section
2016.040.” (CCP §2031.310(b)(2).)
Plaintiff’s
counsel satisfied the meet and confer requirement.
LEGAL
STANDARD - COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
Under CCP § 2017.010, “any party may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action..., if the matter either is
itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.” The
Section specifically provides that “[d]iscovery may relate to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action,”
and that discovery “may be obtained of the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location of any document,
electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.”
On receipt of a
response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order
compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the
following apply:
(1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is
evasive or incomplete.
(2) An exercise of the option to produce documents
under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those
documents is inadequate.
(3) An objection to an interrogatory is without
merit or too general.
(CCP §2030.300(a).
If a timely motion to compel has been filed,
the¿burden is on the responding party¿to justify any objection or failure fully
to answer.¿(Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58
Cal.2d 210, 220–221 [addressing a motion to compel further responses to
interrogatories]; see also¿Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court¿(2000) 22
Cal.4th 245, 255.)
“While the party propounding interrogatories may have
the burden of filing a motion to compel if it finds the answers it receives
unsatisfactory, the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond
remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.” (Williams
v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541 citing Coy v. Superior Court
(1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)
Furthermore, to the extent there is any doubt in
whether these records should be discoverable, California’s liberal approach to
discovery provides that doubt should be resolved in favor of permitting
discovery. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2
Cal.3d 161, 173.)
The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded
shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by any of
the following:
(1) An answer
containing the information sought to be discovered.
(2) An exercise of
the party’s option to produce writings.
(3) An objection to
the particular interrogatory.
(CCP § 2030.210(a).)
LEGAL STANDARD – COMPEL FURTHER – REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION
Under
CCP § 2017.010, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action..., if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” The Section specifically provides that
“[d]iscovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery
or of any other party to the action,” and that discovery “may be obtained of
the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable
matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition
and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible
thing, or land or other property.”
CCP § 2031.310(a) provides that a party demanding a document
inspection may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if
the demanding party deems that:
“(1) A statement of
compliance with the demand is incomplete.
(2) A representation of inability to comply is
inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.
(3) An objection in the response is without
merit or too general.”
Under
CCP § 2031.310 (b)(1), “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good
cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.”
“In
the more specific context of a demand for production of a tangible thing, the
party who asks the trial court to compel production must show “good cause” for
the request—but unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of
attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of
relevance.” (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)
Motion
1- RFPs and Responses
REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION NO. 8:
Any and all DOCUMENTS, ELECTRONIC
RECORDS or COMMUNICATIONS identifying the student who struck Plaintiff the day
of the SUBJECT INCIDENT.
REOUEST
FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19:
Any and all DOCUMENTS, ELECTRONIC RECORDS or COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO the
conduct and behavior of the unknown student who struck Plaintiff the day of the
SUBJECT INCIDENT.
Response
to RFPs 8 & 19
Objection. This request violates
Education Code 49076 in that it seeks pupil information which cannot be
released without court order or parent/guardian written consent.
TENTATIVE
RULING MOTION 1
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff
accurately points out that Defendant’s responses are not code-compliant under
CCP § 2031.240(b).
Under CCP §
2031.240(b):
If
the responding party objects to the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or
sampling of an item or category of item, the response shall do both of the
following:
(1) Identify
with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored
information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection
is being made.
(2) Set
forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an
objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked
shall be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information
sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section
2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted.
(CCP § 2031.240(b)(1)-(2).)
Defendant’s responses simply stated, “Objection. This
request violates Education Code § 49076 in that it seeks pupil information
which cannot be released without court order or parent/guardian written
consent.”
These responses did not identify with particularity any
document or information falling within any category of item in the demand to
which an objection was being made.
Education Code Section § 49076
Defendant asserted an objection with
respect to Education Code § 49076.
Neither party goes into detail about what the relevant
language of Education Code § 49076 is, even though § 49076 has several
subsections and subparts.
However, the Court notes that § 49076(a) states, “A school
district shall not permit access to pupil records to a person without written
parental consent or under judicial order except as set forth in this section
and as permitted by Part 99 (commencing with Section 99.1) of Title 34 of the
Code of Federal Regulations.” (Educ. Code § 49076.)
Although neither party goes into great depth about § 49076,
Defendant concedes that information contained in pupil records cannot be
released without parent authorization or court order.
Since both parties agree that § 49076 allows for pupil
records to be released with a court order, the Court will assume that it has
the authority order pupil records released.
Good
Cause
“In the more specific context of a
demand for production of a tangible thing, the party who asks the trial court
to compel production must show “good cause” for the request—but unless there is
a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is
met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Services
Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)
Here,
Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for the instant RFPs.
Plaintiff
explains that the RFPs are relevant and necessary to establish Defendant’s duty
to Plaintiff, to establish that the risk of physical harm was a foreseeable
harm, and to establish the total lack of supervision or ineffective supervision
by Defendant’s agents and/or employees. Plaintiff argues the documents sought
would lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and are needed to
meaningfully proceed with discovery, assist in the evaluation of the case,
facilitate settlement discussions, and/or prepare for trial.
The Court
finds Plaintiff’s explanation about good cause availing.
Student
Not Named
In Opposition, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff has not named the student as a Defendant in this case and that the
claims of negligence are only against GUSD.
Here, the
Court is not entirely clear what GUSD is trying to argue. Presumably, GUSD is
arguing that Plaintiff can’t obtain the instant discovery about the student
because the student is not named in the lawsuit.
Whatever
GUSD’s argument is, the Court does not find it availing. GUSD cites no legal
authority for its implication that the student also has to be a named Defendant
for Plaintiff to obtain discovery about the student that struck Plaintiff.
Relevance
GUSD argues in Opposition that the
instant discovery is not relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence because the identity of the student is not
relevant to the Plaintiff’s lawsuit since Plaintiff is only targeting the
school district, not the student.
The Court
does not find GUSD’s argument availing. As Plaintiff’s reply further explains,
“The information requested, specifically documents regarding the unknown
student's identity and previous behavioral issues, is necessary and essential
to ascertain the truth of Plaintiffs legal claim against Glendale Unified
School District, to evaluate the case and to evaluate the probability of resolution.”
(Reply, p. 1.)
Plaintiff’s
RFPs regarding identity and the conduct/behavior of the student appear directly
relevant to Plaintiff trying to prove that GUSD had a duty to train and
supervise staff that supervise students with known behavioral issues so as to
maintain a safe environment.
Privacy/Less
Restrictive Options
Defendant argues that special
education student privacy rights are at play and the student’s parents/ guardians
should be allowed to object to this request, and this student’s privacy rights
are not outweighed by the plaintiff’s rights to discovery. Further, Defendant
argues that the school district would ask that it be permitted to notify the
parent/guardian that their student’s records are being sought.
Here,
the Court will hear argument; however, for the most part, the Court does not
find GUSD’s arguments availing.
First, GUSD
does not cite any legal authority for its argument.
As a general rule, all unprivileged information that
is relevant to the subject matter of the action is discoverable if it would
itself be admissible evidence at trial or if it appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. §
2017.010; Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704,
711.) When the information sought to be discovered impacts a person’s
constitutional right to privacy, limited protections come into play for that
person. (Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 999.)
The protections cover both a person’s personal and financial matters. (Id.)
The court must balance competing rights — the right of a litigant to discover
relevant facts and the right of an individual to maintain reasonable privacy —
in determining whether the information is discoverable. (Id.)
For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it
might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or
facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)
The framework for evaluating invasions of privacy in discovery has been
clarified in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531.
There, the California Supreme Court held that, generally, “[t]he party
asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest,
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances,
and a threatened intrusion that is serious. The party seeking information may
raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests
disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible
alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would
diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing
considerations. (Williams, 3 Cal.5th at p. 533, citing Hill
v. Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.) The court
rejected cases which held that the party seeking protected information must
always show a compelling need or interest. (Id. at p. 557.)
Instead, the court held, “[o]nly obvious invasions of interest fundamental to
personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling
interest.” (Id.) When lesser interests are at stake, “the strength of
the countervailing interest sufficient to warrant disclosure of private
information var[ies] according to the strength of the privacy interest itself,
the seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and
protective measures.” (Id.)
Parties may overcome objections on the basis of a
right to privacy by demonstrating that the information sought is “directly
relevant to a cause of action or defense … i.e., that it is essential to
determining the truth of the matters in dispute.” (Britt v.
Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859-862.) Once good
cause is shown, courts must carefully balance a right of privacy against the
interest in having just litigation. (Pioneer Electronics (USA),
Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 371.)
A court may abuse its discretion in denying requests
for discovery, or in granting a motion to quash, where it fails to consider
interests favoring disclosure, or an order partially limiting rather than
outright denying discovery. (Johnson v. Superior Court (2000)
80 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1073 (reversing trial court order quashing entirely
deposition notice, and instead ordering discovery of private medical history,
but only to the extent relevant.)
Here, GUSD cites no legal authority for “special
education student privacy rights,” nor does GUSD cite legal authority for the
proposition that a “student’s parents/ guardians should be allowed to object to
this request.”
To the extent that the objection itself in the
response to the RFP regarding Education Code § 49076 is a privacy right, both
parties agreed that 49076 allows for information in pupil records to be disclosed
with a court order.
Therefore, the Court is unlikely to find the student
privacy arguments availing in light of Plaintiff’s right to discovery and
interest in just litigation.
GUSD also argues that there are less restrictive
discovery alternatives available such as ordering the district to provide the
name of the student (if the Court feels this is proper) alone without having to
provide pupil records that contain highly sensitive, medical and confidential
information.
Here, the Court will hear argument, but it
is unlikely to find GUSD’s arguments availing. As previously explained,
Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for the instant requests.
The instant discovery, whether it is highly sensitive or confidential/medical
information, could reveal GUSD’s knowledge about prior behavioral issues of the
student that injured Plaintiff while Plaintiff was in a GUSD classroom.
TENTATIVE RULING MOTION 1 SUMMARY
The
Court is inclined to grant Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to Plaintiff’s
First Set of Requests for Production of Documents, numbers 8 and 19.
MOTION
2 – SROGs and Responses
SROG
2
State the date of birth of the
STUDENT.
SROG
3
State the height of the STUDENT.
SROG
4
State the weight of the STUDENT.
SROG
5
State whether the STUDENT required
any special accommodations by YOU at the time of the SUBJECT INCIDENT.
SROG
6
State whether the STUDENT required
any special accommodations by any entity other than YOU at the time of the
SUBJECT INCIDENT.
SROG
7
If the STUDENT did require special
accommodations, identify said special accommodations.
SROG
8
If the STUDENT did require special
accommodations, identify the reasons of said special accommodations.
SROG
9
State in detail all incidents of
aggressive or violent behavior involving the STUDENT that are known by YOU.
SROG
30
State the date the STUDENT started
attending Glendale High School.
SROG
31
State the starting date STUDENT
became a student of Glendale Unified School District.
GUSD’s
Response to SROGs 2-9 and 30-31
Objection. This request violates
Education Code 49076 in that pupil information cannot be released without a
court order or parent written consent.
TENTATIVE
RULING MOTION 2
As a preliminary matter, the Court
notes that even though GUSD submitted a separate statement opposing the SROG
requests, GUSD’s separate statement regarding the SROGs was actually just a
separate statement containing RFPs 8 and 19 from Motion 1.
That being
said, GUSD’s Opposition to Motion 2 asserted the same arguments that GUSD
asserted in Opposition to Motion 1.
Since both
parties’ motion, opposition, and reply for the instant motion asserted the same
arguments asserted in Motion 1, the Court incorporates its tentative ruling
from Motion 1 into this ruling for Motion 2.
Therefore,
for Motion 2, the Court is likely to grant Plaintiff’s motion to compel further
responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set One, number 2-9 and
30-31.
Sanctions – Motion
1 and 2
“The court shall
impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010)
against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a
motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that
the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that
other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (CCP § 2030.300(d).)
Except as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall
impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010)
against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a
motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one
subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other
circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP §2031.310(h).)
“The court may
award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion
to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or
opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided
to the moving party after the motion was filed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule
3.1348(a).)
Here, neither
party requested sanctions.