Case Number: 24NNCV02343    Hearing Date: May 1, 2025    Dept: E

Hearing Date: 05/01/2025 – 8:30am
Case No.  24NNCV02343
Trial Date:   UNSET
Case Name:  VALERIE K. BURT, an individual and as trustee of the Valerie K. Burt Revocable Trust, as amended and restated, v. JONATHAN KLEIN, an individual; HELEN MARY QUINTANA HINOJOS aka HELEN MARY QUINTANA-HINOJOS aka HELEN HINOJOS, an individual; HOMEBRIDGE FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. a New Jersey Corporation; EXHIBIT “B”, a legal entity form unknown, EXHIBIT B LLC, a California limited liability company, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

TENTATIVE RULING - MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES

RELIEF REQUESTED¿ 
“Defendant and Cross-Defendant JONATHAN KLEIN will and hereby does move the Court for an order requiring Plaintiff VALERIE K. BURT to provide full, complete and non-evasive responses to Defendant and Cross-Defendant Jonathan Klein’s Special Interrogatories Set No. Two, Special Interrogatory Nos. 32, 34, 35, 36, 38 and 39. Defendant and Cross-Defendant Jonathan Klein also seeks an award of monetary sanctions pursuant to C.C.P. § 2023(a), against Plaintiff Valerie K. Burt and/or her counsel Grant K. Peto, Esq., in the amount of $3,060.00.

This Motion will be based on this Notice of Motion; the Memorandum of Points and Authorities; the Supporting Declaration of Eugene S. Alkana, the discovery requests and deficient responses, in question; the Separate Statement of Responses in Dispute pursuant to Rule 3.1345 of the California Rules of Court, filed concurrently herewith; and upon all papers and pleadings concurrently on file with this Court; and upon such oral and documentary evidence as may be produced at hearing.”

(Def. Mot. p.2.)

Preliminary Procedural
Moving Party: Defendant/Cross-Defendant, Jonathan Klein

Responding Party: Plaintiff, Valerie K. Burt, an individual and as trustee of the Valerie K. Burt Revocable Trust, as amended and restated

16/21 Day Lapse (CCP § 12c and § 1005(b)): Ok

Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300(c)): Ok

Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a, § 1013b): Ok

Moving Papers: Motion; Proposed Order; Separate Statement

Opposition Papers: Opposition; Separate Statement

Reply Papers: Reply

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Valerie K. Burt, an individual and as trustee of the Valerie K. Burt Revocable Trust, as amended and restated, filed the instant action on 6/18/2024. [This action has case number 24NNCV02343.]

Plaintiff’s Complaint named the following Defendants: (1) Jonathan Klein, (2) Helen Mary Quintana Hinojos aka Helen Mary Quintana-Hinojos aka Helen Hinojos, (3) Homebridge Financial Services, Inc., (4) “Exhibit ‘B’” is a legal entity, form unknown, (5) “Exhibit B LLC”, and (6) Does 1-50.

Generally speaking, Plaintiff’s Complaint arises from allegations that Defendants defrauded/tricked Plaintiff into selling her home for less than fair market value.

The Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Quiet Title, (2) Slander of Title, (3) Cancellation of Instrument, (4) Breach of Contract, (5) Fraud, and (6) Elder Abuse.

On 8/27/2024, Plaintiff dismissed Defendant, Exhibit B LLC from the action.

On 1/9/2025, Homebridge Financial Services, Inc., filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity.

On 1/29/2025, a stipulation was filed by Plaintiff, Defendant Jonathan Klein, Defendant Helen Hinojos, and Defendant Homebridge Financial Services, Inc. In relevant part, the parties stipulated that:

1. The amendment to the operative complaint is approved.

2. The correct names: 1) Irina Yaguda Yeva, an individual and 2) Ravi Financial LLC, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company will be substituted into the operative complaint wherever the incorrect name “Exhibit ‘B’, a legal entity form unknown” and/or “Exhibit ‘B” appears in the operative complaint.

3. A summons naming Irina Yaguda Yeva, an individual and Ravi Financial LLC, a Wyoming Limited Company will be issued.

(Stip. & Order filed and signed on 1/29/2025.)

On 3/18/2025, the Court found 24NNCV02343 and 24NWCV01922 related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a). Further, on 3/18/2025, 24NNCV02343 was designated as the lead case.

Meet and Confer
“A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP § 2030.300(b)(1).)

Here, Defendant’s motion included a meet and confer declaration. (See Alkana Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)

45-Day Requirement
“Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories.” (CCP § 2030.300(c).)

Here, neither party addresses this requirement. The Court to hear argument.

LEGAL STANDARD - COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
Under CCP § 2017.010, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action..., if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  The Section specifically provides that “[d]iscovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action,” and that discovery “may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.” (Ibid.)

On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply:

(1)   An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete.

(2)   An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate.

(3)   An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.

(CCP § 2030.300(a).)

If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the¿burden is on the responding party¿to justify any objection or failure fully to answer.¿(Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220–221 [addressing a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories]; see also¿Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) 

“While the party propounding interrogatories may have the burden of filing a motion to compel if it finds the answers it receives unsatisfactory, the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541 citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

Furthermore, to the extent there is any doubt in whether these records should be discoverable, California’s liberal approach to discovery provides that doubt should be resolved in favor of permitting discovery. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173.)

The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by any of the following:

(1) An answer containing the information sought to be discovered.

(2) An exercise of the party’s option to produce writings.

(3) An objection to the particular interrogatory.

(CCP § 2030.210(a).)

Interrogatories, Responses, Reasons to Compel Further, Opposition to Compel Further

SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 32

What was the purchase price for the sale of the property located at 199 N. Hermosa Ave., Sierra Madre, California 91024 (the SUBJECT PROPERTY) to JONATHAN KLEIN?

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY 32:

Objection, misstates the pleadings, assumes facts not in evidence, vague and ambiguous and compound. Subject to the foregoing, Ms. Hinojos and Mr. Klein indicated they would pay Ms. Burt $1.2 million to purchase the subject property. The Complaint in this action contends the agreement and Ms. Burt’s signature on the deed transferring title was procured by fraud, undue influence, and elder abuse and the subject property was worth in excess of $1.4 million at the time. Discovery and investigation are ongoing and responding party reserves the right to supplement this response.

DEFENDANT KLEIN’S REASON TO COMPEL:

Plaintiff did not answer the question. The simple question is “What was the agreed upon purchase price between Plaintiff and Defendant for the property?” Plaintiff needs to provide the purchase price for the property. Plaintiff alleges in Paragraphs 19 and 20 a purchase agreement. Plaintiff cannot use meaningless objections to refrain from answering this interrogatory. The purchase price of the property is relevant and material to the issues presented in this lawsuit. Defendant is entitled to know; if there was a purchase price agreed upon between the Buyer and Seller, then Defendant is entitled to know what that purchase price was, how much of it was to be paid outside of escrow, how much was paid into escrow, and how much remains unpaid. This Special Interrogatory relates not only to the formation of the contract which Defendant alleges in the Complaint, but also relates to the claim for damages.

PLAINTIFF BURT’S OPPOSITION:

This is an elder abuse case. One of the defendants is a convicted felon who has already spent time in prison for elder abuse and real estate fraud. Defendants admit this was not a simple transaction with some money being paid via escrow, some outside of escrow, and parts of the agreement that appear to have been completely undocumented or intentionally misrepresented to Ms. Burt. Given the admitted complexities of the case, the answer to this question is not just a number, as Mr. Klein wrongfully suggests. For various reasons, Plaintiff contends the purchase agreement is unenforceable. Regardless, Ms. Burt did not merely assert an objection or a statement that the contract was unenforceable. She answered the question in the most straightforward way possible and stated Defendant Klein and Defendant Hinojos said they would pay $1.2 million.

To demonstrate how complicated this question really is, the actual answer to the question “what was the purchase price?” should be, “it depends on who you ask.”

If you ask Mr. Klein, he will say $850,000 (only $500k through escrow and the rest through an oral agreement). If you ask the Assessor’s Office, Escrow, or Mr. Klein’s lenders, they will say $500,000. Those answers do not make sense because Redfin will tell you $1.48 million and Mr. Klein immediately borrowed exactly $850k against the house after he closed escrow. The loan to value does not compute. But Mr. Klein did not ask those questions. He only asked Ms. Burt what she thought the price was. Her answer was full and complete – Klein and Hinojos said they would pay $1.2 million, a narrowly tailored objection that the question misstates pleadings and assumes facts not in evidence (i.e. there is no purchase agreement) and a brief statement that the complaint alleges the transaction is unenforceable.

Mr. Klein’s separate statement incorrectly misquotes Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the complaint. Mr. Klein’s separate statement says, “ Plaintiff alleges in Paragraphs 19 and 20 a purchase agreement. Plaintiff cannot use meaningless objections to refrain from answering this interrogatory.”

Paragraph 19 and 20 do not reference allege a purchase agreement. Those paragraphs line up exactly with the discovery responses. Paragraph 19 states, “At first, the parties discussed and agreed that Defendants would purchase the Property from Burt for $1.2 million dollars, which was below fair market value, to accommodate some repairs Ms. Burt was unable to supervise as a result of her ongoing medical issues.” Paragraph 20 states, “Defendants Klein and/or Hinojos then told several lies to Ms. Burt to trick her into reducing that price on paper to $855,000 and then a meager $500,000.” Perhaps this is a reading comprehension issue. The complaint does not allege Ms. Burt agreed to reduce the purchase price of $1.2 million. Instead, it only says the Defendants tricked her to reducing the price on paper. The following paragraphs explain Defendants illegally told Ms. Burt they would save her taxes, fees and costs if they reduced what they reported the price would be in various documents. That explains why Klein admits the price he reported to the Assessor does not match with even his own price.

SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 34:

State the unpaid amount of the purchase price for the SUBJECT PROPERTY.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY 34:

Objection, misstates the pleadings, assumes facts not in evidence, vague and ambiguous and compound. Subject to the foregoing, Ms. Hinojos and Mr. Klein indicated they would pay Ms. Burt $1.2 million to purchase the subject property. The Complaint in this action contends the agreement and Ms. Burt’s signature on the deed transferring title was procured by fraud, undue influence, and elder abuse and the subject property was worth in excess of $1.4 million at the time. The Complaint further seeks to cancel the deed and security instruments and reclaim the subject property in Plaintiff’s name. Discovery and investigation are ongoing and responding party reserves the right to supplement this response.

DEFENDANT KLEIN’S REASON TO COMPEL:

Plaintiff failed to provide an answer to this request. Plaintiff needs to state the unpaid amount of the purchase price. Plaintiff alleges in Paragraphs 19 and 20 a purchase agreement. Plaintiff cannot use meaningless objections to refrain from answering this interrogatory. This is a simple straightforward question, one which is know to the Plaintiff and relates to Plaintiff’s claim of damages.

PLAINTIFF BURT’S OPPOSITION:

This is the same question “what is the purchase priced” asked in a slightly different way as “what is still owed on the purchase price.” The analysis is identical for interrogatory 32. Interrogatory 33, which is not subject to a motion to compel, but is a good example of the problem with the other interrogatories, asked what consideration was received. That answer is not based on an incorrect assumption not in evidence that there was a valid and enforceable agreement to purchase the Property. Ms. Burt answered interrogatory 33 that only $477,031 was received with no objection.

SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 35:

For any amounts that were to be paid by JONATHAN KLEIN for the SUBJECT PROPERTY after close of escrow, state with particularity, the amounts to be paid and the terms of repayment.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY 35:

Objection, misstates the pleadings, assumes facts not in evidence, vague and ambiguous and compound. Subject to the foregoing, Ms. Hinojos and Mr. Klein indicated they would pay Ms. Burt $1.2 million to purchase the subject property. The Complaint in this action contends the agreement and Ms. Burt’s signature on the deed transferring title was procured by fraud, undue influence, and elder abuse and the subject property was worth in excess of $1.4 million at the time. The Complaint further seeks to cancel the deed and security instruments and reclaim the subject property in plaintiff’s name. Discovery and investigation are ongoing and responding party reserves the right to supplement this response.

DEFENDANT KLEIN’S REASON TO COMPEL: Plaintiff failed to provide an answer to this request. This question seeks information concerning payments made by Jonathan Klein for the subject property, after the close of escrow. Plaintiff alleges in Paragraphs 19 and 20 a purchase agreement. Plaintiff cannot use meaningless objections to refrain from answering this interrogatory. Plaintiff’s response simply reiterated the same objection to Special Interrogatories 32 and 34. Plaintiff needs to answer this Special Interrogatory and provide the information concerning amounts paid by Jonathan Klein for the subject property after the close of escrow in order to contest or counter Plaintiff’s claim of damage.

PLAINTIFF BURT’S OPPOSITION:

This is the same question “what is the purchase priced” asked in a slightly different way limited only to parts of the agreement to be paid “outside of escrow.” The analysis is identical for interrogatory 32. Plaintiff Burt does not contend there was a valid agreement to make payments outside of escrow. Moreover, Klein asserts the total purchase price was only $850,000. Ms. Burt asserts Mr. Klein and Ms. Hinojos promised to pay $1.2 million. It appears Mr. Burt alleges he had an agreement to pay $350k outside of escrow. Ms. Burt disagrees. That does not render the discovery response improper. That is an issue to be determined at trial. Mr. Klein attorney is trying to win the lawsuit in a discovery motion and get an order for Ms. Burt to declare under penalty of perjury he only owes $350k to complete the transaction so he can move for summary judgment.

SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 36:

Identify by date and description each document which identifies the total purchase price of the SUBJECT PROPERTY to be paid by JONATHAN KLEIN.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY 36:

Objection, misstates the pleadings, assumes facts not in evidence, vague and ambiguous, compound, and the interrogatory calls for creation of a compilation or abstract. Subject to the foregoing, Ms. Hinojos and Mr. Klein indicated they would pay Ms. Burt $1.2 million to purchase the subject property. The Complaint in this action contends the agreement and Ms. Burt’s signature on the deed transferring title was procured by fraud, undue influence, and elder abuse and the subject property was worth in excess of $1.4 million at the time. The Complaint further seeks to cancel the deed and security instruments and reclaim the subject property in plaintiff’s name. Discovery and investigation are ongoing and responding party reserves the right to supplement this response.

DEFENDANT KLEIN’S REASON TO COMPEL:

This interrogatory requires Plaintiff to identify documents by date and description, which refers to or relates to the total purchase price of the subject property to be paid by Jonathan Klein. This would include emails, text messages, escrow documents not only between Plaintiff and Defendant but between Plaintiff and other persons, including her real estate agents, co-defendants, escrow employees. Plaintiff alleges in Paragraphs 19 and 20 a purchase agreement. Plaintiff simply interposes meaningless objections to refrain from answering this interrogatory. Plaintiff’s response is non-responsive, evasive and in bad faith and an answer is required so that Defendant can prepare and serve a demand for production of documents.

PLAINTIFF BURT’S OPPOSITION:

Ms. Burt does not allege there is a document that references a “total purchase price.” The only thing the parties agree on is that this was a highly unusual transaction. Some of the deal went through an escrow, but that did not memorialize the “total purchase price.” Defendant Klein admits that at least some of the deal, even in his version of events, was oral. The question, as phrased, is therefore incredibly difficult to answer. The best Ms. Burt can do is describe the oral agreement that Mr. Klein and Helen Hinojos said they would pay her $1.2 million. Just because Defendant Klein asked for a document does not mean they exist. This is not a request for production. Ms. Burt responded to Mr. Klein’s request for production of documents. Mr. Klein did not move to compel.

SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 38:

Identify by date each demand made by YOU to JONATHAN KLEIN for payment of any portion of the purchase price to be paid outside of escrow

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY 38:

Objection, calls for creation of a compilation or abstract, misstates the pleadings, vague and ambiguous. Subject to the foregoing, Ms. Hinojos and Mr. Klein indicated they would pay Ms. Burt $1.2 million to purchase the subject property. The Complaint in this action contends the agreement and Ms. Burt’s signature on the deed transferring title was procured by fraud, undue influence, and elder abuse and the subject property was worth in excess of $1.4 million at the time. The Complaint further seeks to cancel the deed and security instruments and reclaim the subject property in plaintiff’s name. Discovery and investigation are ongoing and responding party reserves the right to supplement this response

DEFENDANT KLEIN’S REASON TO COMPEL

This is a request for Plaintiff to identify by date, each demand made by Plaintiff for payment of any portion of the purchase price to be paid outside of escrow. The request is clear and unambiguous. Plaintiff simply reiterated the same objections in prior responses. Plaintiff alleges in Paragraphs 19 and 20 a purchase agreement. If Plaintiff made a demand to Jonathan Klein for payment of any portion of the purchase price to be paid outside of escrow, Defendant is entitled to ask. If Plaintiff did make such a demand, Defendant is entitled to know the date of each demand and Plaintiff needs to so state. Boilerplate objections that Plaintiff repeated in response to Special Interrogatories 32, 34, 35, are 36, are non-responsive, vague and, quite frankly, in bad faith.

PLAINTIFF BURT’S OPPOSITION:

This response was a clerical error. It was not detected because Mr. Alkana indicated he was going to move to compel only regarding questions related to the purchase price. The response will be supplemented before the hearing. Relevant responsive text messages were produced in September of 2024.

SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 39:

State the current unpaid purchase price for the SUBJECT PROPERTY owed by JONATHAN KLEIN.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY 39:

Objection, misstates the pleadings, assumes facts not in evidence, vague and ambiguous, and compound. Subject to the foregoing, Ms. Hinojos and Mr. Klein indicated they would pay Ms. Burt $1.2 million to purchase the subject property. The Complaint in this action contends the agreement and Ms. Burt’s signature on the deed transferring title was procured by fraud, undue influence, and elder abuse and the subject property was worth in excess of $1.4 million at the time. The Complaint further seeks to cancel the deed and security instruments and reclaim the subject property in Plaintiff’s name. Discovery and investigation are ongoing and responding party reserves the right to supplement this response

DEFENDANT KLEIN’S REASON TO COMPEL:

Plaintiff alleges in Paragraphs 19 and 20 a purchase agreement with Defendant. Defendant is not asking the value of the property, Defendant wants to know the Plaintiff’s verified response as to the current unpaid purchase price. This is a number within Plaintiff’s knowledge. Repeating the same objections as contained in prior responses is evasive and in bad faith. Defendant is entitled to a dollar amount.

PLAINTIFF BURT’S OPPOSITION

This is the same question as interrogatory 32. The analysis is the same

TENTATIVE RULING

Informal Discovery Conference

Plaintiff argues that Defendant violated this Court’s local rules by not meeting and conferring in person or telephonically and failing to request an informal discovery conference.

The Court to hear argument.

Substantive

The Court tentatively plans to GRANT Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to SROGs, Set Two, numbers 32, 34, 35, 36, 38, and 39.

If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the¿burden is on the responding party¿to justify any objection or failure fully to answer.¿(Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220–221 [addressing a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories]; see also¿Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) 

“While the party propounding interrogatories may have the burden of filing a motion to compel if it finds the answers it receives unsatisfactory, the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541 citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

Furthermore, to the extent there is any doubt in whether these records should be discoverable, California’s liberal approach to discovery provides that doubt should be resolved in favor of permitting discovery. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173.)

Here, Plaintiff’s responses simultaneously object and provide responses.

Plaintiff’s objections are overruled and stricken, as Plaintiff’s Opposition did not meet the burden of justifying Plaintiff’s objections.

Further, to the extent that Plaintiff’s responses contained answers, those answers are evasive.

Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s Opposition and Opposition Separate Statement are difficult to follow, and the Court fails to clearly understand what Plaintiff is trying to argue.

The Court points to SROG 32 as an example of how it is unclear what point(s) Plaintiff is trying to make.

SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 32

What was the purchase price for the sale of the property located at 199 N. Hermosa Ave., Sierra Madre, California 91024 (the SUBJECT PROPERTY) to JONATHAN KLEIN?

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY 32:

Objection, misstates the pleadings, assumes facts not in evidence, vague and ambiguous and compound. Subject to the foregoing, Ms. Hinojos and Mr. Klein indicated they would pay Ms. Burt $1.2 million to purchase the subject property. The Complaint in this action contends the agreement and Ms. Burt’s signature on the deed transferring title was procured by fraud, undue influence, and elder abuse and the subject property was worth in excess of $1.4 million at the time. Discovery and investigation are ongoing and responding party reserves the right to supplement this response.

In relevant part of the response to SROG 32, Plaintiff responded with, “Subject to the foregoing, Ms. Hinojos and Mr. Klein indicated they would pay Ms. Burt $1.2 million to purchase the subject property. The Complaint in this action contends the agreement and Ms. Burt’s signature on the deed transferring title was procured by fraud, undue influence, and elder abuse and the subject property was worth in excess of $1.4 million at the time.” (See SROG 32 response.)

While Plaintiff argues that her response is straightforward, the Court fails to see how the response is straightforward.

Further, despite Plaintiff arguing that she answered SROG 32, Plaintiff then argues:

To demonstrate how complicated this question really is, the actual answer to the question “what was the purchase price?” should be, “it depends on who you ask.”

If you ask Mr. Klein, he will say $850,000 (only $500k through escrow and the rest through an oral agreement). If you ask the Assessor’s Office, Escrow, or Mr. Klein’s lenders, they will say $500,000. Those answers do not make sense because Redfin will tell you $1.48 million and Mr. Klein immediately borrowed exactly $850k against the house after he closed escrow. The loan to value does not compute. But Mr. Klein did not ask those questions. He only asked Ms. Burt what she thought the price was. Her answer was full and complete – Klein and Hinojos said they would pay $1.2 million, a narrowly tailored objection that the question misstates pleadings and assumes facts not in evidence (i.e. there is no purchase agreement) and a brief statement that the complaint alleges the transaction is unenforceable.

(Pl. Oppo. Sep. Stmt., p. 2.)

If Plaintiff is arguing that she cannot answer the question based on how it is phrased, then why would Plaintiff not object and then attempt to justify its objections in opposition?

Instead, Plaintiff provides an initial evasive response, then argues that the response is straightforward while simultaneously arguing that a straightforward response is not possible because the answer to the question “depends on who you ask.”

As a further example, the Court points to SROG 36.

SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 36:

Identify by date and description each document which identifies the total purchase price of the SUBJECT PROPERTY to be paid by JONATHAN KLEIN.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY 36:

Objection, misstates the pleadings, assumes facts not in evidence, vague and ambiguous, compound, and the interrogatory calls for creation of a compilation or abstract. Subject to the foregoing, Ms. Hinojos and Mr. Klein indicated they would pay Ms. Burt $1.2 million to purchase the subject property. The Complaint in this action contends the agreement and Ms. Burt’s signature on the deed transferring title was procured by fraud, undue influence, and elder abuse and the subject property was worth in excess of $1.4 million at the time. The Complaint further seeks to cancel the deed and security instruments and reclaim the subject property in plaintiff’s name. Discovery and investigation are ongoing and responding party reserves the right to supplement this response.

In Opposition, Plaintiff argued:

Ms. Burt does not allege there is a document that references a “total purchase price.” The only thing the parties agree on is that this was a highly unusual transaction. Some of the deal went through an escrow, but that did not memorialize the “total purchase price.” Defendant Klein admits that at least some of the deal, even in his version of events, was oral. The question, as phrased, is therefore incredibly difficult to answer. The best Ms. Burt can do is describe the oral agreement that Mr. Klein and Helen Hinojos said they would pay her $1.2 million. Just because Defendant Klein asked for a document does not mean they exist. This is not a request for production. Ms. Burt responded to Mr. Klein’s request for production of documents. Mr. Klein did not move to compel.

(Pl. Oppo. Sep. Stmt. p.6.)

Again, the Court here fails to understand what Plaintiff is arguing.

The Court fails to see how the parties agreeing that this was a highly unusual transaction has to do with anything.

Further, Plaintiff continues to argue that “The question, as phrased, is therefore incredibly difficult to answer.”

However, instead of Plaintiff objecting and then attempting to justify its objections in this opposition, Plaintiff provided an initial response. Not only is that response evasive, but it doesn’t align with Plaintiff’s explanation as to why a further response should not be provided.

Overall, the Court cannot make any sense of Plaintiff’s Opposition. Plaintiff’s reasons on why further responses are not warranted do not align with Plaintiff’s initial responses. Ultimately, since Plaintiff did not meet her burden in justifying her objections, and because Plaintiff’s responses are evasive, this Court orders Plaintiff to provide further, verified, code-compliant further responses to SROGs Set Two, numbers 32, 34, 35, 36, 38, and 39 without objection within ten (10) calendar days from this Court’s order.

Sanctions

Defendant’s notice of motion cites to CCP § 2023(a) and seeks an award of monetary sanctions against Plaintiff Valerie K. Burt and/or her counsel of record Grant K. Peto, Esq., in the amount of $3,060.00.

Defendant’s counsel states:

9. The declarant has been an attorney for more than forty (40) years. Declarant has spent four (4) hours in preparing this motion together with the Separate Statement of Matters in Dispute. Declarant will spend at least an additional two (2) hours in reviewing the opposition, preparing the reply and appearing at the hearing. Declarant will spend no less than six (6) hours in connection with this motion. Declarant’s billing rate is $500.00 per hour which is fair and reasonable given the nature and complexity of this case.

10. Declarant seeks an award of attorney’s fees against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of $3,000.00 plus $60.00 for the filing fee, for a total of $3,060.00 as against Plaintiff and counsel.

(Decl. Alkana, ¶¶ 9-10.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that sanctions are not warranted because Defendant does not explain or provide supporting authority for the basis of the sanctions requests.

Plaintiff also argues that although Mr. Alkana seeks $60 for the filing fee, Plaintiff states that the filing confirmation indicates that Alkana did not a pay a fee and Defendant’s client appears to have a fee waiver.

Plaintiff also argues that fees should be awarded to Plaintiff and against Alkana in the same amount that Alkana sought in his moving papers.

Plaintiff’s counsel states:

I have been practicing law for fifteen years and have routinely been awarded attorney’s fees in excess of $500 per hour, which is reasonable value for services rendered to my client and less than similarly experienced attorneys charge for work of this nature in this geographical area. I have spent more than four and one half drafting this opposition and the corresponding opposition to the separate statement. I anticipate spending an additional one and one half hours planning for, preparing, and attending the hearing on this matter, for a total of six hours. Six times $500 is $3,000.

(Decl. Peto ¶ 3.)

Further, Plaintiff cited to CCP § 2030.290(c) as the basis for sanctions because Plaintiff argues the responses were straightforward.

Under CCP § 2030.290(c):

The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. If a party then fails to obey an order compelling answers, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of or in addition to that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).

(CCP § 2030.290(c).)

Further, Plaintiff argues that sanctions should be awarded because Mr. Alkana failed to make a reasonable good faith attempt to resolve the issues informally. Plaintiff cites to 2026.040 and 2030.300.

Here, the Court will hear argument.

Plaintiff is correct to note that Defendant’s memorandum did not make an explanation as to the sanctions request, and Plaintiff is correct to note that only Defendant’s notice of motion cited the basis for the sanctions request. The notice of the motion cited to 20203(a) as the basis for the sanctions request; however, there is no 2023(a) in the CCP.

While Plaintiff is correct to note that Defendant did not cite a proper statute and that the memorandum does not explain the sanctions request, Plaintiff does not come forward with authority that states that this is a basis to deny Defendant’s sanctions request.

Further, in Reply, Defendant does not address Plaintiff’s arguments on sanctions.

At the hearing, Defendant should be prepared to address the argument that Plaintiff’s counsel brought up about the $60 and the fee waiver.

The Court also notes that while Plaintiff pointed out that Defendant did not cite to an appropriate statute to award sanctions, the Court notes that Plaintiff also cited to the wrong sanctions statute.

Plaintiff cited to 2030.290(c); however, that statute relates to compelling responses, not compelling further responses.

Plaintiff did not cite to § 2030.300(d) which appears to be the relevant statute that pertains to sanctions with respect to compelling further responses.

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (CCP § 2030.300(d).)

“The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348(a).)