Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case Number: 24NNCV03306, Date: 2025-05-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 24NNCV03306, Date: 2025-05-28 Tentative Ruling

Hearing Date: 03/20/2025 – 8:30am
Case No. 24NNCV03633
Trial Date: UNSET
Case Name: GUISHENG XU, an individual, v. JIAQI HAN, an individual; FUZHOU LIU, an individual; YINMING LIU, an individual; FIRST STOP AUTO LLC, a California limited liability company; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive

TENTATIVE RULING ON MOTION TO VACATE AND SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT

RELIEF REQUESTED¿¿¿
“Defendant YINMING LIU will and hereby does move this court for an order vacating and setting aside the default entered on October 11, 2024, and subsequent default judgment entered on February 4, 2025, on the grounds:

a) the Summons and Complaint purportedly served on him by substituted service on August 27, 2024, were not properly served on him and hence the default and default judgment are void;

b) alternatively, on the grounds set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5.

A copy of Defendant’s proposed Demurrer is attached to this Motion as Exhibit “C.”

The relief requested by this Motion is based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the declarations of Defendant Yinming Liu and Eugene R. Long, all pleadings and documents currently on file with the Court as well as such other oral or documentary evidence as may be presented at the time of hearing on this Motion.”

(Def. Mot. p. 2.)

PROCEDURAL

Moving Party: Defendant, Yinming Liu (Defendant or Movant)

Opposing Party: Plaintiff, Guisheng Xu

Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300(c)): Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP § 1005(b)): Ok
Proper Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a, § 1013b): Ok

Moving Papers: Notice/Motion [filed 2/10/2025]; Amended Notice/Motion [filed 2/24/2025];

Opposition Papers: Opposition

Reply Papers: Reply

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Guisheng Xu, filed the instant action on 8/19/2024 against Defendants – (1) Jiaqi Han, an individual, (2) Fuzhou Liu, an individual, (3) Yinming Liu, an individual, (4) First Stop Auto LLC, a California limited liability company, and (5) Does 1 to 10, inclusive.

Entry of default was entered against all of the non-Doe Defendants on 10/11/2024.

Does 1 to 10 were dismissed from the Complaint on 10/29/2024.

On 02/04/2025, default judgment was entered against (1) Jiaqi Han, an individual, (2) Fuzhou Liu, an individual, (3) Yinming Liu, an individual, and (4) First Stop Auto LLC, a California limited liability company.

For purposes of this hearing, the Court considers Defendant, Yinming Liu’s, amended notice/motion filed on 2/24/2025 and not the earlier filed notice/motion that was filed on 2/10/2025.

ANALYSIS
Preliminary Matter

In the instant action, Plaintiff filed four proofs of substituted service on 8/29/2024 for all of the named Defendants in this action.

Moving Defendant, Yinming Liu, moves for an order to vacate and set aside the default and default judgments entered against him on the basis that he was not properly served.

Movant appears to move pursuant to CCP § 473(d), and in the alternative, § 473.5.

The Court notes that neither party’s papers is a model of clarity. For example, neither party makes clear why § 473(d) or § 473.5 is or is not the appropriate statute to move under to vacate the default/default judgment. Generally speaking, Defendant argues that service upon him was improper, and Plaintiff argues that service upon Defendant was proper. To the Court, this motion appears to be akin to a motion to quash service of summons. Either way, since Defendant’s motion does not make clear why § 473(d) or § 473.5 is the appropriate statute, and since Plaintiff did not oppose Defendant’s motion on the grounds that those two statutes are not the proper statutes, the Court will assume Defendant moved under the proper statute.

Substantive

On 8/29/2024, Plaintiff filed a proof of service of summons that alleged substituted service on Defendant, Yinming Liu, on 8/27/2024.

Defendant, Yinming Liu, argues that service upon him was not proper.

Compliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. (American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 387.)

As to how Defendant believes that service upon him was improper is not entirely clear. Many times Defendant asserts arguments without citing legal authority. Or at times, Defendant will make reference to legal authority, but in no clear manner does Defendant explain how his argument is tied to the legal authority that he cited.

For example, Defendant first appears to argue that service upon him was not valid because Plaintiff did not personally serve him.

The argument that service was improper because Defendant was not personally served appears to be unavailing for several reasons.

First, Plaintiff’s proof of service lists service upon Defendant via substituted service; it does not list service upon Defendant via personal service.

Second, it does not appear that Defendant has to be personally served, because substituted service is an alternative to personal service.

As explained in American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara:

The Code of Civil Procedure specifies the various methods by which service may be made upon defendants who are sued as individuals.

The method described as “personal service” means service that is accomplished “by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served.” (§ 415.10.) If the complaint and summons were personally delivered to, i.e., handed to, defendant then he could be said to have been “personally served.”

A defendant may also be “personally” served by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to an agent authorized to accept service on behalf of that defendant. (§ 416.90; see Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2011) ¶¶ 4:128 to 4:132, pp. 4–19 to 4–21; (rev. # 1, 2010) ¶ 4:184, p. 4–27 (rev. # 1, 2004) (hereafter Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial).) An authorized agent might include, for example, an attorney who has been expressly authorized to accept service, or a sheriff or jailer having custody of a prisoner. (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 4:128, p. 4–19, ¶¶ 4:130.2, 4:132, pp. 4–20 to 4–21.)

Another alternative available for serving individual defendants is what is commonly known as “substitute service.” Substitute service on an individual is accomplished by “leaving a copy of the summons and complaint **103 at the person's dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address ..., at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.” (§ 415.20, subd. (b).)

However, an individual may be served by substitute service only after a good faith effort at personal service has first been made: the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the summons and complaint “cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered” to the individual defendant. (§ 415.20, subd. (b); Evartt v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 795, 801, 152 Cal.Rptr. 836.) Two or three attempts to personally serve a defendant at a proper place ordinarily qualifies as “ ‘reasonable diligence.’ ” (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 4:196, p. 4–30.)

(American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 389.)

Thus, Defendant’s argument that service was improper because he was not personally served is unavailing.

Substituted Service – Usual Place of Business

The proof of service pertaining to Defendant, Yinming Liu, states that Defendant was substitute served at “314 E Garvey Ave Monterey Park, CA 91755.”

Further, Plaintiff’s proof of service checks a box for substituted service via business to “a person at least 18 years of age apparently in charge at the office or usual place of business of the person to be served.” The proof of service also indicates that the documents were left with “Jane Doe – Angela, refused last name (Gender: F Age: 35 Height : 6’0” Weight: 120 Race: Asian American Hair: Black Other: Hazel Eyes) Manager.”

Under CCP § 415.20(b), substitute service is effectuated when:

If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing.

(CCP § 415.20(b).)

Defendant appears to be arguing that substitute service was not proper under § 415.20(b) because he was not served at his “usual place of business,” and because service was not left with “a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address.”

Attached to the motion, the declaration of Defendant Yinming Liu is attached.

In relevant part, Liu’s declaration states:

2. Plaintiff Guisheng Xu, states that service of a Summons and Complaint was affected [sic] by substitute service on me on August 27, 2024. Plaintiff claims that substitute service was made by serving on one Jane Doe – “Angela” -- who refused to provide her last name, who held a position as a “Manager.” I do not know this individual nor do I have any personal or business relationship with her.

3. The address of 314 Garvey Avenue Monterey Park, CA 91755 is a small building with several businesses at that location, and it is not my place of business. The building does not have any front desk person or onsite management office. The corporate defendant First Stop Auto LLC is a dormant entity with no revenue, employees, or operations. It does not have any manager, employees, or representatives at that address.

4. I first became aware of this lawsuit on January 2, 2025, upon receipt of a WeChat message from defendant Fuzhou Liu. A review of the lawsuit revealed that it concerns a dispute concerning an unpaid loan of $50,000 between two individuals, Plaintiff and Mr. Fuzhou Liu. It has nothing to do with me as an individual or the corporate defendant, First Stop Auto LLC.

5. On February 4, 2025, I appeared at the Court and sought to express my position to the Court. The Court advised me that it cannot give me any legal advice and the only advice to me was to retain a lawyer to file a motion for relief. Accordingly, I have retained the law firm of WHGC, PLC to file this Motion.

(Liu Decl. ¶¶ 2-5.)

To the extent that Defendant is arguing that substitute service was not proper under § 415.20(b) because he was not served at his “usual place of business,” Defendant’s declaration appears to address this in ¶ 3 of the Liu declaration wherein Liu states, “The address of 314 Garvey Avenue Monterey Park, CA 91755 is a small building with several businesses at that location, and it is not my place of business.” (Liu Decl. ¶ 3.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Yinming Liu was in fact properly substitute served at his “usual place of business.” Plaintiff argues that Liu is making misrepresentations to the Court and that the 314 Garvey address is in fact Liu’s “usual place of business.”

To support this argument, Plaintiff attaches the declaration of Plaintiff’s attorney (Tom F.Y. King), along with Exhibits A-E cited in King’s declaration.

King states as follows:

2. In or about August 2024, I searched, downloaded, and printed a statement of information filed with California Secretary of State filed by Yinming Liu on behalf First Stop Auto LLC on August 13, 2024. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the statement of information I obtained from California Secretary of State website. It shows Yingming Liu as the CEO, member, manager, and agent for service of process of First Stop Auto LLC, located at 314 E Garvey Ave, Monterey Park, CA 91755.

3. Previously, before Yinming Liu filed the August 13, 2024 statement, I also searched and download a statement of information Yinming Liu filed with California Secretary of State the year before on July 5, 2023, which also shows Yinming Liu as the CEO, member, manager, and agent for service of process of First Stop Auto LLC located at 314 E Garvey Ave, Monterey Park, CA 91755. A true and correct copy of said statement is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

4. In January 2025, after the three individual defendants appeared in court to try to argue their case on January 16, 2025, I searched, found, and download from California Secretary of State website a statement of information filed by Yinming Liu on January 3, 2025 moving the company address to 797 E Arrow Hwy, Azusa, CA 91702, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C. I also found and downloaded a statement of information filed on January 16, 2025 by co-defendants Jiaqi Han moving the company address back to 314 E Garvey Ave, Monterey Park, CA 91755 and removing Yinming Liu's name from the company. A true and correct copy of said statement is attached hereto as Exhibit D.

5. As a result of the two successively filed statement of information First Stop Auto LLC filed with California Secretary of State in January 2025, all previously filed statement of information were purged from the public record. I inquired on this matter online and discovered that it is the policy of California Secretary of State to only keep the two most recently filed statement of information for an entity for public record. Attached hereto are search results from Google based on the search terms "California Secretary of State purging prior statement of information." The search result shows a general result followed by links to specific webpage results. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a page from the general search result and a specific search results from California Secretary of State website.

(King Decl. ¶¶ 2-5.)

However, even assuming the truth of King’s declaration and the attached exhibits, Plaintiff’s argument is not on point and appears to miss the mark.

For example, to the extent that the California Secretary of State lists Yinming Liu as manager, member, CEO, and agent for service of process at the 314 E Garvey address, that information is applicable to First Stop Auto LLC. That information says nothing about the Defendant as an individual that is filing the instant motion. The instant proof of service that Defendant is arguing is improper is the proof of service as to the individual, Yinming Liu. Yinming Liu is arguing that the 314 address is not his usual place of business. At best, the information attached from the California Secretary of State would maybe seem to indicate that Yinming Liu could accept service at the 314 E Garvey address for First Stop Auto LLC since he was listed as agent of service of process for First Stop Auto LLC. However, to reiterate, that information says nothing about where Yinming Liu, the individual’s usual place of business is. At best, it may show where First Stop Auto LLC’s usual place of business is. Ultimately, First Stop Auto LLC is not moving to vacate default/quash service of summons. Here, moving Defendant is Yinming Liu the individual.

At best, maybe the successive filings with the Secretary of State tests Liu’s credibility for changing the address of First Stop Auto LLC and changing the name of the agent for service of process. However, again, even assuming there were bad faith, the Court fails to see how Plaintiff’s arguments addresses the usual place of business of the moving Defendant, Yinming Liu, the individual.

Despite all this, in Defendant’s Reply Defendant confusingly argues that even if 314 E Garvey were Liu’s place of business, service was not proper because the crucial question is whether service was proper where Plaintiff served an unknown individual at a location that housed several other businesses where there is no indication that the individual ever informed Liu of service.

Therefore, the Court will hear argument from the parties about the “usual place of business” of Defendant.

Substituted Service – Person Apparently in Charge of his or her office, place of business

The proof of service pertaining to Defendant, Yinming Liu, states that Defendant was substitute served at “314 E Garvey Ave Monterey Park, CA 91755.”

Under CCP § 415.20(b), substitute service is effectuated when:

(CCP § 415.20(b).)

Defendant argues that the individual who was served on Defendant’s behalf is not an individual with whom Liu had any personal or business relationship.

Further, in relevant part, Liu’s declaration states:

2. Plaintiff Guisheng Xu, states that service of a Summons and Complaint was affected [sic]by substitute service on me on August 27, 2024. Plaintiff claims that substitute service was made by serving on one Jane Doe – “Angela” -- who refused to provide her last name, who held a position as a “Manager.” I do not know this individual nor do I have any personal or business relationship with her.

(Liu Decl. ¶¶ 2-5.)

Defendant’s argument – that the individual who was served on Defendant’s behalf is not an individual with whom Liu had any personal or business relationship – is confusing because it isn’t entirely clear what portion of § 415.20(b) Defendant is arguing that Plaintiff did not comply with.

Presumably, Defendant is trying to argue that “Jane Doe – Angela” was not “a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business,” and thus service was improper. Defendant’s declaration does not state that Jane Does/Angela was not “a person apparently in charge of his or her office or place of business” in any explicit terms. Instead, the Liu declaration states in relevant part, “I do not know this individual nor do I have any personal or business relationship with her.” (Liu Decl. ¶ 2.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff does not address Defendant’s argument regarding the individual that was allegedly served in any clear manner. Plaintiff’s Opposition seems to mainly contest that 314 E Garvey was in fact the usual place of business of Defendant. It seems like Plaintiff attempts to argue that Defendant is not credible based on the filing with the secretary of state because Defendant would know the people at the 314 E Garvey address because it is his address.

In Reply, Defendant argues that the key issue here is that Plaintiff served an unknown individual that housed several other businesses where there is no indication that the individual ever informed Liu of the service.

Here, the Court will hear argument. Defendant appears to be arguing, although not explicitly stated in Defendant’s motion or Defendant’s declaration, that “Jane Doe – Angela” was not a person apparently in charge of his or her office, or place of business. Opposition does not do much to contest this argument. Plaintiff’s Opposition seems to just be implying that Defendant would in fact know who Angela is because the 314 Garvey address is Defendant’s business. The Reply reiterates that Defendant has no idea who Angela is and that there is no evidence to suggest that she worked with or for Liu.

473.5

Under CCP § 473.5(a):

When service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered.

(CCP § 473.5(a).)

Defendant argues that the Summons and Complaint did not result in actual notice to Liu for Liu to defend the action.

However, the Court notes that neither party’s arguments regarding § 473.5 adds any further substance to their arguments. Plaintiff’s arguments that Defendant did in fact have notice are based on the same arguments previously discussed, i.e., Plaintiff argues that Defendant is lying and in fact had notice because Defendant is/was CEO of First Stop Auto LLC which is located at 314 E Garvey.

Overall

Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. states:

It has been held that the filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper. (M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Superior Court (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 762, 770 [145 Cal.Rptr. 814], quoting from Judicial Council Rep., supra, com. to § 417.10, p. 56; but see Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 243, 255, fn. 7 [211 Cal.Rptr. 517, 695 P.2d 1058], overruling Lowenstein on a related issue.) However, that presumption arises only if the proof of service complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.

(Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441-1442.)

Here, Defendant appears to have shown how Plaintiff’s proof of service as to moving Defendant did not comply with the statutory requirements for proof of substituted service. Defendant appears to have shown this by showing that the location served was not his usual place of business. Plaintiff’s argument in Opposition appeared to be unavailing because at best Plaintiff may have shown that the address served was First Stop Auto LLC’s usual place of business; however, First Stop Auto LLC is not seeking to vacate the default/default judgment. Here, moving Defendant is Yinming Liu. Plaintiff did not submit proof or evidence about Yinming Liu, the individual’s, usual place of business. Even setting aside the issue of “usual place of business” and focusing on whether or not a “person apparently in charge of his or her office or place of business” was served, Defendant seems to argue that he had no idea who the person is that Plaintiff served. In Opposition, Plaintiff simply seems to argue that Defendant is lying and Defendant would know who was served because the location served was where Defendant’s business was located.

Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. states, “In the absence of a voluntary submission to the authority of the court, compliance with the statutes governing service of process is essential to establish that court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant. When a defendant challenges that jurisdiction by bringing a motion to quash, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1439-1440.)

Tentatively, the Court plans to GRANT, Defendant Yinming Liu’s motion to vacate the default and default judgment entered against Yinming Liu. The Court notes that this order does not apply to the other Defendants, as no other Defendants moved to vacate default/judgment.

Case Number: 24NNCV03306 Hearing Date: May 28, 2025 Dept: E

Hearing Date: 05/28/2025 – 8:30am
Case No. 24NNCV03306
Trial Date: UNSET
Case Name: TUSH LAW LTD. v. AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.

TENTATIVE RULING ON MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES

BACKGROUND

Charmain Perez and Amber Perez were allegedly injured in an accident on February 3, 2020. (Compl. ¶ 7.) The alleged accident was allegedly caused by the negligence of Amica Mutual Insurance Company’s (Amica) insured, Elaine Y. Cheng.

Plaintiff in the instant action, Tush Law LTD, was retained by Charmain Perez and Amber Perez on February 3, 2020, to prosecute causes of action against Elaine Y. Cheng, who was insured on the date of the accident by Amica. (Compl. ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff, Tush Law LTD, alleges:

So that they could obtain necessary treatment for their injuries due to the accident, TUSH LAW LTD arranged for medical providers, to treat them on a medical lien basis, and to await settlement of the lawsuit for payment of the medical treatment. In the language of these liens, they directed their attorney to pay directly to the clinic and doctors sums due and owing for medical services, treatment and care, within 30 days of receiving the funds. Attorney Alan Turlington on behalf of TUSH LAW LTD signed these liens making TUSH LAW LTD legally responsible to numerous medical providers to withhold funds sufficient to satisfy the charges of the medical provider out of any funds representing settlement or verdict on the case.

(Compl. ¶ 8.)

Plaintiff alleges that on February 6, 2020, it sent a letter of representation to Amica. (Compl. ¶ 9.)

Plaintiff alleges that on November 30, 2020, Charmain Perez and Amber Perez retained a new attorney, Jacob Emrani. (Compl. ¶ 9.)

Plaintiff alleges that after receiving the notification of being substituted out, it sent Amica a letter providing notice of their lien. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that this notice of lien informed Amica that Tush Law LTD had a lien for attorney’s fees on any proceeds in payment of the claim, and that the name of Tush Law LTD must appear on any checks issued. (Id.)

Plaintiff, Tush Law LTD, alleges that Amica and its employees and attorneys devised and embarked upon a scheme to punish Tush Law LTD by not placing its name on the check as requested. (Compl. ¶ 10.)

Plaintiff alleges that Amica violated the known lien right of Tush Law LTD by issuing checks for Amber Perez and Charmain Perez directly to their new attorney without placing Tush Law LTD’s name on the check. (Compl. ¶ 11.)

Plaintiff named the following Defendants in this action – (1) Amica Mutual Insurance Company, (2) Samuel L. Glazier, (3) Craig M. Macisaac, and (4) Elaine Y. Cheng.

Plaintiff alleges that Glazier and Macisaac are the employees and claims representatives of Amica. (See Compl. ¶ 3.)

Plaintiff alleges that Elaine Y. Cheng is the negligent party in the underlying action of Charmain Perez and Amber Perez. (Compl. ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff, Tush Law LTD, in this action is former attorney of record for Charmain Perez and Amber Perez. (Compl. ¶ 1.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendants alleges cause of action for: (1) Breach of Attorney’s Lien, (2) Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, (3) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations, and (4) Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Relations.

On 2/11/2025, a Cross-Complaint was filed by Amica, Samuel L. Glazier, Craig M. Macisaac, and Elaine Y. Cheng (Cross-Complainants or Defendants).

The Cross-Complaint is alleged against Charmain Perez and Amber Perez.

Defendants/Cross-Complainants allege that Amber and Charmain Perez signed a document titled “Full Release of All Claims.” (Cross-Compl. ¶¶ 8-9.)

Cross-Complainants allege that per the terms of Amber’s release, Amica paid Amber and the Department of Health Care Services $15,000.00 on or about December 22, 2021. (Cross-Compl. ¶ 11.)

Cross-Complainants allege that per the terms of Charmain’s release, Amica paid Charmain and the Department of Health Care Services $50,000.00 on or about December 22, 2021. (Cross-Compl. ¶ 12.)

Cross-Complainants allege that Cross-Defendants (Perezes) breached the Amber and Charmain release agreements by failing to satisfy Plaintiff, Tush Law LTD’s, alleged liens on Cross-Defendants’ recovery with respect to the motor vehicle accident. (Cross-Compl. ¶ 19.)

Cross-Complainants’ Cross-Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Express Indemnity, (3) Equitable/Partial/Total Indemnity and Contribution, (4) Declaratory Relief re: Duty to Defend, and (5) Declaratory Relief re: Duty to Indemnify.

RELIEF REQUESTED

“Defendant SAMUEL L. GLAZIER (“Glazier”) will and hereby does move the Court for an order compelling Plaintiff TUSH LAW, LTD. (“Plaintiff”) to: (1) provide further responses to Requests for Production, Nos. 1-10 and 17-25, (2) comply with Plaintiff’s prior agreement to produce records in response to Requests for Production Nos. 3-10 and 15-25, and (3) produce a privilege log. This Motion shall be made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 on the grounds that Plaintiff provided responses that are inadequate, incomplete and evasive, asserted meritless objections, and failed to provide a privilege log. This motion is also made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.320, subdivision (a) on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to produce compliant documents in conformance with Plaintiff’s own statements.

This Motion is based on the Notice of Motion and Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Separate Statement of Items in Dispute, the Declaration of Richard J. Reese, Esq., and exhibits attached thereto, the records, pleadings, and files on record with the Court, and such other and further oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing on this Motion.”

(Def. Not. p. 2.)

PROCEDURAL – ALL MOTIONS

Moving Party: Defendant, Samuel L. Glazier

Responding Party: No opposition by Plaintiff, Tush Law LTD

Moving Papers: Notice; Memorandum; Separate Statement; Reese Decl.; Proposed Order; Proof of Service

Opposing Papers: No opposition by Plaintiff

Reply Papers: No Reply

NOTE: On 5/27/2025, Defendant/Movant, Samuel L. Glazier, submitted a notice of no-opposition and a proof of service. The proof of service of the notice of no-opposition faces the same service issue of the motion itself that the Court explains below.

Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300(c)): Ok

16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP § 1005(b)): Ok

Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a, § 1013b): Uncertain/No – On eCourt, Plaintiff’s counsel’s email address is listed as contact@tushlaw.com. However, Defendant did not serve the moving papers to contact@tushlaw.com. Instead, Defendant served Plaintiff’s counsel at the following email addresses: (1) alan@tushlaw.com; (2) service@tushlaw.com; (3) alondra@tushlaw.com; and (4) josh@tushlaw.com. The Court points out the email addresses that Defendant served because one of those email addresses is service@tushlaw.com. The Court notes that on the upper left caption of Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff listed its email address as service@tushlaw.com. The Court to hear argument because Defendant did not serve the email address that Plaintiff’s counsel listed on eCourt; however, Defendant did serve Plaintiff’s counsel at the email address that Plaintiff’s counsel listed on its Complaint.

Meet and Confer

“The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP § 2031.310(b)(2).)

Here, Defendant’s counsel (Richard J. Reese) alleges that a meet and confer occurred. (Reese Decl. ¶¶ 11-15.)

Defendant’s counsel states that the meet and confer letter is attached as Exhibit C, but no letter is attached.

45-Day Requirement

“Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand.” (CCP § 2031.310(c).)

Defendant’s counsel (Reese) does not address the 45-day requirement.

However, Reese states that Plaintiff, Tush Law LTD, served the instant responses on March 17, 2025. (Reese Decl., ¶ 10.)

Here, since the instant motion was allegedly served and filed on 4/23/2025, this motion appears timely.

LEGAL STANDARD – COMPEL FURTHER – REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

CCP § 2031.310(a) provides that a party demanding a document inspection may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if the demanding party deems that:

(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.

(CCP § 2031.310(a).)

Under CCP § 2031.310 (b)(1), “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Ibid.)

“In the more specific context of a demand for production of a tangible thing, the party who asks the trial court to compel production must show “good cause” for the request—but unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

TENTATIVE RULING

Movant should first plan to address the service issue that the Court pointed out.

Defendant moves for an order compelling Plaintiff to: (1) provide further responses to Requests for Production, Nos. 1-10 and 17-25, (2) comply with Plaintiff’s prior agreement to produce records in response to Requests for Production Nos. 3-10 and 15-25, and (3) produce a privilege log.

With respect to RFPs 1-10 and 17-25, Plaintiff’s responses either: (1) objected in full to the response, or (2) objected in part while simultaneously stating that Plaintiff will allow the request in part.

In the responses to RFPs 1-10 and 17-25, all of the responses at least contained objections based on attorney-client privilege and attorney work product.

With respect to asserting objections:

(a) If only part of an item or category of item in a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is objectionable, the response shall contain a statement of compliance, or a representation of inability to comply with respect to the remainder of that item or category.

(b) If the responding party objects to the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of an item or category of item, the response shall do both of the following:

(1) Identify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made.

(2) Set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted.

(c) (1) If an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log.

(2) It is the intent of the Legislature to codify the concept of a privilege log as that term is used in California case law. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to constitute a substantive change in case law.

(CCP § 2031.240(a)-(c).)

If Plaintiff plans to stand behind its objections, the Court orders Plaintiff to produce a privilege log under 2031.240(c)(1) for RFPs 1-10 and 17-25 so that the Court can evaluate the merits of Plaintiff’s objections. Further, if Plaintiff plans to stand behind its objections, Plaintiff is ordered to provide further responses that are compliant with 2031.240(b)(1).

With respect to Defendant’s request that Plaintiff “comply with Plaintiff’s prior agreement to produce records in response to Requests for Production Nos. 3-10 and 15-25,” the Court will hear argument.

With respect to 3-10 and 17-25, the Court is not entirely clear what Defendant wants the Court to do. As Defendant’s separate statement indicates, Plaintiff responded with responses that simultaneously objected while partially agreeing to produce documents.

However, Plaintiff’s responses do not indicate what documents are being objected to/withheld, and what documents are being produced.

How can the Court compel production of documents when it does not know what Plaintiff is agreeing to produce?

For 3-10 and 17-25, would it not be more appropriate for the Court to compel further responses, with a privilege log, in compliance with 2031.240, so the Court can evaluate Plaintiff’s objections and assess what documents Plaintiff is agreeing to produce and what documents Plaintiff is withholding?

With respect to 15 and 16, the Court first cites to the requests and the responses.

REQUEST NO. 15:

Produce all correspondence between your firm and The Law Offices of Jacob Emrani regarding the lien you claim to have asserted on Amber Perez’s recovery of damages from Elaine Cheng.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 15:

To the extent Responding Party understands this Request, Responding Party responds as follows: Responding Paty will allow this Request in full and produce all documents within its possession, custody, or control. Discovery is ongoing and Responding Party reserves the right to amend and/or supplement this response throughout this litigation.

REQUEST NO. 16:

Produce all correspondence between your firm and The Law Offices of Jacob Emrani regarding the lien you claim to have asserted on Amber Perez’s recovery of damages from Elaine Cheng.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 16:

“If a party filing a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling under Sections 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230, 2031.240, and 2031.280 thereafter fails to permit the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling in accordance with that party’s statement of compliance, the demanding party may move for an order compelling compliance.” (CCP § 2031.320(a).)

To the extent that Defendant seeks Plaintiff to produce records in response to RFPs 15 and 16, Plaintiff’s responses appear to be stating that Plaintiff will allow this request in full. Defendant cites to 2031.320(a) as a basis to produce compliant documents.

The Court to hear argument. It appears as if 2031.320(a) provides Defendant a basis to compel compliance. Plaintiff did not file opposition.

Sanctions

No sanctions were requested.

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