Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 24NNCV03723, Date: 2025-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NNCV03723    Hearing Date: April 11, 2025    Dept: E

Case No: 24NNCV03723
Hearing Date: 04/11/2025 – 8:30am

Trial Date: UNSET

Case Name: ARARAT GHAHRAMANYAN; AGHASI KHACHATRYAN v. JOSE GONZALEZ; and DOES 1-10, inclusive

[TENTATIVE RULING – MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE]

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, Ararat Ghahramanyan and Aghasi Khachatryan, filed the instant action against Defendant, Jose Gonzalez, on 8/21/2024.

Plaintiffs filed a form complaint that alleges one cause of action for motor vehicle negligence.

Defendant, Jose Gonzalez, filed an Answer on 12/19/2024.

With respect to the instant motion on hearing for 4/11/2025, Intervenor, Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company, moves this Court for leave to intervene.

RELIEF REQUESTED

“[I]ntervenor Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company ("Intervenor") will and hereby does move this Court for leave to intervene. A copy of Intervenor's proposed complaint in intervention is attached as Exhibit A to Rodrigo J. Bozoghlian's declaration.

This motion application is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 387 subdivision (a) on the grounds that Intervenor has a substantial interest in the outcome of this action as it may be bound by the judgment rendered in this matter and because certain issues and defenses may be waived if not raised by Intervenor in the pending action, the disposition of this action may impair or impede Intervenor's ability to litigate the merits of plaintiffs ARARAT GHAHRAMANYAN and AGHASI KHACHATRYAN ("plaintiffs") claims and to protect its own interests.

Significant evidence suggests that the automobile accident at the base of this action was orchestrated with possible involvement of Intervenor's insured, defendant JOSE GONZALEZ ("defendant.") Because allegations of defendant’s suspected fraudulent activity cannot be raised by the defendant's current attorney of record, only through intervention can Intervenor protect its interests. Intervenor risks being bound by the judgment against its insured defendant, yet, without intervention, has no way to introduce evidence of defendant's collusion to stage an automobile accident in order to recover insurance money.

This motion is based on this Notice, on the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, the declaration of Rodrigo J. Bozoghlian, the pleadings and records on file herein and upon such further documents, evidence and argument as may be before the Court at the time of the hearing on this application. Intervenor respectfully requests that this Court take judicial notice of its entire file pursuant to Evidence Code Sections 451 and 452.”

(Int. Mot., p. 1-2.)

PROCEDURAL

Moving Party: Intervenor, Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company

Responding Party: Plaintiffs, Ararat Ghahramanyan and Aghasi Khachatryan

Moving Papers: Notice/Motion; Proposed Order

Opposition Papers: Opposition submitted by Plaintiffs. No Opposition submitted by Defendant.

Reply Papers: No Reply submitted.

PROCEDURAL
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300): Ok

16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP § 1005(b)): Ok

Proper Address (CCP §1013, §1013a, §1013b): Intervenor’s proof of service for this motion lists service via electronic service. As to Intervenor’s service on Defendant’s counsel, Intervenor appears to have served the proper email address, as Intervenor served the email address that the Court sees on file for eCourt. However, the Court notes that Defendant did not file an Opposition. As to Intervenor’s service on Plaintiffs’ counsel, Intervenor allegedly served nkohan@kbtriallawyers.com; however, eCourt lists Plaintiffs’ counsel’s email address as nkohan@dkblawyers.com. Although Intervenor did not serve Plaintiffs’ counsel at the email address listed on eCourt, Plaintiffs submitted an Opposition; therefore, Plaintiffs clearly received this motion. At the hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel should address what is the proper e-service address for Plaintiffs’ counsel.

ANALYSIS

Untimely Opposition

“All papers opposing a motion so noticed shall be filed with the court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days, and all reply papers at least five court days before the hearing.” (CCP § 1005(b).)

The last day for Plaintiffs to file an Opposition was Friday, March 28, 2025. Here, Plaintiffs filed their Opposition on 4/4/2025. Plaintiffs’ Opposition is thus untimely.

Likewise, no reply has been submitted by Intervenor as of 4/7/2025. Intervenor’s Reply would have been due by 4/4/2025.

It is possible Intervenor has not yet submitted a Reply because Plaintiffs submitted an untimely Opposition.

The Court will utilize its discretion and consider Plaintiffs’ untimely Opposition.

Statutory – CCP § 387
Intervenor bases the legal authority for its motion to intervene on both CCP § 387 and case law.

Neither Intervenor, nor Plaintiffs, present their arguments in the context of CCP § 387 in any clear or explicit manner.

Under CCP § 387(b)-(d):

(b) An intervention takes place when a nonparty, deemed an intervenor, becomes a party to an action or proceeding between other persons by doing any of the following:

(1) Joining a plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint.
(2) Uniting with a defendant in resisting the claims of a plaintiff.
(3) Demanding anything adverse to both a plaintiff and a defendant.

(c) A nonparty shall petition the court for leave to intervene by noticed motion or ex parte application. The petition shall include a copy of the proposed complaint in intervention or answer in intervention and set forth the grounds upon which intervention rests.

(d) (1) The court shall, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if either of the following conditions is satisfied:

(A) A provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene.

(B) The person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest, unless that person’s interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties.

(2) The court may, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if the person has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.

(CCP § 387(b)-(d).)

Generally speaking, Intervenor argues that intervention is appropriate because: (1) Intervenor is the insurer of Defendant; (2) Intervenor seeks intervention to protect its interests because it may be bound by the judgment rendered against insured Defendant; (3) Intervenor believes there is strong indications of fraud and collusion between Plaintiffs and Defendant/insured Jose Gonzalez because Intervenor alleges it has compelling evidence that the automobile accident was staged; (4) Counsel for Defendant cannot adequately protect Intervenor’s interests because Defendant’s counsel is ethically bound from alleging fraud and collusion by his own client; and (5) Without intervention, it is likely that Defendant’s own statements evidencing fraud will not be introduced at trial.

Generally speaking, Plaintiffs argue that intervention is not appropriate because: (1) Intervention will enlarge the issues in this case; (2) Intervention will cause extensive law and motion regarding discovery issues associated with Empire Fire contending that its evidence of fraud is protected by the work product privilege including the depositions of the individuals/claims personnel from Empire Fire who took those statements from Defendant; (3) Intervenor’s supporting case law is inapposite to the facts of this case; and (4) Opposition by Plaintiffs outweigh the reasons for intervention.

Discussion – Statutory– CCP § 387

As the Court previously stated, neither party explicitly addresses how Intervenor did or did not meet the requirements under CCP § 387.

In Intervenor’s motion, Intervenor’s counsel, Rodrigo Bozoghlian, attaches a declaration that states:

1. I am an attorney at law licensed to practice before all the courts of the State of California. I am a partner in the law firm of Lagasse, Branch, Bell & Kinkead, attorneys of record for Intervenor Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company ("Intervenor") in this action. I am completely familiar with the facts, pleadings and records in this action, and if called upon to testify I could and would competently testify based on information and belief.

2. The Complaint alleges that plaintiffs were injured in an automobile accident with defendant that occurred on March 3, 2024, on the 170 freeway on ramp from Vanowen Street in North Hollywood California.

3. The plaintiffs claim they were inside their 2022 Mercedez Benz E-Class E350 RWD at the Sherman Way entrance to 170 North Highway in North Hollywood, and that defendant rear-ended them.

4. The parties did not report injuries at the scene and neither police nor first responders were called.

5. Defendant's vehicle had been rented the day of the accident, the accident occurred just hours after the rental, and defendant obtained a high liability limits policy for the rental vehicle most likely inconsistent with his employment, income, and/or lifestyle for someone who claimed not to have a place of permanent residence at the time.

6. Defendant’s version of the accident and his activities on the date of the accident were contradictory and very suspect and he refused to provide corroborating information for his whereabouts and people that would corroborate his story.

7. Both vehicles involved in the accident had their Event Data Recorders (“EDR”) downloaded and the data contradicted the defendant’s version of the facts of the accident, including speeds and the parties activities at the moment of impact. The defendant could not explain the discrepancies in his version of the events and the EDR data.

8. If the present application is not granted, Intervenor will be unduly prejudiced as defendant’s counsel cannot properly represent both defendant and Intervenor. Therefore, the Court should grant intervenor’s leave to intervene and to file its Complaint in intervention pursuant to this motion.

9. A true and correct copy of Intervenor’s Complaint in Intervention is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

(Bozoghlian Decl. ¶¶ 1-9.)

Generally speaking, it appears as if Intervenor meets the requirements of CCP § 387(d)(1)(B) and 387(d)(1)(2). However, the Court will hear argument because technically the Bozoghlian Declaration does not state that Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company insures the Defendant in this action. The motion appears to strongly imply this, but the Bozoghlian Declaration does not explicitly state this.

Further, Intervenor appears to have satisfied CCP § 387(c) by filing the proposed complaint in intervention with this motion in Exhibit A.

Case Law – 4 Requirements
Both parties cite the same case law standard for intervention:

Pursuant to section 387 the trial court has discretion to permit a nonparty to intervene where the following factors are met: (1) the proper procedures have been followed; (2) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the action; (3) the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation; and (4) the reasons for the intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action.

(Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th  383, 386 citing Truck Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 342, 346.)

Despite Intervenor citing the four requirements above, Intervenor does not explain in any clear manner how it met each of the four requirements.

Based on the Court’s reading of the four requirements, if Intervenor addresses the defect the Court previously pointed out with respect to the Bozoghlian Declaration, it appears as if Intervenor at least met requirements (1) and (2). 

As to requirement (3), Plaintiffs contest Intervenor’s argument that the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation.

In Opposition, Plaintiffs argue:

This matter is a motor vehicle versus motor vehicle car crash with one cause of action for negligence. The issues are limited to liability, damages and comparative fault, if any. Now, Empire Fire seeks to significantly enlarge the issues by including claims for fraud and collusion by both Plaintiffs and Defendants. This requires a heightened pleading standard, more than doubling the length of the verdict form and significantly increasing the amount of jury instructions. Additionally, it will either require the jury to hear about the existence of liability insurance or an utterly confusing trial with a lawyer making arguments against both the Plaintiffs and Defendant but not knowing the name of their client because they do not want the jury to know the existence of liability insurance. There will be discovery issues with respect to the “purported evidence” that Empire Fire refuses to disclose yet relies on in the Motion and the depositions of the claims personnel who took the various statements. Expert discovery will also increase as Empire Fire will undoubtedly need its own experts if it is arguing that both Plaintiffs and Defendant committed fraud against Empire Fire. In fact, Empire Fire admits the issues will be enlarged when it argues that if “intervention is not permitted, another [coverage] lawsuit will likely result.” If the issues are not enlarged by intervention, Plaintiffs are befuddled why another lawsuit allegedly declaratory relief regarding coverage for this loss would be necessary.

(Pl. Oppo. p. 4.)

Intervenor also does not appear to address requirement (4). As to requirement (4), Plaintiffs argue that (4) has not been satisfied because:

Similarly, the reasons for intervention are greatly outweighed by Plaintiffs’ Opposition. Empire Fire purportedly wants to protect itself from paying on a judgment involving fraud. However, nowhere in the Motion does it state why that can only be accomplished by intervention. As provided in more detail below, the real reason for Empire Fire’s intervention is pre-suit discovery for its declaratory relief action without having to disclose any of its purported evidence as it will contend that the claims file remains work product in this action. Stated differently, Empire Fire’s purpose for intervention is to get an unfair advantage in the subsequent declaratory relief action regarding coverage by conducting discovery against Plaintiffs regarding alleged fraud while at the same time refusing to disclose the basis for the fraud on the grounds that the claims file is protected under the work product privilege. This nefarious plan should not be countenanced by the Court.

On the other hand, Plaintiffs oppose the intervention so it does not have to litigate a fraud cause of action against an insurance company with an inability to conduct discovery against the party alleging the fraud while at the same time prosecuting its negligence claim against an entirely different party. This would increase both time and expense for the Plaintiffs including additional depositions of both fact and expert witnesses and the retention of experts. It would also significantly increase the issues at trial causing additional time and expense. If not allowed to intervene, Empire Fire is still able to assert its fraud and collusion claims in a declaratory relief action and suffers zero prejudice just like all insurance companies do in every case where they want to disclaim coverage in pending litigation.

(Pl. Oppo. p. 4-5.)

Discussion – Case Law – 4 Requirements
With respect to the four requirements set out in the case law as to when intervention is appropriate, the Court will hear argument.

As the Court previously stated, if Intervenor addresses the defect the Court previously pointed out with respect to the Bozoghlian Declaration, it appears as if Intervenor at least met requirements (1) and (2). 

With respect to requirement (3), the Court notes that this requirement makes littles sense to the Court, as it is difficult to foresee an instance where adding an Intervenor wouldn’t enlarge the issues in the litigation. Likewise, as a practical matter, this requirement makes little sense to the Court because Intervenor seeks to intervene because it can potentially be bound by the judgement against its Insured/Defendant.

The Court will also hear argument on requirement (4), as Intervenor did not address that requirement.

Overall, the Court notes that even if Intervenor did not meet all (4) of the case law requirements, the practical reason for Intervenor’s intent to intervene seems obvious.

Further, the Court points out that with respect to the (4) requirements that both parties cite, that standard comes from Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th  383, 386 citing Truck Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 342, 346. The Court notes that when Truck Ins. Exchange first cited that standard, Truck Ins. Exchange cited the 1997 version of The Weil & Brown Ruter Guide. Therefore, to this Court, it isn’t entirely convinced that the four requirements cited in the case law trumps the standard explicitly laid out in CCP § 387(b)-(d).

The Court to hear argument.

Fraud Case Law
Intervenor argues as follows:

Intervenor must be permitted to intervene where there is evidence of fraud and collusion between the plaintiffs and defendant. (Zander, supra, 259 Cal.App.2d at 805. See also Kobernick v. Shaw (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 914, 918-919). Zander involved an action for breach of an oral insurance binder with issues of fraud and collusion. The court emphasized the necessity of a timely intervention by the insurer, stating:

Fraud arising during a personal injury action perpetrated by a plaintiff and a defendant insured might be, if we must apply an adjective, either ‘extrinsic’ or ‘intrinsic.’ If one assumes skullduggery between the two conspiring to permit plaintiff to obtain a judgment upon a fictitious litigated claim, then the right of the insurer to attack the fraud would depend upon when it had notice of the collusion. If it had notice before the judgment, it could intervene to thwart the nefarious scheme while the original action was still pending and might be barred from collateral attack later if it did not do so. (Id. at 805.)

In the case at bar, there is ample evidence of “skullduggery” between plaintiffs and defendant. Intervenor alone is in the position to raise the issues of fraud and collusion. Intervenor is also the entity that will be bound by any judgment awarded to the parties. Intervenor must, therefore, be allowed to intervene in order to prevent the plaintiff from falsely obtaining a judgment against the defendant, which Intervenor will be responsible for paying.

(Int. Mot. p. 6-7.)

In Opposition, Plaintiffs argue:

Empire Fire’s reliance on Zander v. Casualty Insurance Company of California (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 793 is entirely misplaced. In Zander, the insurance company initially provided a defense in an underlying personal injury case. Early on in the litigation, the insurance company repudiated coverage and refused to pay defense counsel’s fees and costs. In order to proceed on the bad faith case, the plaintiff and defendant agreed to allow plaintiff to take a default judgment against the defendant for $21,590.18, and a covenant not to execute on the judgment in exchange for an assignment of the bad faith rights. In its affirmative defenses in that bad faith case, the insurance company asserted fraud and collusion, against the plaintiff and defendant by entering into that agreement. Id. at 797-802. In denying the insurance company’s appeal from the bad faith judgment, the Court’s analysis was focused on the insurance company repudiating coverage and refusing to pay for defense counsel while at the same time knowing that the alleged fraud took place. The Court reasoned that the insurance company could not just sit back with knowledge of the fraud and do nothing, then later attempt to use that fraud as means to not be bound by the underlying judgment. Id. at 804-806. Most importantly, the Court came to the “inevitable conclusion [that the insurance company] had no evidence of fraud [and] no evidence of collusion.” Id. at 807.

Here, unlike Zander, Empire Fire is still providing defense counsel and, through the tripartite relationship, is actively involved in litigation. In fact, the “intervention” Empire Fire relies on from the opinion is not intervention pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 387(a). Rather, it is intervention in the nonlegal sense of not providing coverage and a defense in the underlying matter. Glaringly missing from the opinion is any reference to the insurance company “intervening” as a party in the underlying litigation like Empire Fire is attempting to do here. Moreover, unlike Zander, there is no bad faith case. In short, Zander does not provide the basis for “intervention” when an insurance company is alleging fraud or collusion. If Empire Fire wants to allege fraud, it should file its own declaratory relief action that subjects it to discovery rather than attempting to circumvent those rules by intervening in the underlying personal injury matter.

(Pl. Oppo. p. 5-6.)

Discussion – Fraud Case Law
With respect to the fraud case law that the parties referred to, neither party’s arguments are particularly helpful. None of the fraud cases are directly on point with respect to a motion to intervene; therefore, the Court fails to see how the parties’ arguments with respect to the fraud case law helps or hurts either party.

Discussion – Gray v. Begley
Intervenor argues that a judgment entered against Defendant could potentially obligate Intervenor within the provisions of the automobile policy it issued to Defendant. Intervenor argues that as Defendant’s insurer, Intervenor’s interests will be impaired and prejudiced by the adverse disposition of this action; therefore, Intervenor must be allowed to intervene to protect its interests within the meaning of CCP § 387.

Intervenor cites to Gray v. Begley (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1522 to support its argument.

Under Gray v. Begley:

It is undisputed that if the insurer admits coverage, the insurer clearly has a direct and immediate interest in the outcome of the action against its insured, and therefore may intervene. “An insurer's right to intervene in an action against the insured, for personal injury or property damage, arises as a result of Insurance Code section 11580. Section 11580 provides that a judgment creditor may proceed directly against any liability insurance covering the defendant, and obtain satisfaction of the judgment up to the amount of the policy limits. [Citation.] Thus, where the insurer may¹⁷ be subject to a direct action under Insurance Code section 11580 by a judgment creditor who has or will obtain a default judgment in a third party action against the insured, intervention is appropriate. [Citation.]” (Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383, 386–387, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 807.)

[Footnote 17 states: The use of the word “may” in this context has been the cause of considerable confusion. An insurer denying coverage and refusing to provide a defense may ultimately be subject to a direct action, but such possible liability is insufficiently immediate to justify intervention. (Hinton v. Beck (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1385, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 612.) We believe the court's use of the phrase “where the insurer may be subject to a direct action” is not meant to refer to those situations in which there is nothing more than a theoretical possibility that a direct action might be brought against the insurer.]

It is also undisputed that if the insurer denies coverage and refuses to provide a defense, the insurer “does not have a direct interest in the litigation between the plaintiff and the insured to warrant intervention. The rationale behind this rule is that by its denial, the insurer has lost its right to control the litigation.” (Hinton v. Beck, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1384, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 612.) When an insurer refuses to defend, it may be bound by a default judgment against its insured ( *1523 Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 883–884, 151 Cal.Rptr. 285, 587 P.2d 1098), or a reasonable, non-collusive settlement reached by its insured with the claimant (Hamilton v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 718, 728, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 318, 41 P.3d 128 **740 (Hamilton )). “An insurer that has received notice of the action against its insured but refuses to defend will be bound by the resulting judgment on all issues material to liability, in the absence of fraud or collusion.” (Tomassi v. Scarff (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1058, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 750, emphasis omitted.) “ ‘In effect, when the insured tenders the suit, the carrier is receiving its chance to be heard. Having rejected the opportunity and waived the chance to contest liability, it cannot reach back for due process to void a deal the insured has entered to eliminate personal liability.’ ” (Hamilton, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 728, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 318, 41 P.3d 128.)

(Gray v. Begley (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1522-1523.)

With respect to Gray v. Begley, the Court will hear argument. Plaintiffs’ Opposition does not address this case.

Discussion – Pre-Hearing Meet and Confer
In Opposition, Plaintiffs argue:

Upon receipt of the instant Motion, Plaintiffs’ Counsel attempted to meet and confer regarding Empire Fire’s intervention. Plaintiffs’ Counsel asked for the underlying evidence that forms the basis for the alleged fraud. Counsel for Empire Fire refused and also refused to state whether the underlying evidence would be produced in discovery. Plaintiffs’ Counsel then offered to stipulate to Empire Fire’s Intervention if Empire Fire agreed to produce that evidence. Counsel for Empire Fire said he would talk to his client and get back to Plaintiffs’ Counsel. As of the date of this Opposition, there was no further communication from Counsel for Empire Fire.

It is clear that Empire Fire’s plan is to intervene in this matter and conduct discovery while hiding behind the work-product privilege and never produce any evidence regarding the alleged fraud. This will give it unilateral and pre-discovery for its declaratory relief action. This is unjust, unfair and unlawful. This nefarious plan should not be countenanced by the Court. Plaintiffs’ Counsel offer remains—it will agree to Empire Fire’s intervention in this matter if: (1) it immediately produces all of its evidence of fraud; (2) agrees to stay in this case through verdict or settlement, whichever comes first and (3) agrees to not file a declaratory relief action until after a verdict in this matter. If Empire Fire does not agree, then its nefarious intent behind intervention should be crystal clear.

(Pl. Oppo. p. 6-7.)

Here, the Court does not understand what Plaintiffs are trying to argue. The Court to hear argument.

TENTATIVE RULING

Overall, if Intervenor can cure its moving declaration, it appears to this Court that Intervenor satisfied the requirements of CCP § 387(b)-(d). The Court to hear argument on this issue.

The Court will hear argument about the four requirements laid out in the case law about when intervention is appropriate. Plaintiffs appear to be correct that the intervention will enlarge the issues in this case, but the Court struggles to understand the third requirement because Intervenor is clearly intervening to protect its interests.  

Further, the Court points out that with respect to the (4) requirements that both parties cite, that standard comes from Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th  383, 386 citing Truck Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 342, 346. The Court notes that when Truck Ins. Exchange first cited that standard with the four requirements, Truck Ins. Exchange cited the 1997 version of The Weil & Brown Ruter Guide. Therefore, to this Court, it isn’t entirely convinced that the four requirements cited in the case law trumps the standard explicitly laid out in CCP § 387(b)-(d).

The discussion by both parties regarding the fraud case law doesn’t seem to help or hurt either party.

The Court to hear argument about Gray v. Begley.

The Court to hear argument about the pre-hearing meet and confer.

If this Court were to grant leave to intervene, the Court points Intervenor’s attention to 387(e).

Under CCP § 387(e):

(e) If leave to intervene is granted by the court, the intervenor shall do both of the following:

(1) Separately file the complaint in intervention, answer in intervention, or both.

(2) Serve a copy of the order, or notice of the court’s decision or order, granting leave to intervene and the pleadings in intervention as follows:

(A) A party to the action or proceeding who has not yet appeared shall be served in the same manner for service of summons pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 415.10) of Chapter 4 of Title 5 of Part 2.

(B) A party who has appeared in the action or proceeding, whether represented by an attorney or not represented by an attorney, shall be served in the same manner for service of summons pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 415.10) of Chapter 4 of Title 5 of Part 2, or in the manner provided by Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1010) of Title 14 of Part 2.

(CCP § 387(e).)