Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case Number: 24NNCV03980, Date: 2025-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 24NNCV03980, Date: 2025-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NNCV03980 Hearing Date: January 30, 2025 Dept: E

Case No: 24NNCV03980
Hearing Date: 1/30/2025 – 8:30am

Trial Date: UNSET

Case Name: KEVIN MEDINA, Individually and as Successor-in-Interest to THE ESTATE OF LEYDA MEDINA v. OLEG BOCHAROV, an Individual; and DOES 1-50 inclusive

TENTATIVE RULING ON MOTION TO STRIKE

Moving Party: Defendant, Oleg Bocharov

Responding Party: Plaintiff, Kevin Medina

Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300(c)): Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP § 1005(b)): Ok
Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a, § 1013b): Ok

Moving Papers: Notice/Motion

Opposition Papers: Opposition

Reply Papers: Reply

RELIEF REQUESTED
“[D]efendant OLEG BOCHAROV (“Defendant”) will and hereby does move this Court, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sections 435, 436 and 437, for an Order to strike portions of Plaintiffs’ September 4, 2024 Complaint, as follows:

(1) Complaint, p. 6, Paragraph 26: “Further, Plaintiff, as Successor-in-Interest to THE ESTATE OF LEYDA MEDINA, seek punitive damages against Defendant OLEG BOCHAROV according to California Code of Civil Procedure § 3294 because Defendant OLEG BOCHAROV acted Oppressively and with Malice according to his despicable conduct which showed a willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of DECDENT. This despicable conduct included, but is not limited, to Defendant OLEG BOCHAROV fleeing the scene after striking DECEDENT with his vehicle instead of calling emergency services right away to assist in the life-saving of DECEDENT Defendant OLEG BOCHAROV was subsequently arrested on August20th, 2024, for Felony hit and run after authorities were made to search for him after he fled the scene.”; and,

(2) Complaint, p. 7, Prayer for Relief Sub-Paragraph 5: “For punitive damages, according to proof.”

The portions of the Complaint that Defendant seeks to strike, above, are improper as they do not meet the necessary standards for punitive damages allegations, as addressed further in the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities. [Code Civ. Proc. § 476(a) & (b).]”

(Def. Mot. p. 1-2.)

PROCEDURAL
Meet and Confer
Before filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike. If an amended pleading is filed, the responding party shall meet and confer again with the party who filed the amended pleading before filing a motion to strike the amended pleading. (CCP § 435.5(a).)

“A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike.” (CCP § 435.5(a)(4).)

Here, Defendant’s counsel alleges that a meet and confer occurred; however, Defendant’s counsel states that the meet and confer effort was unsuccessful because Plaintiff’s counsel did not agree to strike the request for punitive damages. (Capps Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.)

Legal Standard Motion to Strike
The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).) A motion to strike cannot be based upon the grounds that a complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, but instead is properly based on grounds of superfluous or abusive allegations, or improprieties in form or procedure. (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528-29.)

The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code. Civ. Proc. § 437; Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63 [“judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth”].)

Further, CCP § 431.10(a)-(c) states as follows:

(a) A material allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defense and which could not be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient as to that claim or defense.

(b) An immaterial allegation in a pleading is any of the following:

(1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense.

(2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense.

(3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.

(CCP § 431.10(a)-(c).)

TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to allege specific facts that demonstrate that Defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud to support a claim for punitive damages.

Punitive Damages
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example by way of punishing the defendant. (Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a).)

“‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (CCP § 3294(c)(1).)

“‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (CCP § 3294(c)(2).)

“‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (CCP § 3294(c)(3).)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1255.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Sup. Ct. (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.)

Further as stated in Monge v. Superior Court, which helps explain the case law behind alleging punitive damages:

In determining whether a complaint states facts sufficient to sustain punitive damages, the challenged allegations must be read in context with the other facts alleged in the complaint. Further, even though certain language pleads ultimate facts or conclusions of law, such language when read in context with the facts alleged as to defendants' conduct may adequately plead the evil motive requisite to recovery of punitive damages. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6–7, 172 Cal.Rptr. 427.)

Perkins provides the highly pertinent example of this standard in the context of a motion to strike punitive damage allegations. There the complaint alleged that defendants “wrongfully and intentionally” invaded plaintiff's privacy and terminated his telephone service “in retaliation” for prior complaints lodged by plaintiff. The complaint also generally alleged that defendants were guilty of “oppression, fraud and malice.” Perkins read the complaint as a whole and held that the alleged conclusions of fact or law considered in the context of alleged wrongful conduct “in retaliation” pleaded an evil injurious motive sufficient **68 to establish malice and sustain a plea for punitive damages.

In G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 27–32, 122 Cal.Rptr. 218, it was pointed out that there exists an uncertainty in the case law as to just what terms adequately describe the necessary elements of “oppression, fraud or malice” under Civil Code section 3294. Searle suggests that different types of injurious conduct allow different formulations in pleading oppression or malice, but that the critical element is an “evil motive” of the defendant. (Id., at pp. 29–31, 122 Cal.Rptr. 218.)

*511 The meanings of “oppression” and “malice” with regard to Civil Code section 3294 are explained in Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 232, 245–246, 102 Cal.Rptr. 547. “Malice” means a wrongful intent to vex or annoy. “Oppression” means “subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of his rights.” Malice and oppression may be inferred from the circumstances of a defendant's conduct.

(Monge v. Superior Court (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 503, 510-11.)

Although Defendant argues that Plaintiff only pled conclusory allegations and that these allegations cannot support an award for punitive damages, the Court does not find Defendant’s arguments availing.

In relevant part of Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff alleged:

On August 16^th, 2024 at approximately 7:00PM, Decedent was crossing the street in a marked crosswalk while the indicators told her it was safe to do so between Victory Blvd. and Beck Ave. in the City of Los Angeles, CA. At the same time, Defendant OLEG BOCHAROV was hastily traveling westbound on Victory Blvd. Defendant ran the red light and struck DECEDENT as she was lawfully crossing. DECEDENT’s body was thrown from the impact. Defendant OLEG BOCHAROV fled the scene and abandoned his vehicle near Victory Blvd and Troost Ave. DECEDENT passed away at the scene and was taken to Providence Holy Cross where she was officially pronounced dead.

…

Further, Plaintiff, as Successor-in-Interest to THE ESTATE OF LEYDA MEDINA, seek punitive damages against Defendant OLEG BOCHAROV according to California Code of Civil Procedure § 3294 because Defendant OLEG BOCHAROV acted Oppressively and with Malice according to his despicable conduct which showed a willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of DECDENT. This despicable conduct included, but is not limited, to Defendant OLEG BOCHAROV fleeing the scene after striking DECEDENT with his vehicle instead of calling emergency services right away to assist in the life-saving of DECEDENT Defendant OLEG BOCHAROV was subsequently arrested on August 20th, 2024, for Felony hit and run after authorities were made to search for him after he fled the scene.

(Compl. ¶ 18 & 26.)

Although Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations are merely conclusory and that the Complaint fails to plead facts to support an award for punitive damages, the Court does not find Defendant’s arguments availing.

When reading the Complaint as a whole, Plaintiff pled specific facts that could potentially lead a jury to find oppression and/or malice. The Court reminds Defendant that this case is still at the pleading stage. “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)

Defendant’s motion to strike ¶ 26 in the Complaint and ¶ 5 in the Prayer for Relief is DENIED.