Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 24NNCV04776, Date: 2025-02-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24NNCV04776 Hearing Date: February 28, 2025 Dept: E
Hearing Date: 02/28/2025 – 8:30am
Case No: 24NNCV04776
Trial Date: UNSET
Case Name: JESSE MORONES, individually, and on behalf of other aggrieved
employees pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act v. LAWRENCE EQUIPMENT, INC., a California
corporation; and DOES 1-100, inclusive
TENTATIVE
RULING ON MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
PROCEDURAL
Moving Party: Defendant, Lawrence Equipment, Inc.
(Defendant, Movant, or LEI)
Responding Party: Plaintiff, Jesse Morones
Moving Papers: Notice; Memorandum; Matthew Lawrence
Declaration; Jason C. Ross Declaration
Opposing Papers: Opposition; Arman Marukyan
Declaration; Proof of Service;
Reply Papers: Reply; Supplemental Matthew Lawrence
Declaration; Alan N. Goldberg Declaration
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300(c)): Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP § 1005(b)): Ok
Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a, § 1013b): Ok
RELIEF REQUESTED
Defendant moves this
Court for an order: (1) Compelling Plaintiff’s, Jesse Morones, individual PAGA
claim to arbitration; (2) Staying the instant action pending a ruling on
Defendant’s motion; and (3) Staying the remaining representative PAGA action in
court pending completion of arbitration.
Defendant’s motion is
made pursuant to: (1) CCP § 1280 et seq.; (2) 9 U.S.C. § 2; (3) Grounds that
the arbitration agreement signed and entered between the parties compels the parties
to arbitrate all individual claims and controversies related to Plaintiff's
employment, including Plaintiff's individual PAGA claim; (4) and Viking
River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 142 S.Ct. 1906.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Jesse Morones,
filed the instant action on 10/2/2024. Plaintiff brings this action
individually, and on behalf of other aggrieved employees, pursuant to the
California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), California Labor Code § 2698, et
seq. Plaintiff alleges that he was employed by Defendant from August 2023 –
January 2024 as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee. Plaintiff alleges
several violations of the California Labor Code, such as failure to pay overtime,
failure to provide meal periods, failure to provide rest periods, and failure
to pay minimum wages, among many other violations.
Defendant’s motion seeks
to compel Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim to arbitration and stay the
remaining representative PAGA claims in court pending completion of
arbitration.
ANALYSIS
Code
of Civil Procedure § 1281.2, governing orders to arbitrate controversies,
provides in pertinent part:
On petition of a party to an arbitration
agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a
controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that
controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to
arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the
controversy exists, unless it determines that:
(a) The right to compel arbitration
has been waived by the petitioner; or
(b) Grounds exist for rescission of
the agreement.
(CCP § 1281.2(a)-(b).)
The party seeking
arbitration bears the initial burden of demonstrating the existence of an
arbitration agreement. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market
Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.) In ruling on a
motion to compel arbitration, the Court must first determine whether the
parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute, and general principles of
California contract law help guide the court in making this determination. (Mendez
v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541; Victoria
v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 734, 835.) Once the Court concludes an
arbitration agreement exists, it must then consider whether the agreement
covers the claims at issue. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th
966, 960.) Even when the FAA applies, “interpretation of the arbitration
agreement is governed by state law principles.” (Hotels Nevada, LLC v.
Bridge Banc, LLC (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435.)
Defendant submits the
declaration of Matthew Lawrence, an individual presently employed by LEI as Human
Resources Manager, and who was employed in the same capacity during Plaintiff’s
employment from August 11, 2023 – January 18, 2024. (Lawrence Decl. ¶ 3.) Lawrence
attests to personal knowledge of LEI’s business and employment records. (Id.
at ¶ 4.) Lawrence submits the Mutual Arbitration Policy Agreement as Exhibit A
to his declaration that Plaintiff electronically signed on 8/9/2023. (Id.
at ¶ 7, Ex. A.)
In relevant part of the Mutual
Arbitration Policy Agreement, it provides:
…[A]ll disputes regarding your employment
with the Company, or the termination of your employment, will be subject to
final and binding arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq…
In the event of any dispute or claim
relating to or arising out of an employment relationship with Company
(including, but not limited to, any claims of breach of contract, wage and hour
claims, including overtime and meal and rest break claims, wrongfultermination,
or age, sex, race, or other discrimination or harassment under any state or
federal statute or common law,) Employee and Company agree that all such
disputes and claims shall be fully and finally resolved by binding arbitration…
(Lawrence Decl., Ex. A.
p. 1.)
Further, Defendant
explains how under Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U.S. 639
(2022) and Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, the
FAA allows for division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual
(representative) claims through an agreement to arbitrate, and how a plaintiff
who files a PAGA action with individual and non-individual claims does not lose
standing to litigate the non-individual claims in court simply because the
individual claims have been ordered to arbitration.
Therefore here, Defendant
has met its initial burden in demonstrating that the parties agreed to
arbitrate their claims at issue in this action.
Defense to Arbitration
“The party seeking
arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration
agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any
defense, such as unconscionability. [Citation.]” (Marenco v. DirectTV LLC (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1416.)
In Plaintiff’s
Opposition, Plaintiff does not attack the merits of the arguments that
Defendant presented in favor of compelling arbitration, nor does Plaintiff
attack Defendant’s evidence.
Plaintiff argues that this
Court should defer ruling on Defendant’s motion, and instead, stay the action pursuant
to the Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act (SCRA) because Plaintiff’s counsel has
been unable to communicate with Plaintiff to discuss the arbitration agreement
due to Plaintiff’s active military duty.
Plaintiff argues that
this action can be stayed by citing to: (1) 50 U.S.C. Appen. § 522; (2) George
P. v. Super. Ct. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 216; (3) Brewster v. Sun Trust
Mortgage, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 742 F.3d 876, 878; and (4) In re Amber M.
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1229.
As a preliminary matter,
to the extent that Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s cases cited to 50 U.S.C. Appen. §
522, this Court notes that 50 U.S.C. § 3932 appears to be the current, relevant
statue as 50 U.S.C. § 3932 was formerly classified to section 522 of the former
Appendix prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering.
50 U.S.C. § 3932
Chapter
50 (sections 3901 to 4043), of Title 50 of the U.S.C., is cited as the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.
Federal law has long
provided that members of the military services may obtain a stay of civil
litigation when military duties materially affect their ability to participate
in the proceeding. (George P. v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th
216, 223.)
“Under the SCRA, a party
to a civil proceeding who has appeared but whose ability to participate is
interrupted by military obligations is entitled to a 90-day stay and may obtain
additional stays as circumstances require.” (George P. v. Superior Court (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 216, 223 citing 50 U.S.C. Appen. § 522.)
In relevant part of
section 3932:
(b) Stay of proceedings
At any stage before final judgment in a
civil action or proceeding in which a servicemember described in subsection (a)
is a party, the court may on its own motion and shall, upon application by the
servicemember, stay the action for a period of not less than 90 days, if the
conditions in paragraph (2) are met.
An application for a stay under paragraph
(1) shall include the following:
(A)
A letter or other communication setting forth facts stating the manner in which
current military duty requirements materially affect the servicemember's
ability to appear and stating a date when the servicemember will be available
to appear.
(B)
A letter or other communication from the servicemember's commanding officer
stating that the servicemember's current military duty prevents appearance and
that military leave is not authorized for the servicemember at the time of the
letter.
(50 U.S.C. § 3932(b).)
Conditions for Stay
As an initial matter, the
Court notes that Plaintiff did not explain to the Court’s satisfaction how he
met the two conditions under §§ 3932(b)(2)(A) and 3932(b)(2)(B). Instead of
explaining what evidence Plaintiff believes supports the conditions of §§ 3932(b)(2)(A)
and 3932(b)(2)(B), Plaintiff lumped its entire argument/evidence together as
one argument, leaving the Court to guess how Plaintiff believes his evidence
supports each condition.
For the reasons explained
below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff did not sufficiently meet his burden
to show he qualified for both conditions of a stay under 50 U.S.C. §§ 3932(b)(2)(A)
and (B).
Section 3932(b)(2)(A)
“A
letter or other communication setting forth facts stating the manner in which
current military duty requirements materially affect the servicemember’s
ability to appear and stating a date when the servicemember will be available
to appear.” (50 U.S.C. § 3932(b)(2)(A).)
With respect to the
evidence submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel, Arman Marukyan, Marukyan submitted
two documents – (1) A declaration from Marukyan and (2) a printout of a “Status
Report Pursuant to Servicemembers Civil Relief Act” from the Department of
Defense Manpower Data Center.
First, neither of these
documents state a date when the servicemember will be available to appear.
Second, with respect to
Plaintiff’s two documents “setting forth facts stating the manner in which
current military duty requirements materially affect the servicemember’s
ability to appear,” neither of Plaintiff’s documents set forth such facts.
The Status Report from
the Department of Defense Manpower Data Center (Status Report) simply indicates
that Plaintiff had an active duty start date of October 23, 2024, and that
Plaintiff is still serving in Army Active Duty. (See Marukyan Decl., Ex. A.)
This Status Report does
not set forth facts as to how currently being on active duty materially affects
the Plaintiff’s ability to appear. As pointed out in Defendant’s Reply, this
document does not indicate whether Plaintiff is on active duty and deployed
[presumably Defendant points this out since one can be active duty and not
deployed], nor does it indicate whether Plaintiff is unavailable for a
proceeding. Defendant’s counsel argues that there are tens of thousands of
“active duty” servicemembers in Southern California and argues that that does
not make them unavailable to participate in a lawsuit.
To some degree, the Marukyan
declaration addresses facts stating the manner in which current military duty
requirements materially affect Plaintiff’s ability to appear, but the Marukyan
declaration leaves the Court with pause.
For example, Marukyan states
that he made multiple attempts to contact Plaintiff via e-mail, U.S. Mail, and
telephonically, but all the attempts were unsuccessful. (Marukyan Decl. ¶ 4.) Marukyan
also states, “I learned that Plaintiff responded to one of our e-mail
communications, informing us that he had been unable to respond or get in
contact with us due to being in the military. Plaintiff’s email also informed
us that he was on a flight to his deployment and would not have the ability to
contact us anytime soon.” (Marukyan Decl. ¶ 8.)
As Defendant’s counsel
points out, the Marukyan Declaration does not disclose the date on which his
client contacted him about being deployed. Further, Defendant’s Reply pointed
out that the Marukyan Declaration does not indicate a date when the
servicemember will be available to appear.
The Court notes that
Defendant’s counsel also appears to question whether Plaintiff is actually
deployed. The Status Report indicates an active duty start date of 10-23-2024; however,
in the supplemental Lawrence declaration, Lawrence states that in or around
late November 2024, in his role as HR Manager, he fielded a phone call from the
U.S. Army wherein Army personnel asked him about Plaintiff’s whereabouts, and
whether Defendant knew if Plaintiff had started boot camp. (See Lawrence Supp.
Decl. ¶ 4.)
Section 3932(b)(2)(B)
“A
letter or other communication from the servicemember's commanding officer
stating that the servicemember's current military duty prevents appearance and
that military leave is not authorized for the servicemember at the time of the
letter.” (50 U.S.C. § 3932(b)(2)(B).)
Here, Plaintiff did not
meet this condition for a stay.
First, Plaintiff did not
submit a letter or communication from Plaintiff’s commanding officer. Plaintiff
submitted a Status Report from the Department of Defense Manpower Data Center
that appears to be electronically signed by Sam Yousefzadeh, Director,
Department of Defense, Manpower Data Center.
Second, even if this
Status Report were to be considered a letter from Plaintiff’s commanding
officer, it does not state that current military duty prevents appearance and
that military leave is not authorized for the servicemember at the time of the
letter. All the Status Report indicates is that Plaintiff had an active duty
start date of 10-23-2024, and that Plaintiff is still serving Army active duty.
Substantial Compliance
Plaintiff’s
Opposition also cites to In re Amber M. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1223 for
the proposition that an individual can substantially comply with the act, even
when there is not complete compliance, because the act is to be liberally
construed, and courts have discretion to stay the proceedings.
“An overly technical
reading of the SCRA, in a manner that would disadvantage a servicemember on
deployment overseas in defending his or her interests in pending litigation,
would be contrary to its purpose. Where, as here, a servicemember provides
evidence sufficient to show that he or she is actually unavailable to appear in
the proceedings, and the continuance of the proceedings would adversely affect
his or her rights, a stay application should be granted.” (In re Amber M.
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1231.)
In In re Amber M.,
a father filed a request for stay of dependency proceedings under the SCRA. (In
re Amber M. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1225.) “In support of his request
for a stay, father submitted a letter from his commanding officer. That letter
confirmed that he was currently under orders to deploy to Iraq, with an
estimated return date of February 2010. The letter also stated that father
“will be unable to attend the current scheduled court date of 9 Jun[e] 2009”
because of his deployment.” (Id. at 1227.)
Although the trial court
denied the father’s request for a stay under the SCRA, the Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court’s ruling. In relevant part, the Court of Appeal explained,
“We conclude that even if father's application was insufficient, the court
abused its discretion in failing to grant a stay. It is undisputed that father
was unavailable to appear at the June 9 jurisdiction/disposition hearing. The
evidence showed that at that time he was in Iraq. There was no detriment to
mother or the children as they remained detained with her. The court should
have granted a stay at least until information could be received from father's
commanding officer as to whether he would be available to appear prior to the
end of his deployment.” (In re Amber M. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1223,
1231.)
Plaintiff’s evidence here
is not of the sort presented in In re Amber M. In In re Amber M.,
there was a letter from the commanding officer, it indicated that the father
was currently deployed in Iraq, it indicated the father was unable to attend
the currently scheduled hearing, and it stated an estimated return date. Here,
there is no letter from a commanding officer, the Status Report does not
indicate that Plaintiff is unable to attend the scheduled hearing, nor does the
Status Report indicate that Plaintiff is deployed or when Plaintiff will
return. Likewise, Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration does not indicate any
knowledge about Plaintiff’s whereabouts, or the duration of Plaintiff’s alleged
unavailability. The most concrete information that the Marukyan Declaration
conveys is that on some uncertain date, Plaintiff allegedly responded to an
email from counsel informing counsel that Plaintiff had been unable to respond
or get in contact due to being in the military, and that Plaintiff was
currently on a flight to his deployment and would have no ability to contact
counsel anytime soon.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant
met its initial burden in demonstrating that the parties here agreed to
arbitrate their claims at issue in this action. Further, Plaintiff did not demonstrate
he satisfied the conditions of 50 U.S.C. § 3932(b)(2)(A)-(B). Additionally, although
Plaintiff argues that the circumstances here are similar to the circumstances
to In re Amber M., the circumstances here are not, in the Court’s view,
similar to those in In re Amber M.
The Court to hear
argument.