Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case Number: 24NNCV05266, Date: 2025-05-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 24NNCV05266, Date: 2025-05-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NNCV05266 Hearing Date: May 30, 2025 Dept: E

Case No: 24NNCV05266
Hearing Date: 05/30/2025 – 8:30am

Trial Date: UNSET

Case Name: SONYA CHEKHERDEMIAN v. ADVENTIST HEALTH GLENDALE HOSPITAL, a business entity form unknown; and DOES 1-50, inclusive

[TENTATIVE RULING ON DEMURRER]

RELIEF REQUESTED

“Defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale (hereinafter “Moving Defendant”), will present their Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Moving Defendant brings their Demurrer on the grounds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action for Negligence against Moving Defendant and are uncertain pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10. This demurrer is based upon this notice of demurrer and demurrer, the memorandum of points and authorities, the declaration of Alexandra Martino, Esq., and all pleadings, records and files herein, and such further oral and documentary evidence as may be presented up through the time of the hearing of this demurrer.”

(Def. Dem. p. 1-2.)

PROCEDURAL

Moving Party: Defendant, Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale (Defendant or Movant)

Responding Party: No Opposition by Plaintiff

Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300(c)): Ok

16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP § 1005(b)): Ok

Proper Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a, § 1013b): The Court to hear argument. Defendant served the moving papers to Plaintiff’s counsel via email to tm@martinianlaw.com. Further, the Court notes that the email address listed on eCourt for Plaintiff’s counsel is the same email address that Defendant served the moving papers to. However, the Court notes that the upper left caption of Plaintiff’s Complaint lists two email addresses for e-service for Plaintiff’s counsel. Those two email addresses are tm@martinianlaw.com and service@martinianlaw.com. Ultimately, by Defendant serving the moving papers to Plaintiff’s counsel at tm@martinianlaw.com, Defendant served the moving papers to the email address listed on eCourt for Plaintiff’s counsel, and one of the email addresses listed on Plaintiff’s Complaint. Therefore, Defendant’s service of this motion appears to be proper. However, the Court points all of this out because if Plaintiff intended for the other email address listed on the Complaint – service@martinianlaw.com – to be the proper service email, then Plaintiff should update eCourt and inform Defendant accordingly.

Moving Papers: Demurrer; Request for Judicial Notice

Opposition Papers: No opposition by Plaintiff

Reply Papers: Notice of No Opposition

Meet and Confer

A party filing a demurrer “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) “The parties shall meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least five days prior to the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why the parties could not meet and confer.” (Code Civ. Proc., §430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Failure to sufficiently meet and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Id., § 430.41(a)(4).)

Defendant’s counsel alleged that a meet and confer occurred. (See Martino Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.)

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Sonya Chekherdemian, filed the instant action on 10/22/2024 against Defendants, Adventist Health Glendale Hospital, a business entity form unknown, and Does 1 – 50, inclusive.

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges one cause of action for negligence.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRERS

Demurrer – Sufficiency

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda, (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law ….” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)

A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading … is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)

On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to “determine whether or not the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) “Generally it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

Demurrer – Uncertainty

A special demurrer for uncertainty, CCP section 430.10(f), is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)

ANALYSIS

Preliminary

Plaintiff’s Complaint lists one cause of action for negligence.

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specify that the negligence cause of action is a premises liability cause of action, but reading the Complaint as a whole and in context, it appears that Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence is based on the theory of premises liability.

If this is not the case, Plaintiff should address this at the hearing.

“The subject matter of an action and the issues involved are determinable from the facts alleged rather than from the title of the pleading or the character of damage recovery suggested in connection with the prayer for relief.” (Siciliano v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 745, 751 quoting Buxbom v. Smith, 23 Cal.2d 535, 542.)

A general demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the pleading to state any cause of action, and must not be sustained if the pleading states facts from which any liability results, although not for some or all of the relief sought to be obtained. (Siciliano v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 745, 751.) If the pleading states grounds for relief, either legal or equitable, it will stand the test of a general demurrer. (Id.) It is sufficient if the pleading contains the allegations essential to the statement of any one cause of action, even though an abortive attempt is made to state facts calling for other and different relief. (Id.)

First Cause of Action – Negligence – Premises Liability

Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s negligence cause of action on grounds of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action (CCP § 430.10(e)) and uncertainty (CCP § 430.10(f)).

Generally speaking, Defendant’s demurrer is confusing to understand.

On several occasions, Defendant cites to general legal authority and then asserts arguments and conclusions wherein it is entirely unclear how the arguments and conclusions follow from the legal authority that Defendant cites.

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence. (Jones v. Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1207 citing Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998) Accordingly, the plaintiff must prove a legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. (Jones v. Awad, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at 1207 citing Beacon Residential Community Assn. v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP (2014) 59 Cal.4th 568, 573.)

Duty

Premises liability is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises; accordingly, mere possession with its attendant right to control conditions on the premises is a sufficient basis for the imposition of an affirmative duty to act. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158 citing Preston v. Goldman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 358, 368.)

The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.)

In relevant part, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges:

18. On the date of the subject incident, for a period of time prior thereto, and at all relevant times, Defendants ADVENTIST HEALTH GLENDALE and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, and each of them, inclusive and each of them, were owners, occupiers, builders, operators, designers, repairers, possessors, lessors, operators, managers, custodians, supervisors, inspectors, servicers, controllers, engineers, contractors, renters, repairers and/or possessors of the abovementioned SUBJECT PREMISES.

19. On the date of the subject incident and at all relevant times, Defendants ADVENTIST HEALTH GLENDALE and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, and each of them, owed a duty to Plaintiff to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in the ownership, leasing, possession, use, inspection, control, maintenance, design, operation, and/or management of the SUBJECT PREMISES, so as to avoid subjecting Plaintiff and others to an unreasonable risk of harm.

(Compl. ¶¶ 18-19.)

Thus, Plaintiff alleges the duty element of premises liability.

Breach

In relevant part, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges:

20. At all relevant times herein, and for a period of time prior thereto Defendants ADVENTIST HEALTH GLENDALE and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, and each of them, so negligently, carelessly, recklessly, unskillfully, unlawfully, tortuously, and wrongfully owned, operated, built, engineered, contracted, leased, rented, occupied, maintained, controlled, inspected, managed, repaired, supervised, had possession and/or custody of, maintained equipment on or in, and/or had control over the abovementioned SUBJECT PREMISES, as to cause, permit, allow to be in a dangerous, hazardous, unlawful, unsafe condition.

21. On or about November 14, 2023, Plaintiff CHEKHERDEMIAN was waiting for her husband in the Emergency Room of Adventist Health Glendale, located at or near 1509 Wilson Terrace, Glendale, CA 91206. While she was waiting in the emergency room, the workers, rolling over an X-Ray machine, ran over her left foot. As a result of this accident, Plaintiff was severely injured.

22. Despite having negligently created the dangerous condition and/or negligently and knowingly having allowed the dangerous condition to remain for a sufficiently lengthy period of time that a reasonable person would have had ample opportunity to take corrective action, Defendants and each of them, at least in part, created the dangerous condition, and failed to take action to correct the dangerous condition, and thus breached their duty(s) to Plaintiff, by their acts and omissions, including, but not limited to, the following:

a) Creating and/or failing to take corrective measures to cure the dangerous condition, which presented a hazard;

b) Failing to inspect the property for such dangerous condition, especially when a simple visual inspection of the SUBJECT PREMISES would reveal these dangerous conditions;

c) Failing to take corrective measures to cure the dangerous condition or otherwise to reduce the danger to prevent invitees, including Plaintiff, from or falling;

d) Failing to adequately repair and/or modify the SUBJECT PREMISES so as to eradicate the dangerous condition, would be minimal when compared to the substantial risk of the incident;

e) Failing to take proper action to prevent invitees, including Plaintiff, from sustaining the kind of injuries Plaintiff sustained.

(Compl. ¶¶ 20-22.)

Thus, Plaintiff alleges the breach element of premises liability.

Proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury

In relevant part, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges:

23 As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid negligence, acts and omissions of Defendants ADVENTIST HEALTH GLENDALE and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, and each of them, Plaintiff was injured and hurt in her health, strength and activity, sustaining injuries to her physical person, all of which injuries have caused and continue to cause Plaintiff great physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering and economic loss as well. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that her injuries have and will likely continue to result in permanent and degenerative disability, all to Plaintiffs general damage, in an amount which will be stated at trial according to proof, but which amount exceeds the jurisdictional limits of this Court.

24. As a further proximate result of the said conduct of Defendants ADVENTIST HEALTH GLENDALE and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, and each of them, Plaintiff was compelled to and did employ the services of medical, hospital, surgical and nursing professionals, and the like, to care for and treat her injuries and condition, and he did and will continue to incur medical, hospital, surgical, nursing, professional and other related incidental expenses. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that by reason of her physical and emotional injuries, Plaintiff will necessarily incur additional like expenses.

(Compl. ¶¶ 23-24.)

Thus, Plaintiff alleges this element of a premises liability cause of action.

Overall

Plaintiff successfully alleges all the elements of a premises liability cause of action; thus, Plaintiff states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for premises liability.

Unavailing Argument 1

On page 6 of Defendant’s demurrer, Defendant has a section titled “Plaintiffs Entire Complaint is Uncertain.”

Defendant argues that the allegations of the Complaint are vague and ambiguous. The Court does not find Defendant’s argument availing; Defendant is unclear as to how the Complaint is vague and ambiguous.

In Defendant’s uncertainty section, Defendant also argues:

Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that her injury occurred in Ventura County and Moving Defendant conducts business in Ventura County, but Moving Defendant is a Medical Facility located in Los Angeles County, thus it would be impossible for Moving Defendant to have caused Plaintiff’s injuries in Ventura County. (Compl. ¶ 11; RFJN Ex. A).

(Def. Dem. p. 6.)

With respect to Defendant’s argument regarding Ventura County, the Court does not find Defendant’s argument availing.

First, the Court is not entirely clear what Defendant is attempting to argue here. If Defendant is attempting to assert some type of argument based on jurisdiction or venue, Defendant does not demur on those grounds. Defendant demurs based on failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and uncertainty.

In relevant part of Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff alleges:

11. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 395 because the incident and/or related events giving rise to the cause(s) of action alleged herein occurred in County of Ventura; and/or Defendants or some of them are domiciled, reside and/or otherwise conduct business in the County of Ventura.

12. On or about November 14, 2023, Plaintiff CHEKHERDEMIAN was in the emergency room of Adventist Health Medical Center of Adventist Health Glendale, located at or near 1509 Wilson Terrance, Glendale CA 91206. While she was awaiting for her husband, the workers ran the X-Ray machine over her left foot. As a result of this accident, Plaintiff was severely injured.

…

(Compl. ¶¶ 11-12 & 21.)

Second, although the Court realizes that Paragraph 11 alleges that the events giving rise to the causes of action occurred in the County of Ventura, presumably Paragraph 11 is a typographical error in light of Paragraphs 12 and 21 which allege that the accident occurred in Glendale, CA, which the Court notes is in Los Angeles County.

Third, and returning to the Court’s first point on this issue, it is unclear what Defendant is even arguing here. If Defendant is asserting some type of venue argument, Defendant provides no legal authority that improper venue is a basis to sustain a demurrer. Under CCP § 430.10(a), a defendant can demur on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. (See CCP § 430.10(a).) Not only did Defendant not demur on the basis of jurisdiction, if Defendant is asserting some type of venue argument, it is unclear if improper venue provides a basis to demur based on jurisdiction under 430.10(a). Overall, not only did Defendant only demur on grounds of failure to state sufficient facts and uncertainty, but Defendant provides no legal authority for whatever Defendant’s argument is.

Unavailing Argument 2

Defendant’s demurrer has a section titled “Plaintiff fails to Plead a Claim for Negligence.”

In this section, Defendant first argues as follows:

Negligence is never presumed merely because an incident occurred on the owner's property. Harpke v. Lankershim Estates (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 143, 145; Vaughn v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1950) 95 Cal.App.2d 553, 556. Negligence liability for failure to use ordinary care is based on case-specific facts “with reference to the situation and knowledge of the parties.” J.H. v. Los Angeles UnifiedSchoolDist. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 123, 140 (emphasis added).

“In the ordinary personal injury lawsuit, in which the complaint's factual recitations show plainly the connection between cause and effect, it suffices to plead causation succinctly and generally.” Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 78. “But when, by contrast, ‘ “the pleaded facts of negligence and injury do not naturally give rise to an inference of causation[,] the plaintiff must plead specific facts affording an inference the one caused the others.”’ [citation] That is, the plaintiff must allege facts, albeit as succinctly as possible, explaining how the conduct caused or contributed to the injury.” Id at 78 (emphasis added). “[A]llegations of intentional wrongdoing must be specific and will be closely scrutinized.” Allen v. Jones (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 207, 215 (emphasis added).

Here, Plaintiff generally alleges that “the workers” rolled over Plaintiff’s foot with an x-ray machine. (Compl. ¶ 21). Then she goes on to claim that Moving Defendant create a “dangerous condition”. (Compl. ¶ 22). However, it is unknown what “dangerous condition” is alleged to have been created or how such amorphous condition caused Plaintiff’s injury. Furthermore, if Plaintiff is claiming intentional wrongdoing, she must be specific and claiming an amorphous “worker” did something does not meet said standard. Additionally, the entire complaint is broad and ambiguous as to what is being alleged or how an unknown dangerous condition caused Plaintiff’s alleged injury. Moreover, there are no facts to explain the basis for attributing liability to Moving Defendant for an unknown “worker’s” alleged misconduct as it is unclear who the worker is or how they relate to Moving Defendant in any way, especially, since the injury occurred in Ventura County, away from Moving Defendant’s facility. (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 21).

(Def. Dem. p. 6-7.)

With respect to Defendant’s argument above, it is not entirely clear what Defendant’s argument is.

Defendant first cites general case law, but it is entirely unclear how Defendant’s arguments/conclusions about “the workers” follows from the legal authority that Defendant cites.

Further, if Defendant’s arguments about “the workers” is intended to be unrelated to the case law that Defendant cites, then Defendant cites no legal authority with respect to the arguments Defendant asserts pertaining to “the workers.”

Whatever Defendant’s argument is here, it is unavailing.

Additionally in this section, Defendant argues:

Moreover, if Plaintiff is attempting to claim that this unknown “worker” in Ventura was somehow an employee of Moving Defendant, a claim for negligent hiring, supervision or retention can be made “only when the employer knows, or should know, that the employee, because of past behavior or other factors, is unfit for the specific tasks to be performed.” Federico v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1215. “One who employs another to act for him is not liable merely because the one employed is incompetent, vicious, or careless. If liability results it is because, under the circumstances, the employer has not taken the care which a prudent man would take in selecting the person for the business in hand.... Liability results ... not because of the relation of the parties but because the employer antecedently had reason to believe that an undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment. (Citations.)” Id. at 1213-1214 (emphasis in original). An employer's duty to exercise reasonable care in the selection of employees “is breached only when the employer knows, or should know, facts which would warn a reasonable person that the employee presents an undue risk of harm to third persons in light of the particular work to be performed.” Id. at 1214 (emphasis in original).

Here, at most, Plaintiff is claiming carelessness on the part of some unknown worker. Even if such person was somehow related to Moving Defendant, this would not support a cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision or hiring. There are no allegations to support the notion that Moving Defendant knew or should have known of any incompetency of this unknown “worker” or that they were somehow responsible for him. As stated, these bare conclusions alleged are insufficient to support a well pled negligence claim.

(Def. Dem. p. 7-8.)

With respect to the argument above, the Court does not understand Defendant’s argument.

Defendant makes an argument about negligent hiring, supervision, or retention, and the Court is not entirely clear how that is applicable here. To the Court, it appears that Plaintiff is alleging a cause of action for negligence under the theory of premises liability.

While the Court realizes that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that the “worker” referenced in the Complaint is an employee of Defendant, does Plaintiff’s Complaint have to allege as such? Is that what Defendant is arguing? Defendant should clarify its argument at the hearing. Defendant’s argument here appears to be rooted in negligent hiring, supervision, or retention, but based on the Court’s reading of the Complaint, Plaintiff appears to be alleging premises liability.

Therefore, it is entirely unclear to the Court what Defendant’s employer/employee/ “worker” argument has to do with premises liability.

Unavailing Argument 3

Defendant has a section in its demurrer titled “Plaintiff has Failed to Plead a Claim for Premises Liability.”

First, the Court notes that in this section Defendant does not cite to any binding legal authority. Defendant simply cites CACI 1000, CACI 1001, CACI 1011, and CACI 1003.

Second, Defendant makes no argument supported by legal authority as to how the CACI sections it cited are relevant for purposes of pleading standards.

Third, despite the fact that Defendant states that the elements for premises liability are located within CACI 1000, and despite the fact that Defendant states what those elements are, Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff failed to allege the elements for premises liability. Defendant goes into some sort of argument how Plaintiff didn’t allege certain things, but it is entirely unclear as to where Defendant gets this standard as to the certain things that Plaintiff did not allege.

Ultimately, Defendant does not support its arguments with legal authority.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action for negligence is OVERRULED. Plaintiff to address the service issue that the Court called attention to above.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice of Adventist Health Glendale’s Statement of Information filed with the California Secretary of State is GRANTED, but the Court does not admit the truth of the matters therein. Further, whether or not the Court granted or denied Defendant’s request for judicial notice, this would not affect the Court’s ruling on the demurrer. Further, even if the Court had admitted the truth of the matters therein it would not have affected the Court’s ruling on the demurrer.

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