Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case Number: 25NNCV00857, Date: 2025-03-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 25NNCV00857, Date: 2025-03-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25NNCV00857 Hearing Date: March 27, 2025 Dept: E

Hearing Date: 03/27/2025 – 8:30am
Case No: 25NNCV00857
Trial Date: UNSET
Case Name: STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. SAMUEL DJAVADIAN

3-TENTATIVE RULINGS

BACKGROUND
Petitioner, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm, Petitioner, or Movant), filed a “Petition to Open Unlimited Civil Court File to Establish Jurisdiction Over Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Arbitration Matters Under Insurance Code Section 11580.2(f)” on 2/7/2025.

Petitioner alleges that it issued an automobile insurance policy to Respondent, Samuel Djavadian, that included uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. (Pet. ¶ 2.) Petitioner alleges that Respondent made a claim for uninsured/underinsured motorist arbitration arising out of a motor vehicle accident that happened on May 7, 2018, pursuant to the automobile insurance policy with State Farm. (Pet. ¶ 3.)

On 3/21/2025, this Court granted petitioner’s petition (filed on 2/7/2025) to open unlimited civil court file to establish jurisdiction over uninsured/underinsured motorist arbitration matters.

Petitioner, State Farm, has three motions on calendar for 3/27/2025.

In Motion 1 (Res ID 2810), State Farm moves this Court for an order compelling respondent, Samuel Djavadian, to provide verified responses, without objection, to Specially Prepared Interrogatories (Set No. 2) propounded by State Farm to respondent Samuel Djavadian on February 19, 2024. State Farm alleges it received no responses, and State Farm moves pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580.2(f)(3) and Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290 on the ground the interrogatories are a reasonable and necessary tool in evaluation of the pending claim.

The Court notes that although the first paragraph on the notice page for Motion 1 refers to Specially Prepared Interrogatories, Set No. 2, it appears as if this reference to Set No. 2 is a typo. It appears that this reference to Set No. 2 is a typo because the caption on the notice page refers to Specially Prepared Interrogatories Set No. 1. Additionally, the second paragraph on the notice page refers to Specially Prepared Interrogatories Set No. 1. Further, page 3 of the memorandum refers to Specially Prepared Interrogatories, Set No. 1 on two occasions. Additionally, the conclusion of the motion on page 7 refers to Specially Prepared Interrogatories, Set No. 1, on two occasions. Also, the Kwan Declaration in support of Motion 1 refers to Specially Prepared Interrogatories, Set No. 1 in ¶ 2 of the Kwan Declaration. Therefore, the Court will assume Motion 1 pertains to Specially Prepared Interrogatories, Set No. 1.

In Motion 2 (Res ID 9074), State Farm moves this court for an order compelling respondent, Samuel Djavadian, to provide verified responses, without objection, and to provide all responsive documents within 20 days to Demand for Inspection and Production of Documents (Set No. 2) propounded by petitioner State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company to respondent Samuel Djavadian on February 19, 2024. State Farm moves pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580.2 and Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300 on the ground that respondent Samuel Djavadian has failed to provide any response whatsoever to the Demand for Inspection and Production of Documents (Set No. 2).

In Motion 3 (Res ID 4198), State Farm moves for:

an order compelling Respondent Samuel Djavadian to appear, testify and produce the requested documents deposition as follows:

DATE: Friday, April 4, 2025

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

PLACE: REMOTE VIDEO CONFERENCE

Respondent Samuel Djavadian is requested to produce, at deposition, a photographic form of identification, including, but not limited to, a driver's license, Passport, or identification card.

Said deposition will be conducted by remote electronic means pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.010, et seq., including section 2025.310, and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1010. The court reporter/court reporting agency will provide all counsel of record and all parties representing themselves in pro per with the link to the remote video conference.

This motion is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450 on the ground that Respondent Samuel Djavadian is a party to this action and failed/refused to attend and testify at the properly noticed deposition and has not responded to Petitioner’s meet and confer efforts to arrange to appear at another time.

(Mot. 3, p. 1-2.)

PROCEDURAL – SERVICE
For all three motions, the proofs of service were timely filed under CRC, Rule 3.1300(c).

Further, all three motions were timely under CCP § 1005(b).

However, no opposition was filed by Respondent, Samuel Djavadian, for any of the three motions. Since no oppositions were filed, at the hearing, Petitioner needs to address whether or not it served the proper email addresses for Respondent.

Petitioner’s proofs of service indicate service of the instant three motions via electronic mail to: (1) hyka@hglawgroup.com, (2) aida@hglawgroup.com, and (3) service@hglawgroup.com.

The Court points out that on eCourt, Hyka’s email address is listed as hyka@ghlawgroup.com, which is different than the email address listed on Petitioner’s proofs of service, which list hyka@hglawgroup.com. The parties should be prepared to address this issue.

The Court also notes that eCourt indicates that Hyka Karapetian and E. Michael Kwan both represent State Farm. To the Court’s understanding, Hyka represents Respondent, whereas E. Michael Kwan represents Petitioner, State Farm. At the hearing, the parties should address whether this was an error on the Court’s behalf, or if this was an error on the parties’ behalf.

Additionally, all three of Petitioner’s motions argue that since Respondent initiated arbitration, State Farm is not required to serve the instant three motions in the same manner as service of a summons and complaint and that State Farm can serve these motions electronically.

Under Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. :

Requiring service of a discovery motion in the same manner as a summons, on the very party who initiated the arbitration, who had participated throughout the proceeding by representation of counsel, and while the arbitration proceeding is still pending, would serve no useful or legitimate purpose. (Civ.Code, § 3532 [“The law neither does nor requires idle acts”].) We decline to impose such a procedural hurdle where not required by statute and where the requirements of constitutional due process plainly have been satisfied.

(Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, 928.)

At the hearing, the Court would like Petitioner to address how it determined that the three email addresses listed in the proofs of service for the instant motions were the proper email addresses in which Respondent is to be served.

For example, in Motion 1, Petitioner attaches several exhibits that contain emails between the parties. In some of those emails, the Court sees emails from Respondent’s counsel coming from an email address of ernesto@hglawgroup.com; however, the Court does not see emails coming from any of the three email addresses listed in Petitioner’s proofs of service.

Likewise, in Motion 2, Petitioner attaches several exhibits that contain emails between the parties. In some of those emails, the Court sees emails from Respondent’s counsel coming from an email address of ernesto@hglawgroup.com; however, the Court does not see emails coming from any of the three email addresses listed in Petitioner’s proofs of service.

Further, in Motion 3, Petitioner attaches several exhibits that contain emails between the parties. In some of those emails, the Court sees emails from Respondent’s counsel coming from email addresses of: kathy@hglawgroup.com, ernesto@hglawgroup.com, and hyka@hglawgroup.com. While hyka@hglawgroup.com was an email address that Petitioner included in the proofs of service, the two email addresses of kathy@hglawgroup.com and ernesto@hglawgroup.com were not included in Petitioner’s proofs of service.

Overall, the Court would like Petitioner to explain how it determined that the three email addresses of (1) hyka@hglawgroup.com, (2) aida@hglawgroup.com, and (3) service@hglawgroup.com were the proper email addresses for service of the instant three motions.

Jurisdiction
In Exhibit A to all three motions, Petitioner includes the letter from Respondent’s counsel that demanded uninsured/underinsured motorist arbitration pursuant to Insurance Code § 11580.2(i).

In relevant part of Exhibit A, the letter from Hyka Galadzhyan on May 6, 2020 stated:

As you know, this firm represents your insured Samuel Djavadian with respect to the above-referenced accident.

In order to preserve our client’s causes of action under the Uninsured/Underinsured motorist provisions of the policy, we hereby, formally demand Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Arbitration pursuant to CA Insurance Code § 11580.2(i) with respect to our client/your insured in his claim for injuries and damage arising out of the above-referenced May 7, 2018 automobile accident.

(Ex. A, all motions.)

Petitioner argues for all three motions that Section 11580.2(f) expressly commits the resolution of discovery disputes in uninsured/underinsured motorist arbitrations to the jurisdiction of the superior court.

Although no opposition was submitted, Petitioner’s argument that this Court has jurisdiction over the discovery disputes appears to be correct.

In relevant part of Insurance Code § 11580.2(f):

(f) The policy or an endorsement added thereto shall provide that the determination as to whether the insured shall be legally entitled to recover damages, and if so entitled, the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between the insured and the insurer or, in the event of disagreement, by arbitration. The arbitration shall be conducted by a single neutral arbitrator. An award or a judgment confirming an award shall not be conclusive on any party in any action or proceeding between (i) the insured, his or her insurer, his or her legal representative, or his or her heirs and (ii) the uninsured motorist to recover damages arising out of the accident upon which the award is based. If the insured has or may have rights to benefits, other than nonoccupational disability benefits, under any workers’ compensation law, the arbitrator shall not proceed with the arbitration until the insured’s physical condition is stationary and ratable. In those cases in which the insured claims a permanent disability, the claims shall, unless good cause be shown, be adjudicated by award or settled by compromise and release before the arbitration may proceed. Any demand or petition for arbitration shall contain a declaration, under penalty of perjury, stating whether (i) the insured has a workers’ compensation claim; (ii) the claim has proceeded to findings and award or settlement on all issues reasonably contemplated to be determined in that claim; and (iii) if not, what reasons amounting to good cause are grounds for the arbitration to proceed immediately. The arbitration shall be deemed to be a proceeding and the hearing before the arbitrator shall be deemed to be the trial of an issue therein for purposes of issuance of a subpoena by an attorney of a party to the arbitration under Section 1985 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Title 4 (commencing with Section 2016.010) of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be applicable to these determinations, and all rights, remedies, obligations, liabilities and procedures set forth in Title 4 (commencing with Section 2016.010) of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be available to both the insured and the insurer at any time after the accident, both before and after the commencement of arbitration, if any, with the following limitations:

(1) Whenever in Title 4 (commencing with Section 2016.010) of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, reference is made to the court in which the action is pending, or provision is made for application to the court or obtaining leave of court or approval by the court, the court that shall have jurisdiction for the purposes of this section shall be the superior court of the State of California, in and for any county that is a proper county for the filing of a suit for bodily injury arising out of the accident, against the uninsured motorist, or any county specified in the policy or an endorsement added thereto as a proper county for arbitration or action thereon.

(2) Any proper court to which application is first made by either the insured or the insurer under Title 4 (commencing with Section 2016.010) of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure for any discovery or other relief or remedy, shall thereafter be the only court to which either of the parties shall make any applications under Title 4 (commencing with Section 2016.010) of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to the same accident, subject, however, to the right of the court to grant a change of venue after a hearing upon notice, upon any of the grounds upon which change of venue might be granted in an action filed in the superior court.

(3) A deposition pursuant to Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 2025.010) of Title 4 of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be taken without leave of court, except that leave of court, granted with or without notice and for good cause shown, must be obtained if the notice of the taking of the deposition is served by either party within 20 days after the accident.

(4) Subdivision (a) of Section 2025.280 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to discovery under this section.

(5) For the purposes of discovery under this section, the insured and the insurer shall each be deemed to be “a party to the action,” where that phrase is used in Section 2025.260 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(6) Interrogatories under Chapter 13 (commencing with Section 2030.010) of Title 4 of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and requests for admission under Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 2033.010) of Title 4 of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be served by either the insured or the insurer upon the other at any time more than 20 days after the accident without leave of court.

(7) Nothing in this section limits the rights of any party to discovery in any action pending or that may hereafter be pending in any court.

(Ins. Code § 11580.2(f)(1)-(7).)

“[T]he uninsured motorist law grants the superior court the exclusive jurisdiction to hear discovery matters arising under uninsured motorist arbitrations.” (Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, 926.)

“[I]n uninsured motorist arbitrations, discovery may be commenced both before and after the commencement of arbitration.” (Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, 923 citing Ins. Code § 11580.2(f).) “In uninsured motorist arbitrations, however, depositions may be taken for discovery as permitted in any court action, without obtaining prior approval of the arbitrator.” (Id.)

LEGAL STANDARD – COMPEL RESPONSES, INSPECTION DEMANDS
Within 30 days after service of a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the party to whom the demand is directed shall serve the original of the response to it on the party making the demand, and a copy of the response on all other parties who have appeared in the action, unless on motion of the party making the demand, the court has shortened the time for response, or unless on motion of the party to whom the demand has been directed, the court has extended the time for response. (CCP §2031.260(a).)

If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand. (CCP §2031.300(b).)

If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the party to whom the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed waives any objection to the demand, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010). (CCP §2031.300(a).) “The court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with Sections 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230, 2031.240, and 2031.280. (2) The party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” (CCP §2031.300(a)(1)-(2).)

Unlike a motion to compel further responses, a motion to compel responses is not subject to a 45-day time limit, and the propounding party does not have to demonstrate either good cause or that it satisfied a “meet and confer” requirement. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4^th 390, 404 citing Weil and Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2006) ¶¶8:1137 to 8:1144, pp. 8F-59 to 8F-60, ¶¶ 8:1483 to 8:1489, pp. 8H-29 to hH-30 (Weil & Brown).)

LEGAL STANDARD – COMPEL RESPONSES, INTERROGATORIES
Within 30 days after service of interrogatories, the party to whom the interrogatories are propounded shall serve the original of the response to them on the propounding party, unless on motion of the propounding party the court has shortened the time for response, or unless on motion of the responding party the court has extended the time for response. (CCP 2030.260(a).)

If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling response to the interrogatories. (CCP §2030.290(b).)

“The party to whom the interrogatories are directed waives any right to exercise the option to produce writings under Section 2030.230, as well as any objection to the interrogatories, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010). The court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with Sections 2030.210, 2030.220, 2030.230, and 2030.240. (2) The party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” (CCP §2030.290(a).)

TENTATIVE RULING MOTIONS 1 & 2
On February 19, 2024, Petitioner’s counsel served on respondent Specially Prepared Interrogatories, Set No.1, and Demand for Inspection and Production of Documents, Set No. 2.

Petitioner’s counsel granted Respondent an extension to respond to the instant discovery on three occasions. (See Kwan Decl. ¶¶ 4-8.)

As of 2/20/2025, when Kwan signed his declaration attached to the instant motions, Petitioner had not received responses to the Specially Prepared Interrogatories, Set No. 1, nor had Petitioner received responses to the Demand for Inspection and Production of Documents, Set No. 2.

Since Respondent has not provided timely responses, if Petitioner can adequately address the service issues that these motions face, the Court tentatively plans to GRANT Motions 1 and 2, in part. If the service issues are addressed, Respondent is ordered to provide verified responses, without objection, within 20 days, to Specially Prepared Interrogatories, Set No. 1, and Demand for Inspection and Production of Documents, Set No. 2.

The Court noted that it only plans to grant Motions 1 and 2 “in part” because Motion 2 not only sought verified responses without objection, but Motion 2 also sought responsive documents. The Court is unclear as to how it can compel responsive documents when Respondent has not even provided responses to the requests.

The Court also notes that sanctions were not sought.

The Court also notes that Petitioner did not submit a Reply

TENTATIVE RULING MOTION 3
In Motion 3 (Res ID 4198), State Farm moves for:

an order compelling Respondent Samuel Djavadian to appear, testify and produce the requested documents deposition as follows:

DATE: Friday, April 4, 2025

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

PLACE: REMOTE VIDEO CONFERENCE

Respondent Samuel Djavadian is requested to produce, at deposition, a photographic form of identification, including, but not limited to, a driver's license, Passport, or identification card.

(Mot. 3, p. 1-2.)

Here, the Court will hear argument.

Under CCP § 2025.450:

(a) If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.

(b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with both of the following:

(1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.

(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.

(CCP § 2025.450(a)-(b).)

The Court will hear argument because Petitioner does not clearly explain (in the Court’s view) how it satisfied the requirements of CCP § 2025.450(a)-(b) in order to compel Respondent’s deposition.

Petitioner goes through an extensive history on how Respondent’s deposition was noticed eight times, but Respondent has yet to appear. (Kwan Decl. ¶¶ 3-42.) Although Petitioner spends several pages explaining the history on how the deposition was noticed, cancelled, re-noticed, and many other events in a long series of events pertaining to the prospective deposition of Respondent, Petitioner’s explanation as to how it satisfied 2025.450(a)-(b) is not entirely clear to this Court.

Petitioner did not request sanctions.

Petitioner did not submit a Reply for this motion.