Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case Number: EC067612, Date: 2024-02-23 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: EC067612, Date: 2024-02-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: EC067612 Hearing Date: February 23, 2024 Dept: E

Case No: EC067612
Hearing Date: 02/23/2024 – 9:00am and 8:30am

Trial Date: UNSET

Case Name: RAKESH KOTHARI v. GOVIND R. VAGHASHIA, an individual doing business as Quality Inn and Suites Camarillo; SONAL VAGHASHIA, an individual doing business as Travelodge Burbank; PRASHANT R. VAGHASHIA, an individual doing business as Quality Inn Burbank Airport; MITA VAGHASHIA, an individual; VAGHASHIA FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LIMITED; and DOES 1-10 inclusive

MOTION 1 – Motion by the Prashant Defendants to Enforce Global Settlement [Reservation # ending in 0675; Hearing for 9:00am]

RELIEF REQUESTED
“Defendants/Cross-Complainants, Prashant Vaghashia and Mita Vaghashia (hereinafter referred to as "Prashant Defendants"), will and hereby move this Court for an order enforcing the compliance of Defendant, Govind Vaghashia, Defendant, Sonal G. Vaghashia, and their entities, American Financial Services, The Vaghashia Family Limited Partnership, Atmaswaroop Investments LLC, Sherman Oaks First Plaza, LLC, Five Stars Hospitality, LLC, Bellflower First Plaza, LLC, Oak First Plaza, LLC (hereafter referred to as the "Govind Defendants"), with the terms of the global Settlement Agreement reached by the parties on June 10, 2022, which agreement provides that the Prashant Defendants shall completely indemnify the Govind Defendants for any damages in this action and the related Case- Vipulkumar Patel v. Vaghashia- L.A.S.C. Case No: EC064357 (hereafter, the "related cases") and that the Prashant Defendants will appoint the lawyers for the Govind Defendants (going forward) in these related cases. As such, the Govind Defendants can no longer appoint their own lawyers to prosecute these related cases.

In the alternative, the Prashant Defendants request an order staying further prosecution of any proceedings in these related cases by the Govind Defendants.

This Motion is made pursuant to sections 664.6 and 526 (a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, ("C.C.P.") and the prior order of this court (on 08/18/2023), granting the Prashant Defendants a protective order against the Govind Defendants and will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Alfred O. Anyia and the papers, pleadings and records on file in this action and upon such other oral and documentary evidence as may be allowed at the hearing of this motion.”

PROCEDURAL

Moving Party: Defendants/Cross-Complainants, Prashant Vaghashia and Mita Vaghashia (“Prashant Defendants” or “Movants”)

Responding Party: Defendants, Govind Vaghashia and Sonal Vaghashia (Govind Defendants)

Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300(c)): Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP 1005(b)): Ok
Proper Address (CCP §1013, §1013a, §1013b):Ok

Moving Papers: Notice/Motion; Proof of Service [filed 1/30/2024]

Opposition: Opposition [filed 2/2/2024]; Request for Judicial Notice [filed 2/2/2024]; Lal Declaration [filed 2/2/2024]; Opposition [filed 2/15/2024]; Request for Judicial Notice [filed 2/15/2024]; Lal Declaration [filed 2/15/2024]

Reply: Reply

Also Filed: Joint Stipulation filed on 2/6/2024

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on 11/22/2017 and a First Amended Complaint (FAC) on 04/12/2018. The FAC alleges 12 causes of action.

A Cross-Complaint was filed on 06/04/2018 by Prashant Vaghashia and Mita Vaghashia against Govind Vaghashia and Vaghashia Family Partnership Limited and ROES 1-5 inclusive.

Plaintiff Rakesh Kothari alleges that in July of 2014 he entered a written agreement with defendants Govind Vaghashia dba Quality Inn and Suites, Sonal Vaghashia dba Travelodge Burbank, Prashant Vaghashia dba Quality Inn Burbank Airport, Mita Vaghashia and Vaghasia Family Partnership Limited, the owners of hotels/motels in Southern California, wherein it was agreed that Plaintiff would be responsible for the management of Defendants’ Quality Inn hotel/motel in Burbank, and their Quality Inn and Suites hotel/motel located in Camarillo. Plaintiff alleges that under the agreement he was entitled to an hourly wage and a 10% commission of gross revenue for each hotel/motel, to be paid three years after entering the contract. It is also alleged that Plaintiff would be allowed to move with his family to Defendants’ real property located close to the Quality Inn Burbank, with Plaintiff to take possession of the rented property for the seven year duration of the contract without payment of rent and utilities. The parties agreed that Plaintiff could live at the rented property until he ceased to work under the contract or was terminated for any justifiable reason, and that if terminated, Plaintiff would be entitled to twelve months’ notice to vacate the rented property.

Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff performed under the contract, significantly increasing the gross revenues of the hotels/motels, and in January of 2015 entered into a separate agreement for Plaintiff to take over and manage Defendants’ Travelodge Burbank, which also included an agreement for paying a commission.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants would pay Plaintiff late or not pay the monthly agreed upon stipends, and did not pay Plaintiff overtime, or the required minimum wage.

It is also alleged that Defendant Govind ordered Plaintiff to obtain workers’ compensation insurance coverage in his own name, and, when Plaintiff declined, began to harass Plaintiff by threatening to terminate him and calling him names in the presence of other employees. Plaintiff alleges that he was made to sign papers in blank at the beginning of his employment, as Govind had a practice of taking signatures of new employees and later using those signatures on agreements drafted by Govind. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant instructed plaintiff to commit acts that violated the law such as preparing false statements to be submitted in workers compensation claims, or forging documents in civil cases. Plaintiff alleges that when he refused to commit the illegal acts, Defendants decided to terminate his employment, and have otherwise breached the contract by failing to pay the commissions due.

Plaintiff alleges that after he filed the initial complaint in this action he was inundated with numerous requests by Defendants that Plaintiff dismiss his lawsuit, and on March 8, 2018, Plaintiff received a letter terminating his employment without justifiable reasons, but because Plaintiff was about to testify regarding Defendant Govind’s fraud in forging documents and signatures of employees who sued Defendants for violation of various wage laws. On the same day Plaintiff’s employment was terminated, defendant Govind posted a thirty-day notice for Plaintiff and his family to vacate and quit the rented property.

Plaintiff also alleges that in a further effort to harass Plaintiff, Defendant Govind filed a request for restraining order seeking to restrain Plaintiff from his place of residence, but the court denied the request for a temporary restraining order until the day of the hearing, and before the hearing Govind dismissed the case, because it was baseless.

Defendants Prashant Vaghashia and Mita Vaghashia have filed a Cross-Complaint for equitable indemnity and declaratory relief against Cross-Defendants Govind Vaghashia and the Vaghashia Family Partnership Limited, alleging that Cross-Complainants were in no way connected with the termination of Plaintiff’s employment or of any of the acts or conduct complained of in the Complaint, but that any injuries or damages alleged will be founded on the fault of Cross-Defendants.

Defendants Vaghashia Family Limited Partnership, Govind Vaghashia ,and Sonal Vaghasia filed a special motion to strike the fifth and tenth causes of action of the first amended complaint (anti-SLAPP), which was heard on June 22, 2018. The motion was granted as to the fifth cause of action for Injunction Relief, and denied as to the tenth cause of action for Harassment. The motion was also denied with respect to a request to strike specific allegations in the pleading in connection with the harassment claim. The court’s order has been affirmed on appeal and remittitur was issued dated July 15, 2020.

Further Background based on 08/18/2023 Minute Order
On August 18, 2023, this Court heard Defendants/Cross-Complainants’ Motion for Protective Order “concerning certain discovery requests propounded by Defendant Govind Vaghashia in this case and for an order staying further prosecution of this case and the afore-captioned related case by the Govind Defendants.” (Min. Order 8/18/2023, p.1.)

For purposes of contextualizing the instant motion, the Court will cite to a portion of the 8/18/2023 Minute Order in this matter:

The Court notes that many of the previously mentioned standards in the “Legal Standard” section of this ruling have meet and confer requirements. Here, moving Defendants sufficiently met and conferred before filing this motion as indicated by Anyia’s declaration and exhibits. Opposition’s argument about there being no meet and confer is unavailing.

Prashant Defendants and the Opposition do not do a good job of explaining the context of this case with respect to other related cases and unrelated cases that are allegedly pertinent to this motion. However, moving Defendants’ declaration better helps put the instant motion and cases, both related and unrelated, into context to glean a better understanding of what is going on in this motion in the context of the other cases.

Moving Defendants argue that since a global settlement agreement was reached in the “downtown case” (moving Defendants allege this to be BC696133), the Govind Defendants should not be allowed to propound discovery in the instant case and the related case. However, it is unclear based on the moving papers and the Reply what the moving Defendants are referring to is the case related to the instant case. The basis for their argument is that a settlement agreement was reached in the downtown case wherein there was a clause where the Prashant Defendants indemnified Govind R. Vaghashia, Sonal Vaghashia, and the Vaghashia Family Limited Partnership in the Kothari case, and wherein the Prashant Parties were given the ability to choose counsel for the Govind Parties in the Kothari Case.

Generally speaking, the Court agrees with moving Defendants that a protective order is appropriate here based on the settlement agreement in the downtown case; however, there a few issues the moving Defendants would need to address at the instant hearing.

The Court does not find Opposition’s argument convincing that the settlement agreement and indemnification in the downtown case is irrelevant to the instant case because the settlement agreement in the downtown case explicitly mentions the Kothari case, which is the instant case.

However, the Court admits that its mention of the settlement agreement explicitly mentioning the Kothari case is an assumption. In Exhibit C, moving Defendants attached a meet and confer letter with a page that appears to be a portion of the alleged settlement agreement that contains a clause titled “Kothari Case Indemnification.” Although moving Defendants allegedly filed the settlement agreement under seal, nothing was filed under seal with the Court. Likewise, Opposition’s declaration mentioned it filed documents under seal that were also not under seal. Therefore, at the instant hearing, moving Defendants would need to come forward with the entire settlement agreement in the downtown case so the Court can evaluate the entirety of the merits of moving Defendants’ instant motion.

Further, Govind Vaghashia’s argument about an appeal in the downtown case is unavailing, as the moving papers submitted Exhibits D and E which were minute orders from the downtown case, BC696133, wherein the Court denied Govind’s motion to vacate or set aside settlement and wherein the Court granted Prashant and Mita’s motion to enforce settlement.

Further, what is confusing about the Opposition is that the Opposition itself mentions an appeal in BC696133, and Opposition refers to this case as Vaghashia v. Vaghashia at Stanley Mosk; however, Opposition’s request for judicial notice, Exhibit 1, refers to Exhibit 1 as Vipulkumar Patel v. Govind Vaghashia Case No. EC064357.

Either way, in whatever case Opposition is trying to indicate they filed an appeal, this Court does not find convincing Opposition’s arguments that a possibly pending appeal constitutes grounds to deny the instant motion for protective order.

Further, at the instant hearing, Moving Defendants need to clarify what exactly the protective order seeks. For example, Prashant Defendants attach Exhibit B1, B2, and B3 presumably to indicate the discovery Prashant Defendants want the Court to issue a protective order on so that Prashant Defendants do not have to respond to it. However, the motion itself and the declaration do not indicate precisely what discovery propounded on Prashant Defendants they want a protective order issued on. Further, some of the discovery referenced in the Exhibits do not indicate in which case the discovery was propounded, which leads the Court to its next point.

The instant motion seeks an order staying further prosecution of this case and the “the afore-captioned related case.” The moving Defendants do not indicate what the aforementioned related case is. Further, based on the limited evidence before the Court because of the lack of the sealed documents being submitted to the Court, this Court is not convinced as of now that a protective order shall apply to any discovery in a “related case.” Based on the already mentioned Exhibit C which had what appeared to be a portion of the settlement agreement, that portion of the settlement agreement only mentioned the Kothari Case. Nothing in the clause titled “Kothari Case Indemnification,” mentioned anything about a related case. The clause only mentioned the instant case, the Kothari Case.

It is also important to note that the alleged Settlement Agreement clause the Court can see with respect to the Kothari Case Indemnification mentions Govind R. Vaghashia, Sonal Vaghashia, and the Vaghashia Family Limited Partnership. It is thus not clear whether the settlement agreement covers all the Defendants in the FAC. The Court must be sure that all parties are accounted for in the alleged settlement agreement.

Therefore, at the instant hearing, the Moving Defendants must provide this alleged sealed settlement agreement. Further Moving Defendants would need to specify precisely what the protective order seeks, i.e., the discovery instruments, who it was propounded on, who it was propounded by, and in what case the discovery was propounded in. The Court is not convinced that the protective order would apply to a related case, as moving Defendants so far have come forth with no evidence indicating that the settlement agreement applies to a related case. Further, this Court is considering appointing a discovery referee in this case. CCP 639.

(Min. Order 8/18/23, p. 6-7.)

Further, for purposes of contextualizing the instant motion, the Court will cite to another portion of the 8/18/2023 Minute Order in this matter:

The Court hears argument.

The Court modifies the tentative as follows:

- The motion is GRANTED

- The protective order applies to all discovery hereafter propounded by Defendant Govind Vaghashia to protect the Prashant Defendants until further notice of the Court.

The tentative, as modified, becomes the final order of the Court.

The Motion for Protective Order filed by Mita Vaghashia, Prashant Vaghashia on 05/04/2023 is Granted.

Attorney Lal indicates that all the briefing regarding the appeal in case BC696133 has been completed.

The Hearing on Motion for Order MSC Setting is taken off calendar by the Court without prejudice.

The Court finds that case EC064357 is related to case EC067612, but is not related to case BC696133.

The Order to Show Cause Re: Related Case Determination of EC064357 filed 08/14/2015 Glendale Courthouse-Dept E is discharged.

The granting of the motion today renders Defendant Govind Vaghashia's 4 motions to compel scheduled for 10/20/2023 moot.

On the Court's own motion, the Hearing on Motion to Compel Form Interrogatories scheduled for 10/20/2023, Hearing on Motion to Compel Special Interrogatories scheduled for 10/20/2023, Hearing on Motion to Compel Production of Documents scheduled for 10/20/2023, and Hearing on Motion to Compel Request for Admission, Set Two from Cross Complt. Mita Vaghashia; Request for Sanctions (9309) scheduled for 10/20/2023 are advanced to this date and vacated.

Defendant Govind Vaghashia's motions are vacated without prejudice. When the protective order is lifted, Defendant Govind Vaghashia will not be prevented from filing these motions again.

On the Court's own motion, the Hearing on Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement (CCP 877.6) scheduled for 09/08/2023 is advanced to this date and continued to 10/6/2023 at 08:30 AM in Department E at Glendale Courthouse.

On the Court's own motion, the Trial Setting Conference scheduled for 08/18/2023, and Status Conference Re Stay Based on Case BC696133 scheduled for 08/18/2023 are continued to 1/10/2024 at 09:00 AM in Department E at Glendale Courthouse.

Attorney Anyia to give notice.

The minute order is the order.

(Min. Order 8/18/23, p. 9-10.)

ANALYSIS MOTION 1

Service/Notice
Opposition’s argument as to this motion being untimely is disingenuous. When the hearing on this motion was set for 2/9/2024, the Opposition submitted on 2/2/2024 argued that the motion was untimely and that Govind Defendants should not be deprived of his due process rights to file a proper opposition and requested the court to continue the matter to another date.

On 02/05/2024, Govind Defendants signed a stipulation agreeing for this motion to be heard on February 23, 2024.

Despite signing the stipulation on 02/05/2024, Govind Defendants filed another opposition on 2/15/2024 that appears to be nearly identical to the one filed on 2/2/2024, and they again argue that the instant motion is untimely.

In relevant part of CCP §1005(b), “ Unless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers shall be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing.” Further, the Court notes that “if the notice is served by facsimile transmission, express mail, or another method of delivery providing for overnight delivery, the required 16-day period of notice before the hearing shall be increased by two calendar days.” (CCP §1005(b), emph added.)

Here the instant motion was served electronically on 1/29/2024. Sixteen court days before the instant hearing would be January 30, 2024. Adding two calendar days, the motion would have to have been served by January 28, 2024. Although the instant motion was served on January 29, 2024, which appears to be a day late, the Court finds that this motion can still be heard a day early.

Govind Defendants’ counsel signed a stipulation on 2/05/2024 agreeing for this motion to be heard on 2/23/2024. When Govind Defendants submitted their initial Opposition on 2/2/2024, Govind Defendants were aware of the timeliness issue. Despite this, on 2/05/2024, Govind Defendants’ counsel agreed for this motion to be heard on 2/23/2024. For Govind Defendants to continue to argue in Opposition that this motion is untimely, without mentioning that they signed a stipulation for this motion to be heard on 2/23/2024 is disingenuous. Govind Defendants have agreed for this motion to be heard on the instant date; the instant motion is not untimely.

Further, CCP §1005(b) states, “The court, or a judge thereof, may prescribe a shorter time.” Since Govind Defendants have agreed via signed stipulation on 2/5/2024 by their counsel for this motion to be heard on 2/23/2024, the Court does not find this motion untimely.

Movants’ General Arguments in Favor of Granting Motion
Movants seek an order enforcing compliance of the terms of the global Settlement Agreement reached by the parties on June 10, 2022, or in the alternative, an order staying further prosecution of any proceedings in these related cases by the Govind Defendants. Movants’ motion is made pursuant to CCP §664.6 and 526(a)(3).

Movants argue:

These orders are necessary (and good cause exists for the issuance of such orders), to protect the Prashant Defendants and the Plaintiff in the related cases from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden or expense, by the Govind Defendants, because a global settlement agreement between the parties in another case (L.A.S.C. Case No: BC696133 (hereafter, "Underlying Case")), which was filed with this Court under seal (on 10/11/2023), mandates that the Prashant Defendants completely indemnify the Govind Defendants in these related cases. The agreement further provides that the Prashant Defendants will henceforth choose the lawyers for the Govind Defendants in these related cases. However, in violation of the agreement, the Govind Defendants have continued to vigorously litigate this case by serving baseless motions and needless and substantial discovery requests in these cases (in bad faith) for the purpose of creating unnecessary expenses and unduly burdening the other parties in the related cases.

(Movants’ Mot. p. 2.)

Further, Movants argue:

The Prashant Defendants then filed a lawsuit for breach of a partnership agreement against the Govind Defendants in L.A.S.C. Case No: BC696133 ("Downtown case") and also filed a cross-complaint against the Govind Defendants in the related cases. However, in June, 2022, the Govind Defendants and the Prashant Defendants executed a global settlement agreement ("the Settlement Agreement") in the Downtown case (see Declaration of Alfred O. Anyia, ("Anyia Declr.") at ¶7), which effectively provided that the Prashant Defendants will completely (and without qualification) indemnify the Govind Defendants in these two related cases and also choose (and pay) the lawyer for the Govind Defendants in the related cases. As such, the Govind Defendants have no more stake in these related cases. However, the Govind Defendants have since sought to continue to prosecute the related cases in violation of the settlement agreement, which led to the Prashant Defendants seeking a protective order re: discovery from this Court on 08/18/2023 (which was granted).

The Govind Defendants and their lawyer have however persisted in continuing to prosecute the related cases, thereby warranting this motion.

On April 20, 2023, the court in the Underlying Case granted the Prashant Defendants' motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement against the Govind Defendants (see Anyia Declr. ¶8- Exhibit "1") and denied the Govind Defendants' motion to set aside the settlement agreement (Anyia Declr. ¶8 -Exhibit "2"). Again, counsel for the Prashant Defendants in the related cases requested that the Govind Defendants desist from further prosecution of the related cases as mandated by the newly validated settlement agreement, but Mr. Lal has insisted on further prosecuting the related cases at the expense of the Prashant Defendants (see, Anyia Declr. ¶9, 10,11).

Thus, the Govind Defendants (and their counsel), are injecting themselves into this case and engaging in extensive discovery practice for no other purpose but to annoy and unduly burden the Prashant Defendants and the Plaintiff, thereby necessitating this motion for protective order.

(Movants’ Mot. p. 4-5.)

Discussion – Movants’ General Arguments in Favor of Granting Motion
The Court notes that Movants did not attach the settlement agreement that forms the basis for their instant motion to their moving papers. Movants state that the settlement agreement was filed with this Court under seal on 10/11/2023. The Court notes that it does not see the settlement agreement filed under seal on 10/11/2023.The only document filed with the Court on 10/11/2023 does not include the settlement agreement.

The settlement agreement that the Court found on file in eCourt is labeled as “Notice of Conditionally Lodging Under Seal of Exhibit “A”” and appears on eCourt on 10/20/2023. Upon clicking this document on 10/20/2023, the document is titled “DEFENDNATS PRASHANT AND MITA VAGHASHIA’S NOTICE OF CONDITIONALLY LODGING UNDER SEAL OF EXHIBIT “A” TO THE DECLARATION OF ALFRED O. ANYIA IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PRASHANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT.” This document has a stamp on the front indicating that it was filed on October 18, 2023. This document has an Exhibit A that is allegedly the parties’ June 10, 2022 Settlement Agreement in the Downtown Case (BC696133). Therefore, the Court will proceed as if this is the settlement agreement that Movants base their current motion on. If this is not the correct settlement agreement that Movants are basing their instant motion on, then Movants need to indicate this at the instant hearing and come forth with the proper settlement agreement.

In the “Conclusion” section of Movants’ motion, Movants state, “For the foregoing reasons, the Prashant Defendants respectfully request the court to enforce the provisions of paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Settlement Agreement in the Underlying Case so as to prevent the Govind Defendants from appointing any lawyers to engage in any continued prosecution of the related cases (except as provided for by the said Agreement) and or for stay of proceedings as the court may deem appropriate and necessary.” (Movants’ Mot. p. 8.)

For the sake of convenience, the Court will include what appears to be the relevant portions of the settlement agreement below:

This Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”) is dated Friday, June 10, 2022 (“Effective Date”) an entered into between and among the following parties, which below may be referred to individually as a “Party” and collectively as the “Parties.” The parties include:

Govind R. Vaghashia, individually and doing business as American Financial Services; Sonal G. Vaghashia, Sundeep G. Vaghashia, Vbanks Management, Inc., a California corporation; G&S Investments, LLC, a California limited liability company; The Vaghashia Family Limited Partnership, a Nevada limited partnership; Atmaswaroop Investments, LLC, a California limited liability company; Sherman Oaks First Plaza, LLC, a California limited liability company; Five Stars Hospitality, LLC, a California limited liability company; Bellflower First Plaza, LLC, a California limited liability company; Oak Park First Plaza, LLC, a California limited liability company; Graphic RSCH Properties, LLC, a California limited liability company(f/k/a Graphic Research, LLC, a California limited liability company); Pramukh Hospitality Services, Inc., a California corporation; and Govind R. Vaghashia and Sonal G. Vaghashia, as trustees of the Vaghashia Living Trust as amended on February 24, 2015, all collectively “Govind Parties”;

Prashant Vaghashia, Mita Vaghashia; Graphic Research, Inc., a California corporation; and Empire Hospitality Inc., an Arkansas corporation dba Econo Inn Ontario, all collectively the “Prashant Parties.”

Recitals

WHEREAS, the Parties have been and are involved in multiple litigations between and among each other in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, including the following:

· Vaghashia v. Vaghashia, Los Angeles Superior Court Case Nos. BC696133 (Consolidated with Case Nos. EC068519 (“Interpleader Case”), BC696798 and BC704685) and related Case No. PC058529; and 22BBCV00107 (collectively, the “Consolidated Proceedings”). The trial to this case is ongoing at the time of entry into this Agreement.

· Govind Vaghashia v. Horn, et al, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BS172969 (“Shareholder Derivative Complaint”). This case was dismissed without prejudice pursuant to a Stipulation and Order of Dismissal filed on or about May 25, 2019.

· Vaghashia v. Vaghashia, et. al, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. EC064237 (“Manji Case”). This case was dismissed after the execution of a settlement agreement.

· Vaghashia Family Limited Partnership v. Vaghashia, et al., United States District Court, Central District of California – Western Division with Case No. 2:19-cv-01876-JAK-PLA (“Federal RICO Case”). The Federal RICO case is stayed but pending at the time of entry into this Agreement.

WHEREAS, some of the Parties are currently involved in litigation in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. EC064357, in which Vipulkumar Patel is the plaintiff. This case is referred to as the “Vipul Case.”

WHEREAS, some of the Parties are currently involved in litigation in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. EC067612, in which Rakesh Kothari is the plaintiff. This case is referred to as the “Kothari Case.”

…

10. Vipul Case Indemnification. The Prashant Parties agree that they will indemnify, defend, pay the attorneys’ fees and costs for, and hold harmless Govind R. Vaghashia from and against any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, damages or obligations of every nature whatsoever, in law or in equity, that are based upon or arise out of the Vipul Case. To the extent the cooperation of any of the Govind Parties is needed for the defense of the Vipul Case, the Govind Parties shall reasonably cooperate, including providing documents and/or their availability to testify and/or execute settlement documents. The Prashant Parties will choose counsel for the Govind Parties.

11. Kothari Case Indemnification. The Prashant Parties agree that they will indemnify, defend, pay the attorneys’ fees and costs for, and hold harmless Govind R. Vaghashia, Sonal Vaghashia, and Vaghashia Family Limited Partnership from and against any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, damages or obligations of every nature whatsoever, in law or in equity, that are based upon or arise out of the Kothari Case. To the extent the cooperation of any of the Govind Parties is needed for the defense of the Kothari Case, the Govind Parties shall reasonably cooperate, including providing documents and/or their availability to testify and/or execute settlement documents. The Prashant Parties will choose counsel for the Govind Parties.

(Settlement Agreement on eCourt on 10/20/2023, first page stamped as filed 10/18/2023, Ex. A.)

As previously, mentioned, the “Conclusion” section of the instant motion states, ““For the foregoing reasons, the Prashant Defendants respectfully request the court to enforce the provisions of paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Settlement Agreement in the Underlying Case so as to prevent the Govind Defendants from appointing any lawyers to engage in any continued prosecution of the related cases (except as provided for by the said Agreement) and or for stay of proceedings as the court may deem appropriate and necessary.” (Movants’ Mot. p. 8.)

To the extent that this motion seeks to prevent the Govind Defendants from appointing any lawyers in this case, the Kothari case, the Court tends to agree that based on the language of the settlement agreement, the Govind Defendants in this case cannot appoint lawyers. However, below, the Court will note several issues that it has with Movants’ motion as to the extent of the relief requested and if it is appropriate.

Discussion (Related Cases) – Movants’ General Arguments in Favor of Granting Motion
Several times throughout Movants’ motion, Movants refer to “related cases,” and it is not entirely clear as to what Movants believe to be the “related cases.”

In the 8/18/2023 Minute Order, this Court noted, “The Court finds that case EC064357 is related to case EC067612, but is not related to case BC696133.” (Min. Order 8/18/2023, p. 9.)

To the extent that this motion seeks relief for enforcing the settlement agreement, or staying further prosecution of any proceedings by the Govind Defendants, in any “related cases,” Movants need to clarify at the hearing as to what it believes the “related cases” are. No matter what relief Movants are seeking, this Court questions whether it has the authority to enter any orders that are not before it here in Department E.

Discussion (Parties) – Movants’ General Arguments in Favor of Granting Motion
In the first paragraph on Movants’ notice page for this motion, Movants state:

Defendants/Cross-Complainants, Prashant Vaghashia and Mita Vaghashia (hereinafter referred to as "Prashant Defendants"), will and hereby move this Court for an order enforcing the compliance of Defendant, Govind Vaghashia, Defendant, Sonal G. Vaghashia, and their entities, American Financial Services, The Vaghashia Family Limited Partnership, Atmaswaroop Investments LLC, Sherman Oaks First Plaza, LLC, Five Stars Hospitality, LLC, Bellflower First Plaza, LLC, Oak First Plaza, LLC (hereafter referred to as the "Govind Defendants"), with the terms of the global Settlement Agreement reached by the parties on June 10, 2022, which agreement provides that the Prashant Defendants shall completely indemnify the Govind Defendants for any damages in this action and the related Case- Vipulkumar Patel v. Vaghashia- L.A.S.C. Case No: EC064357 (hereafter, the "related cases") and that the Prashant Defendants will appoint the lawyers for the Govind Defendants (going forward) in these related cases. As such, the Govind Defendants can no longer appoint their own lawyers to prosecute these related cases.

(Movants’ Mot. p. 1-2.)

As can be seen above, Movants seek an order enforcing compliance of several parties with the terms of the settlement agreement. Movants list several parties that do not appear to be parties to the instant case. In Plaintiff’s FAC, the only Defendants are listed as: GOVIND R. VAGHASHIA, an individual doing business as Quality Inn and Suites Camarillo; SONAL VAGHASHIA, an individual doing business as Travelodge Burbank; PRASHANT R. VAGHASHIA, an individual doing business as Quality Inn Burbank Airport; MITA VAGHASHIA, an individual; VAGHASHIA FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LIMITED; and DOES 1-10 inclusive.

Therefore, the Court has concerns as to whether it can enter any orders for parties that are not before it in the instant case. At the instant hearing, Movants’ are to address why it listed all the parties it listed in its notice of motion, and Movants are to address specifically which parties it seeks an order against and which specific cases those parties are in. To highlight the importance of the need for specificity as to which parties, and which cases Movants seeks an order in, the Court points out how the Vipul Case Indemnification clause in the settlement agreement appears to pertain to only Govind R. Vaghashia whereas in the Kothari Case Indemnification clause in the settlement agreement appears to pertain to Govind, Sonal, and Vaghashia Family Limited Partnership.

CCP §664.6
Opposition argues that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement dated June 10th, 2022 because under C.C.P §664, jurisdiction was purportedly vested with the underlying court- Stanley Mosk Dept 17.

Specifically, Opposition argues:

The power of Dept 17 at Stanley Mosk is indeed disputed and is under appeal. Paragraph 6 of the Settlement Agreement clearly states that Retention of Jurisdiction to a designated court. Paragraph 6 states that the terms of this Agreement may also be enforced pursuant to the provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6 or any equivalent provision existing under Federal law. It further states that This Agreement, including its exhibits and attachments, may be offered as evidence in any proceeding to enforce this Agreement pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6 or any equivalent law, statute, or rule. The Parties agree to waive the provisions of the California Evidence Code section 1152 so that this writing may be entered into evidence in furtherance of a motion under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6. Even though this matter is under appeal since Dept 17 at the Stanley Mos Courthouse erroneously assumed Jurisdiction contrary to the provisions of C.C.P. §664.6.

The moving papers are vague and ambiguous as to what provisions of the agreement are to be enforced by this court. It is unclear as to what equitable remedy is Prashant seeking under the settlement agreement from this court. C.C.P. §664. Prashant’s argument that this court is vested with authority to enforce the settlement agreement is without any legal authorities since multiple courts enforcing the agreement can have multiple rulings which can be conflicting. Settlement agreement is a contract, and thus legal principles which apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts. Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick, 60 Cal. App. 4th 793, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 (1998). The fact that mediation memorandum indicated settlement would be enforceable under statute authorizing motion for judgment pursuant to terms of settlement did not grant authority to private judge in mediation proceedings to select and impose terms of settlement to which one of parties had not agreed. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 664.6, Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick, 60 Cal. App. 4th 793, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 (1998). Nothing in section 664.6 authorizes a judge to create the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon or another judge without authority to enforce the terms of the agreement. Id.

(Oppo. p. 17-18.)

Discussion – CCP § 664.6
The Court is not entirely persuaded as to the validity of the arguments brought up in Opposition as to this issue.

The settlement agreement states in relevant part:

6. Retention of Jurisdiction. The terms of this Agreement may also be enforced pursuant to the provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6 or any equivalent provision existing under Federal law. This Agreement, including its exhibits, and attachments, may be offered as evidence in any proceeding to enforce this Agreement pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6 or any equivalent law, statute, or rule. The Parties agree to waive the provisions of the California Evidence Code section 1152 so that this writing may be entered into evidence in furtherance of a motion under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6.

(Settlement Agreement on eCourt on 10/20/2023, first page stamped as filed 10/18/2023, Ex. A.)

The Court questions Opposition’s argument because Opposition appears to be arguing that this Court does not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, but also confusingly argues that Dept 17 at Stanley Mosk both does and does not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.

Further, the Court questions Opposition’s argument because nothing in the “Retention of Jurisdiction” section of the settlement agreement mentions specifically which court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.

Putting aside the Opposition’s argument, the Court has its own concerns as to if moving under § 664.6 is the proper statute for Movants to move under based on the relief the Movants seek.

CCP § 664.6 states as follows:

(a) If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.

(b) For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by any of the following:

(1) The party.

(2) An attorney who represents the party.

(3) If the party is an insurer, an agent who is authorized in writing by the insurer to sign on the insurer’s behalf.

(CCP § 664.6(a)-(b).)

In relevant part as stated in Weddington:

Section 664.6 was enacted to provide a summary procedure for specifically enforcing a settlement contract without the need for a new lawsuit….

Although a judge hearing a section 664.6 motion may receive evidence, determine disputed facts, and enter the terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment, (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial supra, at § 12:975 et seq.; Fiore v. Alvord (1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 221 Cal.Rptr. 400 [court may interpret terms of settlement agreement] ) nothing in section 664.6 authorizes a judge to create the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon…

In order to be enforceable pursuant to the summary procedures of section 664.6, a settlement agreement must either be entered into orally before a court (a possibility not involved here) or must be in writing and signed by the parties. The reason for the party-signature requirement is that “settlement is such a serious step that it requires the client's knowledge and express consent. (1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Attorneys, § 194, pp. 221–222.)” (Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 583, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 896 P.2d 171.) “... in 1981 ... the Legislature enacted section 664.6, which created a summary, expedited procedure to enforce settlement agreements when certain requirements that decrease the likelihood of misunderstandings are met. Thus the statute requires the ‘parties' to stipulate in writing or orally before the court that they have settled the case. The litigants' direct participation tends to ensure that the settlement is the result of their mature reflection and deliberate assent. This protects the parties against hasty and improvident settlement agreements by impressing upon them the seriousness and finality of the decision to settle, and minimizes the possibility of conflicting interpretations of the settlement. (See In re Marriage of Assemi, [1994], 7 Cal.4th at p. 905 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 265, 872 P.2d 1190]; City of Fresno v. Maroot, [1987], 189 Cal.App.3d [755] at p. 762 [234 Cal.Rptr. 353]; Datatronic Systems Corp. v. Speron, Inc., [1986] 176 Cal.App.3d [1168] at p. 1174 [222 Cal.Rptr. 658].) It also protects parties from impairment of their substantial rights without their knowledge and consent. (See Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., supra, 38 Cal.3d [396] at p. 404 [212 Cal.Rptr. 151, 696 P.2d 645].) [Fn. omitted.]” (Levy, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 585–586, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 896 P.2d 171.)

(Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 809-810.)

The Court has its concerns as to if moving under § 664.6 is the proper statute for Movants to move under based on the relief the Movants seek because part of§ 664.6 states, “…the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement…” (CCP § 664.6(a); emph. added.)

Here, it does not appear as if Movants are seeking the Court to enter a judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement in the sense that it does not appear as if Movants are arguing that the instant case is settled and a judgment is sought to be entered. Movants more so appear to be seeking to prevent Govind Defendants from prosecuting the instant case based on the Govind Defendants signing a settlement agreement that pertained to many cases, and in relevant part, the settlement agreement allegedly prevents the Govind Defendants from prosecuting the instant case because the Prashant Parties were to choose counsel for the Govind Parties according to the settlement agreement.

Therefore, the Court will hear argument as to whether moving to enforce a settlement agreement under 664.6 is the proper basis to bring this motion based on the type of relief the Movants seek.

CCP § 526
In addition to moving under CCP § 664.6, Movants also sought relief under CCP § 526(a)(3).

CCP § 526(a)(3) states, “An injunction may be granted in the following cases: When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.” (CCP § 526(a)(3).)

Movants argue:

A stay is necessary because if the Govind Defendants are allowed to continue to litigate the related cases (at considerable costs and expense to the Prashant Defendants and in violation of the Settlement Agreement) and any purported appeal by the Govind Defendants is decided in favor of the Prashant Defendants, the Prashant Defendants would have lost a considerable amount of money in litigation expenses and would have also lost the benefit of the Settlement Agreement. The harm is irreparable and should be avoided now, rather than later. Intel Com. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342 1352, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 71 P.3d 296 (2003).

The courts have inherent powers to manage judicial proceedings before it and may stay the entire proceedings in a case in the interests of justice (C.C.P. 187, Jordache Ente rises Inc. v. Brobeck, Phelger & Harrison (1998) 18 Ca1.4th, 739, 758; Bailey v Fosca Oil. Co. (1963) 21 20 Cal.App.2d, 813, 817

This Motion is akin to the Motion for Protective Order brought by the Prashant Defendant against the Govind Defendants in this Court on 08/18/2023 which was granted (see Anyia, Declr. ¶10 and Request for Judicial Notice thereto) based on the Settlement Agreement in the Underlying Case.

Opposition argues that Movants’ use of CCP § 526 as a vehicle to obtain a preliminary injunction to stay all proceedings or restrain Govind from prosecuting or defending this case is procedurally incorrect and defective.

Opposition argues:

In determining whether to issue or use C.C.P. §526 equitable remedy for a preliminary injunction, the trial court considers two related factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of its case at trial, and (2) the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. [Citation.] ‘The latter factor involves consideration of such things as the inadequacy of other remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity of preserving the status quo.’ ” (14859 Moorpark Homeowner's Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1402, [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 712].). None of the above listed factors are applicable to this case and Prashant fails to cite any legal authorities for his basis in using the 525 equitable remedies for a stay of all proceedings or even restraining Govind to exercise his due process rights to defend the case due to personal liabilities and exposure.

(Oppo. p. 10.)

Opposition further addresses § 526 by arguing that: (1) Prashant fails to meet the interrelated factor test – the trial courts can only use injunctions during the litigation in special circumstances; (2) Leaving the interrelated factors alone, Prashant has failed to show great irreparable harm or likelihood of success in this case despite indemnification; and (3) Prashant has failed to show great irreparable harm. Opposition asserts the aforementioned arguments on pages 10-14 of its Opposition.

Discussion – CCP § 526
Opposition pointed out that under CCP § 526, in determining whether to issue or use C.C.P. § 526 equitable remedy for a preliminary injunction, the trial court considers two related factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of its case at trial, and (2) the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction.

The Court notes that Movants did not even mention that this is part of the standard when deciding whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction. As Movants did not even cite this standard, the Court notes how it is entirely unclear as to how Movants believe they satisfied these elements in order for a preliminary injunction to be granted.

While the Court is not entirely convinced as to all the arguments the Opposition brings up as to 526, the Court somewhat agrees with the Opposition’s doubts about whether 526 is the proper vehicle for the relief Movants seek. The Court has its concerns as to whether 526 is the proper vehicle because Movants’ motion admitted, “This Motion is akin to the Motion for Protective Order brought by the Prashant Defendants against the Govind Defendants in this Court on 08/18/2023 which was granted (see Anyia, Declr. ¶10 and Request for Judicial Notice thereto) based on the Settlement Agreement in the Underlying Case.” (Movants’ Mot. p. 7.)

Therefore, the Court will hear argument as to whether CCP §526 is the proper basis to bring the instant motion. Further, the Court would like Movants to address why they didn’t bring a motion for protective order like they previously did. Further, the Court would like Movants to address why they needed to bring a motion at all if their Motion for Protective Order was granted on 08/18/2023 because on 08/18/2023 the Court stated, “The protective order applies to all discovery hereafter propounded by Defendant Govind Vaghashia to protect the Prashant Defendants until further notice of the Court.” (Min. Order 8/18/2023, p.9.)

Mr. Anyia
Opposition argues that Mr. Anyia cannot represent Govind.

Opposition argues:

In order to harass Govind, Prashant has appointed Alfred Aniya to represent the Govind parties in this case under the settlement agreement dated June 10th, 2022. Mr. Anyia’s conflicts of interests arise from the simultaneous representation of clients the Govind Parties and Prashant (or concurrent representation), as well as successive representation. Mr. Anyia has substantial conflict of interest since he represented Defendant Quality Inn Burbank and its principal Govind Vaghashia in a case entitled Robert Edding and Christian Hollman v Quality Inn Burbank, Choice Hotel International [Govind Vaghashia] et a , Los Angeles County Superior Court Case # BC671247. See Lal Decl., Exhibit 3- Representation Letter by Alfred Anyia dated August 17th , 2017. While Mr. Aniya was representing Govind in the Edding Case, at the same time he was filing a Lawsuit and a TRO against the Govind parties in Los Angeles Superior Court. See Lal Decl, ¶¶ 4-6;Ex 5. On or about January 5, 2018 Mr. Aniya having represented Govind in the Edding Case in 2017, breached his professional responsibilities and Code of Ethics while filing a lawsuit against Govind on January 5, 2018 and asking the court to appoint receivership in seizing Govind’s real estate portfolio. See Lal Decl, ¶¶ 4-6; Ex 5.

No sooner after that on June 14th, 2018 Mr. Aniya represented Prashant as a codefendant in this case against Govind and filed a Cross Complaint against Govind seeking $10m indemnification on behalf of Prashant in this Kothari Lawsuit. See Lal Decl, ¶¶ 4-6; Ex 4- Indemnification By Prashant. Mr. Aniya continues with his shenanigans in being indifferent to the State Bar Code of Ethical Conduct by opposing Govind’s Good Faith Settlement under C.C.P. §877.6 on behalf of Prashant in the Kothari matter. See Lal Decl, ¶¶ 6-9. Prashant’s Opposition to Govind’s 877 motion in Glendale Court. As a result of Mr. Aniya’s opposition, this court delayed approval and set the matter for further supplemental briefing. Govind has filed a revised version of the 877 Good Faith Settlement approval which is scheduled for February 23rd , 2024.

(Oppo. p. 5-6.)

Discussion – Mr. Anyia
Here, the Court fails to see how Opposition’s arguments are on point. On 10/27/2023, this Court already denied the motion to disqualify Mr. Alfred Anyia for Co-Defendant Prashant Vaghashia and Mita Vaghashia, et al due to conflict of interest. (See 10/27/2023 Minute Order.)

Further, the settlement agreement explicitly stated, “The Prashant Parties will choose counsel for the Govind Parties,” in section 11 of the settlement agreement titled “Kothari Case Indemnification.”

Govind Faces Personal Liability
Opposition argues that Govind faces personal liability not covered by indemnification and has the right to defend and prosecute this case.

Opposition argues:

Prashant’s attempt to prohibit Govind from prosecuting this case is not persuasive. Govind is eager to settle this case, Prashant is simply ‘playing games’ and pushing Govind to Jury Trial due to personal exposure of Govind, Govind faces personal liabilities which are beyond the indemnification in the settlement agreement. Because Govind has been sued for tort actions that are personal in nature Govind has a heavy exposure as compared to Prashant who purportedly alleges that he was the Manager of Govind and took directions from Govind-a master servant relationship. Under this rule Govind is vicariously liable for torts and misdeeds of co-defendants Mita and Prashant Vaghashia. Personal torts and misdeeds or even criminal activities of Prashant and Mita while employed by Govind cannot be indemnified by Prashant including punitive damages for the purported allegations of having his employees file police report.

There are two distinct reasons why indemnification of punitive damages is prohibited in California. First is the public policy rationale against diluting the deterrent effect of punitive damages by allowing the impact of the penalty to be shifted to the insurer. This justification applies whatever the basis for the punitive damages award. The second reason is applicable only when the basis for the punitive damages is a willful act of the defendant. (Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 158, 181 Cal.Rptr. 784, 642 P.2d 1305.)

The allegations against Govind in the FAC filed in this case in September 13, 2017 are serious in nature as to intentional torts and therefore the law presents an additional reason for disallowing indemnification of the punitive damages, as well as indemnification of the remainder of the plaintiff's recovery....” (Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 158, 181 Cal.Rptr. 784, 642 P.2d 1305.) Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 162 Cal. App. 3d 939, 946, 208 Cal. Rptr. 806, 811 (Ct. App. 1984), If in the event Plaintiff Kothari and Co Defendant Mita Vaghashia are found to be employees of Govind, then willful, malicious, and even criminal torts may fall within scope of his or her employment for purposes of respondent superior, even though employer [ Govind] has not authorized employee to commit crimes or intentional torts. Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 12 Cal. 4th 291, 907 P.2d 358 (1995). Govind faces. Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 12 Cal. 4th 291, 907 P.2d 358 (1995). The rule of respondent superior is familiar and simply stated: an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of employment. (Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 962, 967, 227 Cal.Rptr. 106, 719 P.2d 676.) In light of the reasons stated above, placing a stay or prohibiting Govind from prosecuting this case or preparing for the jury trial in the event the case is unsettled or if Govind prevailing on the appeal would unfair and unreasonable to Govind.

(Oppo. p. 6-8.)

Discussion - Govind Faces Personal Liability
Here, the Court fails to understand Opposition’s arguments.

The relevant provision of the settlement agreement stated:

(Settlement Agreement on eCourt on 10/20/2023, first page stamped as filed 10/18/2023, Ex. A.)

The settlement agreement was signed on 6-10-2022 after the filing of the FAC which was filed on 4/12/2018, and the settlement agreement was also signed after the filing of the Cross-Complaint which was filed on 6/4/2018. If Opposition had problems with how it could be held liable under the FAC or the Cross-Complaint, it appears as if the Govind Defendants should not have signed the settlement agreement on 6-10-2022. Therefore, the Court fails to understand the arguments that Opposition is asserting.

TENTATIVE RULING MOTION 1

The parties are to address all the issues that the Court pointed out above, such as if this motion is properly brought under §§ 664.6 or 526(a)(3).

Further, if neither §§ 664.6 nor 526(a)(3) is the appropriate statute to bring this motion under, it would be beneficial for Movants to cite legal authority for the Court to grant relief to Movants.

Further, the Movants would need to fully explain what this order seeks, whom it is sought against, in what cases the order is sought, and in what cases the parties are in.

Generally speaking, based on the settlement agreement, it appears as if the Prashant Defendants have the power to choose counsel for the Govind Parties.

Therefore, to the extent that this motion seeks to prevent Govind Defendants from appointing any lawyers to engage in any continued prosecution of this case, it appears as if the settlement agreement does in fact prevent the Govind Defendants from appointing lawyers to engage in the continued prosecution of this case.

To the extent that this motion also seeks to prevent the Govind Defendants from appointing any lawyers to engage in continued prosecution of any related cases, the Movants need to clarify what they mean by “related cases.” The Court needs the issue of “related cases” clarified because the Court has its doubts as to its authority/jurisdiction to afford any relief in cases not before it.

Further, if the Court can grant relief by enforcing the settlement agreement, the Movants would need to indicate exactly what parties and in what cases it is seeking to enforce the settlement agreement. Further, the Movants would need to further indicate what exactly it seeks as far as enforcing the settlement agreement.

Further, the Court is not entirely clear why the Movants need an order enforcing the settlement agreement if the prior protective order from 8/18/2023 is still in place.

The court in the downtown case already granted the motion to enforce settlement; the Court is unclear why an order needs to be made in this case as to the settlement agreement. Presumably, the Plaintiff in the instant case, Kothari, has not signed an agreement to settle this case with Prashant Parties’ counsel.

Movants seem to be looking to prevent Govind Defendants’ counsel from prosecuting the instant matter and propounding discovery, which the Court agrees that Govind Defendants’ counsel should not be propounding discovery in the Kothari case based on the Kothari Indemnification clause. Again, Movants need to explain at the hearing as to what exactly they are seeking from this motion.

It may be that the Court will require additional briefing on these questions and issues.

Request for Judicial Notice by Govind R. Vaghashia and Sonal Vaghashia
In Opposition, Govind Defendants’ counsel requested judicial notice of :

1. Case entitled Vipulkumar Patel vs. Govind Vaghashia, et al, before the Los Angeles Superior Court-Glendale, Case Number EC064357. A true and correct copy of the Case Summary is attached as Exhibit 1.

2. Case entitled Bhikahai Patel vs. Govind Vaghashia, et al, before the Los Angeles Superior Court-Burbank, Case Number EC064160. A true and correct copy of the Case Summary is attached as Exhibit 2.

Judicial notice is granted.

TENTATIVE RULINGS MOTIONS 2-5 on FOUR MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES [All on calendar for 9:00am]

Also on hearing for 2/9/2024 are four motions to compel further.

For the sake of clarity, the Court notes that it appears as if the four motions to compel further that are on calendar are as follows:

1. Defendants Govind and Sonal Vaghashia’s motion to compel further responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, from Cross-Complainant Prashant Vaghashia. The last four digits of this motion’s Reservation ID appear to be 8954.

2. Defendants Govind and Sonal Vaghashia’s motion to compel further responses to Request for Admission, Set One, from Cross-Complainant Prashant Vaghashia. The last four digits of this motion’s Reservation ID appear to be 8695.

3. Defendants Govind and Sonal Vaghashia’s motion to compel further responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set Two, from Cross-Complainant Prashant Vaghashia. The last four digits of this motion’s Reservation ID appear to be 8125.

4. Defendants Govind and Sonal Vaghashia’s motion to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, from Cross Complainant Prashant Vaghashia. The last four digits of this motion’s Reservation ID appear to be 3260.

The Court notes that all four of these motions were filed on 06/13/2023. Further, all four of these motions requested sanctions. Further, all four of these motions had a notice/motion, a separate statement, and a declaration.

As to all of the discovery motions at issue, it appears as if Govind Defendants appear to be seeking to compel further responses based on Prashant Defendant’s response of, “Objection. Responding party objects to this request on the grounds that per the settlement agreement between the parties in L.A.S.C. Case No: BC696133, the propounding party (and their attorney) are no longer authorized to propound discovery in this case. Further, the request is propounded in bad faith and is meant to annoy and unnecessarily overburden the responding party such that Responding party has filed a motion for protective order set for hearing on 8/18, 2023.”

In Govind Defendants’ motions, Govind Defendants argue with respect to the settlement agreement:

Indeed, there was a clause of indemnification in the settlement agreement with regards to Prashant indemnifying in the underlying settlement case. Even though the court has ruled the Settlement Agreement is enforceable, this in itself does not excuse this trial from proceeding further because Govind Parties are appealing the Court’s ruling in this matter which would probably be prolonged time over passing the statute of limitations to bring the current instant case to trial on or about August 2024 under . Govind Party attempted to explain this to Prashant Party but their explanation fell on deaf ears to this issue. Furthermore, there is no absolute guarantee that the Prashant and Plaintiff Kothari would settle to an amount and in the event the case doesn’t settle, the case proceeds to trial in this case. The Govind Party faces very serious consequences, and the exposure of Govind Party is unlimited to this case.

Rakesh Kothari was an employee of Govind Vaghashia, and he was on a W-2 status. Thereafter, they purported fraud and produced a fraudulent employment contract in conspiracy with Prashant Vaghashia to claim himself to be an independent contractor on commission. Prashant was business manager for Govind and overlooked the activities of Rakesh Kothari. Prashant Vaghashia and Rakesh Kothari had done previous business together in hotel industry and is now understood that they were partners in an Idaho Hotel or a motel together commonly known the lodge and also partners in another hotel name unknown. Govind alleges that the money they invested in this hotel was embezzled from his business by Prashant Vaghashia and Rakesh Kothari.

Rakesh Kothari falsely alleges that Govind Vaghashia enticed them to file a false police report. This allegation in itself is serious and exposes Govind Vaghashia to liability. Even if the indemnification case comes to a conclusion there is still an exposure for Govind Vaghashia and that is why discovery is necessary to proceed in this case.

(See Mot. to Compel Further Responses to RFA, Set One, p. 5-6.)

Here, the Court fails to understand Govind Defendants’ arguments; therefore, the Court finds Govind Defendants’ arguments unavailing.

Further, in Govind Defendants’ motions, Govind Defendants have a section titled, “On January 23, 2023, The Court Orders Discovery Open and The Parties DO NOT OBJECT.” (See Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFA, Set One, p. 7.) Govind Defendants argue:

On January 23, 2023, this court dealt extensively with the issue of reopening discovery at the request of GOVIND PARTY due to many undiscoverable documents and issues and also COVID-19 related matters. Mr. Alfred Anyia along with Mr. Eloche Ukeje were present at a court conference call when this matter was discussed extensively. Mr. Anyia as the counselor for PRASHANT did not raise any objection and did not raise any issue a protective order at that point in time. No later than the January 23, 2023 status conference meeting, Govind propounded discovery on Prashant Vaghashia, Mita Vaghashia, and Rakesh Kothari. The first set of discovery were propounded on Prashant Vaghashia on March 23, 2023, and at the initial stage, Prashant and Mita did not object, file any protective order, nor file any complaint regarding the discovery propounded on them, including agreeing to meet and confer on the discovery responses of Mita Vaghashia.

Govind sent a letter to Prashant and Mita Vaghashia advising them that the discovery was due and that a response was needed. In an attempt to ambush and abuse the discovery process instead of meeting and conferring in good faith, Prashant parties took the abusive approach and took it upon themselves to file a protective order in order to sanction Govind for trying to make sense of their confoundingly vague and evasive responses to basic discovery questions. This is the very conduct that is punishable by sanctions; the use of delay tactics and fraudulent behavior to prevent the opposing party from being able to evaluate the case and make informed decisions during the lawsuit. Such conduct is punishable by C.C.P. §128.5 on the basis of impeding discovery. GOVIND VAGASHIA requesting that this court shut the matter pursuant to C.C.P. §128.5 and to pursue sanctions against PRASHANT and its counsel so that Govind is given due process.

(See Mot. to Compel Further Responses to RFA, Set One, p.7-8.)

Here, the Court also fails to understand Govind Defendants’ arguments. Govind Defendants state that the discovery was not sent until March 23, 2023; therefore, on January 23, 2023, there would have been no responses to the discovery since it had not been propounded yet. Thus, the objections asserted in response about the settlement agreement would not have been asserted on January 23, 2023 because Prashant had not received the discovery at that date.

No Opposition was submitted to the instant four motions.

The Court DENIES the instant four motions, Motions 2-5, and the request for sanctions in each motion based on the fact that the settlement agreement provided that The Prashant Parties will choose counsel for the Govind Parties. The downtown case already enforced the settlement agreement. Further, on 8/18/2023, this Court granted a protective order applying “to all discovery propounded by Defendant Govind Vaghashia to protect the Prashant Defendants until further notice.” If this protective order is not still in place, the parties need to inform the Court as to when/why the protective order is not in place. Further, even though the 8/18/2023 Minute Order only explicitly mentions discovery propounded by Defendant Govind Vaghashia, the settlement agreement applies to Sonal as well; therefore Sonal is also not allowed to propound discovery. Therefore, it does not appear appropriate that Hari S. Lal is propounding discovery on behalf of Govind and Sonal when the settlement agreement stated that the Prashant Parties will choose counsel for the Govind Parties.

Motion 6 [On Calendar for 8:30am]
Moving Parties: Defendants Govind and Sonal Vaghashia (Govind Defendants or Movants)

Opposition Parties: Defendants, Prashant Vaghashia and Mita Vaghashia (Prashant Parties)

Motion 6 is Defendant Govind Vaghashia and Sonal Vaghashia’s “revised motion to determine good faith settlement pursuant to CCP §877.6.”

For reasons unknown to the Court, Govind Defendants submitted a revised motion and Lal Declaration both on 1/26/2024 and on 1/29/2024. Movants also submitted a proposed order on 1/29/2024.

Prashant Parties submitted an opposition and the declaration of Earth Shah.

Govind Defendants also submitted a reply, evidentiary objections to the declaration of Earth Shah, a supplemental Lal declaration, and evidentiary objections to the declaration of Alfred O. Aniya.

Tentative Ruling Motion 6
The motion submitted on 1/29/2024 states, “Defendants Govind Vaghashia will hereby move the court for a Revised Version of Determination of Good Faith Approval of the Settlement Agreement under C.C.P. §877.6. The settlement agreement entered between plaintiff Rakesh Kothari and defendant Govind Party is strictly confidential, but the payment structure and the conditions of payment are disclosed in this motion including the stipulation to the agreement.” (Govind Mot. p. ii.)

Movants state that a settlement agreement was entered between Plaintiff Rakesh Kothari and Govind Vaghashia , Sonal Vaghashia, and the Vaghashia Family Trust. Movants provide no proof of the settlement agreement by failing to attach this alleged settlement agreement.

While Movants cite law on good faith settlements under 877.6, Movants’ motion misses the mark. Movants’ counsel is currently barred from engaging in settlement negotiations with Plaintiff Rakesh Kothari based on the language of the Kothari Case Indemnification clause in the settlement agreement that the downtown case already enforced.

As stated in the settlement agreement:

(Settlement Agreement on eCourt on 10/20/2023, first page stamped as filed 10/18/2023, Ex. A.)

In Reply, Movants argue the Opposition is untimely. The Court utilizes its discretion and still considers Opposition papers.

In Reply, Movants generally argue that: consent is not needed from the Prashant Parties for Govind to enter into a good faith settlement with Plaintiff; that Prashant parties have no right to be present at settlement negotiations involving other parties and consent is not needed; and that the settlement agreement does not state that Govind shall need Prashant’s consent prior to entering a good faith settlement because a clause which contains the words “indemnify” and “hold harmless” is an indemnity clause which generally obligates the indemnitor like Prashant to reimburse the indemnitee Govind for any damages the indemnitee becomes obligated to pay third persons through settlement or judgments otherwise.

The Court finds Movants’ arguments unavailing. Movants’ arguments rely on a strained reading of the indemnification clause. The indemnification clause stated, “The Prashant Parties will choose counsel for the Govind parties.” The Court fails to see how Govind Defendants’ current counsel can enter into settlement negotiations or agreements with Plaintiff.

The Court finds the Reply’s evidentiary objections to the Earth Shah declaration and the Aniya declaration immaterial. Further, the Court does not understand the Reply’s basis/arguments of the objections. Objections overruled.

Motion 6 is DENIED. Defendant Govind Vaghashia and Sonal Vaghashia’s revised motion to determine good faith settlement pursuant to CCP § 877.6 is DENIED.