Judge: Audra Mori, Case: 19STCV14557, Date: 2023-01-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV14557    Hearing Date: January 5, 2023    Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

BENETTA MYLES,

                        Plaintiff(s),

            vs.

 

GUSTAVO ALONSO VALDEV MEJIA, ET AL.,

 

                        Defendant(s).

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      CASE NO: 19STCV14557

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL

 

Dept. 31

1:30 p.m.

January 5, 2023

 

1. Background

Plaintiff Benetta Myles (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Gustavo Alonso Valdev Mejia (“Mejia”), Falkenn Logistics (“Falkenn”), Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. (“Penske”) for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.  Plaintiff has filed an Amendment to Complaint naming Global Logistics Solutions Group, LLC (“Global Logistics”) as Doe 1.  On October 25, 2019, Plaintiff dismissed the complaint with prejudice as to Penske. 

 

Defendants Mejia, Falkenn, and Global Logistics are in default and an Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal and Order to Show Cause Re: Default Judgment (the “OSCs”) were set for April 21, 2022.  However, there were no appearances or contact by any parties at the OSCs, and Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed without prejudice. 

 

On June 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to set aside dismissal.  This matter was last heard on October 28, 2022, where it was continued to January 5, 2023, for Plaintiff’s counsel to file a declaration that was referenced in but missing from the moving papers.  Plaintiff’s counsel filed the relevant declaration on December 21, 2022. 

 

Plaintiff asserts the dismissal was the result of Plaintiff’s counsel’s mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. 

 

2. Motion to Set Aside Dismissal

a. Mandatory Relief

To the extent the motion is made pursuant to the mandatory provision of §473(b), Plaintiff cannot obtain relief under the mandatory provisions of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §473(b) where an action is dismissed for failure to prosecute. 

 

“Finding that when the Legislature incorporated dismissals into section 473, subdivision (b) it intended to reach only those dismissals which occur through failure to oppose a dismissal motion[,] ‘the only dismissals which are procedurally equivalent to a default, courts have held the mandatory relief provision inapplicable to dismissals for failure to prosecute [citations omitted], dismissals for failure to serve a complaint within three years [citations omitted], dismissals based on running of the statute of limitations [citations omitted] and voluntary dismissals entered pursuant to settlement [citations omitted].” Leader v. Health Industries of America Inc (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 620.

 

“An attorney negligently fails to diligently prosecute an action. Code of Civil Procedure section 473 provides that upon a proper motion the court shall vacate a default judgment or dismissal entered because of an attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. Does that mean that a trial court may not dismiss an action for failure of the attorney to diligently prosecute the action under section 583.410? No. We conclude that the mandatory language of section 473 does not apply to the discretionary dismissal statutes.  After the trial court dismissed this action for failure to prosecute, it properly refused to vacate the judgment of dismissal in response to a motion brought pursuant to section 473.” Graham v. Beers (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1656, 1658.

 

b. Discretionary Relief

The court does, however, have discretion to vacate the dismissal under the discretionary provisions of CCP § 473(b).  To grant relief under the discretionary relief provision of § 473, the moving party must show the dismissal was entered as a result of mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. 

 

A mistake is a basis for relief under CCP § 473 when by reason of the mistake a party failed to make a timely response.  Surprise occurs when a party is unexpectedly placed in a position to his injury without any negligence of his own.  Excusable neglect is a basis for relief when the party has shown some reasonable excuse for the default or dismissal.  (Credit Managers Association of California v. National Independent Business Alliance (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1173; Davis v. Thayer (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 892, 905.)  Under CCP § 473, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating an excusable ground, such as fraud or mistake, justifying a court’s vacating a judgment.  (Basinger v. Roger & Wells (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 16, 23-24.) 

 

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel, Donald R. Hartunian, (“Counsel”), provides that on the day prior to the OSCs, Counsel emailed his appearance attorney to request the attorney appear at the OSCs because Counsel was on medical leave.  However, Counsel’s assistant sent the email to the appearance attorney’s wrong email address.  Counsel’s declaration establishes mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect in connection with failing to appear at the OSCs on April 21, 2022. 

 

Plaintiff’s motion to set aside dismissal, therefore, is granted.  The action is reinstated.  The court sets an OSC re: Default Judgment for February 8, 2023.  Given the age of this case, Plaintiff must move expeditiously in seeking a default judgment against Defendant. 

 

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice. 

 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:

 

Dated this 5th day of January 2023

 

 

 

 

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court