Judge Audra Mori, Case 19STCV22667 2022-09-15 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Weslee Davis, Jr. (“Weslee”), a minor, by and through his Guardian ad Litem Shannon Escott (“Escott”), Estate of Weslee Davis, decedent, (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendants Singer Vehicle Design, Estate of Ryan Blanks, State of California, City of Los Angeles, and County of Los Angeles for damages arising from a motor vehicle and motorcycle accident. The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges that on or about June 20, 2018, at 1:05 p.m., Weslee Davis (“Decedent”) was operating his motorcycle when Ryan Blanks (“Blanks”) proceeded into an intersection directly in front of Decedent and caused the subject collision, which resulted in the deaths of Decedent and Blanks. (FAC ¶ 14.)

At this time, defendant Estate of Ryan Blanks (the “Estate”) moves to enforce a settlement agreement against Plaintiffs pursuant to CCP § 664.6. This matter was last set for hearing on August 23, 2022, where it was continued for the Estate to file a reply after Plaintiffs filed an untimely opposition.

The Estate asserts that it and Plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement on July 22, 2021. An express term of the agreement was that Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiffs’ counsel submit the settlement for court approval pursuant to a minor’s compromise petition. The Estate filed an Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement, seeking an order barring any claims by a joint tortfeasor against Defendant for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. The Estate provides that on December 22, 2021, the Court signed and filed an order finding the settlement in good faith and further ordered Plaintiffs to file a petition for court approval of the minor’s compromise. Upon approval of the minor’s compromise petition pertaining to minor Weslee, the Estate would be dismissed with prejudice.

The Estate asserts that despite repeated requests, Plaintiffs have refused to file a minor’s compromise petition and thereby have prolonged the Estate’s involvement in this matter. The Estate argues that the refusal to file the petition is also detrimental to Weslee, who as a result of not having the settlement funded into an interest bearing account, has not enjoyed accrual of interest on the principal. The Estate requests an order that Plaintiffs file a minor’s compromise petition for Weslee within ten days. Additionally, the Estate requests sanctions of $1,500 against each of Plaintiffs’ counsel- Sullivan & Sullivan and Paoli & Purdy, P.C.

In opposition, Plaintiffs assert that this action was set for mediation on August 25, 2022, with the remaining defendants that have not settled and where there was a high probability that all claims would be fully resolved. Plaintiffs state that they had been waiting to file a petition for approval of minor’s compromise on this basis. Plaintiffs contend petitions for approval of minor’s compromise are laborious documents to draft, and it makes no sense for Plaintiff to draft multiple such petitions. Plaintiffs represent they would promptly file a petition upon the completion of the mediation regardless of whether all claims are resolved.

In reply, the Estate argues that Plaintiffs fail to present any reasonable grounds for their excessive delay in filing the court ordered petition. The Estate avers it is not a burdensome process to prepare and file a petition for minor’s compromise, and that sanctions are warranted for Plaintiffs’ delay.

Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6 provides a mechanism by which a party can seek to enforce a settlement in an expedited fashion, as opposed to filing, for example, a breach of contract action. Pursuant to CCP § 664.6: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by any of the following:

(3) If the party is an insurer, an agent who is authorized in writing by the insurer to sign on the insurer's behalf.

As CCP § 664.6 provides an expedited procedure for enforcement of a settlement agreement, strict compliance with the statutory requirements is necessary before a court can enforce a settlement agreement under this statute. (Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37.) Thus, to enforce a written settlement agreement under CCP section 664.6, the following three elements must be met: (1) the parties must have come to a meeting of the minds on all material points; (2) there must be a writing that contains the material terms of the agreement; and (3) the writing must be signed by the parties. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 797-98.)

Furthermore, CCP § 664.6 “require[s] the signatures of the parties seeking to enforce the agreement under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 664.6 and against whom the agreement is sought to be enforced.” (J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 985.) CCP § 664.6’s “requirement of a ‘writing signed by the parties’ must be read to apply to all parties bringing the section 664.6 motion and against whom the motion is directed.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 306; see Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Const., Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 35-37 [“A written settlement agreement is not enforceable under section 664.6 unless it is signed by all of the parties to the agreement, not merely the parties against whom the agreement is sought to be enforced.”].) “A procedure in which a settlement is evidenced by one writing signed by both sides minimizes the possibility of … dispute[s] and legitimizes the summary nature of the section 664.6 procedure.” (Robertson v. Chen (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1293.)

Here, Plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement whereby they agreed to release all claims against the Estate arising from the underlying accident in exchange for $15,000.00. The agreement provides in pertinent part: “The undersigned and her counsel agree to submit this settlement to the Los Angeles Superior Court for approval of the minor’s compromise vis-à-vis a Petition for approval of the compromise, and to remain solely responsible for any costs and all costs, attorneys’ fees and expenses associated therewith.” (Mot. Exh. A at ¶ 9.)

The Estate avers that after the settlement agreement was reached, it immediately proceeded with an application for a determination that the settlement was in good faith. However, the Estate asserts that Plaintiffs have delayed for over 200 days and have not filed a minor’s compromise petition pertaining to Weslee. The Estate, thus, requests that Plaintiffs be ordered to file a petition for approval of minor’s settlement within ten days.

While the Court understands the Estate’s frustration with Plaintiffs’ delay in filing a minor’s compromise petition, there are at least two issues with the Estate’s motion. First, although it is not disputed that the parties have settled, the agreement provided with the motion is signed by Escott, on her own behalf, as guardian ad litem for Weslee, and as the authorized representative for the estate of Decedent, and by Plaintiffs’ counsel only. (Mot. Exh. A.) The agreement is not signed by the Estate- that is, it is not signed by the party or an attorney that represents the party. (CCP § 664.6(b).) CCP § 664.6 requires that the agreement be signed by all parties bringing the motion and against whom the motion is directed. (J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd., 232 Cal.App.4th at 985; Harris, 74 Cal.App.4th at 306; Sully-Miller Contracting Co.,103 Cal.App.4th at 35-37.) Therefore, the Estate does not establish the agreement strictly complies with CCP § 664.6.

Second, CCP § 664.6 permits the Court to enter a judgment in conformance with the terms of a settlement agreement. (CCP § 664.6(a) [“the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”]; see Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174,1182-83 [“The statute expressly provides for the court to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”]; accord. Hernandez v. Board of Education (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1176 [“The power of the trial court under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, however, is extremely limited.”].) The Estate is not requesting that the Court enter a judgment pursuant to the terms of the agreement between Plaintiffs and the Estate. Rather, the Estate is seeking an order requiring that Plaintiffs file a petition for approval of a minor’s compromise within ten days. The Estate, however, does not cite any authority establishing the Court has the authority to enter such an order under CCP § 664.6, as opposed to a judgment. Further, the Estate already has an order that requires Plaintiffs to file a petition for court approval of the minor’s compromise.

A judicial officer shall have the power to impose reasonable money sanctions, not to exceed fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), notwithstanding any other provision of law, payable to the court, for any violation of a lawful court order by a person, done without good cause or substantial justification…

Sanctions pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except on notice contained in a party's moving or responding papers; or on the court's own motion, after notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing sanctions shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.

Here, the parties entered into a settlement agreement on July 22, 2021, and on December 22, 2021, the Court signed and filed an order finding the settlement was entered into in good faith and ordered Plaintiffs to file a petition for court approval of the minor’s compromise. To date, despite Plaintiffs’ representation in their opposition that a petition would be filed promptly after the mediation scheduled for August 25, 2022, Plaintiffs have not filed a petition for approval of minor’s compromise. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ contention that petitions for approval of minor’s compromise are laborious documents is not a sufficient excuse for their failure to file a petition. As the Estate asserts, petitions for approval of minor’s compromise require Plaintiffs to fill out Judicial Council form MC-350, which consists of ten pages with space for Plaintiffs to provide the requested information and boxes for Plaintiffs to check off, and to attach any appropriate documents.

Further, to the extent that Plaintiffs assert the agreement and court order did not specify when the petition needed to be filed, “[i]f no time is specified for the performance of an act required to be performed, a reasonable time is allowed.” (See Civ. Code, § 1657; see also Patel v. Liebermensch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 344, 352, fn. omitted [“In the absence of a specified time of payment, a reasonable period is allowable under Civil Code section 1657.”]) When confronted with the question of what constitutes a reasonable time, courts consider the situation of the parties, the nature of the transaction, and the facts of the particular case. (Marshall & Co. v. Weisel (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 191, 194.) Plaintiffs do not adequately explain why it is reasonable that Plaintiffs have not filed the petition for more than one year since the agreement was entered into and more than 200 days since the settlement was found to have been entered into in good faith.

By not complying with the Court’s order within a reasonable time, Plaintiffs have prolonged the litigation against the Estate, arguably frustrated the intent of the parties in entering into the settlement agreement, and caused additional litigation expense. The Court therefore expects Plaintiffs’ counsel to appear at the hearing on this matter on September 15, 2022, to explain the delay in filing the minor’s compromise petition. If Plaintiffs’ counsel fails to appear or otherwise does not establish good cause for the delay, the Court may issue an Order to Show Cause Re: Why Plaintiffs’ counsel should not be sanctioned up to $1,500.00.

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court