Judge Audra Mori, Case 19STCV39015 2022-09-28 Tentative Ruling

On October 31, 2019, Plaintiff Ja’Quan Barnes, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem, Michelle Benton (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (“Defendant”) and Does 1 to 50 for damages arising from an incident in Defendant’s school where Plaintiff was allegedly held to the ground by other students while another student kicked him in his mouth. The operative First Amended Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) negligence under Government Code § 815.2, (2) assault and battery, (3) intentional infliction of mental distress, and (4) negligent hiring. The first and fourth causes of action are asserted against all defendants, while the second and third are asserted against the Doe defendants.

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District now moves for summary judgment. Any opposition to the motion was due on or before September 14, 2022. To date, no opposition has been filed.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot assert the negligence causes of action against it because following the Court’s April 22, 2022 order granting Defendant’s motion to deem request for admissions (“RFAs”), set one, admitted, it has been conclusively established that Defendant and its employees were not negligent, that they did not cause the incident, that the incident was caused by Plaintiff’s own negligence, and that Plaintiff was not damaged as a result of the incident.

Defendant requests judicial notice be taken of the April 22, 2022 order granting Defendant’s motion to deem RFAs admitted, and of all the requests contained within Defendant’s RFA’s, set one, which was filed with Defendant’s motion to deem RFAs admitted on November 19, 2021.

The request is granted as to each item. (Evid. Code § 452(d); see also Arce ex rel. Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 485 [court may take judicial notice of a party's admissions or concessions in cases where the admission “ ‘cannot reasonably be controverted,’ such as in answers to interrogatories or requests for admission, or in affidavits and declarations filed on the party's behalf.”].)

Summary judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(c).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A defendant moving for summary judgment must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Id. at §437c(p).) A defendant may discharge this burden by furnishing either (1) affirmative evidence of the required facts or (2) discovery responses conceding that the plaintiff lacks evidence to establish an essential element of the plaintiff's case. If a defendant chooses the latter option, he or she must present evidence “and not simply point out that plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence….” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4^th at 865-66.)

[A] defendant may simply show the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action “by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.) Thus, rather than affirmatively disproving or negating an element (e.g., causation), a defendant moving for summary judgment has the option of presenting evidence reflecting the plaintiff does not possess evidence to prove that element. “The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing” to support an essential element of his case. (Aguilar, supra, at p. 855.) Under the latter approach, a defendant's initial evidentiary showing may “consist of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses, or admissions by the plaintiff in deposition or in response to requests for admission that he or she has not discovered anything that supports an essential element of the cause of action.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 110.) In other words, a defendant may show the plaintiff does not possess evidence to support an element of the cause of action by means of presenting the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence may be reasonably inferred. (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)

Thus, a moving defendant has two means by which to shift the burden of proof under the summary judgment statute: “The defendant may rely upon factually insufficient discovery responses by the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action sued upon. [Citation.] [Or a]lternatively, the defendant may utilize the tried and true technique of negating (‘disproving’) an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action.” (Brantly v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1598.)

Until the moving defendant has discharged its burden of proof, the opposing plaintiff has no burden to come forward with any evidence. Once the moving defendant has discharged its burden as to a particular cause of action, however, the plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence showing that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action. (Id. at §437c(p)(2).) On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party's supporting documents are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21.)

(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.

Moreover, school districts and their employees have a general duty to supervise school children while they are on school grounds and engaged in school activities. (See Dailey v Los Angeles Unified School District (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741; see also Educ. Code § 44807.) “'It is the duty of the school authorities to supervise at all times the conduct of the children on the school grounds and to enforce those rules and regulations necessary to their protection. [Citations.] The school district is liable for injuries which result from a failure of its officers and employees to use ordinary care in this respect.”' (M. W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal. App. 4th 508, 517.)

In this case, Plaintiff’s FAC alleges causes of action for negligence under Government Code § 815.2, and for negligent hiring against Defendant. (UMF 3.) Plaintiff’s primary allegation is that following dismissal at one of Defendant’s middle schools, Plaintiff was attacked by other students. (UMF 4.) Defendant served its RFAs, set one, on Plaintiff on July 7, 2021, and after Plaintiff failed to respond, Defendant filed and served its motion to deem RFAs admitted. (UMF 5-6.) On April 22, 2022, Defendant’s unopposed motion to deem RFAs admitted was heard and granted. (UMF 7.) Consequently, Plaintiff is now deemed to have admitted that “(1) LAUSD was not negligent in supervising him at the time of the incident, (2) no LAUSD employee caused the incident, (3) the subject incident was caused by his own negligence, and (4) he [was] not damaged as a result of the alleged incident described in Plaintiff’s FAC.” (UMF 8.)

Therefore, Defendant’s evidence shows that Plaintiff admits that Defendant and its employees were not negligent and did not cause the incident, and that Plaintiff did not suffer any damages as a result of the alleged incident. The evidence is sufficient to meet Defendant’s moving burden to show it is entitled to judgment as a matter on Plaintiffs’ claims. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact. Because Plaintiff does not oppose the motion, Plaintiff necessarily fails to meet the shifted burden.

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court