Judge Audra Mori, Case 20STCV01045 2022-09-26 Tentative Ruling

On January 9, 2020, Plaintiff Shakeh Bagdassar (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant City of Glendale (“Defendant”) for damages arising out of a trip and fall on the public sidewalk. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff tripped on a raised concrete slab of sidewalk, and that as Plaintiff was attempting to catch herself before she fell, Plaintiff subsequently tripped on a raised manhole cover. The complaint alleges causes of action for (1) negligence under Government Code § 815.2(a) and (2) dangerous condition of public property.

At this time, Plaintiff moves for relief from her waiver of a jury trial by failing to timely deposit jury fees. Defendant opposes the motion.

Plaintiff provides that Plaintiff’s counsel did not realize that Defendant did not post jury fees in this matter, and Plaintiff’s counsel was agreeable to a bench trial. Plaintiff provides that Plaintiff’s counsel, however, made this decision without discussing it with Plaintiff, and when Plaintiff was informed this action would be a bench trial, Plaintiff demanded a jury trial. Plaintiff asserts Plaintiff’s counsel then promptly deposited the jury fees on August 11, 2022, but Defendant filed an objection to the untimely jury fee deposit that same day. Plaintiff contends Defendant will not be prejudiced if a jury trial is granted.

In opposition, Defendant contends that while Plaintiff seeks relief from the jury trial waiver due to Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to consult with his client about such, Plaintiff offers no explanation as to why fees were not posted or what caused the inadvertence. Defendant asserts that it has relied on Plaintiff’ agreement to a bench trial and has evaluated the case accordingly.

Plaintiff was obligated to post jury fees prior to commencement of trial, and in no event more than 365 days after filing the case. Plaintiff failed to do so. Plaintiff seeks relief from this failure per CCP § 631. CCP § 631(g) provides, “The court may, in its discretion upon just terms, allow a trial by jury although there may have been a waiver of a trial by jury.”

“ “ ‘The denial of a trial by jury to one constitutionally entitled thereto constitutes a miscarriage of justice and requires a reversal of the judgment.’ ” [Citation.]” (Mackovska v. Viewcrest Road Properties LLC (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1, 9.) “A party in a civil case may waive the right to a jury trial under section 631 in several ways, including by failing to deposit jury fees “on or before the date scheduled for the initial case management conference in the action.” (§ 631, subds. (c), (f)(5).) Even when a civil litigant waives his or her right to a jury trial, however, the trial court has discretion to ‘allow a trial by jury.’ ” (Mackovska, 40 Cal.App.5th at 9-10.)

“The trial court should grant a motion for relief of a jury waiver ‘unless, and except, where granting such a motion would work serious hardship to the objecting party.’ [Citation.] When there is doubt about whether to grant relief from a jury trial waiver, the court must resolve that doubt in favor of the party seeking a jury trial.” (Id. at 10.) “In a motion for relief from waiver of a jury trial, the crucial question is whether the party opposing relief will suffer any prejudice if the court grants relief. [Citations.] “ ‘The prejudice which must be shown from granting relief from the waiver is prejudice from the granting of relief and not prejudice from the jury trial.’ ” [Citation.]” (Id.) “ ‘The mere fact that trial will be by jury is not prejudice per se.’ ” (Id.)

Moreover, denying relief where the party opposing the motion for relief has not shown prejudice is an abuse of discretion. (Id.; Byram v. Sup.Ct. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 648, 652 [It is an abuse of discretion to deny relief from waiver, where the waiver was shown to be inadvertent and relief from waiver was sought promptly.]; Winston v. Sup.Ct. (Gibbs) (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 600, 602 (fact that it takes longer to try a jury case is not prejudice from granting relief from waiver].)

In this case, Plaintiff’s failure to ensure that Plaintiff would have a jury trial was due in significant part to Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to discuss the subject with Plaintiff. Plaintiff avers that she did not, and does not, want a bench trial, and instead wants a jury trial. Consequently, Defendant is correct that the failure was caused by Plaintiff’s counsel’s failing to recognize the importance of a jury trial to Plaintiff and agreeing to the bench trial without discussing the issue with Plaintiff. Nonetheless, Defendant does not demonstrate it will suffer any prejudice if the motion is granted and does not provide any legal authority to controvert the proposition that denial of the right to a jury has Constitutional implications. While Defendant asserts that it relied on Plaintiff’s agreement to a bench trial and evaluated the case accordingly, Defendant does not articulate how either of these factors now prejudices Defendant if Plaintiff is granted relief from her jury waiver. Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s contentions that the parties’ trial preparation will not be interrupted, and that exhibits and witnesses will remain unchanged. Moreover, Plaintiff has now posted the required jury deposit with the Court, and it is an abuse of discretion to deny relief where Defendant does not show any prejudice. (Mackovska, 40 Cal.App.5th at 10.)

Accordingly, the motion is granted. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s attorney posted the jury fees on August 11, 2022, and therefore no further action is necessary at this time

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court