Judge Audra Mori, Case 20STCV37624 2022-08-10 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Michael Morris (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles (“Defendant”) for injuries Plaintiff allegedly sustained when a chair Plaintiff sat down in inside a courtroom at the Van Nuys Courthouse collapsed. The complaint asserts causes of action for premises liability and general negligence against Defendant. The premises liability claim includes counts for negligence and dangerous condition of public property

Defendant now demurs to the complaint arguing that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant, and that the complaint fails to allege a statutory basis for liability against Defendant as required by the Government Claims Act. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer, and Defendant filed a reply.

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (CCP §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862 [disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287] [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].)

A demurrer can be utilized where the “face of the complaint” itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-72.) The “face of the complaint” includes material contained in attached exhibits that are incorporated by reference into the complaint; or in a superseded complaint in the same action. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; see also Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.”]).

A demurrer can only be sustained when it disposes of an entire cause of action. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97,119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.)

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (CCP § 430.41(a).)

The court finds Defendant has fulfilled this requirement prior to filing the demurrer. (Demurrer Overton Decl. Overton ¶¶ 2-4.)

Defendant requests the court take judicial notice of a recorded quitclaim deed for the Van Nuys Courthouse, Assessor’s Identification Number 2240-004-909. The request is granted. (See Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 194 [“A recorded deed is an official act of the executive branch, of which [a] court may take judicial notice.”].)

Except as otherwise provided by statute, “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code § 815(a).) “[T]his section ‘abolished all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the federal or state Constitution. Thus, in the absence of some constitutional requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be liable’ [Citation.]” (Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1457; Tuthill v. City of San Buenaventura (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1088 (emphasis in the original). It has been established that there is no liability for California governmental entities in the absence of an express statute or constitutional provision creating or accepting liability. (Tolan v. State of California (1979) 100 Cal.App.3rd 980, 986.) It has been recognized that it is impermissible to sue a public entity for common law negligence. (Torres v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 850.) “[S]ection 835 sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property.” (Per Metcalf v. County of San Juaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129.)

Here, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff was at the Van Nuys Courthouse located at 1440 Erwin St., Van Nuys, CA 91401 on September 17, 2019, and that when Plaintiff sat down in a courtroom chair, the chair collapsed underneath him. Plaintiff alleges Defendant is liable for the dangerous condition on its property that was created by a negligent act or omission of Defendant’s employees.

As to the general negligence claim and count one for negligence of the premises liability claim, the complaint’s allegations on their face attempt to allege a claim for a dangerous condition of public property, not general negligence. In other words, despite the fact that Plaintiff checked boxes indicating that he was making negligence claims, he did not provide sufficient allegations to support such claims; rather his allegations appear to relate to a dangerous condition of public property claim. Further, per Metcalf v. County of San Juaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129, when a claim against a governmental entity is premised on the contention that the entity’s property was dangerous, Government Code § 835 is the exclusive remedy under which a plaintiff can pursue a claim. Plaintiff, in opposition, does not challenge that he cannot maintain a cause of action for general negligence against Defendant.

Therefore, Defendant’s demurrer is sustained as to the general negligence claim and count one for negligence of the premises liability claim.

Because this is a purely legal issue, the demurrer is sustained as to the first cause of action for negligence asserted against the City without leave to amend.

As to the count for dangerous condition of public property of the premises liability claim, the judicially noticed evidence shows that the interest in Van Nuys Courthouse was conveyed by quitclaim deed from the County of Los Angeles to the State of California, acting by and through the Judicial Council of California, on November 16, 2009. Consequently, the judicially noticed evidence shows Defendant does not own the Van Nuys Courthouse.

The complaint alleges that Defendant caused a dangerous condition to exist on the property by failing to properly maintain the property, and that Defendant allowed a dangerous chair to remain in the courtroom that it knew would be used by the public. (Compl. at p. 4.) The complaint pleads that Defendant is liable for the dangerous condition created either by a negligent act or omission of Defendant’s employees, or by allowing the condition to exist and failing to correct it. However, to state a “cause of action [for government tort liability] every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty.” (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.) The complaint does not allege any facts with particularity to suggest the alleged dangerous condition of the chair was caused or created by any of Defendant’s employees, or that otherwise suggest Defendant was responsible for discovering and correcting the condition of the chair. Furthermore, the judicially noticeable evidence shows that Defendant does not own the subject property where the chair was allegedly located. While Plaintiff argues in opposition that the responsibility to provide a safe courtroom is not limited to ownership of the premises, the complaint alleges that Defendant owned the property and does not otherwise contain any allegations suggesting Defendant was responsible for the chair on the property.

Therefore, the demurrer to the count for dangerous condition of public property of the premises liability claim is sustained.

The burden is on Plaintiff to show in what manner he or she can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.)

In this case, Plaintiff requests leave to amend to add additional allegations to state a claim against Defendant.

Defendant’s demurrer is sustained to the count for dangerous condition of public property of the premises liability claim with 20 days leave to amend.

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court