Judge Audra Mori, Case 20STCV37624 2023-01-13 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Michael Morris (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles (“Defendant”) for injuries Plaintiff allegedly sustained when a chair inside the courtroom at the Van Nuys Courthouse collapsed as Plaintiff sat down. The complaint asserted causes of action for general negligence and premises liability against Defendant.

The Court heard Defendant’s demurrer to the complaint on August 10, 2022, and sustained the demurrer as to the general negligence claim without leave to amend and sustained the demurrer as to the premises liability claim with 20 days to amend. On August 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) with only one cause of action for premises liability. The premises liability claim includes Count One for negligence against Does 1-50 and Count Three for dangerous condition of public property against Defendant.

Defendant now demurs to the FAC arguing the first cause of action for “Premises Liability, Count Three – Dangerous Condition of Public Property” fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant. Defendant argues that the subject property is not owned or controlled by the Superior Court, and Plaintiff cannot state facts to show that the Superior Court is liable despite the fact it does not own the property.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends the FAC alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for premises liability because it alleges that Defendant and its employees owned, controlled or were otherwise responsible for the dangerous chair which was allowed to remain in the courtroom.

A reply was filed on January 6, 2023. Defendant argues that the FAC does not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that the Superior Court is liable for any injury plaintiff sustained due to a dangerous condition of a property. It further argues that the chair was a “fixture” that was transferred with the courthouse property to the Judicial Council of California.

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (CCP §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862 [disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287] [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].)

A demurrer can be utilized where the “face of the complaint” itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-72.) The “face of the complaint” includes material contained in attached exhibits that are incorporated by reference into the complaint; or in a superseded complaint in the same action. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; see also Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.”]).

A demurrer can only be sustained when it disposes of an entire cause of action. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97,119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.)

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (CCP § 430.41(a).)

The court finds Defendant has fulfilled this requirement prior to filing its demurrer. (Demurrer Overton Decl. ¶ 7.)

Defendant requests the court take judicial notice of a recorded quitclaim deed for the Van Nuys Courthouse, Assessor’s Identification Number 2240-004-909. It is granted. (See Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 194 [“A recorded deed is an official act of the executive branch, of which [a] court may take judicial notice.”].) More specifically, judicial notice of the deed is granted to the extent that it is reasonably beyond dispute. It is not disputed that the recorded deed concerns the 2009 transfer of ownership of the real property. (See, Opposition at 3:11-13.) However, the deed does not speak specifically to transfer of the chair in question, which remains in dispute. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) Thus, the judicial notice is not taken of who owns the chair.

Except as otherwise provided by statute, “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code § 815(a).) “[T]his section ‘abolished all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the federal or state Constitution. Thus, in the absence of some constitutional requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be liable’ [Citation.]” (Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1457; Tuthill v. City of San Buenaventura (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1088 (emphasis in the original).) Further, to state a “cause of action [for government tort liability] every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty.” (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802; Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1020; Trinkle v. California State Lottery (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1202.)

Here, the FAC alleges that Defendant is liable for the injuries and damages suffered by Plaintiff under Government Code § 835, 815.2(a), 820(a), and 840.2.

Government Code § 835 states that “a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:

(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”

Government Code § 815.2 states that “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” Government Code § 820(a) states that “a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person.”

Government Code § 840.2 states that “[a]n employee of a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of public property if the plaintiff establishes that the property of the public entity was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: (a) The dangerous condition was directly attributable wholly or in substantial part to a negligent or wrongful act of the employee and the employee had the authority and the funds and other means immediately available to take alternative action which would not have created the dangerous condition; or (b) The employee had the authority and it was his responsibility to take adequate measures to protect against the dangerous condition at the expense of the public entity and the funds and other means for doing so were immediately available to him, and he had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 840.4 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”

Here, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff was at the Van Nuys Courthouse located at 1440 Erwin St., Van Nuys, CA 91401 on September 17, 2019, and that when Plaintiff sat down in a courtroom chair, the chair collapsed underneath him. Plaintiff alleges the dangerous condition was created by a negligent act or omission of Defendant’s employees who allowed the dangerous and defective chair to remain in the courtroom. Plaintiff additionally alleges that “defendants, and each of them, controlled and were responsible for both the condition, upkeep, maintenance, safety and security in the courtroom where the incident occurred, for the conditions of the chair and failed to maintain, keep, inspect and repair the chair and/or negligently maintained, kept, inspected and repaired the premises and the chair such that plaintiff was proximately injured as a result of defendants' conduct.” (FAC p. 6.) “Moreover, plaintiff is informed, believes and alleges that defendants, and each of them, owned, controlled or were otherwise responsible for the dangerous and defective chair that injured plaintiff even if defendants do not own the courthouse building in which the chair was located.” (Id.)

The judicially noticed evidence shows that the interest in Van Nuys Courthouse was conveyed by quitclaim deed from the County of Los Angeles to the State of California, acting by and through the Judicial Council of California, on November 16, 2009. Consequently, the judicially noticed evidence shows Defendant does not own the Van Nuys Courthouse.

However, the ownership of the courthouse is not dispositive. Government Code § 835 allows a public entity to be liable for a dangerous condition of its property. The “property of a public entity” and “public property” mean real or personal property owned or controlled by the public entity.” (Gov. Code § 830(c).) Thus, to be liable for dangerous conditions on public property, the public entity must be either the owner or in control of the property at time of injury. (Gov. Code § 830; Tolon v. State of California ex rel. Dept of Transportation (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 980, 983.) “For liability to be imposed on a public entity for a dangerous condition of property, the entity must be in a position to protect against or warn of the hazard. Therefore, the crucial element is not ownership, but rather control.” (Mamola v. County of San Bernadino, 94 Cal.App.3d 781, 788.) In Low v. City of Sacramento, 7 Cal.App.3d 826, the court held that the critical inquiry in determining whether a public entity is liable for a dangerous condition of public property is whether it “had control, in the sense of power to prevent, remedy or guard against the dangerous condition. . . .” (Id. at pp. 833-834; see Huffman v. City of Poway (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 975.)

Plaintiff argues, and the Court agrees, that the judicially noted deed does not absolve Defendant of liability. The judicially noted deed does not establish that the chair was a part of the transfer of the real property in 2009 or who controlled the property. It fails to establish that Defendant did not exercise control over the chair and did not have the “power to prevent, remedy or guard against the dangerous condition.” However, the FAC does not plead any facts showing Defendant’s control. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendant was “responsible for both the condition, upkeep, maintenance, safety, and security in the courtroom…” and that Defendant “owned, controlled, or were otherwise responsible for the dangerous and defective chair.” (FAC p. 5.) However, because Defendant is a public entity, every fact essential to liability must be plead with particularity. (See e.g., Searcy, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at 802.) Here, Plaintiff’s allegations supporting Defendant’s control of the courthouse are alleged on information and belief or are conclusory. While legal elements may be stated, no facts are provided to support them.

Additionally, Defendants have failed to allege facts that demonstrate that a negligent or wrongful act or omission of a Defendant employee created the dangerous condition or that the Defendant created the dangerous condition or had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition prior to the injury. The FAC states that Defendants “negligently maintained, kept, inspected and repaired the premises and the chair.” (FAC p. 5.) The FAC also alleges Defendants solely on information and belief that “despite having knowledge, or the ability to have knowledge, of the dangerous condition of the chair, took no action to warn the patrons, including plaintiff, and/or allowed the dangerous condition of the chair and the premises to exist for such a length of time that if defendants had exercised reasonable care in inspecting the premises, they would have discovered the dangerous condition of the chair in time to remedy it, removing it from the courtroom or give warning to the public of the danger before plaintiff was injured.” (FAC p. 5.) The FAC again fails to allege any facts with particularity to suggest the alleged dangerous condition of the chair was caused or created by any of Defendant’s employees, or that otherwise suggest Defendant was responsible for discovering and correcting the condition of the chair. The only allegations are based on information and belief and conclusory, and thus insufficient.

Therefore, Defendant’s demurrer to the count for dangerous condition of public property of the premises liability claim is sustained.

The burden is on Plaintiff to show in what manner he or she can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.)

In this case, Plaintiff requests further leave to amend, stating that Plaintiff can add additional consistent allegations to state a claim against Defendant.

Defendant’s demurrer is sustained to the count for dangerous condition of public property of the premises liability claim with 20 days leave to amend.

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court