Judge: Audra Mori, Case: 20STCV38180, Date: 2023-01-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV38180    Hearing Date: January 19, 2023    Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

JOAQUIN NAVARRETE-RUIZ,

                        Plaintiff(s),

            vs.

 

LARRY WILLIAM ANDERSON, ET AL.,

 

                        Defendant(s).

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      CASE NO: 20STCV38180

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT

 

Dept. 31

1:30 p.m.

January 19, 2023

 

1. Background

Plaintiff, Joaquin Navarrete-Ruiz (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant, Larry William Anderson (“Defendant”) and Does 1 to 20 for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.  On September 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal dismissing Does 1 to 20. 

 

On May 26, 2021, Plaintiff obtained Defendant’s default, and on June 2, 2022, Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Defendant. 

 

On December 14, 2022, Defendant filed the instant motion to set aside the default and default judgment, and to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to CCP § 473(d).  On January 9, just five days before the hearing, Plaintiff filed a late opposition to the motion.[1]  However, Defendant was able to file a Defendant reply. 

 

Defendant asserts that the summons and complaint served on Defendant were voided by the Court Clerk on October 23, 2020, because of Plaintiff’s failure to pay the statutory filings fees after Plaintiff’s fee waiver request was denied.  Defendant contends that the failure to pay the fee, and the Clerk’s voiding of the complaint, are jurisdictional defects that Plaintiff did not remedy.  Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s entire action is thus predicated on voided pleadings.  Additionally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s failure to pay the filing fee deprives the Court of jurisdiction to perform any other act in this matter, so the complaint should be dismissed. 

 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the motion is untimely under CCP § 473(b) because it was filed more than six months after the default judgment against Defendant was entered.  Further, Plaintiff contends that he paid the first appearance fee when Plaintiff’s motion to set aside dismissal was granted. 

 

In reply, Defendant contends that the six-month deadline is not applicable in this matter because Defendant is moving for relief under CCP § 473(d).  Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s failure to pay the filing fee and the voiding of the pleadings mean that the Court lacked jurisdiction to enter a default or default judgment against Defendant.  Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cites no authority to show that this action should not be dismissed. 

 

2. Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment

CCP § 473(d) states: “The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.”

 

There is no time limit for such a motion, which does not hinge on evidence because the “void judgment's invalidity appears on the face of the record ….”  (Trackman v. Kenney (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 175, 181 [internal citations omitted].)

 

“When a court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, such as lack of authority over the subject matter or the parties, an ensuing judgment is void.”  (OC Interior Services, LLC v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1318, 1330.)  “A judgment absolutely void may be attacked anywhere, directly or collaterally whenever it presents itself, either by parties or strangers. It is simply a nullity, and can be neither a basis nor evidence of any right whatever… A void judgment [or order] is, in legal effect, no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one.” (Id.) 

 

A fee must be paid to the Clerk of the Court for filing the complaint in a civil action.  (Gov. Code § 70611 et seq.)  “An initial fee waiver shall be granted by the court at any stage of the proceedings at both the appellate and trial court levels if an applicant meets the standards of eligibility and application requirements under Sections 68632 and 68633. An initial fee waiver excuses the applicant from paying fees for the first pleading or other paper, and other court fees and costs…”  (Id. § 68631.)  The steps required for processing and determination of fee waiver applications in trial courts is specified in Government Code § 68634.  In relevant party, Government Code § 68634(g) states:

 

If a [fee waiver] application is denied in whole or in part, the applicant shall pay the court fees and costs that ordinarily would be charged, or make the partial payment as ordered by the court, within 10 days after the clerk gives notice of the denial, unless within that time the applicant submits a new application or requests a hearing under subdivision (e). If the applicant does not pay on time, the clerk shall void the papers that were filed without payment of the court fees and costs.

 

(Emphasis added.)

 

            The payment of filing fees is “both mandatory and jurisdictional.”  (Hu v. Silgan Containers Corp. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1269.) 

 

In this case, Plaintiff filed the complaint on October 6, 2020, along with a Request to Waive Court fees.  On October 7, 2020, the Clerk denied Plaintiff’s fee waiver request and informed Plaintiff he had 10 days to pay the fee and costs in full or to ask for a hearing.  After Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee or request a hearing, the Clerk issued a Notice of Voiding of Filing on Plaintiff on October 23, 2020.  The notice provided in pertinent part, “The Request to Waive Court Fees by [Plaintiff] having been denied on 10/07/2020 and the party having failed to make the payment, the Complaint filed by the party for which the fee waiver was requested is now voided pursuant to Government Code section 68634(g).”  (Clerk’s Notice of Voiding of Filing, filed Oct. 23, 2020.) 

 

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside dismissal on December 7, 2020, providing that Plaintiff had paid the first appearance fee, and seeking to set aside the Clerk’s dismissal for Plaintiff’s failure to pay the filing.  Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the dismissal was heard on April 9, 2021, where the Court issued the following order: “Based on counsel's representation that the first appearance fee has been paid, the court vacates the dismissal and the voiding of the filing of the complaint.”  (Min. Order, April 9, 2021.)  Defendant argues that the voiding of the filings deprived the Court of jurisdiction to do anything but dismiss the action, and that as a result, the default, default judgment, and the April 9, 2021 order reinstating Plaintiff’s complaint are void. 

 

Plaintiff does not dispute failing to pay the filing fee as required by Government Code § 68634(g).  Instead, Plaintiff asserts, “[t]he first appearance fee was paid by Plaintiff when their motion to set aside dismissal was filed, and properly paid at that time.”  (Opp. at p. 4:1-2.)  Plaintiff filed his underlying motion to set aside dismissal on December 7, 2020.  However, Government Code § 68634(g) is clear that if fee waiver application is denied, the applicant must pay the fees and costs within 10 days after the Clerk gives notice of the denial.  “If the applicant does not pay on time, the clerk shall void the papers that were filed without payment of the court fees and costs.”  (Id.)  The Order on Court Fee Waiver filed in this matter shows the Clerk served the order denying Plaintiff’s fee waiver request on Plaintiff on October 8, 2020.  On October 23, 2020, the Clerk voided Plaintiff’s complaint and served notice of such on Plaintiff. 

 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff failed to timely pay the filing fee as required by Government Code § 68634(g), the Clerk properly voided Plaintiff’s complaint.  The issue is then whether the Court had authority to reinstate the complaint on April 9, 2021, pursuant to Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the dismissal under CCP § 473(b). 

 

            Defendant relies primarily on Hu v. Silgan Containers Corp. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1261, in asserting that the Court did not have jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal.  In Hu, the plaintiff filed an action for alleged discrimination against her employer shortly before the expiration of the statute of limitations but failed to pay the required filing fee to the court.  The clerk gave plaintiff notice that she had to pay the fee within 20 days of the letter.  The pleading was voided under CCP § 411.20[2] due to the plaintiff’s failure to pay the filing fee.  After the running of the statute of limitations on the cause of action, plaintiff paid the late fee charges and obtained an order “retroactively reinstating” her complaint.  (Id. at 1263-64.)  The defendant employer moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff’s claims and that the trial court has no jurisdiction to “reinstate” an action that had been voided for failure to pay required fees.  The trial judge granted the motion, finding that once the plaintiff's complaint was properly voided, the only way the plaintiff could pursue her discrimination claims was by filing a new action, but the one-year statute of limitations ran three months before the court voided the plaintiff's complaint.  (Id. at 1264-65.) 

 

In affirming the order of the trial court, the Hu Court held that once the plaintiff failed to comply with CCP § 411.20’s time limitation, the trial court lost jurisdiction over her complaint and could only void the complaint.  (Id. at 1266.)  In relevant part, the plaintiff argued that the trial court had authority to reinstate her complaint under CCP § 473 in order to grant relief parties relief from proceedings taken against them through their mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  (Id. at 1269.)  However, CCP § 473 was inapplicable because it could not be used to provide relief for jurisdictional errors, such as the failure to timely pay filing fees.  (Id.)  The Hu Court explained “the only basis for setting aside the judgment of dismissal by application of section 473 would be if the fees had actually been paid within the time limit or if Hu had been prevented from paying the fees by fraud or some other conduct perpetuated by the defendant.”  (Id.) 

 

The language analyzed in CCP § 411.20 in Hu is nearly identical to the language in Government Code § 68634(g).  CCP § 411.20 states, upon expiration of the 20-day period specified therein, if the party does not make the required payment, “the clerk shall void the filing.”  Government Code § 68634(g) similarly provides that if a fee waiver application is denied and an applicant does not pay the required fees and costs within 10 days, “the clerk shall void the papers that were filed without payment of the court fees and costs.”  Accordingly, because Plaintiff failed to comply with Government Code § 68634(g)’s time limitation, the Court lost jurisdiction over the complaint, and it could not simply be reinstated under CCP § 473.  (Hu, 70 Cal.App.4th at 1269; see Davis v. Superior Court (1921) 184 Cal. 691,  [finding that it was error to reinstate the case under CCP §473 after the plaintiff failed to pay costs and fees associated with transfer after the defendant’s request for change of venue was granted]; see also (Maynard v. Brandon (2005) 36 Cal.4th 364, 372 [“Notwithstanding the broad construction afforded section 473, subdivision (b), the statute does not offer relief from mandatory deadlines deemed jurisdictional in nature.”].) 

 

Furthermore, Plaintiff does not argue, nor is there any evidence to suggest, that Plaintiff actually timely paid the fees or that Plaintiff was prevented from paying the fees by fraud or some other conduct by Defendant.  (Hu, 70 Cal.App.4th at 1269.)  To the extent that Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s motion is untimely under CCP § 473(b), this contention is rejected because Defendant’s motion is made under CCP § 473(d), and Plaintiff cites no authority Defendant’s motion is untimely under this section.  Moreover, Plaintiff does not address Hu v. Silgan Containers Corp., nor provide any reasoning to differentiate from the facts presented here.  Because Plaintiff’s complaint was properly voided, the default and default judgment entered against Defendant are void.  Likewise, the April 9, 2021 order reinstating the action was void. [3]   

 

Defendant’s motion is granted.  The default, default judgment, and April 9, 2021 order reinstating the complaint are set aside as void.  Plaintiff’s complaint is ordered dismissed against Defendant.  (Hu, 70 Cal.App.4th at 1267.) 

 

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice. 

 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:

 

Dated this 19th day of January 2023

 

 

 

 

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court

 



[1] The opposition could be stricken due to late filing and the matter deemed unopposed.  However, the Court will analyze the opposition as Defendant filed a reply.

[2] CCP § 411.20 states:

 

(a) If the clerk accepts for filing a complaint or other first paper, or any subsequent filing, and payment is made by check which is later returned without payment, the clerk shall, by mail, notify the party who tendered the check that (1) the check has been returned without payment, (2) the administrative charge specified in subdivision (g) has been imposed to reimburse the court for the costs of processing the returned check and providing the notice specified in this subdivision, and (3) the party has 20 days from the date of mailing of the notice within which to pay the filing fee and the administrative charge, except as provided in subdivision (e)…

 

(b) The clerk shall void the filing if the party who tendered a returned check or on whose behalf a returned check was tendered has not paid the full amount of the fee and the administrative charge by a means specified in subdivision (a) within 20 days of the date on which the notice required by subdivision (a) was mailed…

[3] The Clerk’s Notice of Voiding of Filing was filed on October 23, 2020.  Defendant was served after court hours on October 23, 2020 at 5:05 p.m. according to the proof of service of the summons Plaintiff filed on Defendant on May 11, 2021.  Thus, it appears that Defendant was served with a void Complaint, making service ineffective.  Indeed, Defendant asserts that he attempted to file an answer to the complaint shortly after being served, but he was unable to file the answer with the Clerk because the case was marked as dismissed.  Lack of proper service of the Complaint is another ground upon which the default judgment may be rendered void.  (Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852, 857-58 [“A judgment may be void due to improper service of summons.”]; Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544 [“Under section 473, subdivision (d), the court may set aside a default judgment which is valid on its face, but void, as a matter of law, due to improper service.”].) 

 

If service of the Complaint were proper, then Plaintiff should have served Defendant or his counsel with other pleadings in this action.  Defendant provides that he notified Plaintiff in writing on November 12, 2020, that Defendant was represented by counsel, (Mot. Exh. F).  However, Defendant provides that he was never served with Plaintiff’s motion to set aside dismissal or with notice of the April 9, 2021 order, despite the fact that Plaintiff was to provide notice.  (Hsu Decl. at ¶¶ 13-16.)  Defendant was not served with the request to enter the default, which was entered on May 26, 2021, or the request for a default judgment.  (Id.)  Failure to serve Defendant with crucial pleadings would also make a subsequent default judgment problematic. (See e.g., Murray & Murray v. Raissi Real Estate Development, LLC (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 379, 385-86 [court can set aside default judgment where party seeking relief can credibly claim they would have received the request for entry of default if request was mailed to party].)