Judge Audra Mori, Case 21STCV00972 2023-01-18 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Danielle Hemple (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Bristol Farms (“Defendant”) for injuries relating to Plaintiff’s slip and fall in Defendant’ store. Plaintiff alleges that on February 3, 2019, Defendant allowed rainwater to accumulate in the front register area of its store, and that Plaintiff slipped on the wet floor as she was exiting the register area and walking towards the exit doors. The complaint alleges a single claim negligence-premises liability.

Defendant now moves for summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication, as to Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and Defendant filed a reply.

Defendant provides that Plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell on rainwater near the front entrance of Defendant’s store while Plaintiff was carrying her daughter on their way out of the store.[1] Defendant asserts that the incident occurred while the store’s manager, Gloria Matias (“Matias”) was mopping the store’s floor to remove rainwater, and after Matias placed yellow caution signs near the front entrance area. Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot raise a triable issue of fact concerning whether Defendant exercised reasonable care over the incident location prior to Plaintiff’s fall. Further, Defendant contends that the alleged dangerous condition was open and obvious at the time of Plaintiff’s fall. Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot raise a triable issue as to whether Defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff assumed the risk of slipping on the floor at the time of the incident because Plaintiff voluntarily walked toward the bright yellow warning sign on her way to the entrance and exit doors of the store.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s motion fails to address the exact location where Plaintiff initially slipped and where the warning signs were placed, and Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care, which caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant fails to establish that it provided sufficient notice of the hazard, and that Defendant failed to follow its own safety procedures. Further, Plaintiff contends that the water on the floor was not obvious, and that even if it were, Plaintiff was required to walk over the wet floor to reach the only entrance and exit doors of the store. Plaintiff avers that the wet floor caused her to fall, and she argues that Defendant’s assumption of the risk claim fails because Plaintiff did not assume the risk that Defendant would be negligent and fail to warn of the wet floor.

Plaintiff, with her opposition, submits 11 objections to Defendant’s evidence filed in support of the motion. Objection 1 to the surveillance video submitted of the incident, Exhibit A to Defendant’s compendium of Evidence, is overruled. Defendant’s counsel’s declaration, along with Plaintiff’s and Matias’s deposition testimony, provides a sufficient basis to admit the evidence. Objections 2-3 to the declaration of Matias are overruled. Objections 4-11 are sustained to the extent that Matias testifies as to what the surveillance video shows, as the video speaks itself.

In reply, Defendant submits 16 objections to Plaintiff’s evidence: one to the declaration of Danielle Hemple and 15 to the declaration of Plaintiff’s expert, Mark Burns. Objection 1 to the declaration of Hemple is overruled. As to the objections to Burns’ declaration, objections 1-2, 7, 9, and 12 are overruled. Objections 3-4 are sustained to the extent that Plaintiff’s expert states that “Slips, Trips, Missteps and Their Consequences” and “The Slip and Fall Handbook” are authoritative publications, as Plaintiff’s expert provides no foundation for these assertions. Objections 13-14 to portions of these publications are likewise sustained. Objections 5, 8,[2] and 11 are sustained as Plaintiff’s expert does not provide a reasoned explanation for his statement that Plaintiff’s fall originated five to eight feet in advance of the wet floor sign by the door. Objections 6, 10, and 15 are not dispositive to the motion, and thus, the Court declines to rule on them at this time. (CCP § 437c(q).)

Summary judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(c).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A defendant moving for summary judgment must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Id. at §437c(p).) A defendant may discharge this burden by furnishing either (1) affirmative evidence of the required facts or (2) discovery responses conceding that the plaintiff lacks evidence to establish an essential element of the plaintiff's case. If a defendant chooses the latter option, he or she must present evidence “and not simply point out that plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence….” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4^th at 865-66.)

[A] defendant may simply show the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action “by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.) Thus, rather than affirmatively disproving or negating an element (e.g., causation), a defendant moving for summary judgment has the option of presenting evidence reflecting the plaintiff does not possess evidence to prove that element. “The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing” to support an essential element of his case. (Aguilar, supra, at p. 855.) Under the latter approach, a defendant's initial evidentiary showing may “consist of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses, or admissions by the plaintiff in deposition or in response to requests for admission that he or she has not discovered anything that supports an essential element of the cause of action.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 110.) In other words, a defendant may show the plaintiff does not possess evidence to support an element of the cause of action by means of presenting the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence may be reasonably inferred. (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)

Thus, a moving defendant has two means by which to shift the burden of proof under the summary judgment statute: “The defendant may rely upon factually insufficient discovery responses by the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action sued upon. [Citation.] [Or a]lternatively, the defendant may utilize the tried and true technique of negating (‘disproving’) an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action.” (Brantly v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1598.)

Until the moving defendant has discharged its burden of proof, the opposing plaintiff has no burden to come forward with any evidence. Once the moving defendant has discharged its burden as to a particular cause of action, however, the plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence showing that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action. (Id. at §437c(p)(2).) On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party's supporting documents are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21.)

The elements of a negligence and premises liability cause of action are the same: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in order to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) To determine the existence and scope of duty, courts consider the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, and the extent of the burden to the defendant of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach. (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.)

“A store owner exercises ordinary care by making reasonable inspections of the portions of the premises open to customers, and the care required is commensurate with the risks involved.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.) The basic principle to be followed in these situations is that the owner must use the care required of a reasonably prudent person acting under the same circumstances. (Id.) Generally, the question of whether a store owner exercised reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe is a question of fact for a jury and each accident must be viewed in light of its own unique circumstances. (Id. at 1207.)

In this case, Defendant operated the subject grocery store, which had only one set of entrance/exit doors for customers located at the front end of the store. (Mot. Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) 1.) By the time Matias arrived at the store that morning, Defendant had already placed carpeted rubber floor mats inside the entrance to the store. (Mot. UMF 3.) After arriving at the store that morning, Defendant’s manager of service, Matias, placed three warning signs near the front entrance. (Mot. UMF 2.) Two of the three signs were made of yellow plastic and were hinged at the top so that the signs could be opened into an “A” shape, and the third sign was pyramid shaped with fabric stretching around it; each of the signs had lettering reading, “caution wet floor.” (Ibid.) Matias placed one of the warning signs to the right of the entrance doors, placed a second sign farther into the store next to a produce display, and placed the third between that display table and the registers. (Mot. UMF 8.)

On the weekend of February 2 and 3, 2019, it had been raining heavily in the area of the store, and it was raining off and on the morning of the incident. (Mot. UMF 4.) On February 3, 2019, Plaintiff arrived at the store between approximately 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon. (Mot. UMF 5.) Plaintiff went to the deli section of the store and then proceeded to the cashier area at the front of the store to pay for the items. (Mot. UMF 7.) Matias was at the front entrance doors with a mop and a mop bucket to wipe up rainwater on the floor. (Mot. UMF 9.) Matias was mopping the floor in front of the floors, and after completing her purchase, Plaintiff exited the cashier aisle and turned to her left to walk toward the front doors while carrying her daughter. (Mot. UMF 11-14, 15.) Plaintiff testified that she recalled taking one to three steps and then slipping. (Mot. UMF 16.) The time stamp on the surveillance video submitted of the incident shows that Plaintiff slipped and fell at approximately 11:37:29 am. (Ibid.) At the time of the incident, Matias was warning out the mop in front of the store’s doors. (Mot. UMF 17.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff does not recall looking down at the floor at any time before she fell. (Mot. UMF 19.) There were no other reports or complaints of anyone else slipping and falling inside the store on the date of the incident. (Mot. UMF 20.)

Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot raise a genuine dispute that Defendant exercised reasonable care over the incident location prior to Plaintiff’s fall based on the video footage and Matias’s testimony. In particular, Defendant contends that in light of the video footage documenting Matias’s reasonable and methodical efforts to mop the floor.

The video submitted by Defendant shows the front entrance/exit doors and part of the outside area of the doors. (Mot. Compendium of Exhibits, Exh. A.) The footage shows the floor outside appears to be wet from rain. Immediately inside the doors, there is a yellow warning sign to the right of the doors by what appear to be floral arrangements. There are also two mats on the floor just inside the doors. The video footage begins at approximately 11:35:01, and at approximately 11:36:05, Matias is seen walking into frame of the camera with a yellow mop bucket.[3] Matias is then seen beginning to mop the floor near the front entrance commencing at approximately 11:36:14. At approximately 11:36:27, Matias is seen lifting the yellow sign by the right side of the doors and moving it further inside the store slightly in front of what looks like the display with the floral arrangements. Matias then continues to mop the floor until approximately 11:37:29 when Plaintiff is seemingly seen after she fell near the yellow warning sign. Matias, and another unidentified person, are then seen approaching Plaintiff while Plaintiff is on the floor. Regarding Plaintiff, the video includes her upper body, but her legs and feet are not visible to the camera; they are outside the camera frame. While the video appears to show Plaintiff falling, it does not show where Plaintiff began to slip or fall. Nor does it show the relevant area where Plaintiff slipped.

Although Defendant contends that Matias’s efforts to mop the store’s floor was reasonable, Defendant provides no evidence concerning Defendant’s efforts to keep the area that caused Plaintiff’s slip and fall reasonably safe. Indeed, it is unclear based on the video exactly where Plaintiff began to slip and fall, and Defendant does not otherwise provide any evidence showing, for example, that it conducted a reasonable inspection of the relevant area. Plaintiff testified that after making her purchase, she recalled “taking one or two, three steps, a handful of steps, and then -- and then slipping.” (Mot. Compendium of Exhibits, Exh. D at pp. 65-66:19-9.) Plaintiff testified she “slipped, like a sliding motion,” and felt herself “be propelled pretty far forward.” (Id. at p. 66:12-18.) Moreover, Defendant does not cite any authority suggesting that the presence of yellow warning signs in different places in the store and efforts to mop the front entrance are sufficient to show that Defendant exercised reasonable care as a matter of law in relation to Plaintiff’s incident.[4]

Based on the foregoing, Defendant fails to establish that it exercised reasonable care in relation to the incident as a matter of law. (Ortega, 26 Cal.4th at 1207.)

“Generally, if a danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition.” (Krongos v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 387, 393.) However, this is not always the case. (Ibid.) “[T]he obviousness of a condition does not necessarily excuse the potential duty of a landowner, not simply to warn of the condition but to rectify it.” (Martinez v. Chippewa Enterprises, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1184.)

Stated in general terms, the no-duty exception for open and obvious dangerous conditions provides that “ ‘if a danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition.’ ” (Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 701.) Thus, the rationale for the exception to the general duty of ordinary care is that the foreseeability of harm usually is absent because third parties will perceive the obvious and take action to avoid the danger. (Ibid.)

The Court may, in appropriate circumstances, determine a condition is open and obvious where “photographs prima facie established the obviousness” of the condition. (Martinez, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184.)

Nonetheless, the obviousness of a danger “may obviate the duty to warn of its existence,” but if “if it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (e.g, when necessity requires persons to encounter it), there may be a duty to remedy the danger, and the breach of that duty may in turn form the basis for liability . . .” (Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 122.) Foreseeability is an elastic factor, and the degree of foreseeability necessary to warrant a finding of a duty will vary from case to case. (Lopez v. McDonald’s Corp. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 495, 509.) In determining whether a given harm was foreseeable, “it is necessary to review the ‘totality of the circumstances’ including the nature, condition and location of the defendant's premises [Citation], in light of the firmly established rule that ‘what is required to be foreseeable is the general character of the event or harm ... not its precise nature or manner of occurrence. [Citations.]’ ” (Id.)

Here, Defendant contends that the alleged dangerous condition of the floor was an open and obvious condition based on the presence of “(a) the bright yellow warning sign; (b) the large mop bucket; and (c) Ms. Matias herself, holding a mop at the Incident location.” (Mot. at p. 19:11-12.) Defendant contends that any of these factors would have made the wet condition of the floor on a rainy day obvious.

However, as stated above, the surveillance footage of the incident does not show the floor of the area where Plaintiff slipped, and Defendant does not submit any other evidence depicting the area where Plaintiff allegedly began to slip on water.[5] Consequently, it is not clear that the circumstances in that area of the floor would have been obvious to Plaintiff. Moreover, although Matias was actively mopping the area near the front entrance, and there was a yellow warning sign near the entrance doors, there is no evidence that any such sign was present in the area where Plaintiff actually slipped on the water. Even if Plaintiff had seen Matias mopping ahead of her, near the entrance doors, this does not demonstrate that any water on the floor in the area where Plaintiff fell was open and obvious as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendant’s evidence currently presented does not establish the obviousness of any water on the floor was such that Plaintiff could have been expected to see it prior to the trip and fall.

Defendant, thus, does not meet its moving burden to show the alleged dangerous condition was open and obvious as a matter of law.

Furthermore, even if the Court found that the alleged wet condition of the floor was open and obvious, it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s slip and fall occurred while Plaintiff was walking toward the only entrance and exits doors of the store. Accordingly, in making every reasonable inference in non-moving Plaintiff’s favor, it was foreseeable that even if the wet condition of the floor was open and obvious, Defendant’s customers would be required to walk on the wet floor to reach the store’s exit. In other words, Defendant should have foreseen that a customer would be required to encounter water on its floor to exit Defendant’s business. “The modern and controlling law on this subject is that although the obviousness of a danger may obviate the duty to warn of its existence, if it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious,… there may be a duty to remedy the danger, and the breach of that duty may in turn form the basis for liability.” (Martinez v. Chippewa Enters., Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1184 [quotation marks and emphasis omitted].)

Based on the foregoing, even if water on Defendant’s floor was shown to be open and obvious, a reasonable inference from the evidence is that Defendant should have foreseen that a customer would be required to encounter the risk, so Defendant had a duty to remedy the risk.[6] Defendant, therefore, does not meet its moving burden, and even if it had, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether it was foreseeable that water on Defendant’s floor posed a risk of harm that Defendant had to remedy.

“A store owner is not the insurer of its patrons' personal safety, but does have a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises reasonably safe for patrons. [Citation.] This includes a duty to keep the floors safe for patrons' use. [Citation.] To establish an owner's liability for negligence, the plaintiff must prove duty, breach, causation, and damages. [Citation.]” (Peralta v. Vons Companies, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1035.)

[A] “ ‘plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.’ ” [Citation].

Here, Defendant argues that there can be no contention that Defendant caused Plaintiff’s incident. Defendant argues that Plaintiff admitted to not remember looking down toward the ground in the 30 seconds before she fell, and that the video establishes that the yellow warning sign was placed in Plaintiff’s path before she fell. As to Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff did not look at the ground at any time before she fell, questions regarding Plaintiff’s appreciation of the risk are for the factfinder to decide. As to Defendant’s arguments that the video shows a yellow warning sign in Plaintiff’s path before she slipped and fell, there is nothing in the video that shows warnings were present in the area she slipped, which is not observable in Defendant’s surveillance video.

Defendant does not meet its moving burden of showing that Plaintiff cannot establish causation against it as a matter of law.

Under the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, defendants do not owe a duty of care to a plaintiff in certain situations, including sporting activities, depending on the nature of the activity. (McGarry v. Sax (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 983, 999.) For determining assumption of the risk, courts “must evaluate the fundamental nature of the sport and the defendant's role in or relationship to that sport in order to determine whether the defendant owes a duty to protect a plaintiff from the particular risk of harm.” (Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 148, 161; see also Kindrich v. Long Beach Yacht Club (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1258-1262 [summary of cases addressing assumption of risk].) Plaintiffs assume risks inherent in a sport by participating, and defendants generally owe no duty to protect plaintiffs from such risks but owe a duty not to increase the risks beyond those inherent in the sport. (Luna v. Vela (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 102, 107-10.) Where, “by virtue of the nature of the activity and the parties' relationship to the activity, the defendant owes no legal duty to protect the plaintiff from the particular risk of harm that caused the injury,” the assumption of risk “operate[s] as a complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery.” (Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 314-15.)

The doctrine of assumption of risk is not limited to sports. It applies to activities involving an inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants where the risk cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the activity. (Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 650, 658 [affirming application of assumption of risk doctrine where Plaintiff was burned by remnants of Burning Man effigy while at Burning Man Festival].)

Whether a defendant owes a duty of care to protect a plaintiff from the risk that resulted in the injury turns on the nature of the activity in which the defendant was engaged and the relationship of the parties to the activity. (Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 309.) The existence and scope of a defendant’s duty of care is a legal question for the Court to determine. (Id. at 313.) Thus, determinations regarding the elements on which the existence of the duty depends also present questions of law. (Id.)

Here, Defendant does not cite any authority holding that the primary assumption of the risk doctrine is applicable to customers shopping inside of grocery stores, such as in this matter. Defendant cites Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 650, in arguing that Plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk of falling by walking towards Defendant’s store’s doors without any rain gear while carrying her daughter and groceries, and without looking at the floor itself.

Beninati involved the Burning Man festival, an annual event held at a remote desert location, where a number of large structures erected for the festival are burned, culminating in the burning of a 60-foot-tall sculpture in the figure of a man, from which the festival name is derived. (175 Cal.App.4th at 654.) The Burning Man blaze occurs in front of a crowd of thousands of people, who, after the sculpture is toppled, are invited to approach the flames to deposit tokens, mementos, and other combustible objects in the fire, so as to participate more fully and completely in the Burning Man experience. (Id.) The plaintiff in Beninati approached the blaze to throw a photograph into the fire, but in doing so, Plaintiff tripped and fell into the fire twice. (Id. at 655.) Under the primary assumption of risk doctrine, the defendant- Burning Man’s promoter- owed plaintiff no duty of care, absent evidence that it increased the risk of harm normally associated with entering an area surrounded by fire or that this risk could have been mitigated without altering the nature of the ritualistic event. (Id. at 659, 661.)

Once much of the material had burned, and the conflagration had subsided but was still actively burning, Beninati and others walked into the fire. At that point, the risk of stumbling on buried fire debris, including the cables which necessarily had collapsed along with the sculpture, was an obvious and inherent one. Thus, the risk of falling and being burned by the flames or hot ash was inherent, obvious, and necessary to the event, and Beninati assumed such risk.

We need not discuss other non-sport activities where the primary assumption of risk doctrine is, or may be, applicable, for we are confident that this case presents an example “where, by virtue of the nature of the activity and the parties' relationship to the activity, [Black Rock] owe[d] no legal duty to protect [Beninati] from the particular risk of harm that caused the injury....”

Unlike in Beninati, where the risk of falling into a fire could not be eliminated without alternating the fundamental nature of the activity, depositing tokens in flames, keeping its floor free from dangerous conditions would not deter Defendant’s ability to operate a grocery store. Nor is allowing wet floors inside a grocery store an inherent risk to walking through a store. Moreover, the law is clear that a store owner has a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep its premises reasonably safe for its patrons. (Peralta, 24 Cal.App.5th at 1035.) Additionally, to the extent that Defendant contends Plaintiff assumed the risk of falling by walking towards Defendant’s store, there is no dispute that the doors Plaintiff was walking towards were the only exit to the store.

Defendant, thus, fails establish that the primary assumption of the risk doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claims.

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court

[1] The parties provide that Plaintiff’s daughter was not injured in the incident.

[2] Objection 8 is also sustained on the grounds that the relevant surveillance video speaks for itself.

[3] The surveillance footage appears to have been captured on individual frames spaced approximately two or three seconds apart. For example, Matias is seen walking into frame 11:36:05 with the next frame at 11:36:08 showing Matias proceeding to the left side of the doors with the mop bucket, and the next frame at 11:36:10 showing Matias still at the left side of the doors and a customer preparing to raise an umbrella over their head as they exit.

[4] Regarding the warning signs, Plaintiff testified that she remembered seeing a sign near the produce section, but not in the area that she slipped. (Mot. Compendium of Exhibits, Exh. D at pp. 70-71:14-1.)

[5] The quality of the video submitted is such that it is not completely clear which portions inside Defendant’s store may be wet or dry.

[6] While Matias was mopping near the door, it is disputed that this was sufficient to discharge Defendant’s duty of care or remedy the danger.