Judge: Audra Mori, Case: 21STCV03426, Date: 2022-08-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV03426    Hearing Date: August 11, 2022    Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

GRACIELA SANDEZ,

                        Plaintiff(s),

            vs.

 

ALICIA JANE HENFREY, ET AL.,

 

                        Defendant(s).

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      CASE NO: 21STCV03426

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

 

Dept. 31

1:30 p.m.

August 11, 2022

 

1. Background

Plaintiff, GRACIELA SANDEZ (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Alicia Jane Henfrey (“Henfrey”), Alamo Rent-A-Car, LLC (“Alamo”), and Does 1-50 for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.  Plaintiff has dismissed Alamo from the action and has filed an Amendment to Complaint naming Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Los Angeles, LLC (“Enterprise”) as Doe 1.  The complaint alleges a single cause of action for negligence against all defendants.

 

Enterprise now demurs to the complaint arguing it fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a claim against it.  Enterprise contends that the complaint contains merely conclusory allegations without any supporting material facts, and that Enterprise as a rental car company cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its customer under 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (the “Graves Amendment”).

 

Any opposition to the demurrer was due on or before July 29, 2022.  As of August 5, 2022, no opposition has been filed.

 

2. Demurrer

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings.  It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer, or cross-complaint).  (CCP §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)  It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true.  (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)

 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)  No other extrinsic evidence can be considered.  (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862 [disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287] [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].)

 

A demurrer can be utilized where the “face of the complaint” itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery.  (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-72.)  The “face of the complaint” includes material contained in attached exhibits that are incorporated by reference into the complaint; or in a superseded complaint in the same action.  (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; see also Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.”]).

 

A demurrer can only be sustained when it disposes of an entire cause of action.  (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97,119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.)

 

a. Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.  (CCP § 430.41(a).) 

 

The court finds Defendant has fulfilled this requirement prior to filing the demurrer.  (Demurrer Miller Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.)

 

b. Request for Judicial Notice

Enterprise requests the court take judicial notice of the Statement of Information for Enterprise filed with the California Secretary of State, (Dem. Exh. C), and that Enterprise is engaged in the business of renting vehicles.

 

The request as to the Statement of Information is granted pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(c).  (See Friends of Shingle Springs Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1483-84.)  Further, the court takes judicial notice the Statement provides the type of business or services of Enterprise is “motor vehicle rental, sharing and sales.”  (Dem. Exh. C.) 

 

c. Analysis

            The Graves Amendment provides in pertinent part:                                                                    

 

(a) In general. An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person … shall not be liable under the law of any State … by reason of being the owner of the vehicle … for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if—

 

(1) the owner … is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and

 

(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner …

 

In addition, the elements of a cause of action for negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages.”  (Johnson v. Prasad (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 74, 78.)  “Ordinarily, negligence may be alleged in general terms, without specific facts showing how the injury occurred, but there are ‘limits to the generality with which a plaintiff is permitted to state his cause of action, and ... the plaintiff must indicate the acts or omissions which are said to have been negligently performed. He may not recover upon the bare statement that the defendant’s negligence has caused him injury.’ [Citation].” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 527.)  There is no requirement that plaintiff identify and allege the precise moment of the injury or the exact nature of the wrongful act. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) 

 

Here, Enterprise argues that the complaint fails to allege sufficient material facts concerning Enterprise’s liability for the accident, and so the complaint fails to state a claim against it.  Additionally, Enterprise contends that under the Graves Amendment, it is not liable for the actions of its renters, so Plaintiff’s claims are barred against Enterprise. 

 

The complaint alleges in pertinent part:

 

5. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief, alleges that at all times herein mentioned, defendants, and each of them, were acting as the agents, servants, and/or employees of the other named defendants, and were within the course and scope of their employment and with the full knowledge and consent of each of the other named defendants. Each defendant subsequently ratified and condoned the conduct of each remaining defendant.

 

6. At all times herein mentioned, defendants, ALICIA JANE HENFREY, an individual; ALAMO RENT-A-CAR, LLC; AND DOES 1-50 INCLUSIVE and each of them, were the owners and operators of a vehicle, bearing California license plates, hereinafter referred to as defendants' vehicle.

 

 

9. On or about January 30,2019, at the subject location, the defendants, and each of them, so negligently entrusted, managed, maintained, drove, and operated said defendants' vehicle so as to cause defendants' vehicle to collide with the plaintiff's vehicle proximately causing those injuries and damages to the plaintiff as hereinafter described.

 

(Compl. ¶¶ 5-6, 9.)

 

            As to Enterprise’s argument that Plaintiff’s claims are barred against it under the Graves Amendment, the complaint does not contain any factual allegations stating that Enterprise rented the subject vehicle to Henfrey, and while Enterprise argues the judicially noticeable evidence shows it is in the business of motor vehicle rentals, the complaint does not allege that the vehicle involved in the accident was a rental vehicle Henfrey rented from Enterprise.  Rather, the complaint alleges that the defendants, which would include Enterprise and Henfrey, were all the agents and employees of one another and were within the course and scope of their employment.  Further, Enterprise was allegedly the owner of the vehicle and negligently managed and maintained the vehicle.  In its demurrer, Enterprise fails to establish through judicially noticeable evidence that the claims against it are barred by the Graves Amendment, and at this stage of the case, the court cannot consider other matters outside of the complaint. 

 

            As to Enterprise’s argument that the complaint fails to state a claim because it contains only conclusory allegations of negligence against it, although the complaint’s allegations are stated in general terms, they are sufficient to allege a cause of action for negligence.  (See Pultz v. Holgerson (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1117 [“The negligence element may be generally pleaded; the breach of duty of care may be alleged by stating the act was negligently done.]; see also Orey v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1255.)  While Enterprise argues the complaint is not clear as to how Enterprise was negligent, any ambiguity concerning specific facts pertaining to Enterprise can be clarified through discovery.  (See Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822 [“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”].) 

 

As analyzed above, the complaint sufficiently alleges a claim against Enterprise, as it alleges that Enterprise owned the vehicle and negligently maintained, managed, and entrusted it to Henfrey, and that Henfrey was driving within the scope of Henfrey’s agency for Enterprise at the time of the accident.  Furthermore, Enterprise contends that the complaint’s allegations that Enterprise and Henfrey were employees and agents of one another at the time of the accident do not make sense because both could not have been operating the vehicle at the time of the accident.  However, “[a] plaintiff is permitted to plead alternative inconsistent theories.”  (Dubin v. Robert Newhall Chesebrough Trust (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 465, 477.)  The complaint, thus, sufficiently pleads, for example, that Henfrey was Enterprise’s agent or employee and was driving Enterprise’s vehicle at the time of the accident.

 

Therefore, Enterprise’s demurrer is overruled.  Enterprise is ordered to file an answer within 10 days. 

 

Moving Defendant Enterprise is ordered to give notice. 

 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:

 

Dated this 11th day of August 2022

 

 

 

 

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court