Judge: Audra Mori, Case: 21STCV03805, Date: 2022-08-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV03805 Hearing Date: August 23, 2022 Dept: 31
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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Plaintiff(s), vs. BERTHA GLORIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., Defendant(s). | ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) |
[TENTATIVE] ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Dept. 31 1:30 p.m. August 23, 2022 |
1. Background
Plaintiff Antoinette Williams (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Bertha Gloria Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), EAN Holdings (“EAN”), LLC, Enterprise Holdings, Lawrence Bryant, and Angel On My Shoulders for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The complaint alleges causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence.
Defendant EAN now demurs to the FAC arguing it fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a claim against it, and that EAN as a rental car company cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its customer under 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (the “Graves Amendment”). Plaintiff opposes the demurrer, and EAN filed a reply.
2. Demurrer
A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (CCP §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)
A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862 [disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287] [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].)
A demurrer can be utilized where the “face of the complaint” itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-72.) The “face of the complaint” includes material contained in attached exhibits that are incorporated by reference into the complaint or in a superseded complaint in the same action. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; see also Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.”]).
A demurrer can only be sustained when it disposes of an entire cause of action. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97,119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.)
a. Meet and Confer
Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (CCP § 430.41(a).)
The court finds Defendant has fulfilled this requirement prior to filing the demurrer. (Demurrer Miller Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.)
b. Request for Judicial Notice
EAN requests the court take judicial notice of a Statement of Information for EAN and Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Los Angeles, LLC (“Enterprise”), and that as provided in each Statement, that EAN and Enterprise are in the business of renting and/or leasing vehicles. (Dem. Exhs. B-C.)
The request as to each Statement of Information is granted pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(c). (See Friends of Shingle Springs Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1483-84.) Further, the Court takes judicial notice the Statement for EAN states that the type of business or services of EAN is “[m]otor vehicle rental and related service,” and that the Statement for Enterprise states that the type of business or services of Enterprise is “motor vehicle rental, sharing and sales.” (Dem. Exhs. B-C.)
c. Analysis
The Graves Amendment provides in pertinent part:
(a) In general. An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person … shall not be liable under the law of any State … by reason of being the owner of the vehicle … for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if—
(1) the owner … is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and
(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner …
In addition, the elements of a cause of action for negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Johnson v. Prasad (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 74, 78.) “Ordinarily, negligence may be alleged in general terms, without specific facts showing how the injury occurred, but there are ‘limits to the generality with which a plaintiff is permitted to state his cause of action, and ... the plaintiff must indicate the acts or omissions which are said to have been negligently performed. He may not recover upon the bare statement that the defendant’s negligence has caused him injury.’ [Citation].” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 527.) There is no requirement that plaintiff identify and allege the precise moment of the injury or the exact nature of the wrongful act. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Here, EAN asserts that the complaint contains merely conclusory allegations without any supporting material facts, and that under the Graves Amendment, it is not liable for the actions of its renters, so Plaintiff’s claims are barred against EAN. Plaintiff opposes arguing the complaint adequately states a cause of action against EAN. EAN, in reply, again contends the complaint is defective and barred by the Graves Amendment.
The complaint alleges that on December 17, 2019, at La Brea Avenue and 20th Street in Los Angeles, Defendants' vehicle made an illegal left turn into oncoming traffic and collided with plaintiff’s vehicle. (Compl. at p. 5.) It further alleges that defendants “negligently operated, owned, entrusted, and allowed the vehicle occupied by [Rodriguez] to be driven in a manner that caused injuries and damages to plaintiff.” (Compl. at p. 5.) Concerning EAN, the complaint alleges in relevant part that EAN employed the persons who operated the motor vehicle in the course and scope of their employment, that EAN owned the vehicle operated with its permission, that it entrusted the vehicle, and that the defendants that were the agents and employees of other the defendants included EAN. (Compl. at p. 4.)
Regarding EAN’s arguments that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Graves Amendment, the complaint does not contain any factual allegations stating that EAN rented the subject vehicle to the person operating the vehicle that collided with Plaintiff, and while EAN argues the judicially noticeable evidence shows it is in the business of motor vehicle rentals, the complaint does not allege that the vehicle involved in the accident was a rental vehicle rented or leased from EAN. Rather, the complaint alleges that EAN employed the person that operated the vehicle in the course of their employment, and that the defendants, including EAN, were all the agents and employees of one another and acted within the scope of their agency. In its demurrer, EAN fails to establish through judicially noticeable evidence that the claims against it are barred by the Graves Amendment, and at this stage of the case, the Court cannot consider other matters outside of the complaint.
As to EAN’s argument that the complaint fails to state a claim against it because it contains only conclusory allegations of negligence against it, although the complaint’s allegations are stated in general terms, they are sufficient to allege a cause of action for negligence against EAN. (See Pultz v. Holgerson (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1117 [“The negligence element may be generally pleaded; the breach of duty of care may be alleged by stating the act was negligently done.]; see also Orey v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1255.) While EAN argues the complaint is not clear as to how EAN was negligent, any ambiguity concerning specific facts pertaining to EAN can be clarified through discovery. (See Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822 [“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”].)
Furthermore, although EAN argues that the complaint’s conflicting allegations make it unclear what allegations are being asserted against EAN, “[a] plaintiff is permitted to plead alternative inconsistent theories.” (Dubin v. Robert Newhall Chesebrough Trust (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 465, 477.) The complaint, thus, sufficiently pleads, for example, that EAN was the agent of the other defendants and/or that it employed the persons that operated the motor vehicle in the course of their employment.
Therefore, EAN’s demurrer to the complaint is overruled. EAN is ordered to file an answer to the complaint within ten (10) days.
Moving Defendant EAN is ordered to give notice.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
Dated this 23rd day of August 2022
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Hon. Audra Mori Judge of the Superior Court |