Judge: Audra Mori, Case: 21STCV08809, Date: 2022-07-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV08809 Hearing Date: July 29, 2022 Dept: 31
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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Plaintiff(s), vs. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, ET AL., Defendant(s). | ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) |
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Dept. 31 1:30 p.m. July 29, 2022 |
1. Background Facts
Plaintiff Joan Gardner (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”), erroneously sued as Wells Fargo & Company, for negligence and premises liability relating to Plaintiff’s trip and fall on a sidewalk. On March 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint naming DGL Associates (“DGL”) as Doe 1.
On March 17, 2022, Wells Fargo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s was granted based on Plaintiff’s deemed admissions via request for admissions (“RFAs”) served on Plaintiff admitted that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Wells Fargo.[1] (Min. Order March 17, 2022, Ruling on Submitted Matter.) In particular, the court took judicial notice that Plaintiff admitted that Plaintiff’s own negligence and carelessness caused her injuries, and that Plaintiff had no basis for her first and second causes of action against Wells Fargo.
At this time, Defendant DGL moves for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and DGL filed a reply.
2. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
a. Meet and Confer
CCP § 439(a) provides that “Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Emphasis added.)
In this case, DGL did not submit a meet confer declaration with the moving papers. However, DGL’s counsel submits a meet and confer declaration with the reply stating that defense counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel to meet and confer regarding Plaintiff’s complaint. Defense counsel does not state that any attempt was made to meet and confer by telephone as required by the Code, nor do Defendants explain why the declaration was not attached to the moving papers. Nonetheless, because Plaintiff does not dispute the parties met and conferred in the opposition, and despite the meet and confer requirements being deficient, the court will reach the merits of the motion. Counsel is admonished that in the future, where meet and confer efforts are lacking, the court will simply continue the matter or order it taken off calendar.
b. Request for Judicial Notice
DGL requests the court take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s admissions that Plaintiff’s own negligence and carelessness caused her injuries. (Mot. Exh. A, RFAs Nos. 2 and 3.)
Evidence Code § 452(d) provides the court may take judicial notice of “Records of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States.” Moreover, “[A] complaint's allegations may be disregarded when they conflict with judicially noticed discovery responses…,” subject to judges' interpretations of the nature and extent of any discovery admissions. (Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 83.) It is true that a court may take judicial notice of a party's admissions or concessions, but only in cases where the admission ‘can not reasonably be controverted,’ such as in answers to interrogatories or requests for admission, or in affidavits and declarations filed on the party's behalf.” (Arce ex rel. Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 485.)
In this case, Defendant’s request is granted.
c. MJOP Standard
A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (C.C.P. §438(b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).)
“A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself. [Citation.]” (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.) “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 (Citations Omitted).) The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).)
d. Analysis
The complaint pleads a cause of action for general negligence and another for premises liability, which are both based on a legal theory of negligence. In California, the “plaintiff in a negligence suit must demonstrate a legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” (Vasilenko v. Grace Fam. Church, 3 Cal. 5th 1077, 1083 (2017) [internal quotation marks omitted].) As relevant here, Plaintiff is deemed to have admitted that Plaintiff’s own negligence and carelessness caused her injuries. (Mot. Request for Judicial Notice.) Any allegations that are contrary to the law or to a fact of which judicial notice may be taken will be treated as a nullity. (Interinsurance Exchange v. Narula (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1143.)
DGL argues the complaint fails to state a claim against it because Plaintiff has admitted that her own negligence and carelessness caused her injuries, so she cannot maintain causes of action for negligence or premises liability against DGL. In particular, DGL avers that Plaintiff cannot prove that DGL’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing her harm.
However, as Plaintiff argues in opposition, although Plaintiff’s admission establishes that Plaintiff was negligent and careless, the admission does not establish that Plaintiff’s negligence and carelessness was the sole cause of her injuries.[2] While the admissions would show that Plaintiff was at the least contributorily negligent in causing her injuries, this alone does not mean that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for negligence or premises liability against DGL. (See Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51Cal.4th 1148, 1156 [“Under comparative fault principles, a plaintiff's negligence no longer bars recovery, but reduces ‘the damages awarded ... in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the [plaintiff].’ ”].)
DGL, in reply, argues that because Plaintiff has admitted that her own negligence and carelessness caused her injuries, Plaintiff cannot establish that any breach by DGL was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. DGL avers that Plaintiff admits that her own negligence and carelessness caused her injuries, and not that her negligence and carelessness only contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries. However, just as DGL asserts that Plaintiff did not admit that her negligence and carelessness contributed to her injuries, Plaintiff did not admit that her negligence and carelessness were the sole cause of her injuries. The court will not now read such into the admissions. Mot. Exh. A, RFAs Nos. 2 and 3.) If Plaintiff was only contributorily negligent, this alone would not preclude Plaintiff from stating a claim for negligence or premises liability against DGL. (Diaz, 51Cal.4th at 1156.) Furthermore, this ruling does not contradict the earlier order granting Well Fargo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, as Plaintiff specifically admitted that she had no basis for her first and second causes of action against Wells Fargo. (Min. Order March 17, 2022, Ruling on Submitted Matter.) No such admission has been made as to DGL.
DGL does not otherwise contend that the complaint properly pleads the necessary elements for a claim of negligence and premises liability against DGL.
3. Conclusion
DGL’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied
Defendant DGL is ordered to give notice.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
Dated this 29th day of July 2022
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Hon. Audra Mori Judge of the Superior Court |
[1] Plaintiff’s motion for withdrawal of admissions regarding the same RFAs was also heard on March 17, 2022 and was denied. (Min. Order March 17, 2022, Ruling on Submitted Matter.)
[2] Plaintiff’s opposition references Plaintiff’s responses to certain special interrogatories. There are no such interrogatories attached to the opposition, and Plaintiff does not establish it would be proper for the court to consider such interrogatories with this motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court considers only the complaint and the judicially noticeable evidence.