Judge: Audra Mori, Case: 21STCV21315, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV21315 Hearing Date: December 15, 2022 Dept: 31
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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Plaintiff(s), vs. GRANT M. UBERSTINE, ET AL., Defendant(s). | ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) |
[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Dept. 31 1:30 p.m. December 15, 2022 |
1. Background
Plaintiff Michael Aisley (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Grant M. Uberstine (“Grant”), Gary Uberstine (“Gary”), and State Farm Insurance (“State Farm”)[1] for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident. The complaint alleges causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence. Plaintiff alleges that Grant negligently operated a vehicle owned by Gary as to cause it to collide with Plaintiff’s vehicle. The complaint, filed on Judicial Council form PLD-PI-001, indicates that Plaintiff seeks exemplary damages and includes a prayer for punitive damages. (Compl. ¶¶ 10f, 14a(2).)
At this time, Defendants Gary and Grant Uberstine (collectively, “Defendants”) move to strike the prayer for punitive damages and the language seeking exemplary damages from the complaint. The motion is unopposed.
Defendants contend that the complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to support a claim for punitive damages. Defendants argue that simply alleging that Defendants caused Plaintiff damages is not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.
2. Motion to Strike
California law authorizes a party’s motion to strike matter from an opposing party’s pleading if it is irrelevant, false, or improper. (CCP §§ 435; 436(a).) Motions may also target pleadings or parts of pleadings which are not filed or drawn in conformity with applicable laws, rules or orders. (CCP § 436(b).) A motion to strike is used to address defects that appear on the face of a pleading or from judicially noticed matters that are not grounds for a demurrer. (Pierson v Sharp Memorial Hospital (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342; see also City & County of San Francisco v Strahlendorf (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1911, 1913 (motion may not be based on a party's declaration or factual representations made by counsel in the motion papers).) In particular, a motion to strike can be used to attack the entire pleading or any part thereof – in other words, a motion may target single words or phrases, unlike demurrers. (Warren v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 24, 40.) The Code of Civil Procedure also authorizes the Court to act on its own initiative to strike matters, empowering the Court to enter orders striking matter “at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper.” (CCP § 436.)
Civil Code § 3294(a) states, “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. Finally, “fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the party of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civil Code §3294.)
Malice has long been interpreted to mean that malice in fact, as opposed to malice implied by law, is required. Malice in fact may be proved under § 3294 either expressly (by direct evidence probative on the existence of hatred or ill will) or by implication (by indirect evidence from which the jury may draw inferences). Thus it has been held that the “malice” required by §3294 implies an act conceived in a spirit of mischief or with criminal indifference towards the obligations owed to others. Where the defendant’s wrongdoing has been intentional and deliberate, and has the character of outrage frequently associated with crime, all but a few courts have permitted the jury to award in the tort action “punitive” or “exemplary” damages. Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or “malice,” or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 890, 894; Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)
Allegations that a defendant exhibited a conscious disregard for the safety of others are sufficient to show malice. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-96; see also Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 90.) To properly allege punitive damages in a motor vehicle accident action, a plaintiff needs to "establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences." (Taylor, 24 Cal.3d at 896.) Moreover, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.
Here, the complaint alleges that while Plaintiff’s vehicle was at a standstill, it was rear-ended by Grant’s vehicle. (Compl. at p. 6.) The complaint states:
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Grant M. Uberstine was the legal (proximate) cause of damages to Plaintiff by reason of negligence for failing to properly adhere to laws and rules of the road by failing to monitor the surroundings of the motor vehicle that defendant Grant M. Uberstine operated and thus negligently failing to stop the vehicle and preventing it from rear-ending Plaintiff[‘]s vehicle.
Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Gary Uberstine was the legal (proximate) cause of damages to Plaintiff by reason of negligence for entrusting the motor vehicle that rear-ended Plaintiff[‘]s vehicle to defendant Grant M. Uberstine who committed the act of general negligence against Plaintiff Michael Aisley.
(Ibid, capitalization omitted.)
The Complaint does not contain any specific facts showing malice, fraud, or oppression as used in Civil Code § 3294. The complaint merely alleges that Grant was negligent in operating a motor vehicle, and Gary was negligent in entrusting the vehicle to Grant. There are no allegations showing Defendants were aware of probable dangerous consequences of any of their conduct. (Taylor, 24 Cal.3d at 896.) The complaint therefore does not sufficiently allege a claim for punitive damages against Defendants. (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 90.)
The motion to strike is granted.
The burden is on Plaintiff to show in what manner he can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.) Plaintiff does not oppose the motion or otherwise make any showing that the above defects can be cured to state a claim for punitive damages in this action. Accordingly, leave to amend is denied.
Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages is granted without leave to amend.
Defendants are ordered to give notice.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
Dated this 17th day of January 2022
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Hon. Audra Mori Judge of the Superior Court |
[1] On October 31, 2022, State Farm’s demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and Plaintiff’s complaint against State Farm was ordered dismissed.