Judge: Audra Mori, Case: 21STCV37077, Date: 2022-08-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV37077    Hearing Date: August 10, 2022    Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

SIERRA STILL,

                        Plaintiff(s),

            vs.

 

LUIS BERG, ET AL.,

 

                        Defendant(s).

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

      CASE NO: 21STCV37077

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

 

Dept. 31

1:30 p.m.

August 3, 2022

 

1. Background

Plaintiff Sierra Still (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Luis Berg (“Luis”), Nimisha Wildman (“Wildman”), Sigmar Berg (“Sigmar”), Petra Berg, and Nikolas Kate (“Kate”) for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.  The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence.  Plaintiff alleges that Wildman entrusted her vehicle to Luis, who drove it with two teen friends and abandoned the vehicle with the engine running and key inside at a gas station.  After Luis walked into a store, Kate stole the vehicle and caused an accident with Plaintiff and a third-party vehicle.  As against Wildman, Plaintiff alleges she was the registered owner of the vehicle and that she negligently entrusted it to a 16-year-old, Luis, who she knew or should have known was incompetent and unfit to drive.  Further, Plaintiff alleges that Sigmar is liable as Plaintiff’s parent and for signing Luis’s driver’s license application.

 

Defendants Wildman and Sigmar now each demur to the FAC arguing the first and second causes of action fail to state sufficient facts to constitute a claim against them.  Plaintiff opposes both demurrers, and Wildman and Sigmar each filed a reply.    

 

2. Demurrer Legal Standard

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings.  It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer, or cross-complaint).  (CCP §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)  It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true.  (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)

 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)  No other extrinsic evidence can be considered.  (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862 [disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287] [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].)

 

A demurrer can be utilized where the “face of the complaint” itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery.  (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-72.)  The “face of the complaint” includes material contained in attached exhibits that are incorporated by reference into the complaint; or in a superseded complaint in the same action.  (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; see also Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.”]).

 

A demurrer can only be sustained when it disposes of an entire cause of action.  (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97,119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.)

 

3. Wildman’s Demurrer to the FAC

a. Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.  (CCP § 430.41(a).) 

 

The court finds Wildman has fulfilled this requirement prior to filing the demurrer.  (Demurrer Boyd Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.)

 

b. Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests the court take judicial notice of California Bill Analysis, Senate Committee, 2005-2006 Regular Session, Assembly Bill 1474 (February 22, 2005), attached as Exhibit 1 to the request for judicial notice. 

 

The request is granted.  (Evid. Code § 452(c); see also People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 681 n.3 [trial court may take judicial notice of legislative history on its own motion].)

 

c. Parties’ Arguments

Wildman contends that there are no facts stated in the FAC to establish a legal duty owed to Plaintiff.  Wildman argues that there is no special relationship alleged in the FAC, as Wildman merely gave Luis permission to use her vehicle and a subsequent third-person, Kate, stole the vehicle and caused the accident.  Further, Wildman contends the harm incurred was not foreseeable, and that the FAC does not satisfy the elements of negligent entrustment.

 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues the FAC sufficiently alleges that Wildman was the registered owner of the sports car she gave Luis permission to drive, and that Wildman entrusted the car to an inexperienced and incompetent 16-year-old with two teen passengers.  Plaintiff argues that although an owner whose vehicle is stolen is not liable for injuries caused by the thief, the case fits into the special circumstance exception where liability is appropriate.  Plaintiff asserts that because Wildman permitted Luis to drive the car, and Luis impliedly permitted Kate to drive the car, Wildman is liable for the accident.  Additionally, Plaintiff argues that under the facts alleged, Kate’s negligence is imputed to Luis, and consequently, to Wildman, and that the negligent entrustment claim does not depend on a special relationship. 

 

In reply, Wildman argues the Kate’s negligence cannot be imputed to Luis because there are no facts alleged showing Kate was given express or implied permission to operate the vehicle.  Wildman avers a duty cannot be imposed as Wildman did not contemplate Kate using the car, and that all claims concerning two teen passengers are irrelevant. 

 

d. Analysis re: Liability as Owner of Vehicle

California Vehicle Code § 17150 states that “Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.”  Vehicle Code § 17154 provides:

 

If the bailee of an owner with the permission, express or implied, of the owner permits another to operate the motor vehicle of the owner, then the bailee and the driver shall both be deemed operators of the vehicle of the owner within the meaning of Sections 17152 and 17153.

 

Every bailee of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the bailee or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the bailee.

 

            Here, the FAC alleges that Wildman was the registered owner of the vehicle she gave Luis permission to drive.  (FAC at p. 5.)  Luis then allegedly left the vehicle with the engine running, door unlocked, and key inside the car at a gas station, while he went inside the convenience store.  (Ibid.)  Kate, “having the appearance of a transient, stood by observing.”  (Ibid.)  After Luis walked into the store, Kate jumped into the vehicle, stole it, and sped away.  (Ibid.)  Thereafter, Kate caused the subject accident involving Plaintiff. 

           

            There are no allegations in the FAC to suggest, and Plaintiff does not contend, that Wildman gave Kate express or implied permission to operate her vehicle.  Rather, Plaintiff argues that Kate’s negligence is imputed to Luis, which is in turn imputed to Wildman under Vehicle Code § 17154.  In particular, Plaintiff argues that Luis’s action in abandoning a running car in the presence of an alleged transient amounted to implied permission to Kate to drive the car. 

 

            Generally, however, the owner of a vehicle is not responsible for the negligence of a person who allegedly steals the car and causes another injury, even if the owner left the keys in the car.  (See Holder v. Poperaden (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 557, 558-59 [“[I]n the absence of a statute imposing a duty on the part of motorists to protect persons on the streets from any damage caused by thieves driving stolen automobiles (as by prohibiting the leaving of a key in an unattended vehicle on a public street) the owner of an automobile is under no duty to persons who may be injured by its use to keep it out of the hands of a third person in the absence of facts putting the owner on notice that the third person is incompetent to handle it, [Citation], especially when the recognition of such a duty, in the absence of such a statute, ‘would result in imposing greater liability than is now provided by statute when the owner voluntarily entrusts his car to another.” (internal quotations omitted)]; see also Kiick v. Levias (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 399, 404-05 [plaintiff involved in collision with stolen car could not recover damages from owner based on allegation that owner left keys in or about the car].) 

 

            Plaintiff cites to Hergenrether v. East (1964) 61 Cal.2d 440, in arguing that Luis’s actions were an invitation to Kate to take possession and control of Wildman’s car.  In Hergenrether, the defendants’ truck was stolen by an unidentified thief, who later caused an accident with the plaintiffs’ car.  (61 Cal.2d 440, 441-42.)  The defendant that had control of the truck “parked the vehicle on California Street he left the doors of the truck unlocked and the keys in the ignition. Personal property, including a portable radio, was left in the cab of the truck, and some $3,000 worth of roofing equipment, guns and a barrel of gasoline were left in the bed of the truck.”  (Id. at 442.)  Further, the “character of the neighborhood” where the truck was parked was “critical to a proper resolution” of the matter, as it was a “blighted area and certainly easily identifiable.”  (Id. at 442-43.)  Several factors were found to have imposed a duty to the plaintiffs by the defendants.  (Id. at 445.) 

 

When so viewed the significant circumstances disclosed are: (1) the vehicle was left in a neighborhood which was frequented by persons who had little respect for the law and the rights of others; (2) the neighborhood was heavily populated by drunks and near drunks; (3) the vehicle was intended to be left there for a relatively long period of time-from midafternoon to the following morning-and, of particular importance, it was intended that it would be left for the entire night; and (4) the vehicle was a partially loaded two-ton truck, the safe and proper operation of which was not a matter of common experience, and which was capable of inflicting more serious injury and damage than an ordinary vehicle when not properly controlled.

 

(Id.)  Unlike in Hergenrether, where the above factors warranted finding a duty was owed to the plaintiffs by the defendants, in this case, there are no special circumstances alleged in the FAC to justify the imposition of a duty to Plaintiff.    The FAC alleges that Luis left Wildman’s vehicle with the engine running, door unlocked, and the key inside while he went into a store, and that Kate had the appearance of a transient.  There are no facts showing that Luis intended for the vehicle to be left for a long period of time let alone overnight, on a public street, that the vehicle was as dangerous as a two-truck carrying guns and a barrel of gas in its bed, or that the neighborhood was lawless.  There are no facts showing that Luis invited Kate to take the vehicle or gave Kate implied permission to drive it.

 

            Therefore, the FAC fails to allege that Kate’s and/or Luis’s negligence can be imputed to Wildman under the circumstances. 

 

e. Negligent Entrustment

            “ ‘The elements of a negligence cause of action are the existence of a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury…” 

 

“‘“[I]t is generally recognized that one who places or entrusts his [or her] motor vehicle in the hands of one whom he [or she] knows, or from the circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver’s disqualification, incompetency, in experience or recklessness . . . .”’”  (Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063.)

 

“CACI No. 724 outlines the elements of the tort of negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle: ¶ ‘1. That [name of driver] was negligent in operating the vehicle; ¶ ‘2. That [name of defendant] [owned the vehicle operated by [name of driver]/had possession of the vehicle operated by [name of driver] with the owner's permission]; ¶ ‘3. That [name of defendant] knew, or should have known, that [name of driver] was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle; ¶ ‘4. That [name of defendant] permitted [name of driver] to drive the vehicle; and ¶ ‘5. That [name of driver]'s incompetence or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to [name of plaintiff].’ [Footnote omitted.]”  (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 565–566.)

 

“Ordinarily, negligence may be alleged in general terms, without specific facts showing how the injury occurred, but there are ‘limits to the generality with which a plaintiff is permitted to state his cause of action, and ... the plaintiff must indicate the acts or omissions which are said to have been negligently performed. He may not recover upon the bare statement that the defendant’s negligence has caused him injury.’ [Citation].” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 527.) 

 

            Here, the FAC alleges Wildman is liable “for negligently entrusting a sports car to a 16-year-old when she knew or should have known he was incompetent and unfit to drive and assume responsibility for such vehicle…”  (FAC at p. 5.)  Further, Plaintiff alleges the negligence of each defendant was a substantial factor in causing injury to Plaintiff and the damages alleged in the FAC.  (Ibid.) 

 

            However, the FAC fails to assert any factual allegations showing that Wildman knew or should have known that Luis was an incompetent or unfit to drive Wildman’s vehicle.  The FAC merely alleges the legal conclusion that Wildman knew or should have known that Luis was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle.  There are no facts alleged regarding what qualities or factors made Luis unfit and incompetent to drive the vehicle, and why Wildman would know or had reason to know of any unfitness.  Negligent entrustment “requires demonstration of actual knowledge of facts showing or suggesting the driver’s incompetence - not merely his lack of a license. . . . For liability to exist, knowledge must be shown of the user’s incompetence or inability safely to use the [vehicle].”  (Dodge Center v. Superior Court (1988)199 Cal.App.3d 332, 341, internal citations omitted.) 

 

            Moreover, while the FAC asserts that Luis was 16 years old at the time of the incident, and Plaintiff implies in the opposition that Luis had at most a provisional license, there are no allegations in the FAC showing how any of these factors made Luis unfit or incompetent to drive the vehicle.  (See Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 67 [“It is a matter of common knowledge that drivers under 25 years of age as a class have more accidents than older drivers and that they must pay more for insurance… Nevertheless, an owner is not negligent if he entrusts his automobile to a member of such a class unless he knows or has reason to believe that the driver is incompetent, and in the absence of such knowledge he is under no common-law duty to protect third persons from possible misconduct on the part of the driver.”].)  Similarly, nothing in the judicially noticeable evidence submitted by Plaintiff suggests that Luis’s purported possession of a provisional license made it any more foreseeable that the vehicle might be stolen by a third person than if someone with a non-provisional license had left the vehicle outside the store.  While the Bill Analysis provided states that 16 years old are four times more likely to be involved in a collision than adult drivers, Luis was not involved in the accident.  Furthermore, as analyzed above, there are no special circumstances alleged in the FAC that show that Luis’s actions created an unusual invitation to theft.  (Hergenrether, 61 Cal.2d at 445-46.) 

 

            Based on the foregoing, the FAC fails to plead a claim against Wildman for either motor vehicle or general negligence.  The demurrer to the first and second causes of action against Wildman is sustained. 

 

4. Sigmar’s Demurrer to the FAC

a. Meet and Confer

The court finds Sigmar has fulfilled the requirement to meet and confer prior to filing the demurrer.  (CCP § 430.41(a); Demurrer Casey Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.)

 

b. Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests the court take judicial notice of California Bill Analysis, Senate Committee, 2005-2006 Regular Session, Assembly Bill 1474 (February 22, 2005), attached as Exhibit 1 to the request for judicial notice.

 

The request is granted.  (Evid. Code § 452(c); see also People v. Connor, 115 Cal.App.4th at 681 n.3.) 

 

c. Parties’ Arguments

Sigmar argues that no duty was owed to Plaintiff from the negligent operation of a vehicle by a thief, such as Kate, and that Vehicle Code §§ 17701 and 17707 are not applicable in this case because Luis was not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.  Sigmar contends that in reading the FAC as a whole, and pursuant to Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, Sigmar did not owe a duty of care to Plaintiff. 

 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Luis impliedly granted Kate permission to drive the vehicle, and that FAC falls within the special circumstance exception to Richards v. Stanley.  Additionally, Plaintiff contends the FAC alleges that Luis’s negligence is directly imputed to Sigmar under Vehicle Code §§ 17707 and 17708, and that Kate’s negligence is imputed to Luis under Vehicle Code § 17154, which is then imputed to Sigmar.  Plaintiff further contends that Luis was a “driver” of the car under Vehicle Code § 305 because his negligence was committed while he was in physical control of the vehicle. 

 

Sigmar, in reply, avers that the FAC fails to allege any special circumstances giving rise to a duty owed to Plaintiff, and that Luis was not in physical control of the vehicle at the time of the theft.  Further, Sigmar contends that Plaintiff fails to connect the violation of any Vehicle Code section to Kate’s theft of the car. 

 

d. Analysis re: Liability Vehicle Under Vehicle Code §§ 17701 and 17707

Vehicle Code § 17701 states in relevant part, “No application for a driver's license shall be granted by the department to any minor unless it is signed and verified by the father and mother of such minor, if both father and mother are living and have custody of the minor.”  Vehicle Code § 17707 provides that “Any civil liability of a minor arising out of his driving a motor vehicle upon a highway during his minority is hereby imposed upon the person who signed and verified the application of the minor for a license and the person shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages proximately resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of the minor in driving a motor vehicle…” 

 

Any civil liability of a minor, whether licensed or not under this code, arising out of his driving a motor vehicle upon a highway with the express or implied permission of the parents … is hereby imposed upon the parents, person, or guardian and the parents … shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages proximately resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of the minor in driving a motor vehicle.”

 

(Vehicle Code § 17708.)  

 

            In this case, the FAC alleges that the theory of recovery against Sigmar is that Sigmar is Luis’s parent and/or signed Luis’s driver’s license application.  (FAC at p. 5.)  The FAC cites to Vehicle Code §§ 17701 and 11707. 

 

            As Sigmar argues, these Vehicle Code sections are not applicable to the facts alleged in the FAC.  The FAC alleges that Luis abandoned the vehicle, and that it was then stolen by Kate.  Vehicle Code § 17701 merely provides that no driver’s license application will be granted to a minor unless it is signed and verified by the father and mother, or other designated persons, of such minor, and Vehicle Code § 17707’s express language states that “[a]ny civil liability of a minor arising out of his driving a motor vehicle upon a highway during his minority is hereby imposed upon the person who signed and verified the application of the minor…”  (Emphasis added.)  The FAC does not allege that Luis was driving at the time of the accident.  Rather, the FAC states Kate stole the vehicle and caused the subject accident.  Although the FAC does not cite to Vehicle Code § 17708, this section is inapplicable for the same reason- that is, Luis’s alleged liability does not arise from his driving a motor vehicle.  Instead, Plaintiff’s theory is that Luis is allegedly liable for transporting passengers under 20 years old and for “abandoning a running fancy sports car when it was reasonably foreseeable it would be stolen.”  (FAC at p. 5.)

 

            Plaintiff asserts that Luis was the driver of the vehicle that Kate stole within the meaning of Vehicle Code § 305.  This section provides that “A ‘driver’ is a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle…”  However, the FAC on its face repeatedly alleges that the car was stolen after Luis abandoned it.  The cases cited by Plaintiff, Adler v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 252, and Arellano v. Moreno (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 877, are readily distinguishable. 

 

In Arellano, the defendant collided with a third person’s car which then hit the plaintiff and knocked the plaintiff to the ground.  (33 Cal.App.3d at 880-81.)  The plaintiff had assisted the third party push their vehicle into the street because of a purported dead battery, and although the plaintiff suggested they turn on the vehicle’s parking lights, the lights were very dim.  (Id. at 880.)  Judgment was entered for the defendant after the jury determined that the plaintiff’s negligence was a contributing cause of the collision.  (Id. at 881.)  In relevant part, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction that stated that a vehicle could not be driven with parking lamps and that during darkness, a vehicle had to be equipped with lighted lighting.  (Id. at 882, n. 882.)  The plaintiff argued that at the time of the collision he was not driving or operating the third party’s car, so he was not responsible for its lighting.  (Id.)  However, while the plaintiff was standing at the rear of the vehicle at the time of the accident, the plaintiff and the third party were engaged in trying to push the vehicle in a position where the plaintiff could start it with his own car, and the plaintiff was standing at the rear of the third party’s car to manually push the car.  (Id. at 883.)  The plaintiff and the third party controlled the vehicle’s movement in its inoperable condition, and thus, the plaintiff was deemed a driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident.  (Id.)  Consequently, the plaintiff was legally responsible for the third party’s vehicle’s insufficient lighting.  (Id.) 

 

            In Adler, the petitioner sought mandamus relief after the Department of Motor Vehicles suspended her license following an incident where the petitioner opened the door of a parked car into the path of a cyclist.  (228 Cal.App.3d at 254-55.)  The petitioner argued that she was improperly found to be the driver of the vehicle because a person exiting a parked car is not a driver operating a vehicle.  (Id. at 256.)  Although the petitioner’s car was parked with its engine off, the petitioner retained “actual physical control” of the car.  (Id. at 258.)  The petitioner was thus the driver of the vehicle under Vehicle Code § 305.  (Id.) 

 

            Unlike in Adler and Arellano, in this case, there are no allegations showing that Luis retained “actual physical control” of the vehicle after Kate stole it, or that Luis in any way controlled the car’s movement.  Rather, the FAC explicitly states that Luis abandoned the vehicle, and Plaintiff cites no authority holding that a person is deemed the driver of a vehicle subsequently stolen by a third person. 

 

            Furthermore, as to Plaintiff’s arguments that Luis’s alleged negligence is imputed to Sigmar, “[i]n the absence of such a statute [prohibiting the leaving of a key in an unattended vehicle on a public street] … it has generally been held that the owner of an automobile is under no duty to persons who may be injured by its use to keep it out of the hands of a third person in the absence of facts putting the owner on notice that the third person is incompetent to handle it.”  (Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 64.)  In Richards, the owner of a vehicle that was stolen was not liable for injuries caused by the thief.  (Id. at 66-68.)  Although the owner left their key in their car, which might have increased the risk it would be stolen, even if the owner could foresee the theft, the owner had no reason to believe the thief would be an incompetent driver.  (Id. at 66.)  As analyzed above in addressing Wildman’s demurrer to the FAC, there are no allegations suggesting that Luis gave express or implied permission to Kate to drive the car.  Additionally, unlike in Hergenrether v. East, where special circumstances were found to impose a duty on the defendants, the FAC does not allege any special circumstances imposing a duty to Plaintiff.  Therefore, the FAC fails to allege that Luis’s and/or Kate’s negligence can be imputed to Sigmar.

 

            Plaintiff further contends that the legislature intended acknowledged that teen drivers pose a heightened risk to others.  However, Luis was not driving any vehicle involved in the accident, and nothing in the Bill Analysis submitted by Plaintiff shows the legislature intended to hold the parents of minors liable for accidents caused by a thief after a minor’s car is stolen. 

 

In reading the FAC as a whole and its part in their context, the FAC fails to plead a claim against Sigmar for motor vehicle or general negligence.  The demurrer to the first and second causes of action against Sigmar is sustained. 

 

5. Conclusion and Leave to Amend

            The burden is on Plaintiff to show in what manner he or she can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.  (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.)   

 

In this case, Plaintiff requests leave to amend the FAC to allege new or additional facts about the circumstances of Wildman permitting Luis to drive her car and the theft of the vehicle. 

 

Wildman’s and Sigmar’s demurrers are sustained to the first and second causes of action with 20 days leave to amend.

 

Defendants Wildman and Sigmar are ordered to give notice. 

 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:

 

Dated this 3rd day of August 2022

 

 

 

 

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court