Judge: Audra Mori, Case: 22STCV06821, Date: 2023-02-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV06821 Hearing Date: February 17, 2023 Dept: 31
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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                         Plaintiff(s),             vs. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, ET AL.,                         Defendant(s).  | ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )  | 
 [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Dept. 31 1:30 p.m. February 17, 2023  | 
1. Background
Plaintiff Fabrice Benezit (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Federal Express Corporation, Samuel Davila Aguilar (“Aguilar”), FedEx Corporation, FedEx Express Corporation, and Budget Rent A Car System, Inc. (“Budget”) for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.  Plaintiff alleges that Aguilar while in the course and scope of Aguilar’s employment with the other defendants caused a collision with Plaintiff.  Plaintiff further alleges that the other defendants entrusted the motor vehicle to Aguilar, that Aguilar was the agent of the other defendants, and that the other defendants owned the motor vehicle that Aguilar operated.  The complaint alleges causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence. 
Budget now moves for summary judgment.  Any opposition to the motion was due on or before February 3, 2023.  To date, no opposition has been filed, and on February 6, 2023, Budget filed and served a notice of non-opposition to the motion. 
 
2. Motion for Summary Judgment
a. Moving Argument
Budget argues that the undisputed facts establish that 49 U.S.C. § 30106- the Graves Amendment- precludes holding Budget liable for the accident, and that there is no evidence of any independent negligence on Budget’s behalf.  Budget asserts that it is an affiliate of a rental car company and is explicitly precluded from vicarious liability as such, and that Plaintiff does not have evidence to support any other theory of liability against Budget.  Further, Budget contends that it is not the titleholder of the subject rental vehicle involved in the accident. 
b. Burdens on Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(c).)  The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.  (Id. at §437c(p).)  A defendant may discharge this burden by furnishing either (1) affirmative evidence of the required facts or (2) discovery responses conceding that the plaintiff lacks evidence to establish an essential element of the plaintiff's case. If a defendant chooses the latter option, he or she must present evidence “and not simply point out that plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence….”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 865-66.)
[A] defendant may simply show the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action “by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.)  Thus, rather than affirmatively disproving or negating an element (e.g., causation), a defendant moving for summary judgment has the option of presenting evidence reflecting the plaintiff does not possess evidence to prove that element. “The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing” to support an essential element of his case. (Aguilar, supra, at p. 855.) Under the latter approach, a defendant's initial evidentiary showing may “consist of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses, or admissions by the plaintiff in deposition or in response to requests for admission that he or she has not discovered anything that supports an essential element of the cause of action.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 110.)  In other words, a defendant may show the plaintiff does not possess evidence to support an element of the cause of action by means of presenting the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence may be reasonably inferred. (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)
Thus, a moving defendant has two means by which to shift the burden of proof under the summary judgment statute: “The defendant may rely upon factually insufficient discovery responses by the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action sued upon. [Citation.] [Or a]lternatively, the defendant may utilize the tried and true technique of negating (‘disproving’) an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action.” (Brantly v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1598.)
(Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103.)
Until the moving defendant has discharged its burden of proof, the opposing plaintiff has no burden to come forward with any evidence. Once the moving defendant has discharged its burden as to a particular cause of action, however, the plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence showing that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action.  (Id. at §437c(p)(2).)  On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party's supporting documents are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion.  (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21.)
c. Analysis Re: Negligence
The elements of a cause of action for negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages.  (Orey v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1255; Johnson v. Prasad (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 74, 78.) 
Here, Budget is not the registered owner or the registrant of the subject vehicle involved in the accident, a 2019 Ford bearing Oklahoma license plate 3DS8776, which was a rental vehicle.  (Mot. Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) 1.)  Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC (“Avis”) is the registered owner of the subject rental vehicle, and Budget Truck Rental, LLC (“Budget Truck Rental”) is the registrant.  (Id. at 2.)  Budget is an affiliated company of Avis and Budget Truck Rental.  (Id. at 3.)  Budget Truck Rental rented the vehicle involved in the accident, which was being operating by Aguilar, to FDX EXP/CCDA (“FDX”) pursuant to a commercial rental account.  (Id. at 7-8.)  Budget is not involved in the rental transactions between Budget Truck Rental and its renters, and Budget does not maintain, service, or repair the vehicles utilized by Budget Truck Rental in its truck rental business.  (Id. at 4.)  According to the terms and conditions of the rental, the customer’s employees are permitted to operate the rental vehicle, and the customer is responsible for determining whether the employees are qualified to operate the vehicle.  (Id. at 9.) 
At the time FDX entered into the rental agreement with Budget Truck Rental, FDX produced a valid driver’s license for its employee.  (Id. at 11.)  Prior to entering into a rental agreement, Budget’s rental car affiliates are required to confirm that the renter does not appear impaired or otherwise unfit to operate the rental vehicle, and at the time of the accident, Aguilar operated the rental vehicle with a valid California Driver’s license.  (Id. at 12-13.)  In response to written discovery, Plaintiff produced documents demonstrating that Aguilar was a FedEx employee.  (Id. at 30.)  Neither FDX nor Aguilar were employed by Budget, its parent corporation, or its affiliates.  (Id. at 39.)  Further, Budget Truck Rental requires all vehicles to be properly maintained, and the subject vehicle received all properly scheduled maintenance and inspections as of the rental date.  (Id. at 36.)  Maintenance records demonstrate the subject rental vehicle received all regularly scheduled maintenance, and there were no complaints of mechanical issues and no repairs made to the vehicle which contributed to the subject occurrence.  (Id. at 37-38.) 
This evidence is sufficient to meet Budget’s moving burden to show that Budget was not negligent in connection with the subject accident.  As (1) Budget was not the titleholder of the vehicle, (2) there is no evidence to show that Budget knew or had reason to know of any unfitness of the driver, (3) Budget did not employ the driver and the driver was not its agent, and (4) the vehicle underwent regular maintenance and there is no evidence to indicate that Budget knew or should have known of any mechanical issues, or that any mechanical issues even existed, there is no showing that Budget breached a duty to Plaintiff causing Plaintiff damages.
Plaintiff does not oppose the motion, and thus, Plaintiff necessarily fails to meet the shifted burden of raising any triable issue of material fact as Budget’s alleged negligence.
d. the Graves Amendment
            The Graves Amendment provides in pertinent part:                                                                    
(a) In general.--An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if--
(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and
(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner).
(49 U.S.C. § 30106.)[1] 
The Graves Amendment also contains the following “savings clause”:
(b) Financial responsibility laws. Nothing in this section supersedes the law of any State or political subdivision thereof—
(1) imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle; or
(2) imposing liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law.
No published California appellate court decision has addressed whether the Graves Amendment preempts California tort law Vehicle Code §§ 17150 and 17151, while other jurisdictions have already adopted the federal law and concluded that it preempts their own state vicarious liability statutes for lessors or renters of vehicles.  (See Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. (11th Cir. 2008) 540 F.3d 1242; see also Carton v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (8th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3d 451.)
Traditionally, California courts have applied California Vehicle Code §§ 17150 and 17151 in allowing plaintiff's recovery from lessors based on vicarious liability.  Vehicle Code § 17150 provides that “[e]very owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle … by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.”  However, under Vehicle Code § 17151, where the basis for liability is permissive use and the relationship between the owner and the driver is not that of principal and agent or master and servant, the owner's liability is limited by statute to $15,000 per person, not to exceed $30,000 per accident.
Here, moving party Budget is not the titleholder of the subject rental vehicle.  However, even if it were the owner, or it could be deemed an owner through its affiliation with the titleholder, Avis, the Graves Amendment would bar Budget from being held liable.  Budget is an affiliated company of Avis and Budget Truck Rental.  (Mot. UMF 3.)  According to their Statements of Information filed with the Secretary of State of the State of California, Budget and Avis are each in the business of “car rental,” and Budget Truck Rental is in the business of “Rent[ing] trucks and moving equipment.”  (Id. at 5.)  Budget, its parent corporation- Avis, and its related affiliates met their financial responsibility by a certification of self-insurance with respect to their rental fleet.  (Id. at 6.)  Budget, Avis, and its related affiliates are in the business and trade of renting motor vehicles.  (Id.)  A rental agreement between Budget Truck Rental and FDX existed on the date of the underlying accident that is the subject of this lawsuit.  (Id. at 7.)  The subject vehicle was rented to FDX pursuant to a Commercial Rental account, and at the time of the accident, Aguilar was operating the rental vehicle.  (Id. at 8, 13.) 
The undisputed evidence establishes that at the time of the accident, Budget and its affiliates were engaged in the trade or business of renting vehicles.  Budget’s affiliate merely rented the vehicle involved in the accident that was being operated by Aguilar.  The Graves Amendment thus precludes Plaintiff’s claims against Budget to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Budget liable as an affiliate of the rental vehicle’s owner. 
3. Conclusion
Budget’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
Moving Defendant Budget is ordered to give notice. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
Dated this 17th day of February 2023
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Hon. Audra Mori Judge of the Superior Court  | 
[1] The Graves Amendment defines “affiliate” as “a person other than the owner that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the owner. In the preceding sentence, the term “control” means the power to direct the management and policies of a person whether through ownership of voting securities or otherwise.”  (49 U.S.C. § 30106(d)(1).)