Judge Audra Mori, Case 22STCV08568 2022-08-26 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Edgar Esturban (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Irlanda Sanchez “Sanchez”), Jose Alejandro Medina (“Medina”), Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier LLC, Rasier-CA LLC, and ZLS Trans Inc. for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The operative Fist Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges that on March 9, 2020, Sanchez was negligently driving Medina’s vehicle on the wrong side of the road and collided head on with Plaintiff’s vehicle. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was allegedly within the scope of his employment with Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier LLC, Rasier-CA LLC and ZLS. However, Plaintiff alleges that his employers failed to carry workers’ compensation insurance as required. The FAC asserts claims for negligence, negligence per se, and negligent entrustment against all defendants.

Defendant ZLS Trans Inc. (“ZLS” or “Defendant”) now demurs to the FAC arguing that the Court has no jurisdiction of the claims in Plaintiff’s FAC because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the exclusive remedy doctrine of California’s worker’s compensation law. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer, and ZLS filed a reply.

This matter was last set to be heard on July 19, 2022, where it was continued to permit the parties to timely file a verified statement of disqualification pursuant to CCP § 170.3(c), if counsel or the parties contended the Court was disqualified for cause following the Court’s disclosure regarding the State Compensation Insurance Fund. (Min. Orders, July 14, 2022, and July 19, 2022.) As of August 23, 2022, no statement of disqualification has been filed. The Court now rules as follows:

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (CCP §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862 [disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287] [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].)

A demurrer can be utilized where the “face of the complaint” itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-72.) The “face of the complaint” includes material contained in attached exhibits that are incorporated by reference into the complaint; or in a superseded complaint in the same action. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; see also Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.”].)

A demurrer can only be sustained when it disposes of an entire cause of action. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97,119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.)

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (CCP § 430.41(a).)

The Court finds ZLS has fulfilled this requirement prior to filing the demurrer. (Demurrer Grigoryan Decl. ¶ 3.)

ZLS requests the Court take judicial notice of (1) Record of The California Workers' Compensation Coverage Inquiry for ZLS Trans Inc. for March 9, 2020, from Worker's Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau of California, (2) ZLS Trans Inc.’s Annual Rating Endorsement from State Compensation Insurance Fund for policy period May 18, 2019 through May 18, 2020, (3) State Compensation Insurance Fund’s May 19, 2022 Notice of Denial of Claim for Workers’ Compensation Benefits Letter, and (4) Record of California Department of Industrial Relations Division of Workers' Compensation - Workers' compensation court public information search for Edgar Esturban. (Demurrer Request for Judicial Notice at p. 2:1-14.) Plaintiff opposes the request for judicial notice arguing that ZLS fails to establish it is proper to take judicial notice of these matters, and that they are not matters of general common knowledge not subject to dispute.

ZLS is relying on these documents to establish that at the time of the accident, it was insured by State Compensation Insurance Fund (“Fund”) with workers’ compensation insurance that covered all of its employees, and thus, that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. This is the primary dispute between Plaintiff and ZLS. (Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corporation (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 660 “A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts. The hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)]; see also Freemont Indem. Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-115 [“Although the existence of a document may be judicially noticeable, the truth of statements contained in the document and its proper interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those matters are reasonably disputable.”].) Furthermore, Exhibits A and D attached to ZLS’ request for judicial notice appear to be printouts from websites and are subject to interpretation. (Hartwell Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 256, 279 fn. 12 [denied request for judicial notice of internet pages from Department of Health Services website]; see also Ragland v. U.S. Bank NationalAssociation (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 194.) ZLS provides no information to authenticate Exhibits B or C or to show that they are reliable, and their contents are subject to interpretation. ZLS provides insufficient support for its conclusory assertions that the contents of the exhibits are “capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” Accordingly, ZLS does not establish it is proper to take judicial notice of each requested matters in connection with this demurrer.

“ ‘The elements of a negligence cause of action are the existence of a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury…” (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) As in any negligence action, whether a duty was owed under the facts is a question of law for the Court. (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213.)

The WCA provides the exclusive remedy for an injury sustained by an employee in the course and scope of employment. (Lab. Code, §§ 3600, subd. (a), 3602, subd. (a); Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 813, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 562, 14 P.3d 234 (Vacanti).) The workers’ compensation exclusivity rule is based on the “presumed ‘compensation bargain’ ” in which, in exchange for limitations on the amount of liability, the employer assumes liability regardless of fault for injury arising out of and in the course of employment. (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054.) The compensation bargain encompasses both psychological and physical injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. (Lab. Code, §§ 3600, subd. (a), 3208.3.)

(Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College Dist. (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 82, 105.)

Consequently, an injured worker's remedies against his employer or a co-employee are (absent narrow exceptions) solely under the workers' compensation law—i.e., there is no “common law” action against the employer or a co-employee because, as a general rule, workers' comp is the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee occurring in the course and scope of employment. (Lab. Code §§ 3600, 3601; see generally, Jones v. Kaiser Industries Corp. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 552, 556.) Moreover, “The Privette doctrine holds that a hirer generally delegates to an independent contractor all responsibility for workplace safety and is not liable for injuries sustained by the contractor or its workers while on the job.” (Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 40.)

Here, ZLS contends that by alleging that ZLS failed to carry workers’ compensation insurance as required, the FAC is alleging that Plaintiff’s claims fall into an exception provided by Labor Code § 3706, which states that “If any employer fails to secure the payment of compensation, any injured employee or his dependents may bring an action at law against such employer for damages, as if this division did not apply.” ZLS avers that the judicially noticeable evidence shows that at the time of the accident, ZLS was insured by the Fund. ZLS contends Plaintiff was aware of ZLS’ workers’ compensation coverage since Plaintiff filed a claim with the Fund, which was denied on the basis of liability. ZLS, thus, asserts that the Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims because the workers’ compensation exclusivity applies since “(1) Plaintiff alleges he was an employee of Defendant at the time of the accident; (2) Plaintiff alleges he was injured in the course and scope of his employment with Defendant; and (3) Defendant secured payment of compensation as required by the Labor Code.” (Demurrer at p. 5:4-7.)

[ZLS] failed to carry workers’ compensation insurance as required as to Plaintiff Edgar Esturban and the injuries he sustained during the Incident and are thus directly responsible for the injuries Edgar Esturban sustained due to the Collision.”

Employers are directly liable in full for the injuries sustained by Plaintiff since Employers employed Plaintiff at the time, Plaintiff was in the course and scope of his employment with Employers at the time of the collision, Plaintiff’s employment as a passenger transporter was a contributing cause of his injuries since he was involved in a collision in a work vehicle after transporting a passenger on behalf of Employers, and Employers failed to carry workers’ compensation insurance as required under California law for Plaintiff specifically. In fact, Defendant Employers to this day continue to specifically deny Plaintiff access to any workers’ compensation coverage or benefits and have not paid any premiums on Plaintiff’s behalf for such workers’ compensation coverage.

However, as analyzed above, ZLS is relying upon documents of which the court cannot take judicial notice to establish that it had workers’ compensation at the time of the accident and that Plaintiff’s claims are barred as a result. Consequently, the Court is limited to reviewing the four corners of the FAC and must accept the allegations as true, including that ZLS failed to carry workers’ compensation insurance as to Plaintiff.

Moreover, as Plaintiff argues in opposition, even if the Court took judicial notice of these documents, they do not state that Plaintiff was covered within any policy that ZLS may have had. The FAC expressly alleges that ZLS failed to carry workers’ compensation for Plaintiff. While ZLS argues that the alleged workers’ compensation insurance covers all of its employees unless specifically excluded, there is no information provided in the documents concerning which employees were excluded from coverage. The FAC, therefore, sufficiently alleges that Plaintiff was within the scope of his employment with ZLS at the time of the accident, and that ZLS failed to carry workers’ compensation as to Plaintiff. The FAC further alleges that ZLS is liable for the accident, in part, because it failed to ensure the vehicle Plaintiff was driving at the time was safe to drive. At this stage of the proceedings, this is sufficient to state a claim against ZLS. (Labor Code § 3706.) The court cannot consider other evidence as it might in the context of a different type of motion. ZLS does not otherwise contend the FAC fails to state a cause of action against it.

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court