Judge Audra Mori, Case 22STCV22560 2023-01-26 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs April Marie-Borges Brownell and William Brownell (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Defendants Khashayar Vahidi (“Khashayar”) and Kambod Vahidi (“Kambod”)[1] (collectively, “Defendants”) for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Los Angeles County on April 24, 2022.

On August 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed proof of service of the summons and complaint on Kambod, alleging Kambod was personally served on August 8, 2022, at an address located at 18715 Kirkcolm Ln, Porter Ranch, CA 91326.

On September 7, 2022, Kambod filed the instant motion to quash service of the summons and complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and Kambod filed a reply.

Kambod argues that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over him because he resides in Germany and does not have any contacts with California. Additionally, Kambod asserts that the purported service is improper because Plaintiff did not serve Kambod, but rather served someone that was not authorized to accept service on Kambod’ behalf.

In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that the Court has specific jurisdiction over Kambod because Kambod was physically present in California and operating the vehicle involving in the accident on California roads. Further, Plaintiffs contend that service of process on Kambod was proper.

In reply, Kambod again argues that the Court does not have jurisdiction over him, and that service was not properly effected on him.

“A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . .” (CCP § 418.10(a).)

“ ‘On a motion to quash service of summons, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that all jurisdictional criteria are met. [Citations.] The burden must be met by competent evidence in affidavits and authenticated documents; an unverified complaint may not be considered as supplying the necessary facts.’ [Citation.]” (Brown v. Garcia (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1198, 1203; see also Sheard v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 207, 211 [“[W]here a defendant properly moves to quash service of summons the burden is on the plaintiff to prove facts requisite to the effective service.”].)

“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” (CCP § 410.10.) “The exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with these Constitutions ‘if the defendant has such minimum contacts with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”’” (Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1061 (citations omitted).) “The concept of minimum contacts also requires states to observe certain territorial limits on their sovereignty. It ‘ensure[s] that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.’” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 292).) “[T]he minimum contacts test asks ‘whether the “quality and nature” of the defendant’s activity is such that it is “reasonable” and “fair” to require him to conduct his defense in that State.’” (Snowney, 35 Cal 4th at 1061 (citing Kulko v. California Superior Court (1978) 436 U.S. 84, 92).)

“When a defendant moves the trial court to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving that sufficient contacts exist between the defendant and California to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” (Malone v. Equitas Reinsurance Ltd. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1435-1436 (citation omitted).) “Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant's burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449 (citation omitted).)

“Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.” (Vons Companies, 14 Cal.4th at 445.)

“If . . . the defendant’s activities in the forum are not so pervasive as to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over him, then jurisdiction depends upon the quality and nature of his activity in the forum in relation to the particular cause of action. In such a situation, the cause of action must arise out of the act done or transaction consummated in the forum, or defendant must perform some other act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” (Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 147-148.) This is called “specific jurisdiction.” (Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408, 411, n.8.) A nonresident defendant “may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum, if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of the forum benefits (Burger King [Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472-73] . . .), and the ‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” a defendant’s contacts with the forum.’” (Vons Companies, 14 Cal. 4th at 446 (citation omitted).) “[A]s the relationship of the defendant with the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction over him grows more tenuous, the scope of jurisdiction also retracts . . . .” (Cornelison, 16 Cal.3d at 148.)

Accordingly, there are three requirements for the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a nonresident: “(1) ‘the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits’ [citation]; (2) ‘the “controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ [the] defendant's contacts with the forum” ’ [citation]; and (3) ‘ “the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice’ ” ' [citations].” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2022) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269.)

Here, Kambod asserts that the Court has no jurisdiction over him because he does not reside or own property in California. Further, Kambod provides that he has never sued or been sued in, voted in, or held a driver’s license from California. Kambod states that he resides in Germany, and that he simply drove a vehicle on a road for a few minutes before he was struck by Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Defendant argues that the Court therefore does not have general jurisdiction over him.

However, in opposition, Plaintiffs assert that the Court has specific jurisdiction over Kambod because Plaintiffs’ claims against Kambod arise directly out of Kambod’s activity of operating a motor vehicle on California roads, which Kambod admits to doing. Plaintiffs aver that Kambod’s actions of driving in California establish the minimum contacts necessary with California to allow the state to exercise jurisdiction over him in this matter.

Kambod states that in April 2022 he spent a few days in Los Angeles visiting relatives, and on the date of the incident, Kambod borrowed his cousin Khashayar’s car to visit a relative. Consequently, Kambod admits that at the time of the incident he availed himself of the benefits of driving in California. Kambod voluntarily directed his activities toward California and its residents, and Kambod received the benefit of driving on California’s roads. (See Snowney, 35 Cal. 4th at 1062-63 [“[P]urposeful availment occurs where a nonresident defendant purposefully direct[s] [its] activities at residents of the forum, purposefully derive[s] benefit from [its] activities in the forum, create[s] a substantial connection with the forum, deliberately has engaged in significant activities within the forum, or has created continuing obligations between [itself] and residents of the forum.”].) Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ action arises directly out of Kambod’s contacts with California- that is, they relate directly to Kambod’s driving on California roads, and Kambod’s allegedly causing the subject accident by negligently driving. (Vons Companies, 14 Cal. 4th at 452-53 [“The crucial inquiry concerns the character of defendant’s activity in the forum, whether the cause of action arises out of or has a substantial connection with that activity, …]; Cornelison, 16 Cal. 3d at 148-150 (a substantial connection, or “nexus” must exist between the claim and the defendant’s California-related activities].) Kambod’s conduct and connection with California is such that he could reasonably anticipate being hauled into Court here. Plaintiff demonstrates that Kambod purposefully established minimum contacts with California.

Additionally, in determining whether exercising jurisdiction over Kambod comports with the notices of fair play and substantial justice, Plaintiffs establish that they have an interest in convenient and effective relief in California. Kambod does not otherwise argue or establish that it would be burdensome for him to appear in this Court to defend against Plaintiffs’ action. (Vons Companies, 14 Cal. 4th 447-48.)

The case upon which Kambod relies to argue that jurisdiction is improper, Star Aviation, Inc. v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 807, 141 Cal. Rptr. 21 13 (2d Dist. 1977), is readily distinguishable. The issue in that case was whether California “may assert jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation whose allegedly tortious acts occurred outside the state.” Here, we are dealing with an individual whose allegedly tortious acts occurred in the state. (Id. at 809.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs establish the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Kambod.

“A summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete at the time of such delivery.” (CCP § 415.10.)

“A defendant is under no duty to respond in any way to a defectively served summons. It makes no difference that defendant had actual knowledge of the action. Such knowledge does not dispense with statutory requirements for service of summons.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶4:414, p. 4-67 citing Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466 (Kappel) and Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808 (Ruttenberg)) “[N]otice does not substitute for proper service. Until statutory requirements are satisfied, the court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant.” (Ruttenberg, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 808.) “[I]n California, ‘…the original service of process, which confers jurisdiction, must conform to statutory requirements or all that follows is void.”' (Id. at p. 809.)

“Appellant was under no duty to act upon a defectively served summons. The requirement of notice ‘is not satisfied by actual knowledge without notification conforming to the statutory requirements' [citation]; it is long-settled that methods of service are to be strictly construed and that a court does not acquire jurisdiction where personal service is relied upon but has not in fact taken place.” (Kappel, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1466-67.)

Here, Kambod contends that the purported personal service was not properly completed because his relative, Behzad Partovi (“Partovi”) was not the person that was actually served with the summons and complaint, not Kambod. Kambod states, “The complaint and summons were not served on me,” and that he has never lived at the address listed on the proof of service and never authorized anyone to accept serve on his behalf. (Mot. Kambod Decl. ¶ 2.) Kambod declares that he lives in Germany. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Kambod submits a declaration from Partovi providing, “On August 8, 2022, at 6:45 pm, while at my home, located at 18715 Kirkcolm Lane, Porter Ranch CA, I was served with the summons and complaint for Kambod Vahidi with respect to the April Marie-Borges Brownell v Khashayar Vahidi action. My name is not Kambod Vahidi, nor has it ever been Kambod Vahidi. I was never authorized to accept service on behalf of Kambod Vahidi. [¶] A process server did not ask for my name when he served me the documents. The server simply handed me the summons and complaint and left. If he had asked me, I would have told the process server my name.” (Mot. Partovi Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.)

The burden is on Plaintiffs to establish that service of the summons and complaint was proper. (Summers, 140 Cal.App.4th at 413.) Plaintiffs, in opposition, argue that before the registered process server that carried out service served the summons and complaint, the man upon whom the process server served the documents upon identified himself as Kambod Vahidi.

California Evidence Code § 647 states that the “return of a process server registered pursuant to Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 22350) of Division 8 of the Business and Professions Code upon process or notice establishes a presumption, affecting the burden of producing evidence, of the facts stated in the return.” Where service is carried out by a registered process server, Evidence Code § 647 applies to eliminate the necessity of calling the process server as a witness as trial. (Palm Property Investments, LLC v. Yadegar (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1427.) The proof of service in this circumstance establishes a presumption, affecting the burden of producing evidence of the facts stated in the return. (Id. at 1428.) “The effect of a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is to require the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence. . .” (Id.)

Plaintiffs submit a declaration from the process server, who provides that he “knocked on the door of the residence …, and a man opened the door. I told this man I was looking for Kambod Vahidi, and the man who opened the door told me that he was Kambod Vahidi. I then handed this man the documents …” (Opp. Curiel ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs do not assert that this definitively establishes that the process server served Kambod. They do not state any other basis for confirming that Kambod was the person who was served. They argue that the presumption of proper service applies. However, this presumption is rebutted with significant evidence. Kambod states, “The complaint and summons were not served on me,” and that he resides in Germany. Partovi states that he was the person that was actually served at the address, which is Partovi’s home, and that he was not authorized to accept service on Kambod’s behalf. Plaintiffs do not provide evidence that directly contradict these statements. Further, Plaintiffs do not provide any evidence to show the subject address was Kambod’s dwelling house or usual place of abode. The process server’s statement that someone told him they were Kambod does not suffice.

Therefore, Kambod’s motion to quash service of the summons and complaint is granted.

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court

[1] The Court refers to Khashayar and Kambod by their first names for identification purposes.