Judge Audra Mori, Case 22STCV25939 2023-01-17 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Tayler Faulkner-Haupert (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Melissa Dawn Shurtz (“Melissa”) and Jennifer Shurtz (“Jennifer”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The complaint alleges causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence and includes a prayer for punitive damages.

Defendants now moves to strike the punitive damages and other portions of the complaint. The motion is unopposed.

Defendants assert that while the complaint alleges in conclusory fashion that Melissa was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident, this alone is insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages against Defendants. Defendants aver that the complaint merely alleges that Defendants were negligent in connection with the accident.

California law authorizes a party’s motion to strike matter from an opposing party’s pleading if it is irrelevant, false, or improper. (CCP §§ 435; 436(a).) Motions may also target pleadings or parts of pleadings which are not filed or drawn in conformity with applicable laws, rules or orders. (CCP § 436(b).) A motion to strike is used to address defects that appear on the face of a pleading or from judicially noticed matters but that are not grounds for a demurrer. (Pierson v Sharp Memorial Hospital (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342; see also City & County of San Francisco v Strahlendorf (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1911, 1913 (motion may not be based on a party's declaration or factual representations made by counsel in the motion papers).) In particular, a motion to strike can be used to attack the entire pleading or any part thereof – in other words, a motion may target single words or phrases, unlike demurrers. (Warren v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 24, 40.) The Code of Civil Procedure also authorizes the Court to act on its own initiative to strike matters, empowering the Court to enter orders striking matter “at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper.” (CCP § 436.)

a. Law Governing Punitive Damages in the Context of Driving Under the Influence

Civil Code § 3294(a) states, “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

Allegations that a defendant exhibited a conscious disregard for the safety of others are sufficient to show malice. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-96.) The Taylor court concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of "malice" under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences. "One who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others." (Id., at p. 897.)

To properly allege punitive damages in a motor vehicle accident action, a plaintiff needs to "establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences." (Id., at p. 896.) If the gravamen of the complaint is that "Defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby" then this is sufficient to allege punitive damages. (Id.) While a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident, we do not deem these aggravating factors essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases. (Id.)

Taylor justified imposing punitive damages upon the “deliberate” drunk driver for many reasons, including the high degree of foreseeability of injury and damage flowing from driving while intoxicated. The court stated that the essential allegation is that defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby. The decision also discusses the grave havoc wrought by intoxicated drivers nationwide and equates the act of deliberately driving while under the influence with a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others which may be described as willful or wanton. Such conduct, the court said, has traditionally been a basis for awarding punitive damages. (Herrick v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 787, 790.)

“There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every motor vehicle driver who is intoxicated. [Citation.] One who wilfully [sic] consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 896-897.) “[T]he fact of common knowledge that the drinking driver is the cause of so many of the more serious automobile accidents is strong evidence in itself to support the need for all possible means of deterring persons from driving automobiles after drinking, including exposure to awards of punitive damages in the event of accidents.” (Id., at p. 897.)

Taylor fell short, however, of holding that punitive damages are always appropriate in cases involving driving while intoxicated. The Court noted, “we have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under §3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” (Id. at 892.) Emphasis added.

Notably, a subsequent decision held that driving while intoxicated does not always give rise to a claim for punitive damages. “[W]e do not agree that the risk created generally by one who becomes intoxicated and decides nevertheless to drive a vehicle on the public streets is the same as the risk created by an intoxicated driver’s decision to zigzag in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area at 1:30 in the afternoon on a Sunday in June. The risk of injury to others from ordinary driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not necessarily probable. The risk of injury to others from Mardian's conduct under the circumstances alleged was probable.” (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82.)

The court went on to note, “In contrast, in the case at bench, as previously noted, petitioners pleaded specific facts from which the conscious disregard of probable injury to others may reasonably be inferred. Justice Franson aptly noted the distinction in his article on punitive damages in vehicle accident cases: Allegations of intoxication, excessive speed, driving with defective equipment or the running of a stop signal, without more, do not state a cause of action for punitive damages. [Par.] On the other hand, if the facts show that the defendant intentionally drove his vehicle at a high speed into an intersection crowded with pedestrians, or if he drove at a high speed through a crowded residential area where children were playing in the street, a legitimate inference of actual malice perhaps could arise. This would be particularly true if the defendant had not been drinking, or, if drinking, he was not under the influence to the point where he was incapable of being aware of the situation confronting him. Under these circumstances, it reasonably might be said that the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury could infer that he knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others."

Further complicating the matter, in 1987, after all of the foregoing cases were decided, the legislature amended Civil Code § 3294 to include a requirement that conduct in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others be “despicable” in order to support imposition of punitive damages.

Here, the complaint alleges that “Defendant Melissa Shurtz, who was driving while under the influence, made a left turn from the shopping center, in front of Plaintiff's vehicle, causing the vehicles to crash, causing Plaintiff to sustain serious bodily injury and property damage. [¶] Defendant failed to yield the right of way and operated her vehicle in an unsafe manner.” (Compl. at p. 6.) Regarding Jennifer, the complaint alleges that she entrusted the motor vehicle to Melissa. (Id. at p. 4.)

The complaint, thus, alleges that Melissa caused the accident while driving under the influence of an undisclosed substance and after failing to yield the right of way to Plaintiff. There are no factual allegations showing a conscious and deliberate disregard of the safety of others by Melissa, or any allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations against Melissa. Further, there are no factual allegations against Melissa demonstrating any despicable conduct that subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights. The complaint’s allegations are insufficient to support a request for punitive damages. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872 [“the second count's conclusory characterization of defendant's conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of "oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied."].) The allegation that Melissa drove under the influence of alcohol alone is not sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages. If it were, it would essentially mean anyone driving under the influence would be subject to punitive damages. Moreover, merely causing a collision with Plaintiff’s vehicle is a common element in any automobile accident. Similarly, concerning Jennifer, there are no specific facts alleged suggesting malice, fraud, or oppression by Jennifer relating the subject accident. The complaint merely alleges Jennifer entrusted the vehicle to Melissa with no facts alleged showing such was done with a conscious disregard for the rights of others or with malice.

The burden is on Plaintiff to show in what manner he can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.) In this case, Plaintiff does not oppose the motion or otherwise make any showing the complaint can be cured to state a claim for punitive damages against either of the Defendants.

MC025, Attachment MV-2F, paragraph 2 “Defendants designed, manufactured, constructed, built… other property involved in the incident, all or part of the collision site, adjacent property, improvements and/or fixtures thereon, and/or component parts thereof“;

Pg. 6, description of reasons for liability “who was driving while under the influence…“;

MC025, Attachment GN-1, paragraph 2 “Defendants designed, manufactured, constructed, built… other property involved in the incident, all or part of the collision site, adjacent property, improvements and/or fixtures thereon, and/or component parts thereof“

While Defendants establish that the complaint does not properly plead that Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages, Defendants do not provide any authority or analysis showing that the above allegations are improper. In other words, although Defendants make the initial request to strike these allegations, their memorandum of points and authorities does not address the request. It is as if the initial request was forgotten and the brief drafted as if the request was never made. Thus, Defendants do not provide grounds upon which to grant their request to strike the above allegations.

The allegation that Melissa was “driving under the influence” seemingly provides context for Melissa’s liability and the potential cause of the accident. This allegation is therefore relevant to the action. Further, negligence can be based upon allegations that Defendants designed, manufactured, constructed, and/or built the vehicle or other property involved, and Defendants do not establish that such allegations are improper as a matter of law at this stage of the proceedings.

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court