Judge Audra Mori, Case 22STCV29647 2023-02-10 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Felix Interiano (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants G.T.O. Auto Glass Corporation (“G.T.O. Auto Glass”), Emilio Almanza, and Francisco Almanza (collectively, “Defendants”) for injuries Plaintiff sustained after he was allegedly invited to and encountered a dangerous condition on Defendants’ property. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of encountering the dangerous condition, Plaintiff fell and landed with great force.

Following the granting of Defendants’ motion to strike, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging causes of action for premises liability and negligence. The FAC includes a prayer for punitive damages. (FAC at p. 6.)

Defendants, at this time, move to strike the prayer for punitive damages in the FAC. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and Defendants filed a reply.

Defendants argue that the FAC does not contain any new allegations that could support a claim for punitive damages. Defendants contend that the FAC lacks any factual allegations concerning the purported dangerous condition that caused Plaintiff to fall or showing that any of Defendants’ conduct was malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent. Further, Defendants assert that there are no allegations supporting punitive damages against G.T.O. Auto Glass as a corporation warranting punitive damages against it.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the FAC sufficiently pleads allegations against the individual Defendants to support a claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff contends that Defendants willfully failed to keep Plaintiff safe on their property after inviting Plaintiff to work on their property.

Defendants, in reply, again assert that the FAC alleges only conclusory and vague allegations. Defendants aver that Plaintiff failed to address the lack of any allegations against G.T.O. Auto Glass as a corporate defendant and that Plaintiff’s allegations show no more than negligence against Defendants.

California law authorizes a party’s motion to strike matter from an opposing party’s pleading if it is irrelevant, false, or improper. (CCP §§ 435; 436(a).) Motions may also target pleadings or parts of pleadings which are not filed or drawn in conformity with applicable laws, rules or orders. (CCP § 436(b).) A motion to strike is used to address defects that appear on the face of a pleading or from judicially noticed matter but that are not grounds for a demurrer. (Pierson v Sharp Memorial Hospital (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342; see also City & County of San Francisco v Strahlendorf (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1911, 1913 (motion may not be based on a party's declaration or factual representations made by counsel in the motion papers).) In particular, a motion to strike can be used to attack the entire pleading or any part thereof – in other words, a motion may target single words or phrases, unlike demurrers. (Warren v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 24, 40.) The Code of Civil Procedure also authorizes the Court to act on its own initiative to strike matters, empowering the Court to enter orders striking matter “at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper.” (CCP § 436.)

Civil Code § 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases “where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied . . . .” “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. Finally, “fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the party of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civil Code §3294.)

Malice has long been interpreted to mean that malice in fact, as opposed to malice implied by law, is required. Malice in fact may be proved under § 3294 either expressly (by direct evidence probative on the existence of hatred or ill will) or by implication (by indirect evidence from which the jury may draw inferences). Thus it has been held that the “malice” required by §3294 implies an act conceived in a spirit of mischief or with criminal indifference towards the obligations owed to others. Where the defendant’s wrongdoing has been intentional and deliberate and has the character of outrage frequently associated with crime, all but a few courts have permitted the jury to award in the tort action “punitive” or “exemplary” damages. Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or “malice,” or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 890, 894; Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) Moreover, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)

Furthermore, “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees.” (Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167.) “ “[T]he punitive damage statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the “officer[s], director[s], or managing agent [s].” [Citation.] This is the group whose intentions guide corporate conduct. By so confining liability, the statute avoids punishing the corporation for malice of low-level employees which does not reflect the corporate “state of mind” or the intentions of corporate leaders. This assures that punishment is imposed only if the corporation can fairly be viewed as guilty of the evil intent sought to be punished. “ ‘[T]o award [punitive] damages against the master for the criminality of the servant is to punish a man for that of which he is not guilty.’ ” [Citation.]” (Id.) “Managing agents” are employees who “exercise [ ] substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.” (Id.)

Here, the FAC alleges in pertinent part that “Defendants, and each of them, invited Plaintiff onto the Property,” failed to inspect the property, and failed to remedy or warn Plaintiff of the dangerous condition. (FAC at p. 5.) Plaintiff alleges that because of Defendants’ breach of duties, Plaintiff fell and sustained severe injuries. (Id.) Regarding the punitive damages, the FAC states:

On September 25, 2020, at the 995 N. Mission Road, Los Angeles property, which the Defendants, and each of them, owned, maintained, controlled, and supervised, the Defendants, and each of them, invited Plaintiff onto the Property, and intentionally, willfully, consciously, and/or recklessly ignored and dismissed their duties to Plaintiff, and intentionally, willfully, consciously, and/or recklessly ignored Plaintiffs safety, that the Defendants, and each of them, intentionally failed to inspect the Property to discover any dangerous condition; failed to repair or eliminate said dangerous condition; defendant knew or should have known that the dangerous condition would cause severe harm to plaintiff and chose to conceal the dangerous condition from Plaintiff which was not obvious.

Therefore, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants, and Does 1-50, acted with gross negligence in intentional, willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of Plaintiff. Defendants and Does 1 - 50, at all times demonstrated the lack of any care or an extreme departure from what a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation to prevent harm to oneself or to others, thereby severely injuring Plaintiff. Defendants and Does 1-50 were grossly negligent by both their actions and their failures to act. Therefore, punitive or exemplary damages should be awarded in favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendants, and Does 1-50.

Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the level of malice, fraud, or oppression, as defined by the Code. There are no factual allegations showing a conscious and deliberate disregard of the safety of others, or any allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations. Further, there are no factual allegations of any despicable conduct that subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights. The FAC asserts only general and conclusory allegations against them. To the extent Plaintiff contends he was lured to the property, no such factual allegations appear in the FAC. In order to plead punitive damages, Plaintiff must plead allegations of fraud, malice, or oppression with sufficient particularity. (Hilliard v. AH Robbins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 392.)

Claims for punitive damages must be pleaded with particularity as to the facts constituting the alleged egregious conduct. (G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.) This requires Plaintiff to allege sufficient facts to support conclusory allegations, which Plaintiff has not done. (Brousseau, 73 Cal.App.3d at 872 [“the second count's conclusory characterization of defendant's conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied,’ ...”].) Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants invited Plaintiff onto their property, and Plaintiff encountered an unspecified dangerous condition that Defendants failed to inspect, remedy, or warn against, which caused Plaintiff to fall.

Furthermore, as Defendants argue, the FAC alleges that G.T.O. Auto Glass is a corporation, but the FAC does contain any allegations showing malice by G.T.O. Auto Glass’s officers, directors, or managing agents. (Cruz, 83 Cal.App.4th at 167.) Plaintiff, in opposition, does not address this defect raised by Defendants.

Therefore, Defendants’ motion to strike the request for punitive damages in the FAC is granted.

The burden is on Plaintiff to show in what manner he can amend the FAC, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.) While Plaintiff requests leave to amend, Plaintiff offers no facts that can be alleged, or any explanation as to how, the FAC can be cured to allege sufficient facts in this matter to support a prayer for punitive damages. This is the second motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages being granted, and Plaintiff’s allegations have remained only conclusory and insufficient to support the prayer for punitive damages.

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court