Judge Audra Mori, Case BC664872 2022-09-13 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Marcello Stewart (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Antonio Reyes, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“LACMTA”) for injuries Plaintiff sustained while a passenger on LACMTA’s bus. On January 31, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint naming Donald Sanders (“Sanders”) as Doe 1. Plaintiff alleges Sanders was operating LACMTA’s bus at the time of the accident.

LACMTA previously filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings arguing that Plaintiff’s action against it was barred based on Sanders’ acceptance of Plaintiff’s statutory offer to compromise pursuant to CCP § 998. The MJOP was heard and argued on July 22, 2022, where the motion was denied. The Court held in relevant part:

As LACMTA can provide no case in which an employer has used a § 998 judgment against an employee to escape liability, and it provides insufficient justification for doing so here, LACMTA fails to meet its burden to show that it is entitle[d] to judgment on the pleadings. Although any potential judgment against LACMTA might be offset by the amount in Plaintiff’s § 998 offer accepted by Sanders, LACMTA does not establish that acceptance of § 998 offer discharges LACMTA from the action.

At this time, LACMTA moves for reconsideration of the July 22, 2022 order denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and LACMTA filed a reply.

LACMTA contends there is new law the Court did not consider at the time of the hearing on LACMTA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and LACMTA argues the law sheds new light on LACMTA’s contention that Plaintiff cannot obtain a vicarious liability judgment against an employer in excess of the amount obtained against its employee under a CCP § 998 offer. Further, LACMTA contends that even if it fails to make an adequate showing for relief under CCP § 1008, the Court has inherent power to reconsider its own interim orders at any time. LACMTA assert that under California law, LACMTA is entitled to judgment on the pleadings based on Sanders’ acceptance of Plaintiff’s § 998 offer.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that LACMTA fails to provide any new case law not available at the time of the hearing, and that instead LACMTA merely asserts it belatedly discovered case law to support its position. Plaintiff avers this is not a valid reason to grant a motion for reconsideration. In addition, Plaintiff argues the authority cited by LACMTA does not establish that LACMTA’s liability is extinguished by Sanders’ acceptance of Plaintiff’s CCP § 998 offer.

In reply, LACMTA argues that the motion for reconsideration can be granted based on new legal arguments that were not permitted at the hearing and that shed new light on its position. LACMTA again asserts that its liability is extinguished based on Sanders’ acceptance of Plaintiff’s CCP § 998 offer to compromise.

The legislative intent was to restrict motions for reconsideration to circumstances where a party offers the court some fact or circumstance not previously considered, and some valid reason for not offering it earlier. (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.) “[A] court acts in excess of jurisdiction when it grants a motion to reconsider that is not based upon ‘new or different facts, circumstances, or law.’” (Id.) The burden under § 1008 “is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial.” (New York Times Co. v. Sup.Ct. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213.) A party seeking reconsideration of a prior order based on “new or different facts, circumstances or law” must provide a satisfactory explanation for failing to present the information at the first hearing; i.e., a showing of reasonable diligence. (Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690.) A motion for reconsideration is properly denied where based on evidence that could have been presented in connection with the original motion. (Morris v. AGFA Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1460.)

Reconsideration cannot be granted based on claims the court misinterpreted the law in its initial ruling, as opposed to a change in the law in the interim; that is not a “new” or “different” matter. (Gilberd v. AC Transit, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at 1500.)

Here, LACMTA is correct that the Court has the inherent authority to reconsider, correct, or change its own interim decisions. (Pinela v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 227, 237 [“Even without a change of law, a trial court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to reconsider an interim ruling.”], citing Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1096-1097.) However, the Court is not exercising its power to reconsider its prior ruling denying LACMTA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings at this time. Consequently, LACMTA must demonstrate new or different facts, law, or circumstances to obtain reconsideration of the July 22, 2022 order denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings.

LACMTA asserts that its motion is based on new law and legal arguments. As a preliminary matter, LACMTA does not specify which of the many cases it cites in its motion are the “new law.” However, it primarily cites to the following cases: Ponce v. Tractor Supply Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 500, Freeman v. Churchill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 453, Goodstein v. Bank of San Pedro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 899, and the dissent in Mayhugh v. County of Orange (1973) 141 Cal.App.3d 763. Each of these cases was decided and published well before the hearing for LACMTA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on July 22, 2022. Moreover, the Court notes that LACMTA referenced the Ponce and Freeman cases in its motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings filed May 13, 2022, at pp. 4:15, 5:8.) And Plaintiff, in opposition to LACMTA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, cited to the Mayhugh case. Therefore, these opinions do not constitute new law that would authorize the Court to reconsider its order., and LACMTA was aware of these cases prior to the hearing on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Baldwin v. Home Sav. of America (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1197 [opinion issued two years before trial court’s ruling on motion could have been provided prior to ruling on motion].)

While LACMTA did not cite to the Goodstein case, this opinion was issued in 1997 and similarly could have been provided to the Court prior to the ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings.[1] Moreover, LACMTA fails to show that it could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered this case or any of the purportedly new authority it cites when it made its initial motion. (Id. at 1198-99; see also In re Marriage of Herr (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1468 [“A motion for reconsideration must be based on new or different facts, circumstances or law [citation], and facts of which the party seeking reconsideration was aware at the time of the original ruling are not ‘new or different.’ [Citation.] In addition, a party must provide a satisfactory explanation for failing to offer the evidence in the first instance.”].) To the contrary, LACMTA indicates that had it done more research earlier, it would have discovered these already existing cases. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is properly denied on the ground that LACMTA does not provide a satisfactory explanation for failing to provide the purportedly new law in the first instance.

Furthermore, LACMTA essentially contends the Court should reconsider and grant LACMTA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because its position concerning the issues raised therein is correct. However, LACMTA’s contentions that the Court erroneously applied the law or reached an incorrect result is not a proper basis for reconsideration, as such does not constitute new or different matter. (Gilberd v. AC Transit, 32 Cal.App.4th at 1500.) LACMTA fails to meet its burden to show the existence of new or different facts, circumstances, or law that could not have been presented at the prior hearing to justify reconsideration.

Finally, even in considering the authority now cited by LACMTA, the cases again do not hold that an employer can use a § 998 offer to compromise accepted by an employee to escape liability. Instead LACMTA largely relies on cases concerning judgments on the merits, or in the case of Ponce v. Tractor Supply Co., a default judgment decided by the Court after hearing and entered against an employee prior to a jury verdict against an employer. Other cases cited by LACMTA address whether costs should be awarded after a CCP § 998 offer to compromise is rejected. LACMTA does not establish that the reasoning used therein should be applied to this case involving an employee’s acceptance of a CCP § 998 offer to compromise, which does not involve an adjudication of fact.

[1] Goodstein does not hold that an employee’s acceptance of a plaintiff’s statutory offer to compromise pursuant to CCP § 998 bars an action against the employer. In Goodstein, the defendant made a Statutory Offer to Compromise, which the plaintiff declined to accept. A judgment of nonsuit was ultimately granted in favor of the defendant. The issue in Goodstein was whether expert witness fees could properly be awarded to the defendant pursuant to CCP § 998. One of many arguments that the plaintiff made was that the Statutory Offer to Compromise did not fall within CCP § 998 because it required that the defendant be dismissed with prejudice; it did not require entry of judgment against the defendant. The court found that a CCP § 998 offer did not require that a judgment be entered, as CCP § 998 did not limit the terms on which a settlement could be offered. The court held that the award of expert witness fees was proper. As LACMTA points out, Goodstein dealt with the limited “proposition that, as between the parties thereto and for purposes of enforcement of settlement agreements, a compromise agreement contemplating payment by defendant and dismissal of the action by plaintiff is the legal equivalent of a judgment in plaintiff's favor.” (Mot. at p. 7 [emphasis added].) It did not analyze the impact on a compromise agreement or CCP § 998 judgment on other, non-settling parties to an action.