Judge Audra Mori, Case BC690185 2022-10-24 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Linda Hammel (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Stink Inc. dba the Stinking Rose (“Defendant”) for injuries relating to Plaintiff’s trip and fall on stairs at Defendant’s restaurant. The complaint alleges causes of action for negligence and premises liability.

At this time, Defendant moves for an order compelling Plaintiff to sign authorizations for her out of state medical records from certain medical providers. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and Defendant filed a reply.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s medical records are relevant to this action, but Plaintiff has refused to signed authorizations for release of the information without justification. Defendant seeks medical records from eight out of state medical providers and argues the Court has authority to order Plaintiff to sign authorizations for the release of her medical records.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the requested authorizations are seeking lifetime records of all body parts, not just those claimed injured in the subject incident. Plaintiff argues that the authorizations violate Plaintiff’s right to privacy because they are overbroad in scope and time.

In reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s representations regarding her injuries require a broad inquiry because Plaintiff has not limited her injuries to the body parts claimed. Defendant contends that Plaintiff has waived any physician-patient privilege and that the relevant documents are discoverable in this action.

However, in moving for an order compelling Plaintiff to sign authorizations for her medical records from eight medical providers, Defendant does not cite any authority that specifically gives the Court express authority under the Discovery Act to compel a party to sign an authorization for release of records. Case law on this particular issue is limited and that which does exist is not clear. For example, Defendant argues it is entitled to compel Plaintiff to sign the authorizations pursuant to Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, Coats v. K-Mart Corporation (1990) 215 Cal.App.3d 961, and Little v. Superior Court (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 311.

In Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, the Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of an action where the plaintiff failed to comply with the court's order to sign an authorization for release of medical records. (Id. at pp. 918-919.) However, in a footnote, the Court stated it was not clear why the defendant moved to compel an authorization rather than compel compliance with a subpoena. (Id. at 918, fn. 2.)

In Coats v. K-Mart Corporation (1990) 215 Cal.App.3d 961, the Court addressed whether the relation back doctrine applied to confer standing on a plaintiff who knowingly lacked it when the action was initially filed. (Id. at 967.) While the Court noted in summarizing the factual and procedural history of the matter that the trial court had ordered the plaintiff to sign authorizations for the release of certain medical and psychiatric records, the Coats Court did not address whether such order was appropriate or not. (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 614 [“Cases are not authority for propositions not considered therein.”].)

In Little v. Superior Court (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 311, the plaintiff commenced an action against her husband for a divorce and custody of the parties’ minor child. (Id. at 313.) The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel her husband execute releases so she could obtain information from his psychologists. (Id. at 314.) However, the court's order simply stated that it was granting the motion and did not direct the husband to do anything, and it provided that if the releases were not executed within a certain time, the court clerk was authorized to do so. (Id. at 314, 317-18.) The plaintiff then obtained an order to show cause why her husband should not be held in contempt for disobeying the order, but the Court of Appeal held, in adjudging order finding the husband in contempt void, that the husband could not be held guilty of contempt because the order did not require him to do anything and could simply let the clerk execute the consent. (Id. at 317-19.) As with Miranda and Coats, the Court did not address whether the trial court was authorized to order a party to sign authorizations for release of confidential or private records.

Defendant further cites to Civil Code § 56.26 in contending that a written authorization is required for the release of the medical records. This provision states in relevant part: “No person or entity engaged in the business of furnishing administrative services to programs that provide payment for health care services shall knowingly use, disclose, or permit its employees or agents to use or disclose medical information possessed in connection with performing administrative functions for a program, except as reasonably necessary in connection with the administration or maintenance of the program, or as required by law, or with an authorization.” (Civ. Code § 56.26(a).) Based on its plain language, this statute provides that no person or entity in the business of providing administrative services to programs that provide payment for health care services shall disclose medical information except as required by law or with an authorization. While Civil Code § 56.26 acknowledges that a signed authorization is one means which through medical information can be obtained, it does not state it is the only way, nor does it expressly authorize the Court to compel a party to sign an authorization for such.

It is well established that California courts lack the power to order civil discovery by a method that is not authorized in the Code of Civil Procedure. (Haniff v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 191, 200.) The request that a party sign a release for records is not a method expressly or impliedly included in the Civil Discovery Act. (See, e.g. CCP § 2019.010.) Moreover, Defendant has not made a showing that Defendant’s efforts to use normal discovery procedures to obtain the records have failed to yield the documents. Defendant does not address why it cannot or will not follow the Wisconsin laws that clearly govern and provide instruction concerning seeking discovery for use in other states.

In addition, the requested authorizations are overbroad on their face. (Mot. Exh. 1.) They request all medical records without limitation to body part or time from the eight medical providers. The authorizations demand all documents and records pertaining to Plaintiff regarding any treatment or condition Plaintiff may have ever had whether related to Plaintiff’s injuries sustained in this incident or not. Defendant does not establish there are any preexisting conditions Plaintiff may have had that are directly relevant to her injuries for the alleged trip and fall. Defendant offers no explanation for why Plaintiff’s entire medical history without limitation is necessary to evaluate Plaintiff’s claimed injuries in this action. Plaintiff has a protected privacy interest in her medical records, and Defendant fails to show that the records are so relevant as to outweigh Plaintiff’s right to privacy. (Williams v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.)

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to compel Plaintiff’s signed authorizations is denied

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court