Judge Audra Mori, Case SC118462 2023-03-08 Tentative Ruling

On September 21, 2022, Plaintiff California Capital Insurance Co. (“Plaintiff”) filed this subrogation action against Defendants Juan R. Bautista (“Bautista”) and Gisela Ramirez (“Ramirez”) (collectively, “Defendants”) to recover for damages paid to Plaintiff’s insured. On August 24, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal dismissing the entire action “pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.” No stipulation was attached to the Request for Dismissal.

At this time, Plaintiff moves for relief from its voluntary dismissal pursuant to CCP § 473(b) and seeks an order for entry of judgment pursuant to CCP § 664.6. Plaintiff provides that on October 3, 2013, the parties entered into a written settlement. (Mot. Exh. A.) Plaintiff provides that under the agreement, Defendants were to make monthly payments to Defendant in exchange for a dismissal without prejudice. Plaintiff asserts that the agreement provided that the Los Angeles Superior Court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. Plaintiff states that Defendant made payments totaling $8,150 but have missed all payments since March 1, 2020. Plaintiff contends that pursuant to the settlement agreement, Defendants are liable for a total of $42,882.00, minus payments made of $8,150.00. Plaintiff thus seeks entry of judgment in the amount of $34,732.00 against Defendants. The motion is unopposed.

Plaintiff briefly addresses its request for relief from dismissal pursuant to CCP § 473(b). Plaintiff recognizes that this section calls for relief to be granted when a dismissal has been entered as a result of the mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect of a party or its legal representative. However, in neither its Memorandum of Points and Authorities nor the supporting Declaration does Plaintiff make a showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. In fact, it does not attempt to do so. Rather, Plaintiff states, “Plaintiff [sic] counsel acted with substantial justification in dismissing this action based on the representations of the defendants that they would pay Plaintiff its damages on a deferred basis. Defendants have failed to make any further payments beyond the $8150 they have paid so it because [sic] necessary to file this motion to enforce the settlement as a judgment.” (Memorandum at p. 5.) Thus, Plaintiff indicates that it intentionally dismissed the action because the parties had agreed to a settlement, which is not uncommon, and because the Defendants have breached the settlement agreement, Plaintiff seeks to obtain a judgment using the expedited procedure set forth in CCP § 664.6 rather than filing a separate collection action. As Plaintiff has not shown that the dismissal was entered as a result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect as required by § 473(b), the request for relief must be denied. (Basinger v. Roger & Wells (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 16, 23-24 [Under CCP § 473, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating an excusable ground, such as fraud or mistake, justifying a court’s vacating a judgment.].)

The Court turns to the request to enter judgment pursuant to CCP § 664.6: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

Strict compliance with the statutory requirements is necessary before a court can enforce a settlement agreement under this statute. (Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37.) To enforce a written settlement agreement under CCP section 664.6, the following three elements must be met: (1) the parties must have come to a meeting of the minds on all material points; (2) there must be a writing that contains the material terms of the agreement; and (3) the writing must be signed by the parties. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 797-98.)

Pertaining to a request for the trial court to retain jurisdiction under CCP 664.6, the request ‘ “must conform to the same three requirements which the Legislature and the courts have deemed necessary for section 664.6 enforcement of the settlement itself: the request must be made (1) during the pendency of the case, not after the case has been dismissed in its entirety, (2) by the parties themselves, and (3) either in a writing signed by the parties or orally before the court.’ [Citation.] The ‘request must be express, not implied from other language, and it must be clear and unambiguous.’ [Citation.]” (Mesa RHF Partners, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 913, 917.)

The request to the court that it retain jurisdiction under section 664.6, thus, must be made by the parties. (Id. at 918.) Furthermore, the request should be made while the court still has jurisdiction. (see Sayta v. Chu (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 960, 962 [because “parties failed to request, before dismissal, that the trial court retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, or alternatively seek to set aside the dismissals, … the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain” motion to enforce settlement (emphasis in original)]; Mesa RHF Partners, 33 Cal.App.5th at 918 [same].) Normally, the court loses subject matter jurisdiction when an action is voluntarily dismissed, with or without prejudice, and it has no power to enforce a settlement agreement thereafter. (see Sayta, 17 Cal.App.5th at 966-68; see also Mesa RHF Partners, 33 Cal.App.5th at 918.)

In Mesa RHF, the Court held that the parties must personally request that the court maintain jurisdiction under Section 664.6. (Mesa RHF Partners, 33 Cal.App.5th at 918.) They can do this by either appearing before the court or submitting a written request signed in their own hand. (Id.) Their counsel cannot appear for them, nor sign for them. (Id.) A request for dismissal, in which counsel for one party states that the court will retain jurisdiction, is simply not sufficient. (Id.) Further, it is not enough for the parties to agree that a court will retain jurisdiction in a settlement agreement, if that agreement is not presented to the trial court prior to dismissal. (Id.)

Here, Plaintiff fails to establish the Court has jurisdiction over this matter to grant the motion for entry of judgment. While the agreement contains a handwritten notation stating, “LASC shall retain jurisdiction to enforce [ ] upon payment of the money called for herein” (Mot. Exh. A at p. 2), and even in assuming that this was intended to constitute a request for the Court to retain jurisdiction under CCP § 664.6, there is no evidence showing this agreement was transmitted to the Court before Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action. The settlement agreement was not attached to Plaintiff’s Request for Dismissal, and the agreement does not otherwise appear in the Court’s records. Consequently, the court lacks jurisdiction to grant this motion under CCP § 664.6 because Plaintiff dismissed the action without a party expressly requesting the Court retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. (Mesa RHF Partners, 33 Cal.App.5th at 918.)

As the Mesa Court explained, “the parties could have easily invoked section 664.6 by filing a stipulation and proposed order either attaching a copy of the settlement agreement and requesting that the trial court retain jurisdiction under section 664.6 or a stipulation and proposed order signed by the parties noting the settlement and requesting that the trial court retain jurisdiction under section 664.6. The process need not be complex. But strict compliance demands that the process be followed.” (Id.) Therefore, it is not enough simply to provide for such retention in the settlement agreement. (Id.) Because under Mesa, the requirements of § 664.6 were never fulfilled, this Court no longer has jurisdiction over this case. Plaintiff’s dismissal is effective.

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court