Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 19STCV31223, Date: 2023-04-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV31223 Hearing Date: April 18, 2023 Dept: 30
Calendar No.
Ortega vs. Frontier Communications
Corporation, et. al., Case No. 19STCV31223
Tentative
Ruling re: Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Summary Adjudication of Issues
Defendants Frontier Communications Corporation, Frontier
California, Inc., and Citizens Telecom Services Company LLC (collectively,
Defendants) move for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary
adjudication against Plaintiff Sonia Ortega (Plaintiff). The motion is denied
as to the first cause of action, only as it relates to the recovery of civil penalties, and the eighth causes of
action, and is otherwise granted.
The function of a motion for summary judgment or
adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party can
show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and if not to enable an order
of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Atlantic
Richfield).) Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c, subdivision (c)
“requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence
submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and
uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor
Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the
defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof
by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense.
(Code Civ. Proc, § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Courts “liberally construe the evidence
in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006)
39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Once the moving party has met that burden, the
burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To
establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must
produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
The
Court’s “role on summary judgment is simply to decide whether the parties
possess evidence requiring the fact-weighing procedures of a trial. (Soto v.
County of Riverside (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 492, 496.) “The purpose of the
summary judgment procedure is not to try the issues, but merely to
determine whether there are issues to be tried.” (Orser v. George
(1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 660, 668.)
Plaintiff began working as a Sales Consultant for the
company Verizon in December 1998. (Plaintiff’s Undisputed Material Facts (PUMF)
1.) On April 1, 2016, Verizon was purchased by Defendant Frontier
Communications Corporation (FCC). (Defendants’ Undisputed Material Facts (DUMF)
1.) Following Verizon’s acquisition, Plaintiff became an employee of Frontier
California, a wholly owned subsidiary of FCC, until August 1, 2017. (DUMF 3.)
Plaintiff was then transferred as an employee to Defendant Citizens
Telecom Services Company (Citizens), another wholly owned subsidiary of FCC. (DUMF
3.) Plaintiff was employed by Citizens as a sales consultant until her
termination on February 9, 2018. (DUMF 4.)
Plaintiff’s job title with Defendants was “Language
Assistance Consumer Sales Consultant.” Her job duties included conversing with
non-English speaking customers, assisting customers with billing or services,
recommending company products to customers, and handling customer complaints.
(Plaintiff’s Evidence (PE), Ex. A, p. 33 [17], Ex. 5. [82].) Throughout
her employment, Plaintiff was a member of Communications Workers of America
Union, Local CWA. (DUMF 5.)
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, after
acquiring Verizon, began to pressure Plaintiff to sell to customers products and
services that were not being rendered. (Comp. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff allegedly
complained to her supervisors, Giovanna Hull and Juan Moreno, about the
practices, and also took intermittent medical leave in order to recuperate from
the stress of regularly dealing with angry customers. (Comp. ¶¶ 20-22.)
Around June 2017, Plaintiff stopped offering Defendants’
customers certain services and products, as she believed that doing so was
illegal and unethical. (Comp. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff was reprimanded by her supervisors
on November 3, 2017, for continuing to refuse their instructions to sell the
products. (Comp. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff was then placed on medical leave from
November 28, 2017, until January 2, 2018, due to her job-related anxiety,
depression, and stress. (Comp. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff was again reprimanded on her
return from leave, and continued to complain about the unethical business
practices. (Comp. ¶ 29.) After this time, Plaintiff stopped receiving sales
calls from clients. (Comp. ¶ 29.) On February 9, 2018, Plaintiff was terminated
by Moreno for failing to meet her sales quota. (Comp. ¶ 30.)
Plaintiff asserts eight causes of action against Defendants
under FEHA, the Labor Code, and for wrongful termination of public policy.
Defendants first argue that FCC is entitled to summary
judgment on all causes of action because it never employed Plaintiff. Plaintiff
was employed by Frontier California and Citizens, both wholly owned
subsidiaries of FCC. (DUMF 3.)
California law applies the “integrated enterprise test” to
determine whether a parent corporation may be held liable for the acts or
omissions of its subsidiary, under the theory that the two entities constitute
a single employer. (Laird v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th
727, 737 (Laird), disapproved of on other grounds in Reid v. Google,
Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512.) The test has four factors: “interrelation
of operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations, and
common ownership or financial control.” (Ibid.)
“Under this
test, common ownership or control alone is
never enough to establish parent liability. [Citation.] Although courts
consider the four factors together, they often deem centralized control of
labor relations the most important. [Citations.] ‘The critical question is,
“[w]hat entity made the final decisions regarding employment matters related to
the person claiming discrimination?” [Citation.] A parent's broad general
policy statements regarding employment matters are not enough to satisfy this
prong. [Citation.] To satisfy the control prong, a parent must control the
day-to-day employment decisions of the subsidiary. [Citations.]’ ” (Laird
at 738.)
In support of finding that FCC and its subsidiaries
constituted a single employer, Plaintiff submits the following evidence: FCC
provides its subsidiaries with use of its general counsel (DUMF 123); FCC’s
Senior Vice President of Labor and Employment relations, Robert J. Cosagliola,
signed the Collective Bargaining Agreement on behalf of Frontier California
(PUMF 55); FCC uses the same employee handbook, policies, and guidelines as its
subsidiaries (PUMF 56); and Maisha Daniels, Citizens’ Director of Human
Resources and Labor Relations, testified that FCC “was the operating group,”
and holds herself out on her LinkedIn page as working for FCC. (PUMF 57).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot rely on this theory
because it was not alleged in the Complaint. “Although
California courts take a liberal view of inartfully drawn complaints, ‘[i]t remains essential ... that a complaint set forth the actionable facts relied
upon with sufficient precision to inform the defendant of what plaintiff is
complaining, and what remedies are being sought.’ [Citation.] Fairness
dictates that a complaint give the defendant
sufficient notice of the cause of action stated to be able to prepare the case.” (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 413.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff provided sufficient
notice of this theory of liability through her allegation that Defendants were
each “parent corporation, joint employers, alter ego, and/or joint
ventures of the other Defendants...” (Comp. ¶ 9.)
The Court also finds Plaintiff’s evidence sufficient show a
triable issue of material fact as to whether FCC and Citizens constitute a
single employer under the integrated enterprises test. FCC’s control
over the day-to-day employment decisions of the subsidiaries is shown by the
participation of its Senior Vice President of Labor
and Employment Relations in collective bargaining on behalf of Frontier
California, as well as the evidence that FCC promulgated a common set of
employee handbook, policies, and guidelines to its
subsidiaries. (PUMF 55-56.)
First Cause of Action
for Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5 (Whistleblower Statute)
Labor Code § 1102.5, subd.
(b), forbids “[a]n employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer,”
from retaliating against an employee for disclosing information “to a
government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the
employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or
correct the violation or noncompliance . . . if the employee has reasonable
cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal
statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal
rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of
the employee's job duties.”
Defendants first argue
that Plaintiff’s claim under § 1102.5 is time-barred. Plaintiff was terminated
on February 9, 2018, and filed the current action on September 4, 2019, over
one year later. The parties dispute whether this cause of action is subject to
the three-year statute of limitations under Code Civ. Proc. § 338(a), as “[a]n
action upon a liability created by statute,” or to the one-year statute of
limitations under Code Civ. Proc. § 340(a), as “[a]n
action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture.”
Labor Code § 1102.5,
subd. (f), provides, “In addition to other penalties, an employer that is a corporation
or limited liability company is liable for a civil penalty not exceeding ten
thousand dollars ($10,000) for each violation of this section.” Based on this
provision, Defendants argue that the one-year statute of limitations under Code
Civ. Proc. § 340 applies. However, the whistleblower statue does not limit an
injured employee’s recovery to the civil penalty; the employee may also recover
damages for violations of § 1102.5, including punitive damages. (Mathews v.
Happy Valley Conference Center, Inc. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 236, 266-67; see
Labor Code § 1105 [“[n]othing in this chapter shall prevent the injured
employee from recovering damages from his employer for injury suffered through
a violation of this chapter”].)
“California Labor Code § 1102.5 forms the
basis for two distinct claims. . . . A plaintiff can bring a § 1102.5 claim for
damages, which seeks to remedy individual harms. . . . .A plaintiff can also
bring a § 1102.5(f) claim for civil penalties, aimed to redress public wrongs. .
. . Because claims based on §§ 1102.5 and 1102.5(f) seek to redress different
harms, they implicate different types of primary rights, and give rise to
separate and distinct causes of action.” (Ayala v. Frito Lay, Inc. (E.D. Cal. 2017) 263 F.Supp.3d
891, 917.)
Here, Plaintiff seeks
both damages and the civil penalty under subdivision (f) for Defendants’
alleged violation of § 1102.5. (Comp. ¶¶ 41-43.) Plaintiff’s claim under Labor
Code § 1102.5 therefore consists of two separate and distinct causes of action.
The Court finds that the claim is time-barred insofar as it seeks to recover
civil penalties, and is timely as to the remainder of the claim. (C.f. Hypertouch,
Inc. v. ValueClick, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 805, 841 [“different
statute of limitations may apply where plaintiff seeks ‘actual and treble
damages ... based upon separate statutes contained within the same act’].)
Plaintiff argues that equitable
tolling should apply to bring her claim for civil penalties within the statute
of limitations. The Court disagrees.
“It has long been
settled in this and other jurisdictions that whenever the exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a prerequisite to the initiation of a civil action,
the running of the limitations period is tolled during the time consumed by the
administrative proceeding.” (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College
Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 101.) Moreover, equitable tolling is not
“limited to cases in which a plaintiff was
required to pursue a particular alternate remedy before initiating suit”;
rather, “ ‘regardless of
whether the exhaustion of one remedy is a prerequisite to the pursuit of
another, if the defendant is not prejudiced thereby, the running of the
limitations period is tolled.’ [Citation.] . . . The filing of an administrative claim,
whether mandated or not, affords a defendant notice of the claims against it so
that it may gather and preserve evidence, and thereby satisfies the principal
policy behind the statute of limitations.” (Id. at 102.)
Here, neither Plaintiff’s
original DFEH complaint or her amended complaint make any mention whatsoever of
any protected activity related to Plaintiff’s refusal to sell certain products
or services to customers because she believed her employer was engaged in
unlawful or unethical conduct.
Plaintiff’s complaints to the DFEH relate solely to disability discrimination
and harassment and retaliation because she “reported or resisted any form of
discrimination or harassment, requested or used a disability-related
accommodation, participated as a witness in a discrimination or harassment
complaint, requested or used leave under the California Family Leave Act.” Nothing
in the DFEH complaints would have put Defendant on notice of the Labor Code
claim Plaintiff alleges in her complaint.
Furthermore, the Court sees no reason why Plaintiff could not have
timely filed a complaint alleging a Labor Code violation seeking civil
penalties and later seek leave to amend to allege the FEHA claims after she
exhausted her administrative remedies.
Second Cause of Action
for Disability Discrimination and Third Cause of Action for Retaliation under
FEHA
To establish a claim for discrimination in violation of
FEHA, the plaintiff must generally prove that (1) he or she was a member of a
protected class; (2) that he or she was qualified for the position he or she
sought or was performing competently in the position he or she held; (3) that
he or she suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion,
or denial of an available job; and (4) some other circumstance suggesting
discriminatory motive. (See Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 317, 355.) A qualified
individual is someone who is
able to perform the essential functions of his or her job, with or without
reasonable accommodation. (See Nealy, 234 Cal.App.4th at 378.)
“[I]n order to establish
a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA,
a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a “protected activity,” (2) the
employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a
causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer's action.
[Citations.] Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer is
required to offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment
action. [Citation.] If the employer produces a legitimate reason for the
adverse employment action, the presumption of retaliation ‘drops out of the
picture,’ and the burden shifts back to the employee to prove intentional
retaliation.” (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028,
1042.)
Plaintiff’s
second cause of action alleges that her “perceived disabilit[ies]…, engagement
in protected activity, medical condition, medical leave, and/or some
combination of protected characteristics under Government Code § 12926(j) were
motivating reasons and/or factors in the decisions to subject Plaintiff to the
aforementioned adverse employment actions.” (Comp. ¶ 51.)
Defendants first move for summary adjudication of the
FEHA discrimination and retaliation claims on the basis that Plaintiff has
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff
argues that she has established a prima facie case based on the evidence that
Defendants terminated her due to her medical leave.
Plaintiff took both intermittent and continuous medical
leave during her employment with Defendants. (DE, Garcia-Preuss Decl. ¶¶
21-22.) Plaintiff took the medical leave due to anxiety and depression
resulting from her stress over her employment with Defendants. (PE, Ex. A, pp.
99-101 [53].) Plaintiff was approved for intermittent leave between July 1,
2017 and January 1, 2018, and from January 1, 2018 to October 5, 2018. Plaintiff
also took continuous medical leave from March 13, 2017 through March 17, 2017,
and also from November 28, 2017 through January 1, 2018. (Ibid.) When
Plaintiff returned from her leave in January 2018, Plaintiff told Moreno that
she had been on medical leave, and Moreno had also been in contact with her
attendance supervisor, Michelle Gittens about the leave. (PE, Ex. A, p. 122
[69].) Around two weeks after her return, on January 19, Moreno sent an email
to Frontier’s HR representatives stating that “all options have been exhausted
to help [Plaintiff] succeed,” and requesting that Plaintiff be terminated. (PE,
Ex. E [157].) Plaintiff was terminated on February 3, 2018. (PUMF 53.)
Plaintiff’s sole evidence of Defendants’ discriminatory
motive is the temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s return from medical leave
and her subsequent termination. “Because the employee's burden of establishing
a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is fairly minimal, the temporal proximity
between an employee's disclosure of his symptoms and a subsequent termination
may satisfy the causation requirement at the first step of the
burden-shifting process.” (Arteaga v. Brink's, Inc. (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 327, 353; see Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente Internat. (2007)
151 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110.).) “[T]o be
persuasive evidence, temporal proximity must be very close, and importantly
... temporal proximity alone, when very close, can in some instances establish
a prima facie case of [discrimination
or] retaliation....” (Arteaga at
354.)
It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s
disability was protected under FEHA and that she was subject to an adverse
employment action. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to show
discriminatory motive. Here, though, the temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s
return from leave and Moreno’s email requesting her termination was very close,
around two weeks. Given Plaintiff’s minimal burden on the first step, this
evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
Defendants’ evidence is sufficient to
meet its burden to show that Plaintiff was terminated for reasons unrelated to
her disability or taking of medical leave. Moreno’s January 19, 2018 email to
the HR representatives cited Plaintiff’s failure to follow the call-flow,
consistent with Plaintiff’s prior reprimands. (PE, Ex. E; DE, Garcia-Preuss
Decl., Ex. F [314].) Unlike the Section
1102.5 claim, the evidence that Plaintiff’s failure to follow the call-flow was
grounded in her concerns about illegal customer billing is immaterial as to
whether Defendants’ reasons for termination were “legitimate” for purposes of
Plaintiff’s FEHA claims: “‘legitimate’ reasons [citation] in this context are reasons that are facially unrelated to
prohibited bias, and which, if true, would thus preclude a finding of discrimination.”
(Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 171 [emphasis in
original].)
Evidence of close
temporal proximity alone, while sufficient to satisfy a plaintiff’s burden on
the first step, is insufficient to create a triable issue as to pretext. (Arteaga,
163 Cal.App.4th at 354.) The evidence of temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s
return in January 2018 and her termination is also weakened given that
Plaintiff’s leave was
not the first time that she disclosed her health condition to the company or
the first time that she took medical leave. (DE, Garcia-Preuss Decl. ¶¶ 21-22.) Additionally, Plaintiff testified that she never
discussed her medical or health condition with Moreno, Hull, or anyone else at
Frontier other than in the context of requesting time off. (DE, Ex. A, p. 112
[60].) As Plaintiff has
presented no further persuasive evidence in support of pretext, she has failed
to meet her burden to show a triable issue on the FEHA causes of action.
Accordingly, summary judgment is granted for Defendants on the second and third
causes of action.
Fourth Cause of Action
for Failure to Prevent Discrimination (FEHA)
Under Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k), it is an unlawful employment
practice “[f]or an employer, labor organization, employment agency,
apprenticeship training program, or any training program leading to employment,
to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and
harassment from occurring.”
Because Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination under FEHA
fails, her claim for failure to prevent discrimination also necessarily fails. (Trujillo v. North
County Transit District, 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 288–289 [“[T]here's no logic
that says an employee who has not been discriminated against can sue an
employer for not preventing discrimination that didn't happen”].)
Fifth Cause of Action for
Retaliation (CFRA)
Retaliation for protected medical leave
is prohibited by the Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA). (Gov. Code §
12945.2, subd. (k).) “The elements of a cause of action for retaliation in violation of CFRA
are: ‘(1) the defendant was an employer covered by CFRA;
(2) the plaintiff was an employee eligible to take CFRA
[leave]; (3) the plaintiff exercised her right to take leave for a qualifying CFRA purpose; and (4) the plaintiff suffered an
adverse employment action, such as termination, fine, or suspension, because of
her exercise of her right to CFRA [leave].’
[Citation.] Like claims for discrimination, CFRA
retaliation claims . . . are subject to the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting analysis.” (Bareno v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 546, 560.)
Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation under CFRA is subject
to the same legal framework as her claim for retaliation under FEHA, and so
likewise fails due to Plaintiff’s failure to show a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether Defendants’ stated reasons for her termination were
pretextual.
Sixth
Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
Defendants move for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s claim for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy on the basis that it is
derivative of Plaintiff’s FEHA and CFRA claims. As discussed above, Plaintiff Labor
Code § 1102.5 for damages is timely. Plaintiff suggests that the wrongful
termination claim may be based on Defendants’ violation of the public policies
set forth in the Labor Code. However, it is not clear from the Complaint that Plaintiff’s
wrongful termination claim is based on the Labor Code violation. The
allegations under the wrongful termination claim explicitly cite only FEHA and
CFRA, and state that Defendants violated the fundamental policy “that
Defendants cannot discriminate and/or retaliate against any employee on the
basis of perceived disability and/or disability, engagement in protected
activity, medical condition and medical leave.” (Comp. ¶ 90.)
Given the lack of any explicit reference to the Labor Code and the disability
discrimination-related allegations, the Complaint fails to provide sufficient
notice that the wrongful termination claim is partly premised on the alleged
Labor Code violation. (Compare Prue v.
Brady Co./San Diego, Inc. (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 1367, 1380 [“Because [plaintiff’s] complaint
made numerous references to statutory provisions of FEHA and specifically
alleged a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy, [defendant] was placed on notice that [plaintiff] was relying,
at least in part, on public policies set forth in FEHA”].) Because
summary adjudication is granted as to Plaintiffs’ claims under FEHA and CFRA,
summary adjudication is also granted as to the cause of action for wrongful
termination.
Seventh
Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief
Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory
relief seeks “a declaration that Defendants discriminated against her on
the basis of her perceived disability and/or disability, engagement in
protected activity, medical condition, medical leave, and/or some combination
of these protected characteristics.” (Comp. ¶ 103.) Again, summary adjudication
is granted against Plaintiff’s discrimination-related causes of action, and so this
claim also fails.
Eighth
Cause of Action for Failure to Timely Permit Inspection of Payroll Records
Under Labor Code § 226, subd. (c), “An employer who receives a
written or oral request to inspect or receive a copy of records pursuant to
subdivision (b) pertaining to a current or former employee shall comply with
the request as soon as practicable, but no later than 21 calendar days from the
date of the request.” Labor Code § 1198.5, subd. (b)(1), requires that an
employer “make the contents of those personnel records available for inspection
to the current or former employee, or his or her representative, at reasonable
intervals and at reasonable times, but not later than 30 calendar days from the
date the employer receives a written request.”
It is
undisputed that Plaintiff submitted a written demand to Defendants for her
personnel and payroll records on December 5, 2018. (DUMF 122.) Defendants
provided information in response on December 26, 2018. (DE, Charles Decl. ¶ 2,
Ex. B [132].)
The Court
agrees with Plaintiff that the production fails to include records required by
Labor Code § 226, subd. (c), as described under subd. (a). The required
production must include “an accurate itemized statement in writing” showing
information including gross wages earned, total hours worked, all deductions,
net wages earned, and all applicable hourly rates and the hours worked at each
rate. (Labor Code § 226, subd (a).) For at least three years, the employer must
keep on file “a duplicate of the itemized statement provided to an employee or
a computer-generated record that accurately shows all of the information
required by this subdivision.” (Ibid.) These records must be produced
when an employee makes a written request. (Labor Code § 226, subds. (b)-(c).)
Here, while Defendants’ production includes some information
related to deductions (DE, Charles Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. B [265]), a large portion of
the required information appears to have been omitted. Defendants fail to cite
any specific part of the production containing the payroll records.
Accordingly, summary adjudication is denied as to the eighth cause of action.
Punitive
Damages
Defendants last seek summary
adjudication on the issue of Plaintiff’s entitlement to punitive damages.
“Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b) sets forth the
circumstances under which an employer may be held liable for punitive damages
based upon acts of an employee. They include the employer's (1) advance
knowledge of the employee's unfitness; (2) authorization or ratification of the
wrongful conduct; and (3) personal culpability. Moreover, a corporate employer
may be liable only if the knowledge, authorization, ratification or act was on
the part of an officer, director or managing agent of the corporation.” (Grieves
v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 167.)
Plaintiff does not address Defendants’
liability for punitive damages as a corporate employer under Section 3294(b),
and has presented no evidence of malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct
committed by “an officer, director or managing
agent of the corporation.” Accordingly, summary
adjudication is granted for Defendants on the issue of punitive damages.