Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 20STCV18357, Date: 2023-04-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV18357 Hearing Date: April 4, 2023 Dept: 30
Calendar No.
Bankuthy, e.t al. vs. Millennium
House, Inc, et. al., Case No. 20STCV18357
Tentative
Ruling re: Intervenor/Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Adjudication
Intervenor Nautilus Insurance Co. and Defendants Peter
Schuster, Knacio Moore, and Dennis James (collectively, Defendants) move
for summary adjudication on Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for violation of
Civil Code § 1942.4. The motion is granted as to Defendants
Knacio Moore and Dennis James, and denied as to Defendant Peter Schuster.
The function of a motion for summary judgment or
adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party can
show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and if not to enable an order
of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Atlantic
Richfield).) Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c, subdivision (c)
“requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence
submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and
uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor
Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the
defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof
by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense.
(Code Civ. Proc, § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Courts “liberally construe the evidence
in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006)
39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Once the moving party has met that burden, the
burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To
establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must
produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
The
Court’s “role on summary judgment is simply to decide whether the parties
possess evidence requiring the fact-weighing procedures of a trial. (Soto v.
County of Riverside (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 492, 496.) “The purpose of the
summary judgment procedure is not to try the issues, but merely to
determine whether there are issues to be tried.” (Orser v. George
(1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 660, 668.)
Civil Code § 1942.4 provides, “[a] landlord of a
dwelling may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase,
or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit . . . if all of the following
conditions exist prior to the landlord's demand or notice: (1) The dwelling
substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard characteristics listed in
Section 1941.1 or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code, or is deemed and declared substandard as set forth in Section
17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code because conditions listed in that section
exist to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or
welfare of the public or the occupants of the dwelling; (2) A public officer or
employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after
inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in
writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the
substandard conditions.;
(3) The conditions have existed and have
not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in
paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause; (4) The conditions were not caused by an act
or omission of the tenant or lessee in violation of Section 1929 or 1941.2
Defendants first move for summary adjudication on the basis
that they were not “landlords” within the definition of Section 1942.4. Plaintiff does not oppose the motion with respect to
Defendants Knacio Moore and Dennis James. (UMF 21.) Summary adjudication is
therefore granted on the third cause of action as to Moore and James. The remaining dispute is whether the cause of action can be
maintained against Defendant Peter Schuster (Schuster).
In May 2013, Schuster, as tenant, entered into a lease with
Caara Shayne, as landlord, for the property located at 127 S. Boyle Ave., Los
Angeles, CA. (Ricketts Decl., Ex. 4 [40].) During the relevant period, Schuster
was the sole owner, director, and decisionmaker for Millennium House, Inc.,
which was located 127 S. Boyle. (UMF 34; Rickets Decl., Ex. 2 [18].) Millennium
House had a business license from the City of Los Angeles to operate as a
boarding home, and provided room and board to individuals who were suffering
from addiction, disabled, or were court-ordered to reside there. (Ibid.)
Under his lease agreement with Shayne, Schuster was permitted to allow others
to reside at 127 S. Boyle, and held sole authority over admitting and
discharging new residents. (Rickets Decl., Ex. 52, p. 20 [192].) Schuster
charged sublessees for rent and kept all profits from those rents. (Ibid.)
Those sublessees included Plaintiffs, who were court-ordered to live at
Millennium House for varying periods from 2018 through 2019, and paid rent to
Schuster. (UMF 6-10; Stegen Decl. ¶¶ 2-3; Bankuthy Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.)
Plaintiff argues that the term “landlord” under Section
1942.4 is not limited to the owner of a residential property, but may also
include a sublessor and manager such as Schuster.
By its terms, Civil Code § 1942.4
provides that “a landlord of a dwelling” may be liable to “the tenant or
lessee.” Section 1942.4 is located at Title 5, chapter 2 of the Civil Code. The
first section of that chapter, Section 1940, provides, “Except as provided in subdivision (b), this chapter shall
apply to all persons who hire dwelling units located within this state
including tenants, lessees, boarders, lodgers, and others, however denominated.”
(Civ. Code, § 1940, subd. (a).)
There is no express definition given for “landlord” as used
in Section 1942.4; while “landlord” is defined in other sections of this
chapter as “an owner of residential rental property,” those definitions are explicitly limited to the
particular section in which they are given. (Civ. Code §§ 1940.8.5, subd.
(a)(5); 1950.1, subd. (e)(5); 1950.6, subd. (g).) Given the lack of any provisions expressly limiting the
scope of Section 1942.4, Section 1940 indicates that those protections should
be construed to extend to “any hirer of a dwelling,” including a sublessee. (C.f.
Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
1004, 1035 [“As this broad statutory definition makes clear, the covenant of
quiet enjoyment protects not only ‘tenants’ but all ‘hirers’ of real property.”].)
Application
of Section 1942.4 to Schuster’s circumstances is consistent with the statute’s
text and purpose. A liable “landlord” is one who “demand[s] rent, collect[s]
rent, issue[s] a notice of a rent increase, or issue[s]
a three-day notice to pay rent or quit” given certain conditions. (§ 1942.4,
subd. (a).) It is undisputed that Schuster collected rent from Plaintiffs for
his own benefit and was solely responsible for admitting and discharging
new residents. (Rickets Decl., Ex. 52, p. 20 [192].) If
“landlord” included only the owner of the real property, Plaintiffs would have
no recourse under this section, a result at odds with the mandate that “this chapter shall apply to all persons who hire dwelling
units located within this state including tenants, lessees, boarders, lodgers,
and others, however denominated.” (Civ. Code, § 1940, subd. (a).) Furthermore, given
that liability under Section 1942.4 is tied to a landlord’s failure to remedy
habitability violations (§ 1942.4, subd. (a)(1)), applying it here is
consistent with Schuster’s responsibility under the lease with Shayne to “professionally
maintain the Premises, including “heating, air
conditioning, electrical, plumbing, and water systems…” (UMF 29; Ricketts
Decl., Ex. 1, p. 2 [41].)
Accordingly, the Court concludes that a triable issue
exists as to whether Schuster was Plaintiffs’ “landlord” under Section 1942.4.
Defendants next argue that Schuster cannot be held liable
because Plaintiffs did not reside at the property when written notice of the
housing violations were issued, or beyond the 35 days allowed for abatement or
repair following notice.
Two of the
four necessary conditions for liability under Section 1942.4 are: “(2) A public officer or employee who is responsible for the
enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the
landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate
the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions”; and “(3) The conditions have existed and have not been abated 35
days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in paragraph (2) and
the delay is without good cause.” (Civ. Code § 1942.4, subd. (a).)
Contrary to Defendants’ argument, there is no indication
that these conditions require a written notice or inspection to take place
during a plaintiff’s tenancy. Section 1942.4 requires only that the conditions exist “prior to the landlord’s demand
or notice.” (Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (a).) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs
that Schuster may be held liable under Section 1942.4 based on the continual
failure to abate housing violations noticed prior to the Plaintiffs’ tenancies.
(See, e.g., Ricketts Decl., Ex. 35.) Defendants’ evidence that no inspections
were conducted during Plaintiffs’ tenancies is insufficient to meet their
initial burden to negate an element of this claim. Summary adjudication is
therefore denied as to Schuster.