Judge Barbara M. Scheper, Case 20STCV29795 2023-04-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 20STCV29795, Date: 2023-04-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV29795 Hearing Date: April 13, 2023 Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. vs. Kocharyan, et. al., Case No. 20STCV29795

Tentative Ruling re: Cross-defendant’s Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint

Cross-Defendant Marat Nazaret (Nazaret) demurs to the Third Amended Cross-Complaint of Tigran Kocharyan, Gevork Dashtoyan, Narek Hakobyan, Ira Ohanjanyan, and Asatur Kocharyan (collectively, Cross-Complainants). The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.) It is well settled that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Guclimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (internal quotes omitted).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)

When ruling on a demurrer, the Court may only consider the complaint’s allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) The Court may not consider any other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations plead or the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the complaint, liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)

Cross-Complainants’ claims in the TACC concern an insurance dispute arising from an automobile accident that took place on August 7, 2019. (TACC ¶ 10.) The accident involved Cross-Complainants Gevork Dashtoyan (as driver) and Narek Hakobyan, in one vehicle, and Diana Gevorgyan, in the other vehicle. (TACC ¶ 10.) The vehicle that Gevorgyan was driving was insured by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) and owned by Nazaret, who had rented the vehicle to Gevorgyan through Turo, an online car sharing service. (TACC ¶ 12.) The vehicle driven by Dashtoyan was owned by Asatur Kocharyan and insured by State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm). (TACC ¶ 9.) Gevorgyan was allegedly the sole cause of the accident through her negligence. (TACC ¶ 14.)

Cross-Complainants filed claims with State Farm and Liberty Mutual for property damages and personal injury resulting from the accident. (TACC ¶ 16.) After investigation, Liberty Mutual advised Cross-Complainants that it would accept coverage and liability for the accident. (TACC ¶ 23.) On March 18, 2020, Liberty Mutual reneged on its acceptance of liability and instead assigned the matter for investigation, purportedly on the basis that there was evidence of a “roll over” collision. (TACC ¶¶ 27-28.) On August 6, 2020, State Farm filed the current action for declaratory relief against Cross-Complainants, seeking to deny coverage for the August 7, 2019 accident. (TACC ¶ 31.)

Cross-Complainants assert claims against Nazaret for general negligence, motor vehicle negligence, and negligent entrustment. The sole factual allegation regarding Nazaret is his loan of the vehicle to Gevorgyan through Turo. (TACC ¶ 12.)

As with Turo’s demurrer to the First Amended Cross-Complaint (FACC), the Court agrees with Nazaret that Cross-Complainants’ claims against him for bodily injury are time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations for actions for injury due to negligence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1.) But regardless of the time bar, the claims against Nazaret fail due to Insurance Code § 11580.24, subd. (d). That section provides as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any provision in a private passenger motor vehicle owner’s automobile insurance policy, in the event of a loss or injury that occurs during any time period when the vehicle is under the operation and control of a person, other than the vehicle owner, pursuant to a personal vehicle sharing program, or otherwise under the control of a personal vehicle sharing program, the personal vehicle sharing program shall assume all liability of the owner and shall be considered the owner of the vehicle for all purposes. Nothing in this section limits the liability of the personal vehicle sharing program for its acts or omissions that result in injury to any persons as a result of the use or operation of a personal vehicle sharing program.

Nazaret allegedly rented his vehicle to Gevorgyan through Turo, an online car sharing service. (FACC ¶ 12.) Consequently, for any injuries resulting from Gevorgyan’s operation and control of the vehicle, Turo “shall assume all liability of the owner and shall be considered the owner of the vehicle for all purposes.” (Ins. Code § 11580.24, subd. (d).) Conversely, Nazaret cannot legally be considered the owner of the loaned vehicle and cannot be held liable for any resulting damages. Cross-Complainants’ claims against Nazaret for General Negligence, Negligence (Motor Vehicle), and Negligent Entrustment therefore fail.