Judge Barbara M. Scheper, Case 20STCV31478 2023-04-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 20STCV31478, Date: 2023-04-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV31478 Hearing Date: April 10, 2023 Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Progress Place vs. Cepeida, et. al., Case No. 20STCV31478

Tentative Ruling re: Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiffs Jose Rivera, Rose Rivera, Angelica Rivera, and Elizabeth Rivera (collectively, Plaintiffs) move for an award of attorney’s fees against Defendant Eva Cepeida (Defendant). The motion is denied.

“Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1032, subd. (b).) “Prevailing party” includes the party with a net monetary recovery. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) “[A]s a general rule, attorney fees are not recoverable as costs unless they are authorized by statute or agreement.” (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. Speedee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 424, 429.) “

On December 7, 2022, the Court issued its ruling entering Judgment for Plaintiffs and awarding damages in the amount of $38,300. Plaintiffs had brought claims against Defendant for private and public nuisance. The Court found that Plaintiffs established their private nuisance claim, but did not submit sufficient evidence to support their public nuisance claim.

Plaintiffs seek to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to the “private attorney general” doctrine codified under Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5. That section allows a prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees “in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5.)

“The ‘significant benefit’ and ‘important right’ requirements of section 1021.5 are separate elements.” (California Common Cause v. Duffy (1987) 200 Cal.App.3d 730, 749.) In assessing a motion for attorney’s fees under this section, the court should “determine the significance of the benefit, as well as the size of the class receiving benefit, from a realistic assessment, in light of all the pertinent circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a particular case.” (Ibid.)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs may not recover attorney’s fees under Section 1021.5. Plaintiffs argue that they may recover under a “catalyst theory,” as their suit was the impetus for Defendant’s eviction of the tenant from the Property. (See Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 260.) But regardless of any catalyzing effects Plaintiffs’ suit resulted in, Plaintiffs would not be entitled to fees under Section 1021.5, because their action has not “resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest.”

“The ‘important right’ requirement directs the judiciary to exercise judgment in attempting to ascertain the ‘strength’ or ‘societal importance’ of the right involved.’ [Citations.] [T]he public right must be important and cannot involve ‘trivial or peripheral public policies.’ ” (California Common Cause, 200 Cal.App.3d at 745.)

“Those cases upholding or allowing an award under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 consistently emphasize that the benefits provided by the protagonist's action must inure primarily to the public and be substantial in a doctrinal if not a material sense. [Citation.] The statute itself, however, provides no concrete standard by which a court may determine whether the right sought to be vindicated is sufficiently important to justify an award of fees. At bottom, the inquiry is an intensely pragmatic one requiring a realistic assessment of the gains which have resulted in any particular action.” (Bouvia v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1075, 1083.)

Here, Plaintiffs cite the eviction of the disruptive tenant from the Property as the benefit produced by their action, but fail to identify any “important right” implicated by this result. While the action may have vindicated Plaintiffs’ rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their property, it did not enforce or effectuate any “important legal principles that potentially impact a large segment of society.” (Bouvia, 195 Cal.App.3d at 1085; see Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 167 [finding no “significant benefit” conferred to a “large class of persons,” where “[t]he decision vindicated only the rights of the owners of a single parcel of property.”].) Plaintiffs have also provided no evidence that a “large class of persons” benefitted from the tenant’s removal. Plaintiffs failed to establish their public nuisance claim at trial, and, in any case, it appears unlikely that Plaintiffs and their neighbors would be sufficiently numerous to satisfy this element. Accordingly, the motion is denied.