Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 20STCV49201, Date: 2022-08-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV49201    Hearing Date: August 29, 2022    Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Townsend vs. Cordova, et. al., Case No. 20STCV49201

Tentative Ruling re:  Defendant’s Motion to Determine Prevailing Party and for Attorney’s Fees

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Angel Cordova (Defendant) moves for an order finding Defendant to be the prevailing party and awarding reasonable attorney’s fees against Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Shamika Townsend (Plaintiff). The motion is granted.

“[A]s a general rule, attorney fees are not recoverable as costs unless they are authorized by statute or agreement.” (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. Speedee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 424, 429.) 

The attorney bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.) 

A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

            In determining whether the requested attorney’s fees are “reasonable,” the Court’s “first step involves the lodestar figure—a calculation based on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the lawyer’s hourly rate. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of facts specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774 [internal citations omitted].) In determining whether to adjust the lodestar figure, the Court may consider the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (EnPalm LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

Prevailing Party

The parties first dispute whether Defendant is a “prevailing party” entitled to recovery of attorney’s fees.

“Prevailing party” includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the “prevailing party” shall be as determined by the court (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).)

“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)

“The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section, whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(1).) “Under Civil Code section 1717, the prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees even when it wins on the grounds that the contract is inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or nonexistent, so long as the party pursuing the lawsuit would have been entitled to attorney's fees had it prevailed.” (Rainier National Bank v. Bodily (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 83, 86.)

“[I]n deciding whether there is a ‘party prevailing on the contract,’ the trial court is to compare the relief awarded on the contract claim or claims with the parties' demands on those same claims and their litigation objectives as disclosed by the pleadings, trial briefs, opening statements, and similar sources. The prevailing party determination is to be made only upon final resolution of the contract claims and only by ‘a comparison of the extent to which each party ha[s] succeeded and failed to succeed in its contentions.’” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 876.)

Here, Plaintiff asserted claims against Defendant for Specific Performance and Breach of Contract, arising out of an alleged purchase agreement between the parties for the sale of Defendant’s real property to Plaintiff. Prior to closing, an issue arose regarding which party would bear responsibility for certain outstanding liens on the property, and the sale was not executed. The purchase agreement provided for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party “[i]n any action, proceeding, or arbitration between Buyer and Seller arising out of this Agreement.” (Comp., Ex. 1, p. 9.)

In the Complaint, Plaintiff' sought to compel Defendant’s specific performance of the sale at the agreed-upon price. (Comp., Prayer 1.) Plaintiff requested, in the alternative, damages in the amount of $100,000 based on Defendant’s alleged breach of the purchase agreement. (Comp., Prayer 2.) Defendant filed a Cross-Complainant against Plaintiff for Declaratory Relief, requesting that the Court determine which party would be responsible for the two assessments on the property. (Cross-Complaint, Prayer 2.)

On July 19, 2022, following non-jury trial, the Court found that no agreement was formed between the parties based on mutual mistake. The Court denied Plaintiff’s request for specific performance and ordered judgment for Defendant.  The Court also ordered that any deposits made by Plaintiff be returned.

            The Court finds that Defendant is the prevailing party on the contract. Plaintiff did not obtain the requested specific performance and did not establish Defendant’s breach of the contract. The return of Plaintiff’s $5,000 deposit is not dispositive, in light of the overall “comparison of the extent to which each party ha[s] succeeded and failed to succeed in its contentions.” (Hsu, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 876.) Though Defendant did not obtain relief on his Cross-Complaint, “a defendant who defeats the plaintiff's claim on a complaint, but who recovers nothing on his [or her] cross-complaint against the plaintiff, is nevertheless a prevailing party entitled to costs.” (Zintel Holdings, LLC v. McLean (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 431, 438.)

Defendant prevailed on the grounds that the contract was not formed, and Plaintiff would have been entitled to attorney’s fees had Plaintiff prevailed; therefore, Defendant is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717. (Rainier National Bank, 232 Cal.App.3d at 86.)

Requested Attorney’s Fees

Defense counsel requests billing rates of $495 and $285 per hour, and $95 per hour for a law clerk. (Prince Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. 1.) Defense counsel has billed 29.21 hours, for total fees in the amount of $13,236.50. (Prince Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff argues that the requested fees are inflated, but has not met her burden to challenge the unreasonableness of any specific item: “General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical, 230 Cal.App.4th at 488.)

            The Court finds that the requested rates and hours billed are reasonable, and awards attorney’s fees in favor of Defendant in the amount of $13,236.50.