Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 21STCV04076, Date: 2023-02-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV04076    Hearing Date: February 17, 2023    Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Yohanan vs. General Motors, LLC, et. al., Case No. 21STCV04076

Tentative Ruling re:  Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff Jessica Yohanan (Plaintiff) moves for an award of attorney’s fees and costs against Defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant). The Court awards Plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of $39,309.50 and costs in the amount of $1,788.59, for a total of $41,098.09.

“[A]s a general rule, attorney fees are not recoverable as costs unless they are authorized by statute or agreement.” (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. Speedee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 424, 429.) 

In a lemon law action, costs, and expenses, including attorney fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. (See Civ. Code, §§ 1790, et seq.) Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d) provides,

If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.

The attorney bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.) 

A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

            In determining whether the requested attorney’s fees are “reasonable,” the Court’s “first step involves the lodestar figure—a calculation based on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the lawyer’s hourly rate. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of facts specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774 [internal citations omitted].) In determining whether to adjust the lodestar figure, the Court may consider the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (EnPalm LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

“‘The reasonable market value of the attorney's services is the measure of a reasonable hourly rate. [Citations.] This standard applies regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge nothing for their services, charge at below-market or discounted rates, represent the client on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel. [Citations.]’” (Center For Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 619.)

            Plaintiff moves for an award of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, as the prevailing party pursuant to the parties’ settlement. Plaintiff requests an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $43,822, plus costs totaling $1,788.59, for a total of $45,610.59 total.

            Plaintiff counsel’s requested rates and hours are broken down as follows:

Reasonableness of Hours and Rates

Requested rates are reasonable if they are “within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (Children’s Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.) In calculating the lodestar rate, “the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [Citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [Citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases. [Citation.]” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437.)

Defendant does not challenge the rates requested by Plaintiff’s counsel, and the Court finds that those rates are reasonable.

Regarding the hours requested, Defendant first challenges 3 hours billed, totaling $1,575 in fees, for pre-litigation activity that Defendant argues are not compensable. The entries are labeled, “telephonic conference with potential client to discuss case,” and “Draft Representation Agreement.” (Barry Decl., Ex. 8, p. 1.)  The Court sees  no reason why this work is not compensable.

Defendant next contests 2.5 hours (for fees totaling $1,312.50), that were billed in connection with Defendant’s demurrer, which was exclusively to Plaintiff’s fraud cause of action. (Barry Decl., Ex. 8, pp. 2-3, 8-9.) The Court agrees that Plaintiff may not recover for this work and so strikes those hours.

Defendant also challenges a number of billing entries that it argues are inflated.in light of Plaintiff counsel’s use of templated motions and discovery. For example, in March and April 2021, counsel billed 3.8 hours to read Defendant’s discovery requests, then 5.7 hours to draft Plaintiff’s responses to discovery requests, though those responses consisted entirely of identical, boilerplate objections. (Barry Decl., Ex. 8, p. 4; Major Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. G.) Counsel also billed 4.4 hours to draft Plaintiff’s discovery requests to Defendant, though those similarly consisted only of templated requests. (Barry Decl., Ex. 8, p. 5; Major Decl., Ex. A.) The Court agrees with Defendant that some of these entries are somewhat excessive. To account for this, the Court applies a reduction of $3,200 to the requested fees.

            Finally, Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s requested fees connected to the current motion. Plaintiff seeks fees in the amount of $7,125, for 15.9 total hours incurred on this motion. (Barry Decl., Ex. 8 [181].) The Court finds that this is reasonable.

            The fees requested by Plaintiff are reduced by a total of $4,512.50, for an award of $39,309.50.

Costs

            Plaintiff requests costs in the amount of $1,788.59. (Barry Decl., Ex. 10.) Defendant challenges $550 in fees anticipated to retain a court reporter for the hearing on this motion, as well as costs for milage and parking fees in the amount of $54.54.

Court reporter fees as provided by statute are expressly allowable as costs. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5, subd. (a)(11) However, Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5, subd. (a) does not expressly provide for recovery of costs for trial-related travel.“ Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).) The Court finds these costs reimbursable and reasonably necessary to the litigation, and so declines to strike them from Plaintiff’s memorandum of costs. Accordingly, costs are awarded in the amount of $1,788.59.