Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 21STCV11968, Date: 2024-01-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV11968    Hearing Date: January 12, 2024    Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No. 

Martinez Soto vs. General Motors LLC, et. al., Case No. 21STCV11968

Tentative Ruling re:  Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff Galileo Martinez Soto (Plaintiff) moves for an award of attorney’s fees and costs against Defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant). The Court awards Plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of $46,600 and costs in the amount of $1,836.16.

“[A]s a general rule, attorney fees are not recoverable as costs unless they are authorized by statute or agreement.” (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. Speedee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 424, 429.) 

In a lemon law action, costs, and expenses, including attorney fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. (See Civ. Code, §§ 1790, et seq.) Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d) provides,

If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.

The attorney bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.) 

A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

            In determining whether the requested attorney’s fees are “reasonable,” the Court’s “first step involves the lodestar figure—a calculation based on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the lawyer’s hourly rate. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of facts specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774 [internal citations omitted].) In determining whether to adjust the lodestar figure, the Court may consider the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (EnPalm LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

“‘The reasonable market value of the attorney's services is the measure of a reasonable hourly rate. [Citations.] This standard applies regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge nothing for their services, charge at below-market or discounted rates, represent the client on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel. [Citations.]’” (Center For Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 619.)

            Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing party under the parties’ settlement. (Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 53.) Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees in the amount of $61,871.50, costs of $1,836.16, and an additional $7,800 for fees incurred in connection with the current motion. (Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 86.) The requested rates and hours are broken down as follows:

(Gonzalez Decl., Ex. 27 [216].)

Fee rates are recoverable if they are “within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (Children’s Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.) In calculating the lodestar rate, “the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [Citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [Citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases. [Citation.]” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437.)

Defendant first challenges the fees requested for time billed by counsel’s paralegals (Elaine Astorga, Daisey Hernandez, Clarence Serrano). Fees for paralegal time are recoverable as attorney’s fees, and “[t]he amount of the award is to be made on the basis of the reasonable market value of the services rendered.” (Sundance v. Municipal Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 268, 274.) The Court finds the requested hours and rates for counsel’s paralegals reasonable.

Defendant also challenges several Plaintiff’s billing entries as excessive and unreasonable. For instance, Defendant argues that 22.9 hours billed by counsel to prepare discovery requests, discovery responses, and meet and confer letters are excessive because counsel uses templated discovery. (Gonzalez Decl., Ex. 27, pp. 2-5 [194].) Similarly, Defendant argues that 9.1 hours billed to prepare Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses, and 10.8 hours billed for Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel PMQ Deposition are excessive because those motions were also largely derived from templates. (Id. pp. 8, 19.) Defendant also contests 10.3 hours billed by counsel to draft supplemental discovery requests, and 11.7 hours billed to review and respond to Defendant’s opposition to Plaintiff’s discovery motion. (Id. pp. 17, 19 [209].)

“Reasonable compensation does not include compensation for ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts....’ [Citations.] ‘A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case or submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections.’ ” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38.)

The Court agrees with Defendant that the billing entries show some padding. Accordingly, the Court reduces the lodestar fee award to $43,000. Defendant does not challenge Plaintiff’s requested costs of $1,836.16, and so those costs are granted.

            Plaintiff has also requested fees of $7,800 for time incurred in connection with the current motion, at an hourly rate of $400, for 5 hours to draft the motion; 8.5 hours anticipated to review the opposition, draft a reply, and attend the hearing; and 6.5 hours purportedly anticipated to oppose Defendant’s Motion to Tax Costs. (Gonzalez Decl. ¶¶ 83-84, 86 [14].) However, Defendant has not filed a Motion to Tax Costs, and the Court finds the remaining anticipated hours excessive. The Court reduces the fees requested for this motion to $3,600.