Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 21STCV15197, Date: 2023-03-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV15197    Hearing Date: March 2, 2023    Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Attar, et. al. vs. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., et. al., Case No. 21STCV15197

Tentative Ruling re:  Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (Defendant) moves for summary judgment on the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) of Plaintiffs Michael Attar and Marni Attar (collectively, Plaintiffs). The motion is granted.

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party can show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and if not to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Atlantic Richfield).) Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c, subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc, § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the moving party has met that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

            The Court’s “role on summary judgment is simply to decide whether the parties possess evidence requiring the fact-weighing procedures of a trial. (Soto v. County of Riverside (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 492, 496.) “The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the issues, but merely to determine whether there are issues to be tried.” (Orser v. George (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 660, 668.)

Plaintiffs’ SAC asserts one cause of action against Defendant under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  The Court previously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs’ claims under the Song-Beverly Act on the basis that the statute does not apply to Plaintiff’s purchase of a used vehicle with balance remaining on the manufacturer’s express warranty. (See Rodriguez v. FCA US (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 509, 219-25.) Defendant now argues that summary judgment should also be granted as to Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of warranty under Magnuson-Moss, because (1) the failure of Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims precludes Plaintiff’s Magnuson-Moss claim; (2) Defendant provided only a limited warranty on the vehicle, and (3) Plaintiff failed to comply with the Magnuson-Moss Act’s informal dispute resolution exhaustion requirement.

            Under the Magnuson-Moss Act, “a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief . . . in any court of competent jurisdiction in any State or the District of Columbia. (15 U.S.C § 2310(d).) Magnuson-Moss “authorizes a civil suit by a consumer to enforce the terms of an implied or express warranty,” and “ ‘calls for the application of state written and implied warranty law, not the creation of additional federal law,’ except in specific instances in which it expressly prescribes a regulating rule.” (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 833.) Consequently, “failure to state a warranty claim under state law necessarily constitute[s] a failure to state a claim under Magnuson–Moss.” (Ibid.)

Courts have consistently concluded that, “[a]lthough Magnuson–Moss ‘provides a federal cause of action for state warranty claims’ [Citation], it does not expand the rights under those claims, and dismissal of the state law claims requires the same disposition with respect to an associated [Magnuson–Moss] claim.” (Gimenez v. Ford Motor Company (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 21, 2017) 2017 WL 4173321, at *6; see, e.g., Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) [“disposition of the state law warranty claims determines the disposition of the Magnuson–Moss Act claims.”]; Gertz v. Toyota Motor Corporation (C.D. Cal., Apr. 28, 2011) 2011 WL 13142144, at *13.) Given this, the Court agrees with Defendant that the failure of Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly causes of action is fatal to the Magnuson-Moss claim.

The cases cited by Plaintiffs do not compel a different conclusion. Those cases indicate that a plaintiff may maintain a Magnuson-Moss claim without concurrently asserting a state law breach of warranty claim. (Carrillo v. BMW of North America, LLC (C.D. Cal., Mar. 25, 2020) 2020 WL 12028895, at *5.) However, they confirm that a plaintiff must still be entitled to remedies under Song-Beverly or another state law to bring a Magnuson-Moss claim.  (Carrillo at *5 [“Defendant may eventually prevail against Plaintiff on his MMWA claim based on state law defenses…”]; Brilliant v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc. (N.D. Cal., July 7, 2010, No. C 09-04568 SI) 2010 WL 2721531, at *3 [“the Romo case lends support to the conclusion that Song–Beverly remedies are available in this case.”]; Richan v. Fleetwood Motor Homes (C.D. Cal., Oct. 26, 2010, No. CV08-6790-SVW (VBKX)) 2010 WL 11507998, at *4 [“it is clear that the Court should look to available remedies under Song-Beverly for limited express warranties because Magnuson-Moss is silent”].)

Arana v. Tesla Motors, Inc. (C.D. Cal., Feb. 7, 2023) 2023 WL 1796956, involved identical factual circumstances to those present here: the plaintiff purchased the vehicle used with balance remaining on the express warranty and brought claims under Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss for violations of the warranty. (Id. at *1.) The district court, citing Rodriguez, 77 Cal.App.5th 509, first dismissed Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claim on the basis that the statute does not apply to used vehicles. (Id. at *2.) The defendant then argued that “because Plaintiff's SBA claim fails, his MMWA claim must also be dismissed,” while the plaintiff argued “that the MMWA ‘does not require the consumer to have been the original purchaser of the vehicle, so long as the original warranty is still in effect.’ ” (Id. at *2.) The court agreed with the defendant, finding that the plaintiff’s Magnuson-Moss claim failed because he could not assert a claim under any provision of California warranty law; thus, “[b]ecause Plaintiff's sole state-law claim fails, and because his MMWA claim is predicated solely on that claim, the MMWA claim must fail as well.” (Id. at *3.)

            In this case, Plaintiffs are not entitled to remedies under Song-Beverly, and Plaintiffs have not shown that they are entitled to remedies under any other provision of state warranty law. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted.