Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 21STCV32125, Date: 2024-11-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV32125 Hearing Date: November 7, 2024 Dept: 30
Calendar No.
Hidden Ridge Lot 9 LLC vs. Kennco
Plumbing Inc., et. al., Case No. 21STCV32125
Tentative Ruling re: Cross-Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Cross-Defendant
Uponor, Inc. (Uponor) moves for summary judgment against Cross-Complainant
Kennco Plumbing Inc. (Kennco). Uponor argues that Kennco previously released
Uponor from the claims in its first amended cross complaint (FACC). Kennco
contends that its claims are for newly discovered injuries occurring after the
releases. The Court denies summary judgment.
The function of a motion for summary judgment or
adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party can
show evidentiary support for a claim or defense and if not to enable an order
of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code
of Civil Procedure Section 437c, subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to
grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences
reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences
or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
As to each claim as framed by the complaint, a
moving defendant “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action
has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of
action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is
a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(p)(2).) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party
opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor
of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) Once
the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing plaintiff “to
show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause
of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To
establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must
produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Uponor argues that releases signed by Kennco in 2017 and
2019 bar its present claims. A general release does not extend to claims that
the releasing party does not know or suspect to exist at the time of executing
the release that that would have materially affected his or her settlement.
(Civ. Code, § 1542.) When interpreting a contract with uncertain wording, its
language should be interpreted against the drafting party. (Id., §
1654.)
Uponor paid Kennco $8,941.70 in connection with a leak that
occurred on December 27, 2016. (Beissel ¶ 6.) In exchange, Kennco executed a
general release. (Id. Ex. A.) Uponor recommended that Kennco replace all
Uponor PEX hot water lines. (Id. ¶ 8.) Another leak occurred on March
27, 2018. (Id. ¶ 9.) Uponor paid $10,695.45 to fix that issue as well. Kennco
signed an agreement containing another release on February 13, 2019. (Id.
¶ 14, Ex. C.)
The 2017 release acted as the “full and final settlement and
satisfaction of all claims [Kennco] have or may have against [Uponor] relative
to plumbing system failures which occurred on Kennco’s property.” (Ex. A.) It
constituted “sole consideration for the full release and discharge of all
actions, claims and demands whatsoever, that may now or hereafter exist or
accrue against [Uponor] as a direct or indirect result of the . . . event which
occurred on or about December 27, 2016. (Ibid.) Additionally, Kennco
acknowledged and dismissed “all risk, chance, or hazard that said damage may
become greater or more extensive than is now known or expected.” (Ibid.)
The 2019 release similarly acted as the “full and final
settlement and satisfaction of all claims Releasors have or may have against
Releasee relative to plumbing system failures which occurred on Releasors’
property.” (Ex. C.) It constituted sole consideration for the “full release and
discharge of all actions, claims and demands whatsoever, that may now or
hereafter exist or accrue against [Uponor] as a direct or indirect result of
the . . . event which occurred on or about March 27, 2018.” (Ibid.)
Both releases are general releases, as they are labeled as such.
(Beissel Decl. Ex. A., Ex. C.) But both releases addressed damage arising out
of a specific event. The Court must determine whether Kennco’s causes of action
for implied indemnity and declaratory relief are a direct or indirect result of
the events which occurred on or about December 27, 2016, and March 27, 2018, in
accordance with those releases. They are not. The present leaks began on May 6,
2020, and are thus not covered by the general releases relating specifically to
the 2016 and 2018 leaks. (Id. ¶ 18.) Such an interpretation is
reinforced by the existence of the 2018 release: it would not have been
required if the 2016 release extended to future leaks. And the two releases
share identical language.
Under Civil Code section 1542, the general releases do not
extend to Kennco’s current claims. When signing each release, Kennco did not
know about the other issues with the pipes that would cause future problems.
(Kennedy Decl. ¶¶ 8, 12.) Uponor’s recommendation that Kennco replace all
piping in the property does not constitute such required knowledge. (Beissel
Decl. ¶ 8.) Kennco would not have signed either release if it knew the present
leaks would occur. (Kennedy Decl. ¶ 17.) Thus, the general releases do not
release Uponor from Kennco’s present claims.
The Court finds that Uponor has not met its burden of demonstrating
a complete defense to both causes of action. Accordingly, Uponor’s motion for
summary judgment is denied.