Judge Barbara M. Scheper, Case 21STCV33592 2022-07-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 21STCV33592, Date: 2022-07-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV33592 Hearing Date: July 26, 2022 Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

I-Chung International Inc. vs. Green Aid Group, Inc., et. al., Case No. 21STCV33592

Tentative Ruling re: Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Defendant Green Aid Recovery Group, Inc. (Defendant) moves for an award of attorney’s fees against Plaintiff I-Chung International, Inc. (Plaintiff).

“Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1032, subd. (b).) “Prevailing party” includes “a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) “[A]s a general rule, attorney fees are not recoverable as costs unless they are authorized by statute or agreement.” (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. Speedee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 424, 429.) “

The attorney bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.) Requested rates are reasonable if they are “within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (Children’s Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.)

A party’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

On June 1, 2022, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend, and granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Because the Court entered dismissal in favor of Defendant, it is the prevailing party and is entitled to recover costs. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1032.)

Defendant seeks recovery of attorney’s fees pursuant to the lease agreement between the parties (the Lease). Plaintiff is the Landlord under the Lease, and Defendant is the Tenant. (Motion Ex. A [43].) Under Section 27, “[i]n the event that Landlord should bring suit for the possession of the Premises, for the recovery of any sum due under the Lease, or because of the breach of any provision of this Lease, or for any other relief against Tenant hereunder, then all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred by the prevailing party therein shall be paid by the other party. . .” (Motion Ex. A [36].) This section entitles Defendant to recover attorney’s fees as the prevailing party in this unlawful detainer action brought by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant should not recover attorney’s fees under the contract because Defendant is litigating the validity of the Lease in a pending action, LASC Case No. 21STCV09998. However, the evidence presented by Plaintiff from that action does not show that Defendant is seeking to declare the Lease invalid; Defendant merely stated in a discovery response that “[t]here are numerous ambiguous paragraphs and clauses and incongruities and undefined terms” in the Lease, and that those ambiguities should be construed against the drafter pursuant to Civ. Code § 1654. (Hu Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to the Lease.

Defendant requests fees in the amount of $57,277.45 for 90.5 hours billed, at a rate of $632.99 (Neer Decl. ¶ 14.) Counsel for Defendant calculated the requested fee rate from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) Laffey Matrix, adjusted upwards 1.93% by the locality pay differential for attorneys in Los Angeles. (Neer Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. E.) Plaintiff argues that the requested fee is unreasonable because defense counsel’s actual billing rate is $450 per hour.

The circumstances here are like those in in Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, in which the plaintiff argued that the trial court failed to adopt “reasonable” rates for the award of attorney’s fees, where it relied on an adjusted Laffey Matrix to award rates far exceeding the actual rates billed by defense counsel. (Id. at 700.) The Court of Appeal found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the requested higher rate, stating that “[t]here is no requirement that the reasonable market rate mirror the actual rate billed. . .. ‘The reasonable market value of the attorney's services is the measure of a reasonable hourly rate. [Citations.] This standard applies regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge nothing for their services, charge at below-market or discounted rates, represent the client on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel.’” (Id. at 701.)

Accordingly, the proper measure of counsel’s rate is the reasonable market value of defense counsel’s services, not counsel’s actual billing rates. The Court does not find the rate reasonable for attorneys practicing in Los Angeles in an unlawful detainer matter. The Court finds the reasonable rate to be $400.

Plaintiff next contests the hours claimed by Defendant, first arguing that Defendant has failed to properly allocate fees spent on each Defendant. Kandice Rose Perez and Nicole Olivera were also named as defendants in this action. The Court agrees with Defendant that such allocation was unnecessary given that the individual defendants were added based on their status as employees of Defendant.

Plaintiff further argues that Defendant’s hours billed are unreasonable and duplicative given the overlap with the previous unlawful detainer action (21STCV19186) and ongoing breach of contract action (21STCV09998). Defendant has not provided billing invoices or timesheets, but rather details the tasks and hours billed in his declaration. (Neer Decl. ¶¶ 2-10.) The Court finds the number of hours billed excessive and reduces it to 50 hours. Accordingly, the Court awards Defendant fees in the amount of $20,000.