Judge Barbara M. Scheper, Case 21STCV46408 2023-04-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 21STCV46408, Date: 2023-04-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV46408 Hearing Date: April 5, 2023 Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Melendez Loza vs. FCA US LLC, et. al., Case No. 21STCV46408

Tentative Ruling re: Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses

Plaintiff Arturo Melendez Loza (Plaintiff) moves to compel Defendant FCA US LLC’s (Defendant) further responses to the Requests for Production of Documents (Set One), Nos. 19-32, 37-43, and 45-46. The motion is granted as to Request Nos. 45 and 46, and otherwise denied as moot. Defendant is ordered to produce documents in response to Request Nos. 45 and 46 within ten (10) days of today’s date.

A motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) It is not necessary for the motion to show that the material sought will be admissible in evidence. “Good cause” may be found to justify discovery where specific facts show that the discovery is necessary for effective trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial. (See Associated Brewers Dist. Co. v. Superior Court (1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 586-588; see also CCP §§ 2017.010, 2019.030(a)(1) [Information is discoverable if it is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and it is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612.)

“For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it ‘might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement.’ [Citation]. Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. [Citation] These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery.” (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)

A motion to compel further responses must also be accompanied by a separate statement containing the requests and the responses, as well as reasons why a further response is warranted.¿¿(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a).)

Plaintiff propounded the Requests for Production (Set One) on Defendant on January 28, 2022. (Thomas Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant served responses on March 11, 2022. (Thomas Decl. ¶ 8.) Defendant produced further documents on January 25, 2023, following Plaintiff’s agreement to a protective order. (Shepardson Decl. ¶ 9.)

The parties agree that this motion is moot as to Request Nos. 19-24, 30-32, and 37-43. Plaintiff argues that Request Nos. 25-29 and 45-46 remain at issue.

Request Nos. 25 through 29 seek all documents describing Defendant’s policies, procedures, and parameters for determining what constitutes a “repair presentation,” “non-conformity,” “substantial impairment,” “reasonable number of repair attempts,” and the turn-around time to respond to a vehicle repurchase request under the Song-Beverly Act.

In response to the requests regarding Defendant’s policies for assessing “repair presentation” and “reasonable number of repairs,” Defendant responded that it “does not utilize a single definition of what constitutes a reasonable number of repairs,” and noted, “California Civil Code section 1793.2 does not define what constitutes a reasonable number of repair attempts. Whether a vehicle was repaired within a reasonable number of repair attempts will vary depending on myriad factors . . .” For the requests regarding Defendant’s policies for determining “non-conformity” and “substantial impairment,” Defendant responded that it “has not attempted to redraft the definition … as that term is defined in California Civil Code section 1792.22(e)(1).” Defendant also objected to each of these requests as vague, ambiguous, irrelevant, and overly broad.

Though Plaintiff argues that these Requests are still at issue, Defendant states that it has provided Plaintiff all responsive documents within its possession, custody, or control since the parties’ agreement to the protective order. Given this, the motion appears to be moot as to Request Nos. 25 through 29.

Request Nos. 45 seeks all documents evidencing complaints from other owners of vehicles of the same make, model, and year as Plaintiff’s, “regarding any of the complaints that the SUBJECT VEHICLE was presented to YOUR or YOUR authorized repair facilities for repair during the warranty period.” Request No. 46 seeks documents evidencing warranty repairs for vehicles of the same make, model, and year “regarding any of the components that YOU or YOUR authorized repair facilities performed repairs on under warranty.”

Defendant objected to these requests as vague, ambiguous, overly broad, and irrelevant, and argues that Plaintiff has not identified the “complaints” about which information is sought. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the objection is improper. The Request identifies the scope of the complaints sought, i.e., those concerning issues identical to the issues for which Plaintiff’s vehicle was presented for repair during the warranty period. While Defendant suggests that it should not have to speculate what non-conformity Plaintiff experienced, the request makes no reference to a “non-conformity,” only “the complaints that [Plaintiff’s vehicle] was presented . . . for repair.” Defendant’s argument is inapplicable to No. 46, which concerns “warranty repairs,” not complaints.

Accordingly, the motion is granted as to Nos. 45-46, and denied as to the remaining requests as moot.

Because the motion is denied in part, and because Defendant produced further documents largely mooting this motion following Plaintiff’s agreement to the protective order on January 25, 2023, the Court declines to award monetary sanctions.