Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 22STCV04860, Date: 2022-09-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV04860 Hearing Date: September 20, 2022 Dept: 30
Dept. 30
Calendar No.
Wise vs. Los
Angeles Unified School District, et. al., Case No. 22STCV04860
Tentative Ruling
re: Defendant’s Demurrer to Second
Amended Complaint
Defendant
Los Angeles Unified School District (Defendant) demurs to the Second Amended
Complaint (SAC) of Plaintiff Ruth Wise (Plaintiff). The demurrer is overruled.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint against a
demurrer, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts
properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); C & H Foods Co.
v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.) It is well settled
that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the
complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594,
601.) “The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a
general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting
all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable
interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Guclimane Co. v.
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (internal quotes
omitted).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be
construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner
v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)
When ruling on a demurrer, the Court may only consider the
complaint’s allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank,
supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) The Court may not consider any other extrinsic
evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations plead or the difficulty a
plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson
(1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the
complaint, liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute
any cause of action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574,
578.)
The SAC asserts two causes of action against Defendant under FEHA for
(1) Disability Discrimination, and (2) Failure to Prevent Discrimination.
The SAC
alleges that Plaintiff has been employed with Defendant and its schools as a
teacher since November 2006. (SAC ¶ 7.) Beginning in 2015, Plaintiff began work
as a substitute teacher at various elementary schools within Defendant’s
district, and received praise for her job performance. (SAC ¶ 8.) In July 2019,
Plaintiff began work as a middle-school English teacher at Westside Global
Awareness Magnet (WGAM). (SAC ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff
alleges that she suffered from clinical depressive disorder, anxiety, and
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that affected her major life activities.
(SAC ¶ 12.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with those conditions in January 2020, and
was required by her doctor to take a medical leave of absence to recover from
January 23, 2020, through March 13, 2020. (SAC ¶ 13.) Plaintiff returned to
work at WGAM without restrictions on March 16, 2020. (SAC ¶ 15.) Around a month
later, on April 30, Plaintiff received a Below Standard Evaluation in a meeting
with the assistant principal and others. This was Plaintiff’s first negative
evaluation in her career with Defendant. (SAC ¶ 16.) On May 21, 2020, Plaintiff
received a Notice of Non-Reelection from Defendant’s Director of Employee
Relations, stating that Defendant had decided not to reelect Plaintiff for her
position for the succeeding school year. (SAC ¶ 18.) Plaintiff later filed a
successful grievance to change the April 2020 Evaluation from “Below Standard”
to “Meets Standard,” but when Plaintiff then filed another grievance to
overturn the Notice of Non-Reelection, which had been based on the inaccurate
evaluation, Defendant refused to allow a meeting on the basis that Plaintiff
was no longer an employee. (SAC ¶¶ 22-24.)
Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment was done
due to her clinical depressive disorder, anxiety, and PTSD, “in order to avoid
the perceived probability of accommodating any anticipated future additional
medical leave(s) and any other accommodations.” (SAC ¶ 29.) It is alleged that
“Defendant provided a false and pretextual reason for terminating Plaintiff’s
employment in an effort to hide their true illegal reasons for terminating
Plaintiff’s employment.” (SAC ¶ 30.)
First
Cause of Action for Disability Discrimination
To survive demurrer, a plaintiff alleging a
discrimination claim under FEHA “[m]ust plead the prima facie elements of
employment discrimination specified in McDonnell Douglas [411
U.S. 792].” (Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41
Cal.App.4th 189, 203 fn 7.) That is, the complaint must allege “that: (1)
Plaintiff suffers from a disability; (2) Plaintiff is otherwise qualified to do
his job; and (3) Plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action
because of his disability.” (Alejandro v. ST Micro
Electronics, Inc (N.D. Cal. 2015) 129 F.Supp.3d
898, 907.)
“[T]he
touchstone of a qualifying handicap or disability is an actual or perceived
physiological disorder which affects a major body system and limits the
individual's ability to participate in one or more major life activities.” (Bagatti v. Department of Rehabilitation (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 344, 353.) FEHA defines a
mental disability as “[h]aving any mental or psychological disorder or
condition, such as intellectual disability, organic brain syndrome, emotional
or mental illness, or specific learning disabilities, that limits a major life
activity.” (Id. § 12926, subd. (j)(1).) “A mental or psychological
disorder or condition limits a major life activity if it makes the achievement
of the major life activity difficult.” (Id. § 12926, subd. (j)(1)(B).)
“Major life activities” under FEHA are broadly construed and include “physical,
mental, and social activities and working.” (Id. § 12926, subd.
(j)(1)(C).)
Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s
cause of action for disability discrimination under FEHA on the grounds that
Plaintiff was notified of her non-re-election prior to her leave of absence,
and therefore the decision to terminate Plaintiff could not have been because
of Plaintiff’s disabilities.
Defendant requests judicial notice of Plaintiff’s
responses to requests for admissions. “[A] court may take judicial notice of a party's admissions
or concessions, but only in cases where the admission ‘can not reasonably be
controverted,’ such as in answers to interrogatories or requests for admission,
or in affidavits and declarations filed on the party's behalf.” (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 471, 485.) Accordingly, the Court grants the requested notice.
Defendant’s Requests for Admissions
(Set Two) asked Plaintiff to admit the veracity of four emails between
Plaintiff and various administrators. (RJN Ex. 4.) In response to each request,
Plaintiff admitted in part and denied in part. In one of the emails,
Plaintiff wrote that “[o]n November 22, 2019 . . . [interim principal Dr.
Rambo] and Christina Lincoln-Moore met with me and let me now that I would not
be offered a 2nd probationary year at WGAM (in 2020-2021), but they felt I
should teach at the elementary level instead and should seek an immediate
alternative position among those currently open, using my holiday breaks to
search for another position.” (RJN Ex. 4, Ex. C [43].) The other emails
similarly reference a November 22, 2019 meeting in which Plaintiff was informed
by administrators that she would not be re-elected for her position at WGAM for
the following year.
Defendant argues that these emails constitute
incontrovertible admissions that Plaintiff was notified of her non-re-election
before she took her leave of absence. However, Plaintiff denied the Request for
Admission Nos. 4 and 5, which asked Plaintiff to admit that “administrators at
[WGAM] informed Plaintiff [] that she would likely be non-re-elected because
she was not a good match/fit for teaching Middle School.” (RJN Ex. 3, p. 4.) These
denials directly contradict the fact that Defendant seeks to rely upon.
“‘A demurrer is simply not the appropriate
procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.’ [Citation.] The hearing
on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the
guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness
or proper interpretation are disputable. [Citation.] [Citation] ... ‘[J]udicial
notice of matters upon demurrer will be dispositive only in those instances
where there is not or cannot be a factual dispute concerning that which is
sought to be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.]” (Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI
Semiconductor Corp. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 660.)
Because Plaintiff’s responses to Defendant’s Requests for
Admission appear to present a factual dispute as to whether Plaintiff was
informed of her non-re-election by Defendant at the November 22 meeting, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of that fact and so cannot properly sustain
the demurrer on that basis.
Defendant also demurs to the first
cause of action on the basis that Plaintiff has not alleged facts constituting
a prima facie case of disability discrimination. Defendant argues that it was
entitled to terminate Plaintiff on timely notice without cause, and so
Plaintiff cannot plead discriminatory intent by Plaintiff based exclusively on
a theory of temporal proximity.
“‘The Education Code establishes four possible
classifications for certificated employees: permanent, probationary, substitute
and temporary.’ [Citation.] The code authorizes the governing boards of school
districts to hire, classify, promote and dismiss certificated employees (i.e.,
teachers) (see § 44831), but establishes a complex and somewhat rigid scheme to
govern a board's exercise of its decisionmaking power.” (California Teachers Assn. v. Vallejo City
Unified School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 135, 144.) “Probationary
employees may not be dismissed during the school year except for cause or
unsatisfactory performance (§ 44948.3), but, on timely notice, ‘may be
nonreelected without any showing of cause, without any statement of reasons,
and without any right of appeal or administrative redress.’” (Id. at
144.) Plaintiff admitted in responses to Requests for Admission that she was a
probationary teacher as defined under the Education Code. (RJN Ex. 3.)
Defendant’s
argument here fails for the same reason as its prior one. Plaintiff does not
allege in the SAC that she was timely notified of non-re-election by Defendant.
While Defendant seeks to establish that fact as uncontroverted based on
Plaintiff’s responses to the Requests for Admissions, Plaintiff expressly
denied the fact in Request Nos. 4 and 5 and so the Court cannot take judicial
notice of Plaintiff’s timely notification.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s second cause of action for
failure to prevent discrimination fails as derivative of the first cause of
action. (Trujillo v. North County
Transit District, 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 288–289 [“[T]here's no logic that
says an employee who has not been discriminated against can sue an employer for
not preventing discrimination that didn't happen, for not having a policy to
prevent discrimination when no discrimination occurred”].) As
the demurrer is overruled as to the first cause of action, the demurrer is also
overruled as to the second cause of action.